Download or read book Auctioneer s Behavior at a Single Object English Auction with Heterogeneous Non cooperative Bidders written by Daniel A. Graham and published by . This book was released on 1987 with total page 36 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Collusive Bidder Behavior at a Single Object English Auction written by Daniel A. Graham and published by . This book was released on 1985 with total page 78 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Cartels Competition and Public Procurement written by Stefan Weishaar and published by Edward Elgar Publishing. This book was released on 2013-01-01 with total page 343 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: ÔThis volume is long overdue. Integrated legal and economic analysis of competition law is crucial given the nature of the sector. However to carry this off successfully, one either needs intensive editorial work to bring different teams together; or one has to rely on the few who master both economic and legal analysis to a tee. Stefan WeishaarÕs analysis not only looks at a stubborn issue in competition law. He does so in three jurisdictions, in detailed yet clear fashion, with clear insight and ditto conclusions. Over and above its relevance to academic analysis, this book can go straight into competition authoritiesÕ decision making, and therefore also in compliance and remediation advice.Õ Ð Geert Van Calster, University of Leuven, Belgium Cartels, Competition and Public Procurement uses a law and economics approach to analyse whether competition and public procurement laws in Europe and Asia deal effectively with bid rigging conspiracies. Stefan Weishaar explores the ways in which economic theory can be used to mitigate the adverse effects of bid rigging cartels. The study sheds light on one of the vital issues for achieving cost-effective public procurement Ð which is itself a critical question in the context of the global financial crisis. The book comprehensively examines whether different laws deal effectively with bid rigging and the ways in which economic theory can be used to mitigate the adverse effects of such cartels. The employed industrial economics and auction theory highlights shortcomings of the law in all three jurisdictions Ð the European Union, China and Japan Ð and seeks to raise the awareness of policymakers as to when extra precautionary measures against bid rigging conspiracies should be taken. Students and researchers who have a keen interest in the relationship between law and economics, competition law and public procurement law will find this topical book invaluable. Practitioners can see how economic theory can be used to identify situations that lend themselves to bid rigging and policymakers will be informed about the shortcomings of existing legislation from a legal and economics perspective and will be inspired by approaches taken in different jurisdictions.

Download or read book Auctions of Identical Objects with Single unit Demands written by Flavio M. Menezes and published by . This book was released on 1999 with total page 42 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Auction Theory written by Vijay Krishna and published by Academic Press. This book was released on 2009-09-28 with total page 337 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Auction Theory, Second Edition improves upon his 2002 bestseller with a new chapter on package and position auctions as well as end-of-chapter questions and chapter notes. Complete proofs and new material about collusion complement Krishna’s ability to reveal the basic facts of each theory in a style that is clear, concise, and easy to follow. With the addition of a solutions manual and other teaching aids, the 2e continues to serve as the doorway to relevant theory for most students doing empirical work on auctions. Focuses on key auction types and serves as the doorway to relevant theory for those doing empirical work on auctions New chapter on combinatorial auctions and new analyses of theory-informed applications New chapter-ending exercises and problems of varying difficulties support and reinforce key points

Download or read book Common Value Auctions and the Winner s Curse written by John H. Kagel and published by Princeton University Press. This book was released on 2021-04-13 with total page 419 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: An invaluable account of how auctions work—and how to make them work Few forms of market exchange intrigue economists as do auctions, whose theoretical and practical implications are enormous. John Kagel and Dan Levin, complementing their own distinguished research with papers written with other specialists, provide a new focus on common value auctions and the "winner's curse." In such auctions the value of each item is about the same to all bidders, but different bidders have different information about the underlying value. Virtually all auctions have a common value element; among the burgeoning modern-day examples are those organized by Internet companies such as eBay. Winners end up cursing when they realize that they won because their estimates were overly optimistic, which led them to bid too much and lose money as a result. The authors first unveil a fresh survey of experimental data on the winner's curse. Melding theory with the econometric analysis of field data, they assess the design of government auctions, such as the spectrum rights (air wave) auctions that continue to be conducted around the world. The remaining chapters gauge the impact on sellers' revenue of the type of auction used and of inside information, show how bidders learn to avoid the winner's curse, and present comparisons of sophisticated bidders with college sophomores, the usual guinea pigs used in laboratory experiments. Appendixes refine theoretical arguments and, in some cases, present entirely new data. This book is an invaluable, impeccably up-to-date resource on how auctions work--and how to make them work.

