Download or read book Three Essays on Auction and Information Markets written by Ricardo Ungo and published by . This book was released on 2003 with total page 172 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Three Essays on Auction Markets written by Nicholas James Shunda and published by . This book was released on 2008 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Three essays on auction retail risk management and market share evolution written by Xiaorui Hu and published by . This book was released on 2000 with total page 226 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Three Essays on the Effects of Information in Online Markets written by and published by . This book was released on 2012 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This dissertation contains three essays on the effects of information in online markets. The first essay examines an online market for digital music and how consumers may learn from one another when making their decisions. In markets where a product is of unknown quality and consumers observe information about the previous actions of others, models of observational learning often predict herding behavior. The possible consequences of this herding behavior include consumers ignoring a high quality product and consumers spending resources on a low quality product (i.e., bad herds). In this essay, I estimate the probability of the former (bad herd on a high quality product) in an online digital music market named Amie Street Music. In addition, I examine the effect of moving from a fixed pricing scheme (iTunes, Amazon) to a demand-based pricing scheme (Amie Street) on the probability of a bad herd, expected consumer costs and expected long run revenue. I find that there is a 2% probability that consumers ignore a high quality song in the Amie Street market, compared to a 100% probability with a fixed price as low as 30 cents. Using bid data from 8,000 Chevrolet Corvettes sold on eBay, the second essay empirically tests Akerlof's (1970) hypothesis that the used car market is characterized by low quality and informational problems. The hypothesis states that the used market has a higher proportion of low quality cars than the new market and buyers account for the difference by discounting their value for a used car relative to a new car. This is tested by comparing bids on new and late model used 'Vettes. The paper finds little evidence of a premium for new 'Vettes. Two other tests are performed and results of these tests also show little evidence of information problems on eBay Motors. Finally, in the third essay, I test whether bidders shade their bids for Chevrolet Corvettes in response to changes in the supply of other Corvettes up for auction. The results suggest that bidders are shading their bids, even when the other cars up for auction are not perfect substitutes.

Download or read book Three Essays in Auction and Information written by Tao-yi Joseph Wang and published by . This book was released on 2005 with total page 308 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Three Essays on Restricted Market Participation in Auctions Incomplete Markets and Posted price Selling written by Subir Bose and published by . This book was released on 1996 with total page 85 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Market Institutions written by Garrett H. Milam and published by . This book was released on 2002 with total page 214 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Three Essays in Applied Economics written by Dominic Herzog and published by . This book was released on 2015 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Three Essays in Auctions and Information Acquisition written by Gabor Virag and published by . This book was released on 2004 with total page 250 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Essays on Market Design and Auction Theory written by Seungwon (Eugene) Jeong and published by . This book was released on 2015 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This dissertation consists of three essays on market design and auction theory. In Chapter 1, I introduce new multidimensional auction mechanisms. In many auctions, because of externalities, each bidder has a different maximum willingness to pay in order to beat each specific competitor, which causes the following new problem. When there are three bidders, two bidders might compete against each other unnecessarily and have worse payoffs than if they had lost to the third bidder, i.e., the two bidders have "group winner regret, " which can also lead to inefficiency. While no one-dimensional-bid mechanism is efficient, the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) may require losers to pay. This paper introduces a novel mechanism, the "multidimensional second-price" (MSP) auction (and its open ascending version), and characterizes it. MSP is free of a loser's payment, pairwise stable, and has good incentive properties, including no group winner regret. Moreover, the winner cannot win at any different price by any misreport, and a loser cannot be better off winning by any misreport. MSP is strategyproof for a bidder without externalities imposed by others, and it reduces to the second-price auction when there are no externalities. Simulations suggest that MSP outperforms the second-price auction in terms of both revenue and efficiency. In Chapter 2, I study properties of VCG when externalities exist, and introduce shill bidding strategies that weakly dominate truthful bidding. When externalities exist, VCG is efficient, incentive compatible, and individually rational. However, as occurs in package auctions without externalities, VCG outcomes may not be in the core. Moreover, VCG is not pairwise stable. Due to externalities, several additional problems occur. VCG may require losing bidders to pay, which might be undesirable. Also, it might be budget infeasible, and the auctioneer might need to pay the winner a subsidy. The subsidy problem can occur even when all bids are positive. Furthermore, unlike package auctions without externalities, there exists a shill bidding strategy that weakly dominates truthful bidding. In addition, when this shill bidding is used, there is no Nash equilibrium. Each bidder is better off using an infinite number of shills, which eventually makes VCG undefined. In Chapter 3, I study properties of VCG in the advertising auction setting. Even though VCG is incentive compatible (IC) in the advertising auction setting, the actual implementation of VCG in practice is not VCG per se. The main reason is that the price needs to be determined when the billing event happens at the same time as the estimation of click-through rate (CTR) or position discount (PD) is occurring. After all, advertising auctions charge the estimate of externalities. However, even in this "estimated" VCG (eVCG), CTR miscalibration does not ruin IC. Even when PD miscalibration exists, IC still holds with "perfect competition." Regarding efficiency and revenue, both CTR and PD miscalibrations matter. Interestingly, however, the revenue of the auctioneer does not necessarily decrease by underbidding.

Download or read book Three Essays in Empirical Auctions written by Sudip Gupta and published by . This book was released on 2005 with total page 148 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Three Essays in Financial Markets The Bright Side of Financial Derivatives Options Trading and Firm Innovation written by Iván Blanco and published by Ed. Universidad de Cantabria. This book was released on 2019-02-15 with total page 90 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Do financial derivatives enhance or impede innovation? We aim to answer this question by examining the relationship between equity options markets and standard measures of firm innovation. Our baseline results show that firms with more options trading activity generate more patents and patent citations per dollar of R&D invested. We then investigate how more active options markets affect firms' innovation strategy. Our results suggest that firms with greater trading activity pursue a more creative, diverse and risky innovation strategy. We discuss potential underlying mechanisms and show that options appear to mitigate managerial career concerns that would induce managers to take actions that boost short-term performance measures. Finally, using several econometric specifications that try to account for the potential endogeneity of options trading, we argue that the positive effect of options trading on firm innovation is causal.

Download or read book Three Essays on Auctions and Innovation written by Thomas Giebe and published by . This book was released on 2009 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Three Essays on Auctions and Innovations written by Thomas Giebe and published by . This book was released on 2009 with total page 89 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Three Essays on Auction Theory written by Xiaoshu Xu and published by . This book was released on 2011 with total page 63 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Abstract: My dissertation consists of three chapters in theoretical auction analysis. The first chapter considers optimal sequential auctions with new bidders arriving in each period. The second chapter examines how resale affects bidding strategies and auction outcomes in an auction environment with costly entry. The third chapter investigates how resale affects bidding strategies and auction outcomes in a sequential auction setting where the values of items auctioned in different periods exhibit synergies. The first chapter gives a full characterization of the optimal sequential second-price (or ascending English) auctions with sequentially arriving bidders. There are n bidders in the first period and m new bidders arrive in the second period. Based on the auctioneer's commitment power, we study two cases: full commitment and noncommitment. In both cases, we establish the existence of a symmetric equilibrium characterized by a threshold strategy - -a bidder does not bid in the first auction when her valuation is below this threshold and bids according to an increasing function otherwise. In the noncommitment case, the auctioneer chooses an optimal reserve price to maximize the expected revenue from the second period; thus her decision of whether to include previous bidders as potential buyers is endogenously determined by the reserve price in the first auction. This might create multiple equilibria depending on the beliefs of the auctioneer and the bidders. We apply a fairly intuitive rule to establish the uniqueness. We also extend our analysis to allow for opportunities for resale, where the winner in the first auction can opt to resell the item to new bidders. The second chapter, joint with Dan Levin and Lixin Ye, studies how resale affects auctions with costly entry in a model where an arbitrary number of bidders possess two-dimensional private information signals: entry costs and valuations. We establish the existence of symmetric entry equilibrium and identify sufficient conditions under which the equilibrium is unique. Our analysis suggests that the opportunity of resale induces motivation for both speculative entry and bargain hunting abstentions. By following the uniform distribution for numerical analysis, our results suggest that while the entry probability and efficiency are always higher when resale is allowed, the auctioneer's expected revenue is lower when resale is allowed for almost all parameter values. We also compare this model to one where bidders may follow "strong" or "weak" distributions in terms of valuations. The third chapter, joint with Dan Levin and Lixin Ye, studies a sequential second-price auction of two objects with two bidders, where the winner of the package obtains a synergy from the second object. If reselling after the two auctions occurs, it proceeds as either monopoly or monopsony take-it-or-leave-it offer. I find that a post-auction resale has a significant impact on bidding strategies in the auctions. When seller makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer in resale, there is no equilibrium where at least one bidder reveals her type with positive probability. When buyer makes the offer instead, there exist symmetric increasing equilibrium strategies for both items. While allowing resale always improves efficiency, I demonstrate that the effect of resale is ambiguous on expected revenue as Ill as the probability of exposure. I also extend this model to allow for three bidders and provide the equilibrium analysis.

Download or read book Three Essays on Empirical Asset Pricing in International Equity Markets written by Birgit Charlotte Müller and published by Springer Gabler. This book was released on 2021-08-20 with total page 147 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In this Open-Access-book three essays on empirical asset pricing in international equity markets are presented. Despite being of fundamental economic and scientific importance, international financial markets have remained considerably underresearched until today. In the first essay, the role of firm-specific characteristics is analyzed for the momentum effect to exist in international equity markets. The second essay investigates the validity, persistence, and robustness of the newly discovered capital share growth factor across international equity markets as proposed by Lettau et al. (2019) for the U.S. market. Lastly, the third and final essay studies stock market reactions of European vendor banks to distressed loan sale announcements.

Download or read book Three Essays on Financial Markets written by Min Hwang and published by . This book was released on 2001 with total page 322 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: