Download or read book Adverse Selection and Assortative Matching in Labor Markets written by Daniel Ferreira and published by . This book was released on 2017 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Adverse Selection in the Labor Market written by Bruce C. Greenwald and published by Dissertations-G. This book was released on 1979 with total page 330 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Hiring Through Referrals in a Labor Market with Adverse Selection written by Aurelie Dariel and published by . This book was released on 2019 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Information asymmetries can prevent markets from operating efficiently. An important example is the labor market, where employers face uncertainty about the productivity of job candidates. We examine theoretically and with laboratory experiments three key questions related to hiring via referrals when employees have private information about their productivity. First, do firms use employee referrals when there are social ties between a current employee and a future employee? Second, does the existence of social ties and hiring through employee referrals indeed alleviate adverse selection relative to when social ties do not exist? Third, does the existence of social ties have spill-over effects on wages and hiring in competitive labor markets? The answers to all three questions are affirmative. However, despite the identified positive effect of employee referrals, hiring decisions fall short of the (second-best) efficient outcome. We identify risk aversion as a potential reason for this.

Download or read book A Test of Adverse Selection in the Market for Experienced Workers written by Kevin Lang and published by . This book was released on 2016 with total page 39 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We show that in labor market models with adverse selection, otherwise observationally equivalent workers will experience less wage growth following a period in which they change jobs than following a period in which they do not. We find little or no evidence to support this prediction. In most specifications the coefficient has the opposite sign, sometimes statistically significantly so. When consistent with the prediction, the estimated effects are small and statistically insignificant. We consistently reject large effects in the predicted direction. We argue informally that our results are also problematic for a broader class of models of competitive labor markets.

Download or read book Alleviating Adverse Selection in Labor Markets written by Vickie L. Bajtelsmit and published by . This book was released on 1994 with total page 254 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Essays on Information in Labor Economics written by Kenneth Shangold Mirkin and published by . This book was released on 2015 with total page 187 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Chapter 1: It is a commonly held view that the quality of unemployed workers varies countercyclically. During economic downturns, firms raise standards for retaining workers---better workers are fired, so it is natural to expect an accompanying rise in the unemployment pool's quality. However, I present a model in which the reverse is true. Firms learn about employee quality over time and fire their lowest quality workers, but workers enter unemployment also via quitting. In equilibrium, the quality of the unemployment pool reflects a balance between flows of selective firings and of (relatively higher quality) quits. Although firms fire better workers during economic downturns, there are more of these firings at such times, and quits are no longer sufficient to balance the corresponding negative selection---the unemployment pool thus \textit{declines} in quality. I use the model to explore the dynamic consequences of this. Firms limit hiring in response, and even after the economy rebounds otherwise, hiring will not resume until the unemployment pool's quality recovers. This offers a possible contributing factor to jobless recoveries. Using CPS micro-data and JOLTS, I then provide empirical support for several testable implications of the model, focusing on direct evidence for the mechanism driving the decline in unemployment pool quality. The model is consistent with other, previously-observed empirical patterns as well, and it provides a tractable framework for dynamic analysis of labor markets with private learning during employment. Chapter 2: We consider a dynamic trading environment, where heterogeneous buyers and sellers are randomly paired in each period. Within each match, seller types become observable while buyer types remain private information, and sellers make take-it-or-leave-it offers. We first establish the existence of steady-state equilibrium where sellers offer prices that are continuous in their types. We then characterize properties of sorting under search frictions of varied strength, focusing on two extreme cases. With maximal search frictions---complete disregard for future payoffs---we demonstrate that log-supermodularity (log-submodularity) of the production function is a necessary and sufficient condition for positive (negative) assortative matching. Log-supermodularity (Log-submodularity) is stronger than the standard supermodularity (submodularity) sorting condition. The resistance to sorting comes from the fact that higher type sellers have stronger incentive to secure trade by lowering prices. At the other extreme, the incentive to secure trade grows inconsequential when search frictions vanish and hence the condition for positive (negative) sorting returns to supermodularity (submodularity). Chapter 3: We study the dynamics of a market where agents trade assets that are heterogeneous in quality, but publicly indistinguishable. All agents begin with only public knowledge of the aggregate asset pool composition, but each owner learns privately about the quality of an asset in her possession. Ownership entails a constant choice between (i) the value of retaining the asset (and its corresponding payoffs) and (ii) that of selling it on the market for a uniform price that reflects the instantaneous average quality of assets being sold. In turn, the market composition reflects not only those owners who have opted for (ii), but also owners selling for reasons unrelated to asset quality. Learning is gradual, so ownership can be understood as an optimal experimentation problem. Whereas an environment with public learning would entail symmetric timing of sales, private learning precludes this due to externalities sellers exert on other market participants. Instead, owners must spread sales over a broad time interval and, in turn, must experiment inefficiently. Qualitatively, price dynamics resemble those found in speculation-fueled ``panics'' of the sort often invoked to explain market breakdowns. After an initial period without movement, prices enter a steady decline. Eventually, the stock---and corresponding flow---of owners looking to sell due to poor asset performance grows thin. Prices stop falling and finally rise as the presence of adverse selection fades from the market.

Download or read book Adverse Selection Asymmetric Information and Discrimination in a Labor Market written by Paulo R. A. Loureiro and published by . This book was released on 2015 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The main objective of this study is the application of an adverse selection model to verify the existence of discrimination in a competitive labor market caused by asymmetric information. The most important result obtained is when a group of workers with different productivities earn the same wage characterizing discrimination.

Download or read book Adverse Selection in the Labor Market written by Wei Wu and published by . This book was released on 1999 with total page 64 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book An Empirical Assessment of Assortative Matching in the Labor Market written by Rute Mendes and published by . This book was released on 2007 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Optimal Wage Redistribution in the Presence of Adverse Selection in the Labor Market written by Spencer Bastani and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page 17 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book A Theory of Dynamic Selection in the Labor Market written by Pooya Molavi and published by . This book was released on 2018 with total page 48 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: I propose an equilibrium search and matching model with permanent worker heterogeneity, asymmetric information, and endogenous separations and study the dynamics of adverse selection in the labor market. The interaction between asymmetric information and endogenous separations leads to a cyclical adverse selection problem that has testable predictions both for the aggregate variables and for individual workers' outcomes. First, a deterioration in the distribution of ability in the pool of the unemployed leads firms to raise their hiring standards, thus resulting in shifting out of the Beveridge curve. Second, if the separation rate is log-supermodular (log-submodular) in productivity and ability, the pool of the unemployed becomes more (less) adversely selected in downturns. Third, firms rationally discriminate against the long-term unemployed by demanding more unequivocally positive signals of their ability before hiring them. Fourth, this scarring effect is more (less) severe for lower-ability workers and after deeper recessions if the separation rate is log-supermodular (log-submodular). I conclude by providing conditions on the fundamentals of the economy that lead to log-supermodular and log-submodular separation rates.

Download or read book A Formal Test of Assortative Matching in the Labor Market written by and published by . This book was released on 2009 with total page 38 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We estimate a structural model of job assignment in the presence of coordination frictions due to Shimer (2005). The coordination friction model places restrictions on the joint distribution of worker and firm effects from a linear decomposition of log labor earnings. These restrictions permit estimation of the unobservable ability and productivity differences between workers and their employers as well as the way workers sort into jobs on the basis of these unobservable factors. The estimation is performed on matched employer-employee data from the LEHD program of the U.S. Census Bureau. The estimated correlation between worker and firm effects from the earnings decomposition is close to zero, a finding that is often interpreted as evidence that there is no sorting by comparative advantage in the labor market. Our estimates suggest that this finding actually results from a lack of sufficient heterogeneity in the workforce and available jobs. Workers do sort into jobs on the basis of productive differences, but the effects of sorting are not visible because of the composition of workers and employers. This paper is available as PDF (1303 K) or via email.

Download or read book A Note on Adverse Selection in the Labour Market written by Oded H. Sarig and published by . This book was released on 1987 with total page 5 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Risk Pay for Performance and Adverse Selection in a Competitive Labor Market written by Felipe Balmaceda and published by . This book was released on 2004 with total page 33 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Adverse Selection and Race in the Labour Market written by Luis Pinedo Caro and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Worker Mobility in a Search Model with Adverse Selection written by Carlos Carrillo-Tudela and published by . This book was released on 2015 with total page 66 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We analyze the effects of adverse selection on worker turnover and wage dynamics in a frictional labor market. We consider a model of on-the-job search where firms offer promotion wage contracts to workers of different abilities, which is unknown to firms at the hiring stage. With sufficiently strong information frictions, low-wage firms offer separating contracts and hire all types of workers in equilibrium, whereas high-wage firms offer pooling contracts, promoting high-ability workers only. Low-ability workers have higher turnover rates and are more often employed in low-wage firms. The model replicates the negative relationship between job-to-job transitions and wages observed in the U.S. labor market.

Download or read book Handbook of Labor Economics written by Orley Ashenfelter and published by Elsevier. This book was released on 2010-10-27 with total page 1140 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: What factors affect the ways individuals participate in labor markets?New Developments and Research on Labor Markets (volume 4B) proposes answers to this and other questions on important topics of public policy. Leading labor economists demonstrate how better data and advanced experiments help them apply economic theory, yielding sharper analyses and conclusions. The combinations of these improved empirical findings with new models enable the authors of these chapters to reveal how labor economists are developing new and innovative ways to measure key parameters and test important hypotheses. - Concentrates on empirical research in specific labor markets, including those defined by age, gender, and race - Reveals how questions and answers about these markets have changed and how models measure them - Documents how conceptual models and empirical work explain important practical issues