Download or read book Synchronizing Airpower and Other Operational Fires The Joint Force Commander s Role written by and published by . This book was released on 2003 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Poor decisions by the Joint Force Commander (JFC) regarding command relationships and synchronization procedures will inhibit effective employment of airpower and other operational fires given the compressed time, greater mobility, and enhanced lethality of twenty-first century warfare. The trend toward a smaller force structure, diminished acceptance of collateral damage and increased involvement by political leaders makes the modern battlefield less forgiving to errors in command relationships, apportionment, targeting, and fire support coordination. Operation Desert Storm proves that improper command relationships, incorrect apportionment, absence of a joint targeting coordination board (JTCB), and poor placement of the fire support coordination line (FSCL) will prevent accomplishing the desired end state even with a harmonious operational design. Operation Allied Force demonstrates that success is elusive and operational fires ineffective with incoherent national policy objectives, poor center of gravity analysis, unsuitable command relationships, fruitless apportionment, and a nonexistent JTCB. This analysis suggests that for the effective employment of operational fires, U.S. Joint Doctrine should require the JFC to construct a coherent operational design and then actively orchestrate synchronization by designating component commanders, initiating a logical air apportionment decision, establishing a JTCB, and then controlling placement of the FSCL for any campaign or major operation.

Download or read book The Role of the Joint Force Commander in Synchronizing Operational Fires written by and published by . This book was released on 2003 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Poor decisions by the JFC regarding command relationships and synchronization procedures will inhibit effective employment of operational fires given the compressed time, greater mobility, and enhanced lethality of twenty-first century warfare. The trend toward a smaller force structure, diminished acceptance of collateral damage and increased involvement by political leaders makes the modern battlefield less forgiving to errors in command relationships, apportionment, targeting, and fire support coordination. Operation Desert Storm (ODS) proves that improper command relationships, incorrect apportionment, absence of a JTCB, and poor placement of the FSCL will prevent accomplishing the desired end state even with a harmonious Operational Design. Operation Allied Force (OAF) demonstrates that success is elusive and operational fires are ineffective with incoherent national policy objectives, poor COO analysis, unsuitable command relationships, fruitless apportionment, and a nonexistent JTCB. This analysis suggests that U.S. Joint Doctrine should mandate that JFCs construct a coherent Operational Design, designate component commanders, and use appropriate synchronization procedures to effectively employ operational fires for any campaign or major operation.

Download or read book Synchronizing Airpower And Firepower In The Deep Battle written by Lt.-Col. R. Kent Lauchbaum and published by Pickle Partners Publishing. This book was released on 2015-11-06 with total page 138 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In this award-winning study on Synchronizing Airpower and Firepower in the Deep Battle, Lt.-Col. R. Kent Lauchbaum argues that current joint doctrine does not provide sufficient and acceptable guidance for synchronizing Air Force and Army deep operations. To improve such synchronization, Colonel Lauchbaum proposes five modifications to current joint doctrine.

Download or read book Synchronizing Airpower and Firepower in the Deep Battle written by R. Kent Laughbaum and published by . This book was released on 2009-01-30 with total page 90 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The concept of "deep battle" was formally introduced to US war fighters during the early 1980s through the US Army's AirLand Battle doctrine. As envisioned by Air Force and Army leaders, the initial purpose for the deep battle was to delay and weaken Soviet second and follow-on echelons during a European conventional war. Within the AirLand Battle construct, the Air Force had responsibility for synchronizing deep operations and for employing air interdiction against Soviet maneuver forces to set the conditions for victory in the decisive "close battle." The fire support coordination line (FSCL), normally positioned at field artillery maximum range from the forward line of troops (FLOT), separated the Air Force's deep operations from the Army's close battle. During the late 1980s the Army began fielding a potent deep-battle capability of its own. Concurrently, Army doctrine assigned to the ground force commander responsibility for synchronizing deep operations with the close battle. Thus were planted the seeds of conflict with the Air Force over management of the deep battle. To better influence deep operations, the Army defined the FSCL as a permissive fire support coordination measure and also extended the range of the FSCL from the FLOT. The Persian Gulf War "field tested" US deep-battle doctrine. The joint force air component commander (JFACC) synchronized deep operations using several ad hoc procedures approved by the joint force commander (JFC). By most Air Force accounts, the deep battle was well managed and executed, except for the Army's use of the FSCL during the last days of the war. Conversely, the Army was thoroughly disappointed with prosecution of the deep battle during Operation Desert Storm. Army frustration arose from the fact that the deep battle was synchronized by the JFACC and not by the ground force commander-a direct violation of joint and Army doctrine. Joint doctrine produced since the Gulf War has attempted to create a framework for synchronizing airpower and land-based firepower in the deep battle. In spite of that effort, many contentious issues between airmen and soldiers remain unresolved, chief among them the matter of command relationships on and above the deep battlefield. In this award-winning study on Synchronizing Airpower and Firepower in the Deep Battle, Lt Col R. Kent Laughbaum argues that current joint doctrine does not provide sufficient and acceptable guidance for synchronizing Air Force and Army deep operations. To improve such synchronization, Colonel Laughbaum proposes five modifications to current joint doctrine: assign the joint force commander responsibility for establishing and positioning the fire support coordination line; redefine the fire support coordination line as a restrictive fire support coordination measure; include all planned airpower, firepower, and maneuver operations beyond the fire support coordination line in the air tasking order; position the fire support coordination line relatively close to the forward line of own troops, typically no farther than the maximum range of tube artillery; and restrict planned air interdiction missions from targets short of the fire support coordination line.

Download or read book Synchronizing Airpower and Firepower in the Deep Battle written by and published by . This book was released on 1997 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Deep battle was formally introduced to US warfighters through the Armys AirLand Battle doctrine during the early 1980s. The initial purpose for the deep battle, as envisioned by Air Force and Army leaders, was to delay and weaken Soviet second and follow-on echelons during a European conventional war. Within the AirLand Battle construct, the Air Force had the responsibility for synchronizing deep operations, and planned to employ air interdiction against Soviet maneuver forces to set the conditions for victory in the decisive close battle. The fire support coordination line, normally positioned at field artillery maximum range from the FLOT, separated the Air Forces deep operations from the Army s close battle. During the late 1980s, the Army fielded a potent deep battle capability. Concurrently, Army doctrine assigned the ground forces commander the responsibility for synchronizing deep operations with the close battle germinating the seeds of conflict with the Air Force over deep battle management. To better influence deep operations, the Army defined the FSCL as a permissive fire support coordination measure and also extended the range of fire support coordination line from the FLOT. The Persian Gulf War tested US deep battle doctrine. The JFACC, synchronized deep operations using several ad hoc procedures approved by the JFC. By most Air Force accounts the deep battle was well managed and executed, except for the Army s use of the FSCL during the last days of the war. Conversely, the Army was thoroughly disappointed with the prosecution of the deep battle during Desert Storm. Army frustration stems from the fact that the deep battle was synchronized by the JFACC and not by the ground forces commander in violation of Joint and Army doctrine. Joint doctrine produced since the Gulf War attempts to create a framework to synchronize airpowerand acceptable guidance to synchronize Air Force and Army deep operations. Re-defi.

Download or read book Coordinating Operational Fires for the Twenty First Century written by Gregory B. Schultz and published by . This book was released on 1998 with total page 62 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Operational fires have played an increasingly vital role in the campaign plans of Joint Force Commanders as technology has increased the ability to identify, target, and engage enemy forces, facilities, and functions throughout the depth of the battlefield. In the past, operational fires, in the form of air interdiction, have predominantly been the responsibility of the Air Force since they have possessed the systems to range and engage the enemy effectively at operational depths. New and developing capabilities like JSTARS, ATACMS, Extended Range MLRS, Apache Longbow, and brilliant munitions, are increasing the complexity, potential, and joint nature of operational fires. These capabilities have contributed to the increased emphasis on joint operations and has led to considerable debate on the issue of operational fire planning, coordination, and execution. This monograph examines the need for a Joint Force Fires Coordinator (JFFC) to help maximize the potential of operational fires. To determine whether a JFFC is needed, this paper first examines the nature and concept of operational fires from contextual and doctrinal perspectives. This is done by reviewing the historical background and development of operational fires and the Army, Air Force, and Joint doctrine regarding operational fires and interdiction planning, coordination, and execution. Using the criteria of effectiveness, efficiency, and unity of effort, this paper then reviews the experiences of joint and service component planners during the Gulf War and identifies problems or shortcomings in current doctrine and procedures. This paper concludes that shortcomings in joint doctrine, combined with competing interests and perspectives by the component services prevents the optimal use of operational fires.

Download or read book Analysis of the Function to Coordinate Synchronize and Integrate Fire Support as Accomplished by an Army Corps Acting as a Joint Task Force written by Harold T. Fields and published by . This book was released on 1997 with total page 160 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: "This Research Product provides a detailed description of joint fires as accomplished by an Army Corps acting as a Joint Task Force. It is one in a series that describes the tasks, performers, and outcomes for the combat function of Coordinate, Synchronize, and Integrate Fire Support. Assessment criteria are provided for reports in this series except for the one at Brigade level. Reports focus on fire support at the echelons of Brigade, Division, and Corps and to related functions at Corps as a Joint Task Force. This series of Research Products provides resource documents for military and civilian trainers to assist in the design and evaluation of single service and joint training. Doctrinal writers may use these descriptions as a basis for modifying current doctrine or for the formulation of future doctrine."--DTIC.

Download or read book Command and Control of Operational Fires How Will It Be Done written by Gary Supnick and published by . This book was released on 1998 with total page 24 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Recent advances in weapon and information systems have enhanced the impact Service components can have on the future battlefield. As a result of this technological explosion the method by which the operational or Joint Force Commander can command and control operational fires has become a dilemma requiring new methods to accomplish this coordination task. New and improved weapon systems now provide the tactical commander and all Service components the ability to contribute to the Joint Force Commander's operational fires. Upcoming information systems will greatly increase the speed of real-time targeting, battle damage assessment and retargeting information. As a consequence of the increased depth of the tactical commander's battlefield and the net-centric manner in which battlefield information is expected to be shared, the command and control of operational fires has become a problem for the Joint Force Commander. Current procedures for the planning of operational fires are antiquated in light of new technology. If the Joint Force Commander is to command and control his operational fires and maintain the tempo of the battlespace certain steps must be taken. These steps include creating a Deep Battle Synchronization Line, a designated operational fires cell at the Joint Task Force level and the approval of joint fires doctrine which currently remains in the draft format.

Download or read book Operational Fires Improving Doctrine to Apply the Operational Art to Fires written by and published by . This book was released on 2002 with total page 22 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper analyzes whether joint doctrine adequately provides a framework for the Joint Forces Commander to apply the operational art to fires. With the increased lethality of precision, fires will play an increased role in campaign plans of the future. Joint Doctrine should enable the Joint Force commander to employ the facets of Operational art to the function of fires. Operation Desert Storm demonstrated the capabilities and challenges of employing fires at the Joint Operational level. Operational fires facilitated the rapid collapse of Iraqi ground forces during the coalition's four day ground offensive. Friction, however, arose between the ground and air components, both while fires were shaping the battle space and during the offensive. The doctrine developed since Desert Storm still leaves unanswered questions concerning who is responsible for operational fires and where they will be delivered. This paper recommends that joint doctrine be developed for operational fires. New joint doctrine should prescribe the direction of joint-operational fires under a single joint command. Doctrine should also address how the battle space should be divided to facilitate the Joint Force Commander's concept of fires. Finally, doctrine should anticipate that maneuver may be conducted to support operational fires.

