Download or read book Financial Markets Marketing and Information Sharing written by Rodney Benjamin Wallace and published by . This book was released on 2000 with total page 145 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Three Essays on the Industrial Organization of Financial Markets written by David F. Andrade and published by . This book was released on 1997 with total page 236 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Essays on Industrial Organization and Finance written by Menghan Xu and published by . This book was released on 2016 with total page 117 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The dissertation consists of three essays on industrial organization with a particular focus on the structures of financial markets. The first chapter theoretically studies how search friction affects competition and resource allocation in crowdfunding loan markets, which are described using a many-to-one matching framework. Namely, competitive fundraisers must accumulate multiple investors to complete a transaction. I develop a dynamic matching model with a fixed sample search, a la Burdett and Judd (1983), in which fundraisers compete in interest rates while investors look for good investment targets. I highlight two important economic forces in the model. First, investors can only observe a limited number of quotes. Second, a surplus cannot be created until a fundraiser attracts contributions from enough investors. I show that in the presence of search friction, fundraisers implement mixed strategies to set interest rates in a unique stationary equilibrium, which results in rate dispersion even if the goods are homogeneous. Regarding resource allocation, I show that in the many-to-one market, rate dispersion creates an endogenous coordination mechanism among anonymous and independent investors, thereby making it easy for them to concentrate their investments. In other words, search friction improves allocation efficiency in a crowdfunding market compared with its perfect competition counterpart. Based on the theoretical framework constructed in the first chapter, the second chapter empirically studies the market structure of the crowdfunding market. I construct a novel data set based on a large panel of fundraisers' behaviors. Using reduced form analysis, I find evidence of persistent rate dispersion and funding mismatches, which are consistent with the theoretical predictions of the search model. I also show that the model is identifiable and can be estimated using a non-parametric approach, which allows me to measure the allocation efficiency. Regarding methodology, I demonstrate that it is sufficient to use projects' ranks to recover search friction primitives, which reduces the computational burden and increases the precision. The third chapter studies how the combination of adverse selection and moral hazard affects the design of financial contracts. Specifically, the chapter studies an optimal mechanism design problem,a la Mussa and Rosen (1978), in the presence of limited enforcement. In the study, the bank (principal) designs loan contracts to screen firms (agents) with unobserved productivities. Meanwhile, the bank cannot prevent the firm from consuming acquired funds without producing anything. The impediment of forming contracts creates an endogenous outside option for all borrowers. I show that in the optimal mechanism, loan sizes for higher types are decreased by ironing, i.e., by pooling on the top. In addition, the lower types produce at the second-best level. Moreover, I show that firms' participation is independent of the enforcement level.

Download or read book Three Essays on the Efficiency of Selected Financial Markets written by Fabian Ackermann and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page 143 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Essays on Industrial Organization and Financial Economics written by Xiaoye (Phoebe) Tian and published by . This book was released on 2021 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This dissertation explores how imperfections in financial markets affect decisions made by market participants and subsequent market outcomes. The three chapters in this dissertation focus on three different financial markets: corporate lending market for small firms in China, refinance market for residential mortgage in US and retail investment product market in China. The first chapter studies inefficiencies arising from the lack of long-term contracting between borrower (firm) and lender (bank). I draw on a proprietary data from a Chinese bank, which only offers one-year term loans for small firms. How, and to what extent can default risk be reduced if they were able to enter long-term contract? I develop a dynamic model of business lending to analyze borrower's default incentives in an environment with imperfect information and learning. Estimation of the structural model implies that over seventy percent of observed defaults are strategic borrower defaults. In the counterfactual model, banks are able to offer long-term contingent contract which involves a schedule of future lending terms that can vary with time and firm's financial status. I find that optimal long-term contract has two main benefits: First, by frontloading prices, it alleviates agency frictions and disincentivizes willful defaults. Second, by cross-subsidization, it provides insurance for firms against negative shocks. As a result, with long-term contracting 17% fewer firms default, and total firm outputs expand by 2.6%. The second chapter (joint with Chen Zheng) studies the unintended consequences arising from program design, and how it augments the market power of incumbent lenders, in the context of a federal program called Home Affordable Refinance Program. We build a dynamic discrete choice model of refinance decision where the payoff is generated from a search and negotiation process. We estimate the model using data on program participation and pricing decision. The estimation exploits a significant change to the program design that gives exogenous variation in the competitive advantage of incumbent lenders under the program. In a counterfactual where the advantage granted by program design is shut down, we find that it leads to an average welfare improvement of 4,977. The insight from this study could apply to other policies whose implementation depends on intermediaries with incumbency advantage with respect to targeted agents. In the third chapter, I develop an empirical structural model of the wealth management sector in China in order to analyze the welfare impact of the proposed regulation aimed at ending the prevalence of the implicit guarantee in this industry. The implicit guarantee means the bank implicitly promises the returns on wealth management products to investors, and investors choose from differentiated wealth management products based on characteristics including guaranteed returns. In the counterfactual post-regulation scenario, the bank does not guarantee returns, and it only serves as an intermediary charging a constant fee, shifting the underlying risk of investment to investors. The change of consumer welfare hinges on two forces-the adjustment of the bank's markups and investor's disutility of risk. Empirical findings suggest that the markup decreases moderately, but not enough to completely compensate for investor's aversion of risk, so consumer surplus drops slightly as a result of the regulation.

Download or read book Three Essays on the Interaction Between Product Markets and Financial Markets written by John Joohahn Moon and published by . This book was released on 1994 with total page 286 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Three Essays on Frictions in Financial Markets written by Yifei Wang and published by . This book was released on 2019 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Three Essays on Financial Markets written by Andrey G. Zagorchev and published by . This book was released on 2010 with total page 141 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The third essay examines the impact of government ownership and financial markets on corporate governance using 1327 firms from fourteen EU countries in the period 2003 to 2008. The results show that aggregate government ownership measured through privatization and financial markets lead to improvements in the corporate governance practices of firms.

Download or read book Three Essays on Information Transmission in Financial Markets written by James Clifford Hackard and published by . This book was released on 2006 with total page 268 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Three Essays in Industrial Organization and Corporate Finance written by Emanuele Tarantino and published by . This book was released on 2010 with total page 140 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Essays on Financial Economics and Industrial Organization written by Marcus Eduardo Mathias Studart and published by . This book was released on 2015 with total page 126 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This essay consist of three chapters. In chapter 1, I analyze the equilibrium behavior of asset prices and margins (i.e collateral required to trade shares using debt), when Market Makers smooth out price fluctuations by trading on a margin. I address the questions of 1) whether financial margins can increase in reaction to supply shocks without misinformation about the shocks' nature, 2) when non-fundamental shocks reduce asset prices and increase margins, and 3) how margins and prices react to persistent supply shocks, as opposed to temporary ones. In the model, price fluctuations are induced by supply shocks, and margins are set to match the price depreciation induced by a future negative tail shock. Temporary shocks (i.e. shocks that fade very soon) are shown to have no effects on prices or margins, when either they are small or Market Makers hold large collateral amounts. If the shock is sufficiently large, some shares will be held by (currently active) risk averse investors, and price falls due to larger risk premium. If, before the shock, Market Makers were holding asset shares, prices fall even more, because Market Makers wealth is marked down, and expected future prices falls, since it becomes more likely that future shocks will depress prices. Persistent shocks (i.e. shocks that do not fade quickly) reduce current prices, because, in the best scenario, they shift down the future price distribution, and reduce Market Makers' asset valuation. I give conditions for margins to increase with a persistent shock. Falling prices and higher margins are not necessarily the result of a margin spiral (i.e. when margins increase and constrain Market Makers, who are forced to sell, causing prices to fall and margins increase more). Margins can increase because future price variance increases at the same time as Market Makers' asset valuation reduces, and Market Makers may not be financially constrained at all. In chapter 2, I study repurchase agreements, short-term collateralized loans known as repos, that are commonly used to fund different sorts of assets. Using a dataset of Money Market Mutual Funds (MMF), I find that repos backed by liquid collateral, such as US Treasuries securities, have on average shorter maturities, lower haircut rates and lower interest rates than less liquid collateral, while the average maturities of repos held by MMF are positively correlated with fund size and overall portfolio maturity. Motivated by these evidences, I develop an equilibrium model to price simultaneously assets and repos. I show that assortative matching between assets and lenders offering different maturities exists in equilibrium. Lenders who offer longer maturities are better suited to finance less liquidity securities, since investors' expected transaction costs are lower, as collateral (to repay debt) is sold long after their debt is considered unworthy. Liquid securities prices increase with repos, in order to make the financing of illiquid securities more attractive to long maturity lenders. Interest rates and haircuts are functions of both the transaction costs and maturities distributions, and are shown to be increasing in illiquidity. Haircuts exceed the securities' transaction costs, in order to cover how much securities depreciate when sold, and to force borrowers to repay the interest on their debt. Moreover, illiquid securities have higher haircuts, because not only they have larger transaction costs but also because the repos used to finance them pay more interest. I emulate a financial crisis through an increase in the probability of a debt run. As repos are terminated earlier, all asset prices decrease. Illiquid securities prices, however, fall notably more and haircuts and interest rates of repos to fund them increase. In chapter 3, which is co-authored with Siwei Kwok, we study the interaction of information and competition in incentivizing quality provision. We estimate a discrete quality game with Los Angeles County restaurant hygiene inspection data set, via the two step method of Bajari et al (2006). Our results suggest that firm competition incentivizes quality provision, but the effect is non-monotonic. If a market is saturated with a sufficiently large number of firms, an additional firm might actually reduces the likelihood that all others will provide quality. Information, however, enhances the effects of competition and reduces the threshold which additional firms reduce quality provided.

Download or read book Three Essays in Financial Markets The Bright Side of Financial Derivatives Options Trading and Firm Innovation written by Iván Blanco and published by Ed. Universidad de Cantabria. This book was released on 2019-02-15 with total page 90 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Do financial derivatives enhance or impede innovation? We aim to answer this question by examining the relationship between equity options markets and standard measures of firm innovation. Our baseline results show that firms with more options trading activity generate more patents and patent citations per dollar of R&D invested. We then investigate how more active options markets affect firms' innovation strategy. Our results suggest that firms with greater trading activity pursue a more creative, diverse and risky innovation strategy. We discuss potential underlying mechanisms and show that options appear to mitigate managerial career concerns that would induce managers to take actions that boost short-term performance measures. Finally, using several econometric specifications that try to account for the potential endogeneity of options trading, we argue that the positive effect of options trading on firm innovation is causal.

Download or read book Economic Theory Dynamics and Markets written by Takashi Negishi and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2012-12-06 with total page 542 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Economic Theory, Dynamics, and Markets. The collection of essays in honor of Ryuzo Sato, written by his colleagues and students, covers the many fields of economic theory and policy to which he has contributed. The first section pays tribute to his contributions to mathematical economics and economic theory. Ryuzo Sato is known for his work in growth theory and technical progress, and the second section has a number of papers on macroeconomics and dynamics. The third section has a number of papers on financial markets and their functioning in Japan and the United States. The next section examines various aspects of the economics of firms and industry. Ryuzo Sato has been very involved in analyzing the economic and business relations between Japan and the United States, and the last section is devoted to comparative analysis of economic systems.

Download or read book Essays in Financial Econometrics and Quantitative Industrial Organization written by Soheil Rashid Nadimi and published by . This book was released on 2015 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This dissertation consists of one essay in financial econometrics and two essays in quantitative industrial organization. The first essay studies the relationship between stock return volatility and current and prior shocks to oil price volatility. We study the behavior of aggregate stock markets as well as individual industry sectors. Our results show that lagged stock return volatility is the main determinant of current stock return volatility in aggregate markets, with oil price volatility providing no additional information that can be used to forecast stock return volatility. For individual industry sectors, we find a robust and stable prediction relationship only for the chemicals industry. Additional estimation exercises confirm the robustness of these results. The second essay uses a Bertrand-Nash price-competition framework to models a vertically integrated provider (VIP) that is a monopoly supplier of an essential input for downstream production. An input price that is "too high" can lead to inefficient foreclosure and one that is "too low" creates incentives for nonprice discrimination. The range of non-exclusionary input prices is circumscribed by the input prices generated on the basis of upper-bound and lower-bound displacement ratios. The admissible range of the ratio of downstream to upstream "price-cost" margins for the VIP is increasing in the degree of product differentiation and reduces to a single ratio in the limit as the products become perfectly homogeneous. The third essay explores the relationship between upstream input prices and downstream market exclusion under a Stackelberg quantity-competition framework. Market exclusion is a concern when input prices are "too high" and "too low" because it can result in inefficient foreclosure and sabotage, respectively. Consistent with the results obtained in the second essay, the safe harbor range of downstream to upstream "price-cost" margin ratios is decreasing in the degree of product homogeneity and approaches a single ratio in the limit as the products become perfectly homogeneous. This single margin ratio preserves equality between the VIP's wholesale and retail "price-cost" margins. A key finding for competition policy is that the bounds of non-exclusionary input prices are markedly wider under Bertrand-Nash competition than they are under Stackelberg competition. Hence, it is critical that the antitrust and regulatory authorities understand the nature of the industry competition so that rules governing permissible conduct are properly calibrated to yield efficient outcomes.

Download or read book Three Essays on the Consequences of Financial Market Frictions written by Andrada Bilan and published by . This book was released on 2020 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Three Essays in Empirical Industrial Organization written by Maria Andrea Martens Olivares and published by . This book was released on 2008 with total page 268 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Three Essays in Empirical Asset Pricing written by Ali Shahrad and published by . This book was released on 2020 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: "This thesis consists of three essays in empirical asset pricing. In the first essay, I study momentum crashes in emerging equity markets. In particular, I investigate that the momentum crashes are related to volatility, unconditional of the market state. I use emerging stock markets as a laboratory because of their high volatility in both bear and bull markets. My main finding is that momentum crashes are not limited to bear markets, and in fact, one third are experienced in bull markets. These crashes do not fit into the optionality model of Daniel and Moskowitz (2016). Instead, I provide evidence that momentum crashes are linked to the market volatility. In volatile states, the optionality payoff of momentum increases and momentum skewness decreases. Furthermore, I show that the poor performance of momentum in EMs is due to the high volatility in these markets. In the second essay, I investigate whether excessive shortselling is the primary cause for momentum crashes. My hypothesis is that the excessive shortselling of the loser stocks pushes their price below their fundamental values. When the market rebounds, the reversal in the price of the losers leads to momentum crash. I collect the data on shortselling policies across countries, and test whether momentum crashes less in markets with shortselling ban, controlling for the market state and volatility. My results show that the crashes are less severe in markets with shortselling ban, suggesting that shortselling partially explains momentum crashes.In the third essay, I study the mutual fund industry in 77 countries and examine how the fund styles are developed on the aggregate level. I apply textual analysis to the fund names in order to classify funds. I find that the 20 most frequently used words appear in over 50% of all fund names and I define 10 categories (“styles”) based on those (and related) words. These 10 categories are sufficient to classify over 85% of all funds. I find that the menu of funds are remarkably universal. My main result shows how the menu of funds offered to investors in those 77 countries converges over time to a common (“global”) menu of funds. I trace this surprisingly simple and uniform process of global menu convergence to the actions of individual fund families who follow similar growth paths. My results shed new light on the aggregate process of financial innovation and the industrial organization of the asset management industry that appears to produce the same “wholesale” menu around the world"--