Download or read book Training Indigenous Forces in Counterinsurgency written by James S. Corum and published by . This book was released on 2006 with total page 68 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The author examines the British experience in building and training indigenous police and military forces during the Malaya and Cyprus insurgencies. These two insurgencies provide a dramatic contrast to the issue of training local security forces. In Malaya, the British developed a very successful strategy for training the Malayan Police and army. In Cyprus, the British strategy for building and training local security forces generally was ineffective. The author argues that some important lessons can be drawn from these case studies that are directly applicable to current U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine.
Download or read book Training Indigenous Forces in Counterinsurgency written by James S. Corum and published by . This book was released on 2006-03-31 with total page 62 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Counterinsurgency is manpower intensive, and nearly all major counterinsurgency campaigns of the last century have relied heavily on indigenous police and military forces. Indeed, there have been few counterinsurgency situations in which the indigenous security forces were not the primary forces employed on the government side in the conflict, at least in terms of numbers. Although the importance of training indigenous police and military forces is understood in counterinsurgency doctrine and theory, relatively little research has been conducted concerning how this mission should be carried out. Hopefully, this monograph will help fill some of the information gap on this vital subject. There are several major questions that need to be addressed: How can the supporting or governing power best organize the local police and military forces for counterinsurgency? What level of training do security forces need to conduct effective counterinsurgency operations? What is the role of the police in counterinsurgency? What is the role of home guards or irregular security organizations? What kinds of training programs produce effective police and military leaders? These are very relevant questions today as the U.S. military revises its counterinsurgency doctrine. Currently, U.S. forces are engaged in campaigns against insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan, and are providing advice and support to the Philippine and Colombian governments in their battles against insurgents. In all of these countries, the U.S. military is engaged in training and supporting the local police and military forces for counterinsurgency operations. As the Global War on Terror continues, the U.S. military will certainly see many more missions to train and support indigenous security forces. Training indigenous security forces is also one of the most complex tasks in developing an effective counterinsurgency strategy. Building new forces from scratch is difficult enough. It is often even more difficult to take indigenous police and military forces with a tradition of incompetence and corruption and transform them into effective forces that can find and defeat insurgents without undermining the legitimacy of the government in the eyes of the population. This monograph is built around two case studies concerning the British experience in training indigenous security forces in the Malaya and Cyprus insurgencies. Although these events occurred 50 years ago, most of the problems faced in both insurgencies would sound very familiar to any American soldier in Iraq or Afghanistan. In both Cyprus and Malaya, the hostility of major ethnic groups was at the heart of the insurgent movement. In both cases, the degree of success in counterinsurgency largely was determined by the effectiveness of the government in winning support among the disaffected part of the populace. The training, competence, and leadership of the indigenous security forces in these cases played a central role in the government's ability to win civilian support. The two insurgencies were protracted conflicts. At the beginning of each conflict, the government's police and security forces were undermanned, poorly trained, and poorly prepared to conduct counterinsurgency. Strategic success in both cases depended on the government's ability to recruit, retrain, and reorganize the indigenous security forces. In Malaya, the British eventually succeeded in building a highly effective Malayan police and army. As the Malayans became more capable of handling their own security, the British were able to withdraw forces and leave behind a stable and democratic nation that was able to finish off the insurgent movement. In Cyprus, the British dramatically increased the Cypriot police force and organized new local security units.
Download or read book Training Indigenous Forces in Counter insurgency written by James S. Corum and published by . This book was released on 2006 with total page 62 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Counterinsurgency is manpower intensive, and nearly all major counterinsurgency campaigns of the last century have relied heavily on indigenous police and military forces. Indeed, there have been few counterinsurgency situations in which the indigenous security forces were not the primary forces employed on the government side in the conflict, at least in terms of numbers. Although the importance of training indigenous police and military forces is understood in counterinsurgency doctrine and theory, relatively little research has been conducted concerning how this mission should be carried out. Hopefully, this monograph will help fill some of the information gap on this vital subject. There are several major questions that need to be addressed: How can the supporting or governing power best organize the local police and military forces for counterinsurgency? What level of training do security forces need to conduct effective counterinsurgency operations? What is the role of the police in counterinsurgency? What is the role of home guards or irregular security organizations? What kinds of training programs produce effective police and military leaders? These are very relevant questions today as the U.S. military revises its counterinsurgency doctrine. Currently, U.S. forces are engaged in campaigns against insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan, and are providing advice and support to the Philippine and Colombian governments in their battles against insurgents. In all of these countries, the U.S. military is engaged in training and supporting the local police and military force for counterinsurgency operations. As the Global War on Terror continues, the U.S. military will certainly see many more missions to train and support indigenous security forces.
Download or read book Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan written by Seth G. Jones and published by Rand Corporation. This book was released on 2008 with total page 176 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This study explores the nature of the insurgency in Afghanistan, the key challenges and successes of the U.S.-led counterinsurgency campaign, and the capabilities necessary to wage effective counterinsurgency operations. By examining the key lessons from all insurgencies since World War II, it finds that most policymakers repeatedly underestimate the importance of indigenous actors to counterinsurgency efforts. The U.S. should focus its resources on helping improve the capacity of the indigenous government and indigenous security forces to wage counterinsurgency. It has not always done this well. The U.S. military-along with U.S. civilian agencies and other coalition partners-is more likely to be successful in counterinsurgency warfare the more capable and legitimate the indigenous security forces (especially the police), the better the governance capacity of the local state, and the less external support that insurgents receive.
Download or read book Training Indigenous Forces in Counterinsurgency written by James S. Corum and published by . This book was released on 2014-06-26 with total page 62 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This monograph examines the British experience in building and training indigenous police and military forces during the Malaya and Cyprus insurgencies. The two insurgencies provide a dramatic contrast to the issue of training local security forces. In Malaya, the British developed a very successful strategy for training the Malayan police and army. In Cyprus, the British strategy for building and training local security forces generally was ineffective. The author argues that some important lessons can be drawn from these case studies that apply directly to current U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine. The research for this monograph was carried out while the author was a visiting fellow of All Souls College, Oxford University. The author used the superb library and archive of the Rhodes House Centre for Imperial and Commonwealth History at Oxford University. The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this contribution to the current debate on counterinsurgency doctrine.
Download or read book Finding the Right Indigenous Leader and Force for Counterinsurgency Operations written by Naval Postgraduate Naval Postgraduate School and published by CreateSpace. This book was released on 2014-12-04 with total page 64 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In recent decades, insurgents and other nonstate actors with their nontraditional styles of warfare have become significant threats to the U.S. and its allies. Failing to draw lessons from past conflicts has been a root cause of the misguided strategies implemented against insurgents in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Combating these insurgencies using a military-heavy strategy has proved to be a drain on both the U.S. economy as well as the military forces that have shared the burden of deployments since the onset of operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. As a result, the U.S. should consider alternative strategies for dealing with insurgents that are both more tactically sound and less taxing on the economy and military. Using special operations forces (SOF) to establish local indigenous security forces in under-governed areas is one means of accomplishing this goal. This thesis focuses on the importance of choosing the right indigenous leader and force for U.S. SOF to partner with to defeat insurgents through the establishment of security, governance, and development at the grassroots level. A step-by-step process is described in this thesis that will assist SOF units in choosing the best local indigenous force leader (LIFL) and training him and his force. Also discussed is the importance of maintaining that partnership until the LIFL and his force are capable of operating on their own, and lines of support and communication have been opened with higher levels of the host nation government.
Download or read book Finding the Right Indigenous Leader and Force for Counterinsurgency Operations written by David J. Hodges and published by . This book was released on 2011 with total page 61 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In recent decades, insurgents and other nonstate actors with their nontraditional styles of warfare have become significant threats to the U.S. and its allies. Failing to draw lessons from past conflicts has been a root cause of the misguided strategies implemented against insurgents in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Combating these insurgencies using a military-heavy strategy has proved to be a drain on both the U.S. economy as well as the military forces that have shared the burden of deployments since the onset of operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. As a result, the U.S. should consider alternative strategies for dealing with insurgents that are both more tactically sound and less taxing on the economy and military. Using special operations forces (SOF) to establish local indigenous security forces in under-governed areas is one means of accomplishing this goal. This thesis focuses on the importance of choosing the right indigenous leader and force for U.S. SOF to partner with to defeat insurgents through the establishment of security, governance, and development at the grassroots level. A step-by-step process is described in this thesis that will assist SOF units in choosing the best local indigenous force leader (LIFL) and training him and his force. Also discussed is the importance of maintaining that partnership until the LIFL and his force are capable of operating on their own, and lines of support and communication have been opened with higher levels of the host nation government.
Download or read book Counterinsurgency in Iraq 2003 2006 written by Bruce R. Pirnie and published by Rand Corporation. This book was released on 2008-01-25 with total page 135 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Examines the deleterious effects of the U.S. failure to focus on protecting the Iraqi population for most of the military campaign in Iraq and analyzes the failure of a technologically driven counterinsurgency (COIN) approach. It outlines strategic considerations relative to COIN; presents an overview of the conflict in Iraq; describes implications for future operations; and offers recommendations to improve the U.S. capability to conduct COIN.
Download or read book The U S Army Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual written by David H. Petraeus and published by Silver Rock Publishing. This book was released on 2015-12-31 with total page 244 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This field manual establishes doctrine for military operations in a counterinsurgency (COIN) environment. It is based on lessons learned from previous counterinsurgencies and contemporary operations. It is also based on existing interim doctrine and doctrine recently developed. Counterinsurgency operations generally have been neglected in broader American military doctrine and national security policies since the end of the Vietnam War over 40 years ago. This manual is designed to reverse that trend. It is also designed to merge traditional approaches to COIN with the realities of a new international arena shaped by technological advances, globalization, and the spread of extremist ideologies--some of them claiming the authority of a religious faith. This is a comprehensive manual that details every aspect of a successful COIN operation from intelligence to leadership to diplomacy. It also includes several useful appendices that provide important supplementary material.
Download or read book Learning from Iraq written by Steven Metz and published by . This book was released on 2007 with total page 140 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: While the involvement of the United States in counterinsurgency has a long history, it had faded in importance in the years following the end of the Cold War. When American forces first confronted it in Iraq, they were not fully prepared. Since then, the U.S. military and other government agencies have expended much effort to refine their counterinsurgency capabilities. But have they done enough?
Download or read book Improving Counterinsurgency written by and published by . This book was released on 2006 with total page 77 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The US military has proven its strengths many times over through its ability to dominate opponents on the conventional battlefield. However, when it comes to irregular wars and insurgent conflicts, which are defined by enemies who conduct war from the shadows and refuse to meet on the open field, finding success has been far more difficult. The nature and dynamics of these unconventional wars are dramatically different from the conventional warfare realm, and require innovative approaches and rethinking of many long held conceptions of waging war. Conducting unconventional warfare has been the core mission of US Army Special Forces (USSF) since they were founded in 1952. Throughout a relatively short history, USSF have shown a broad utility in conducting operations with indigenous military, paramilitary, and civilian personnel in "irregular wars" and low intensity conflicts (LICs), and thus Special Forces have been widely regarded as the preeminent experts in this particular field of warfare. Now more than ever, the capabilities of Special Forces are invaluable in supporting US national security strategy, continuing the Global War on Terror (GWOT), and supporting efforts to transform military capabilities for irregular warfare and unconventional conflicts. USSF are now faced with a difficult challenge: high demand and operations tempo require that USSF must find new ways to more effectively and efficiently employ their skills in unconventional environments. In order to enhance the capabilities of USSF in conducting unconventional warfare and counterinsurgency, this thesis proposes that USSF develop a training program that allows recruitment and selection of both indigenous personnel and US foreign-born as auxiliaries and surrogates to USSF operations. Training would take place in the US and would be for the explicit purpose of creating indigenous cadres for assisting Special Forces Operational Detachment Alphas (SFODAs) in developing operational/security forces and intelligence networks at the local level in order to create long-term stability in unconventional conflict areas.
Download or read book Tactical Methods for Combatting Insurgencies written by Gregory Heritage and published by . This book was released on 1993 with total page 49 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Paths to Victory written by Christopher Paul and published by Rand Corporation. This book was released on 2013 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: When a country is threatened by an insurgency, what efforts give its government the best chance of prevailing? Contemporary discourse on this subject is voluminous and often contentious. Advice for the counterinsurgent is often based on little more than common sense, a general understanding of history, or a handful of detailed examples, instead of a solid, systematically collected body of historical evidence. A 2010 RAND study challenged this trend with rigorous analyses of all 30 insurgencies that started and ended between 1978 and 2008. This update to that original study expanded the data set, adding 41 new cases and comparing all 71 insurgencies begun and completed worldwide since World War II. With many more cases to compare, the study was able to more rigorously test the previous findings and address critical questions that the earlier study could not. For example, it could examine the approaches that led counterinsurgency forces to prevail when an external actor was involved in the conflict. It was also able to address questions about timing and duration, such as which factors affect the duration of insurgencies and the durability of the resulting peace, as well as how long historical counterinsurgency forces had to engage in effective practices before they won.
Download or read book US Special Forces and Counterinsurgency in Vietnam written by Christopher K. Ives and published by Routledge. This book was released on 2007-01-24 with total page 368 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This volume examines US Army Special Forces efforts to mobilize and train indigenous minorities in Vietnam. Christopher K. Ives shows how before the Second Indochina War, the Republic of Vietnam had begun to falter under the burden of an increasingly successful insurgency. The dominant American military culture could not conform to President Kennedy’s guidance to wage 'small wars', while President Diem’s provincial and military structures provided neither assistance nor security. The Green Berets developed and executed effective counterinsurgency tactics and operations with strategic implications while living, training, and finally fighting with the Montagnard peoples in the Central Highlands. Special Forces soldiers developed and executed what needed to be done to mobilize indigenous minorities, having assessed what needed to be known. Combining Clausewitz, business theory and strategic insight, this book provides an important starting point for thinking about how the US military should be approaching the problems of today's ‘small wars’. US Special Forces and Counterinsurgency in Vietnam will be of much interest to students of the Vietnam War, Special Forces operations, military innovation and strategic theory in general.
Download or read book Boots on the ground Troop Density in Contingency Operations written by John J. McGrath and published by Government Printing Office. This book was released on 2006 with total page 212 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper clearly shows the immediate relevancy of historical study to current events. One of the most common criticisms of the U.S. plan to invade Iraq in 2003 is that too few troops were used. The argument often fails to satisfy anyone for there is no standard against which to judge. A figure of 20 troops per 1000 of the local population is often mentioned as the standard, but as McGrath shows, that figure was arrived at with some questionable assumptions. By analyzing seven military operations from the last 100 years, he arrives at an average number of military forces per 1000 of the population that have been employed in what would generally be considered successful military campaigns. He also points out a variety of important factors affecting those numbers-from geography to local forces employed to supplement soldiers on the battlefield, to the use of contractors-among others.
Download or read book The Army s Role in Counterinsurgency and Insurgency written by Stephen T. Hosmer and published by . This book was released on 1990 with total page 60 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This report identifies potential initiatives for improving Army doctrine and capabilities for counterinsurgency and insurgency warfare. These include recommendations that the Army (1) build and maintain small cadres of counterinsurgency and insurgency experts; (2) create, along with the other services, a counterinsurgency institute to train U.S. and foreign nationals; and (3) ensure more appropriate and effective U.S. arms and equipment transfers to countries facing insurgent threats. The author also examines the reasons insurgency is likely to continue to be a frequent form of conflict; describes the threat of insurgency to important U.S. interests in the Third World; explores the potential for U.S. Army noncombat support to Third World countries fighting insurgency; describes the impediments to U.S. influence and assistance; outlines the potential situations that might lead to U.S. involvement in counterinsurgency combat; and discusses the Army's role in support of friendly insurgency.
Download or read book Irregular Forces in Counterinsurgency Operations written by Lieutenant William E. Rieper and published by . This book was released on 2010-12-01 with total page 54 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The purpose of this monograph is to determine the ideal practices for militias and irregular forces in counterinsurgency operations. This study specifically addresses those groups organized by a legitimate sponsor such as the Host Nation or one of its partners and takes note to exclude criminal organizations that seek to terrorize the government or its population to gain concessions. As part of its study, this paper provides a basic outline of the goals of insurgent and counterinsurgent doctrine. It uses Mao Tse-tung as a source for universal insurgent goals and Revolutionary Insurgencies and David Galula for Nationalist Insurgencies (Galula refers to them as Bourgeois-Nationalist). Galula's differentiation is unique because it attempts to identify situations and expected insurgents actions for each type of insurgency though insurgencies may include characteristics of both models. This study also refers to US doctrine to provide an understanding of how the US expects to fight insurgencies. This monograph then establishes a baseline of criteria for militia tasks and considerations that it subsequently investigates using historical examples of three conflicts: The Malayan Emergency, The US in the Vietnam War, and Operation Iraqi Freedom. As in any military operation, commanders must balance a myriad of criteria that weigh on possible alternative solutions. In the employment of irregular forces, a leader must consider how using locally hired indigenous forces affect operations. He should be aware of how the roles of such unconventional forces affect the militias themselves, how the Host Nation or its defense forces react to them, and possible US government and popular reactions. While verifying that militias are effective in counterinsurgent operations for basic security and defense related tasks, providing intelligence, population control, and permit for conventional forces to direct actions against the insurgents, this paper revealed that irregulars have the potential for additional contributions. With training and supervision, surrogates can engage in short duration offensive operations. Militias also provide a means for the government to garner local support against the insurgency through inclusion. They can facilitate reconciliation with disaffected groups and provide a unifying force for these groups in politics. In the course of researching applicable doctrine, there is a noticeable gap in the use of irregular forces in counterinsurgency operations. The author attributes this gap to the residual effects of the Vietnam War and the criminal militia operating in Operation Iraqi Freedom, which made US forces resistant to employing irregular forces. In the conclusion, the author calls for a revision of current US doctrine to expand the use of irregular forces in Counterinsurgency Operations. This calling is not so much based on the author's own opinion but reflects the reality that since most potential enemies, unable to match the combat power of the US, will continue to use asymmetric methods, including exploiting and operating among the local population. Irregular forces provide a feasible solution to this problem that can provide an advantage in future US operations.