Download or read book Coordinating Operational Fires in a High Risk Battle Space A New Concept for the Joint Commander written by and published by . This book was released on 2001 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Current joint doctrine is adequate for coordinating fires up to the corps/MEF level. Operation Allied Force, the 78-day major air operation designed to stop Serb aggression in Kosovo from March to June 1999, has clearly shown the need for a common method to coordinate operational fires and ground maneuver, while simultaneously minimizing collateral damage. The Joint Force Commander has a requirement for a permanent joint staff fires element to plan, coordinate and execute fires to support the JFC's overall objectives. My thesis emphasizes that the solution is not a technological one, but one capitalizing on service experts to form a joint fires cell. In my opinion, the joint fires problem stems from a combination of factors; lack of joint integration at the JFC level, and no one with their finger on the pulse of the total joint fires picture. My thesis proposes a way that the joint staff could be integrated to more effectively address the joint fires function of the JFC.

Download or read book Operational Fires for the 21st Century The Argument for a Joint Fires Coordinator written by and published by . This book was released on 1998 with total page 53 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A void exists in current joint doctrine concerning operational fires for the joint task force. This vacuum is doubly troubling when the proliferation of increasingly capable information management systems, digital communications links, all weather target acquisition assets, and precision attack systems is considered. The Persian Gulf War highlighted weaknesses in inter-service cooperation of fire support, but seven years after the conflict, substantive changes to resolve these doctrinal problems remain unmade. As part of a solution, this paper argues for the creation of a Joint Forces Fire Support Coordinator and a Joint Fire Support Cell to coordinate operational fires for the joint force commander. It further asserts the continued viability of the Fire Support Coordination Line while suggesting the need for a doctrinal boundary delineating the areas of responsibility of the land and air component commanders. This work uses data on the technical capabilities and interoperability of service component systems to demonstrate that operational fires, offering decisive battlefield effects, are reasonable to assume in the near future. Operational theories from students at the Command and General Staff College, Army War College, and Naval War College are used to support the argument that many of those assets now dedicated to air interdiction and deep attack by individual services should be fused into a unified combat power capable of effecting decisive results at the operational level.

Download or read book The Joint Fires Element An Initial Solution written by and published by . This book was released on 2003 with total page 24 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The 21st Century joint force will be the centerpiece for a wide range of military operations that will emphasize gaining operational and strategic effects against the enemy force. Modern systems, sophisticated communications, sensors and unprecedented battlefield awareness make more decentralized and independent operations easier to plan, coordinate and execute. As the joint task force assumes the role as the primary deployment arm of the military instrument, its commander must be capable of managing a multitude of operational level activities across a battle space that continues to change its shape and become less defined. The addition of the Joint Fires Element to the JTF provides the commander with a dedicated staff to ensure that the joint force is capable of successfully accomplishing the joint fire support tasks and allows component commanders to focus greater attention to planning and execution of assigned missions. Simply stated, there is a compelling need for a standing joint fires element at the joint task force headquarters to plan, coordinate and integrate joint fires into the commander's concept of operations. This paper briefly summarizes the need to modify current doctrine, presents the current state of staff roles and functions to manage joint fires, identifies where doctrine has attempted to appease its critics but fallen short of adequately addressing the key issues, and finally presents a suggested organization at the joint task force level to plan, coordinate and execute effective joint operational fires.

Download or read book The Fire Support Coordination Line written by Michael J. McMahon and published by . This book was released on 1994 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This monograph addresses the question of whether the concept of the Fire Support Coordination Line (FSCL) should be included in future joint doctrine. The FSCL was originally designed as a concept to fulfill a requirement for deconfliction of fires between air and ground forces to prevent fratricide. As the concept evolved it became a permissive FSCM to allow the delivery of uncoordinated fires into an area that the ground commander could not reach with his organic fires. The concept has changed over time to become a more restrictive measure, limiting the ability of the commander to influence a portion of his AO directly. In essence, the FSCL is being used to deconflict fires, particularly at the operational level, rather than to facilitate the integration of complementary capabilities of joint systems and operations. Furthermore, though the FSCL was at one time an appropriate and necessary control measure because of technological limitations, tremendous advances in information-age technology and a new battlefield environment increasingly characterized by non-linear operations have made the concept of the FSCL irrelevant. In fact, the FSCL impedes the JFC from applying joint fires on the battlefield in the most effective and efficient manner possible. The fundamental conclusion of the paper is that the FSCL is a concept behind its time, and should be eliminated from joint doctrine. Commanders should use boundaries, to include forward boundaries, to achieve unity of effort within their AOs. The Joint Force Commander should control all assets that can be applied as operational fires through an Integrated Tasking Order, and should apportion control of resources to subordinate commanders to accomplish his intent. Within their AOs, commanders should continue to use other FSCM to mold their battlefield. Finally, advances in information technology must be exploited jointly so that commanders can integrate fully the complementary capabilities offered by the service component.

Download or read book Joint Fires Coordination Service Specialties and Boundary Challenges written by and published by . This book was released on 1997 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Among the challenges facing joint force commanders today is the coordination of operational and tactical fires which traverse boundaries within a joint operations area. These boundaries are the demarcation of deep and close battlespaces within individual areas of operations that are normally controlled by different supported commanders. Adequate coordination among supported commanders is pivotal to avoid fratricide and reduce duplication of effort. Unfortunately, joint doctrine does not adequately address how commanders can ensure economy of force and unity of effort when conducting joint fires. Specifically, the challenge is most critical in the area between the Fire Support Coordination Line (FSCL) and the Joint Force Land Component Commander's (JFLCC) forward boundary because joint fires must complement future operational maneuvers. This paper evaluates the issue of joint fires coordination by examining joint and service doctrine publications, combatant command directives, and the Joint Universal Lessons Learned (JULLs) database. Interviews were also conducted to gain a deeper understanding of the problem. In short, there is no common understanding among services about joint fires coordination, operational and tactical fires, and deep battlespace missions. This challenge can be resolved by modifying joint doctrine to address adequately joint fires that traverse intratheater boundaries. Recommendations include creating a coordination element within each supported commander's staff and providing the JFLCC an adequate maneuvering area beyond the FSCL to independently conduct deep operational maneuvers.

Download or read book Joint Fires Coordination Service Competencies and Boundary Challenges written by and published by . This book was released on 1999 with total page 9 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The boundaries between close and deep battlespace will vary among combatant commands in typical theaters of operations. The point at which deep and close battlespace meet rates attention from planners because it challenges joint force commanders (JFCs) who must conduct tactical and operational fires and maneuvers as well as joint fire support. One cause for this consideration is the umbrella under which joint fires are placed, where cross-boundary coordination is critical for synchronized actions that create economy of force, unity of effort, and integrated joint operations. Joint doctrine does not sufficiently address intra-theater, cross-boundary joint fires coordination. The answer lies in modifying doctrine. This proposal can be examined in joint publications, joint universal lessons learned (JULL) archives, combined forces command, and combatant command boundary relationships and sources. The problem transcends service interests. More importantly, lives depend on adequate joint fires coordination. A review of the differences between terms of art and service perspectives on battlespace reveals the implications of this issue for commanders and suggests some solutions.

Download or read book Integrating Space Based Fires Into the Joint Force After Next written by and published by . This book was released on 2000 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: How should future commanders integrate space-based fires into their combat operations? Space-based fires represent a significant departure from traditional force structure. They present such an interesting challenge because of their global nature and their out-of-theater planning and execution processes. As a result, fires from space will require significant integration from the operational to tactical level. Unfortunately, current doctrine on commanding, planning and executing is insufficient to accommodate space-based fires. This paper blends current joint and service doctrine on space operations, fires, fire support and command and control with emerging methodologies on out-of-theater support operations, to create a more comprehensive view on how space-based fires integrate with in-theater combat forces at the operational and tactical levels. The author contends a strong tactical space control system, leveraging communication combined with the establishment of specific support relationships at the right echelons will allow for coherent and effective integration of space-based fires in the joint force after next.

Download or read book Military Strategy Joint Operations and Airpower written by Ryan Burke and published by Georgetown University Press. This book was released on 2022 with total page 277 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This second edition of Military Strategy, Joint Operations, and Airpower introduces contemporary strategy at the operational level of war. Developed as foundational reading for all US Air Force Academy cadets, this textbook is designed to close the gap between military theory and practice.