Download or read book Auction Theory written by Pak-Sing Choi and published by Springer Nature. This book was released on 2021-05-24 with total page 304 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This textbook provides a short introduction to auction theory through exercises with detailed answer keys. Focusing on practical examples, this textbook offers over 80 exercises that predict bidders’ equilibrium behaviour in different auction formats, along with the seller’s strategic incentives to organize one auction format over the other. The book emphasizes game-theoretic tools, so students can apply similar tools to other auction formats. Also included are several exercises based on published articles, with the model reduced to its main elements and the question divided into several easy-to-answer parts. Little mathematical background in algebra and calculus is assumed, and most algebraic steps and simplifications are provided, making the text ideal for upper undergraduate and graduate students. The book begins with a discussion of second-price auctions, which can be studied without using calculus, and works through progressively more complicated auction scenarios: first-price auctions, all-pay auctions, third-price auctions, the Revenue Equivalence principle, common-value auctions, multi-unit auctions, and procurement auctions. Exercises in each chapter are ranked according to their difficulty, with a letter (A-C) next to the exercise title, which allows students to pace their studies accordingly. The authors also offer a list of suggested exercises for each chapter, for instructors teaching at varying levels: undergraduate, Masters, Ph.D. Providing a practical, customizable approach to auction theory, this textbook is appropriate for students of economics, finance, and business administration. This book may also be used for related classes such as game theory, market design, economics of information, contract theory, or topics in microeconomics.

Download or read book Rings in Auctions written by Angelo Artale and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2012-12-06 with total page 176 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In auctions, bidders compete with one another in their attempt to 1 purchase the goods that are up for sale • But buyer competition may be reduced or disappear when a ring of colluding bidders is present. The purpose of the participants to a ring is to eliminate buyer competition and to realize a gain over vendors. When all participants are members of the ring, this is done by purchasing the item at the reserve price and splitting the spoils (the difference between the item market value and the reserve price) among the participants. "The term ring apparently derives from the fact that in a settlement sale following the auction, members of the collusive arrangement form a circle or ring to facilitate observation of their trading behavior by the ring leader" (Cassady jr. (1967)). If the coalition members knew other players' values, the problem faced by the ring might be easily solved: the player with the highest value should submit a serious bid and the other members, on the contrary, only phony bids. However, ring participants do not usually know the values of other members. Therefore, ring members have to find out some mechanism which selects the player who has to bid seriously and, eventually, esta blish side payments paid to each of the losers2.

Download or read book Non equivalence of English and Second price Auctions written by Soo Hong Chew and published by . This book was released on 1994 with total page 48 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Understanding Auctions written by Asunción Mochón and published by Springer. This book was released on 2014-09-15 with total page 161 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In recent years, auctions have become an important field and many markets have designed new and sophisticated auction models to assign different types of items. The prime goal of this book is to set an organized classification of the main auction mechanisms in a way that readers can understand the importance of auction design and the advantages and drawbacks of each model. Given the relevance of the subject, there is a great volume of research about this topic. Nevertheless, most of these contributions use complex mathematical language difficult to understand for the average reader. In this book, the authors summarize the main ideas of the auction theory and explain them with simple language and plenty of examples. This book is a good starting point for any researcher interested in embracing the auction design as it also includes numerous real-world examples to engage the reader in the topic. “This book fills an important gap by making the main ideas and findings of auction research accessible.” Professor Paul Milgrom, Department of Economics, Stanford University.

Download or read book Handbook of Game Theory and Industrial Organization Volume I written by Luis C. Corchón and published by Edward Elgar Publishing. This book was released on 2018-02-23 with total page 567 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The first volume of this wide-ranging Handbook contains original contributions by world-class specialists. It provides up-to-date surveys of the main game-theoretic tools commonly used to model industrial organization topics. The Handbook covers numerous subjects in detail including, among others, the tools of lattice programming, supermodular and aggregative games, monopolistic competition, horizontal and vertically differentiated good models, dynamic and Stackelberg games, entry games, evolutionary games with adaptive players, asymmetric information, moral hazard, learning and information sharing models.

Download or read book An Introduction to Auction Theory written by Flavio M. Menezes and published by Oxford University Press, USA. This book was released on 2005 with total page 200 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book provides a step-by-step, self-contained treatment of auction theory and aims to provide an introductory treatment to allow students to work through all the basic results. The techniques and insights gained provide a useful starting point for those wanting to venture into information economics, mechanism design and regulatory economics.

Download or read book Auction Strategies for Real World Markets written by Joseph Uri Podwol and published by . This book was released on 2011 with total page 189 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The theoretical and empirical study of auctions is of importance to economists as it provides unique insights into the behaviors and decision-making processes involved in the setting of prices that are otherwise unobserved in traditional fixed price sales. The papers in this dissertation look at observed outcomes from real world auctions and draw inferences as to the underlying economic behavior. The first paper examines the practice of auctioneers "fishing" for an opening bid by calling out lower and lower amounts until an opening bid is eventually proffered. I incorporate such a tactic into an auctioneer's strategy set within a game-theoretic model in which an indivisible good is sold via English ascending-price auction by a seller or auctioneer that cannot commit to a predetermined sequence of starting prices in advance. The analysis departs from previous literature by showing that the English auction is not strategically equivalent to the second-price auction within the dynamic setting. This difference has implications for the optimal starting price path, giving rise to an initial starting price consistent with the Coase conjecture. Additional price dynamics resembling "auction fever" are rationalized within this rational framework. In the second paper, I, along with a co-author, investigate theories of non-standard preferences and irrational bidding that have been used to explain the behavior of bidders in auctions online. We test these theories using data from a field experiment that we ran on eBay and supplemented with an observational dataset we collected from eBay. We find little evidence that several of these behavioral mechanisms are important in the field, and instead find behavior consistent with a standard rational model. The third paper examines the practice of shill bidding, whereby a seller in an online auction bids on his own item. To incorporate shill bidding into a seller's strategy set, I model the sale of a common value item via auction where some proportion of potential buyers have superior information and some proportion of potential sellers participate in the market only for the purpose of fraudulent selling. The model establishes the conditions under which shill bidding is supported in equilibrium.

Download or read book A Primer on Auction Design Management and Strategy written by David J. Salant and published by MIT Press. This book was released on 2014-12-19 with total page 199 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A guide to modeling and analyzing auctions, with the applications of game theory and auction theory to real-world auction decision making. Auctions are highly structured market transactions primarily used in thin markets (markets with few participants and infrequent transactions). In auctions, unlike most other markets, offers and counteroffers are typically made within a structure defined by a set of rigid and comprehensive rules. Because auctions are essentially complex negotiations that occur within a fully defined and rigid set of rules, they can be analyzed by game theoretic models more accurately and completely than can most other types of market transactions. This book offers a guide for modeling, analyzing, and predicting the outcomes of auctions, focusing on the application of game theory and auction theory to real-world auction design and decision making. After a brief introduction to fundamental concepts from game theory, the book explains some of the more significant results from the auction theory literature, including the revenue (or payoff) equivalence theorem, the winner's curse, and optimal auction design. Chapters on auction practice follow, addressing collusion, competition, information disclosure, and other basic principles of auction management, with some discussion of auction experiments and simulations. Finally, the book covers auction experience, with most of the discussion centered on energy and telecommunications auctions, which have become the proving ground for many new auction designs. A clear and concise introduction to auctions, auction design, and auction strategy, this Primer will be an essential resource for students, researchers, and practitioners.

Download or read book Putting Auction Theory to Work written by Paul Milgrom and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2004-01-12 with total page 378 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book provides a comprehensive introduction to modern auction theory and its important new applications. It is written by a leading economic theorist whose suggestions guided the creation of the new spectrum auction designs. Aimed at graduate students and professionals in economics, the book gives the most up-to-date treatments of both traditional theories of 'optimal auctions' and newer theories of multi-unit auctions and package auctions, and shows by example how these theories are used. The analysis explores the limitations of prominent older designs, such as the Vickrey auction design, and evaluates the practical responses to those limitations. It explores the tension between the traditional theory of auctions with a fixed set of bidders, in which the seller seeks to squeeze as much revenue as possible from the fixed set, and the theory of auctions with endogenous entry, in which bidder profits must be respected to encourage participation.

Download or read book Handbook of Computational Economics written by Karl Schmedders and published by Newnes. This book was released on 2013-12-31 with total page 680 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Handbook of Computational Economics summarizes recent advances in economic thought, revealing some of the potential offered by modern computational methods. With computational power increasing in hardware and algorithms, many economists are closing the gap between economic practice and the frontiers of computational mathematics. In their efforts to accelerate the incorporation of computational power into mainstream research, contributors to this volume update the improvements in algorithms that have sharpened econometric tools, solution methods for dynamic optimization and equilibrium models, and applications to public finance, macroeconomics, and auctions. They also cover the switch to massive parallelism in the creation of more powerful computers, with advances in the development of high-power and high-throughput computing. Much more can be done to expand the value of computational modeling in economics. In conjunction with volume one (1996) and volume two (2006), this volume offers a remarkable picture of the recent development of economics as a science as well as an exciting preview of its future potential. Samples different styles and approaches, reflecting the breadth of computational economics as practiced today Focuses on problems with few well-developed solutions in the literature of other disciplines Emphasizes the potential for increasing the value of computational modeling in economics

Download or read book The American Economic Review written by and published by . This book was released on 1990 with total page 1270 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: