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Book Three Essays in Evolutionary Game Theory

Download or read book Three Essays in Evolutionary Game Theory written by Jack Robles and published by . This book was released on 1996 with total page 148 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Book Exploring Individual Preferences in Economic Contexts

Download or read book Exploring Individual Preferences in Economic Contexts written by Niko Noeske and published by . This book was released on 2011 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Book Essays in Evolutionary Game Theory

Download or read book Essays in Evolutionary Game Theory written by Jonas Björnerstedt and published by . This book was released on 1995 with total page 167 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Book Essays on Evolutionary Game Theory and Its Applications

Download or read book Essays on Evolutionary Game Theory and Its Applications written by Shota Fujishima and published by . This book was released on 2013 with total page 95 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This dissertation consists of three essays on evolutionary game theory and its applications. The first essay considers mechanism design in the evolutionary game-theoretic framework. The second essay studies equilibrium selection of coordination games by using an evolutionary game-theoretic concept. The third essay formulates a multi-regional economic growth model as an evolutionary game and characterizes the stability of its equilibria under an evolutionary dynamic. The summaries of each essay are provided below. In the first essay, I consider an implementation problem in a class of congestion games with players that have heterogeneous costs of taking actions. One application is to traffic congestion with drivers having heterogeneous time costs. The planner would like to design a price scheme under which the economy converges to an epsilon-optimum from any initial state when he does not have full knowledge of the cost functions, and he can observe only the aggregate strategy distribution. Although the planner would like to internalize the externalities, the informational constraints compel him to estimate their values. Using the optimality and equilibrium conditions, I construct a practical estimation procedure that yields the true values of externalities in the long-run. Moreover, I show that our scheme makes the epsilon-optimum globally stable under the best response dynamic if the externalities among players taking the same action are sufficiently large relative to those among players taking different actions. In the second essay, I study the long-run outcomes of noisy asynchronous repeated games with players that are heterogeneous in in terms of their patience. The players repeatedly play a 2-by-2 coordination game with random pair-wise matching. The games are noisy because the players may make mistakes when choosing their actions and are asynchronous because only one player can move in each period. I characterize the long-run outcomes of Markov perfect equilibrium that are robust to the mistakes and show that if there is a sufficiently patient player, the efficient state can be the unique robust outcome even if it is risk-dominated. Because I need heterogeneity for the result, I argue that it enables the most patient player in effect to be the leader. In the third essay, I consider a microfounded urban growth model with two regions and a mass of mobile workers to study interactions among growth, agglomeration, and urban congestion. Unlike previous research in the urban growth literature, I formulate the model as a one-shot game and take an evolutionary game-theoretic approach for stability analysis. My approach enables us to analyze the stability of nonstationary equilibria in which populations of each region are not constant over time. I show that if both the expenditure share for housing and inter-regional transport cost are small, a stable stationary equilibrium does not exist. Moreover, in such a case, I show that there can exist a stable nonstationary equilibrium in which mobile workers agglomerate in one region at first but some of them migrate to the other region later. I argue that such a nonstationary location pattern is related to return migration.

Book Essays in Evolutionary Game Theory

Download or read book Essays in Evolutionary Game Theory written by Srinivas Arigapudi and published by . This book was released on 2021 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This dissertation consists of three self-contained chapters. The first chapter studies the effect of introducing a bilingual option on the long run equilibrium outcome in a class of two-strategy coordination games with distinct payoff and risk dominant equilibria under the logit choice rule. Existing results show that in the class of two-strategy games under consideration, the inefficient risk dominant equilibrium is selected in the long run under noisy best response models. We show that if the cost of the bilingual option is sufficiently low then the efficient payoff dominant equilibrium will be selected in the long run under the logit choice rule. The second chapter studies a model of stochastic evolution under the probit choice rule. In the small noise double limit, where first the noise level in agents' decisions is taken to zero, and then the population size to infinity, escape from and transitions between equilibria can be described in terms of solutions to continuous optimal control problems. We use resultsfrom optimal control theory to solve the exit cost problem. This is used to determine the most likely exit paths from the initial basin of attraction and also to assess the expected time until the evolutionary process leaves the basin of attraction of a stable equilibrium in a class of three-strategy coordination games. The third chapter (joint work with Yuval Heller and Igal Milchtaich) studies the population dynamics under which each revising agent tests each action k times, with each trial being against a newly drawn opponent, and chooses the action whose mean payoff was highest during the testing phase. When k = 1, defection is globally stable in the prisoner's dilemma.By contrast, when k > 1 we show that, if the gains from defection are not too large, there exists a globally stable state in which agents cooperate with probability between 28% and 50%. Next, we characterize stability of strict equilibria in general games. Our results demonstrate that the empirically plausible case of k > 1 can yield qualitatively different predictions than the case k = 1 commonly studied in the literature.

Book Three Essays in Game Theory

Download or read book Three Essays in Game Theory written by Jeroen M. Swinkels and published by . This book was released on 1990 with total page 256 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Book Three Essays in Game Theory

Download or read book Three Essays in Game Theory written by Samuel Häfner and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page 125 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Book Essays in Evolutionary Game Theory

Download or read book Essays in Evolutionary Game Theory written by Joerg Oechssler and published by . This book was released on 1994 with total page 190 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Book Three Essays in Game Theory

Download or read book Three Essays in Game Theory written by Doru C. Cojoc and published by . This book was released on 2004 with total page 188 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Book Three Essays on Game Theory and Computation

Download or read book Three Essays on Game Theory and Computation written by Elham Nikram and published by . This book was released on 2016 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Book Three Essays in Game Theory

Download or read book Three Essays in Game Theory written by Bo Chen and published by . This book was released on 2007 with total page 188 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Book How to improve the applicability of game theory

Download or read book How to improve the applicability of game theory written by Philipp Christoph Wichardt and published by . This book was released on 2006 with total page 109 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Book Three Essays in Game Theory

Download or read book Three Essays in Game Theory written by Leslie McFarland Marx and published by . This book was released on 1994 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Book Three Essays in Game Theory

Download or read book Three Essays in Game Theory written by Maria Kozlovskaya and published by . This book was released on 2016 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Book Three Essays on Game Theory and Its Applications

Download or read book Three Essays on Game Theory and Its Applications written by Sunku Hahn and published by . This book was released on 1998 with total page 184 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Book Essays in Evolutionary Game Theory

Download or read book Essays in Evolutionary Game Theory written by and published by . This book was released on 2015 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Book Three Essays in Applied Game Theory

Download or read book Three Essays in Applied Game Theory written by Michael E. Conlin and published by . This book was released on 1995 with total page 286 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: