Download or read book Strategic Reflections Operation Iraqi Freedom written by George W. George W. Casey and published by CreateSpace. This book was released on 2015-03-18 with total page 226 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom were the first major wars of the 21st century. They will not be the last. They have significantly impacted how the U.S. Government and military think about prosecuting wars. They will have a generational impact on the U.S. military, as its future leaders, particularly those in the ground forces, will for decades be men and women who served in Iraq and Afghanistan. It is imperative that leaders at all levels, both military and civilian, share their experiences to ensure that we, as a military and as a country, gain appropriate insights for the future. When General George W. Casey, Jr., was the Army chief of staff, he encouraged leaders at the war colleges, staff colleges, and advanced courses to write about what they did in Iraq and Afghanistan so that others could be better prepared when they faced similar challenges. This book is General Casey's effort to follow his own advice, offering narratives and insights about his tenure as commander of Multi-National Force-Iraq so that future leaders can be better prepared for the next conflict.
Download or read book Strategic Reflections written by George W. Casey and published by Military Bookshop. This book was released on 2012-10 with total page 226 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom were the first major wars of the 21st century. They will not be the last. They have significantly impacted how the U.S. Government and military think about prosecuting wars. They will have a generational impact on the U.S. military, as its future leaders, particularly those in the ground forces, will for decades be men and women who served in Iraq and Afghanistan. It is imperative that leaders at all levels, both military and civilian, share their experiences to ensure that we, as a military and as a country, gain appropriate insights for the future. When General George W. Casey, Jr., was the Army chief of staff, he encouraged leaders at the war colleges, staff colleges, and advanced courses to write about what they did in Iraq and Afghanistan so that others could be better prepared when they faced similar challenges. This book is General Casey's effort to follow his own advice, offering narratives and insights about his tenure as commander of Multi-National Force-Iraq so that future leaders can be better prepared for the next conflict.
Download or read book Strategic Reflections Operation Iraqi Freedom July 2004 February 2007 written by Jr. George W. Casey and published by Lulu.com. This book was released on 2014-02 with total page 228 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom were the first major wars of the 21st century. They will not be the last. They have significantly impacted how our government and military think about prosecuting wars. They will have a generational impact on the U.S. military, as its future leaders, particularly those in the ground forces, will for decades be men and women who served in Iraq and Afghanistan.* I believe it is imperative that leaders at all levels, both military and civilian, share their experiences to ensure that we, as a military and as a country, gain appropriate insights for the future. As the Army chief of staff, I encouraged leaders at the war colleges, staff colleges, and advanced courses to write about what they did in Iraq and Afghanistan so that others could be better prepared when they faced similar challenges. This book is my effort to follow my own advice. I believe that we have not seen the last of the challenges and demands that I faced during..
Download or read book Strategic Reflections Operation Iraqi Freedom July 2004 February 2007 October 2012 written by and published by . This book was released on 2013 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Strategic Reflections written by Department of Defense and published by . This book was released on 2017-10-20 with total page 112 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Author General Casey writes: Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom were the first major wars of the 21st century. They will not be the last. They have significantly impacted how our government and military think about prosecuting wars. They will have a generational impact on the U.S. military, as its future leaders, particularly those in the ground forces, will for decades be men and women who served in Iraq and Afghanistan. I believe it is imperative that leaders at all levels, both military and civilian, share their experiences to ensure that we, as a military and as a country, gain appropriate insights for the future. As the Army chief of staff, I encouraged leaders at the war colleges, staff colleges, and advanced courses to write about what they did in Iraq and Afghanistan so that others could be better prepared when they faced similar challenges. This book is my effort to follow my own advice. I believe that we have not seen the last of the challenges and demands that I faced during my 32 months of combined command in Iraq, and I offer these insights so that future leaders can be better prepared. During my command tenure, the Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) mission transitioned from one of occupation to one of partnership with three Iraqi governments. We used this period to lay the foundation for and begin the transition to a self-reliant Iraqi government, our mandate from the United Nations (UN). This book primarily addresses the events, decisions, and actions of MNF-I as I perceived them at the time. I have occasionally offered retrospective insights that come from experience and hindsight, but I felt it is more important to focus on what I thought and what I did then to provide the best insight into the challenges I faced and how I dealt with them. It reflects my insights as a commander in one theater of a broader war. In preparing this book, I relied on the historical records that I kept from Iraq-personal notes, briefings, plans, assessments, meeting notes - that, while decidedly incomplete, greatly sharpened my personal recollections and offered insights into how we viewed the situation over time and what we conveyed to our political leaders. They are available for research at the National Defense University. Chapter 1 - Preparing for the Mission (May-June 2004) * Framing the Mission * Building a Key Relationship * Consultations and Direction * Direct Insights * Confirmation * Chapter 2 - Establishing the Mission and Preparing for the First Elections (July 2004-January 2005) * Organizing for Success * Military Operations * Election Planning and Preparation * Looking Beyond the Elections * The First Elections: January 30, 2005 * Chapter 3 - Completing the UN Timeline and Setting Conditions for a New Iraq (January-December 2005) * Adapting in Transition * Completing the UN Timeline * Chapter 4 - Government Transition and the Rise of Sectarian Violence (January-June 2006) * Government Transition * The Samarra Bombing and Its Aftermath * Building New Partnerships * Camp David and June D.C. Consultations * Chapter 5 - The Toughest Days (July 2006-February 2007) * Adjusting the Plan * Civil-Military Relations * Military Operations in Baghdad * Washington Policy Review * Chapter 6 - Insights for Leaders * Developing Vision and Strategy * Creating Unity of Effort * Continuous Assessment and Adaptation * Influencing Organizational Culture * Civil-Military Interaction * Political-Military Integration * Momentum and Transitions * Sustaining Yourself
Download or read book Decisionmaking in Operation Iraqi Freedom written by Steven Metz and published by Strategic Studies Institute. This book was released on 2010 with total page 74 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In this second volume of the series, Dr. Metz looks carefully at the 2007 decision to surge forces into Iraq, a choice which is generally considered to have been effective in turning the tide of the war from potential disaster to possible, perhaps probable, strategic success. Although numerous strategic decisions remain to be made as the U.S. military executes its "responsible withdrawal" from Iraq, Dr. Metz has encapsulated much of the entire war in these two monographs, describing both the start and what may eventually be seen as the beginning of the end of the war. In this volume, he provides readers with an explanation of how a decision process that was fundamentally unchanged, with essentially the same people shaping and making the decision, could produce such a different result in 2007. As the current administration tries to replicate the surge in Afghanistan, this monograph shows the perils of attempting to achieve success in one strategic situation by copying actions successfully taken in another, but where different conditions applied.--
Download or read book Operation Iraqi Freedom written by Thomas Donnelly and published by American Enterprise Institute. This book was released on 2004 with total page 148 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This study argues that the George W. Bush administration charted the correct strategy in Iraq, but has failed to match its military means to its strategic ends.
Download or read book From Storm to Freedom written by John R Ballard and published by Naval Institute Press. This book was released on 2010-04-15 with total page 362 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: From Storm to Freedom analyzes and assesses the strategic interaction between Iraq and the United States from 1990 to 2009, from the perspective of a single, if discontinuous conflict. With this longer-term perspective, covering both Operation Desert Storm and Operation Iraqi Freedom, the book clarifies the long road of war against Iraq. This work recounts presents the evolution of counterinsurgency operations from 2003 to 2009, explains the misunderstanding and miscommunication between government leaders in Iraq and the United States throughout the period and describes the ineffective nature of the UN sanctions, the inefficient efforts of the Clinton Administration and the impact of the preemptive strategy of the Bush Administration that led to conflict in 2002. The book first identifies the influence of the Vietnam era on the use of U.S. military power and the decision for war in 1990. The book then outlines the important factors of Iraqi history and culture which dominated relations between the two nations during the 1980s and 1990s. In subsequent chapters, the 1991 campaign of Desert Storm is analyzed from both the U.S. and Iraqi perspectives; then the military, economic and diplomatic actions of the period between the two more conventional, military parts of the conflict are assessed. The final chapters analyze the highly successful, 2003 conventional campaign from both perspectives; the ineffective post-war stabilization operations in Iraq which began with the failure to transition under the Coalition Provisional Authority; and the eventual development and implementation of a more effective strategy in Iraq – combining new doctrine and a “Surge” of forces to protect the population in a renewed counterinsurgency campaign. In a concluding chapter, the key lessons for the future are reviewed, including the importance of effective strategic decision-making and the mindset required to prosecute modern war.
Download or read book Decision Making in Operation Iraqi Freedom written by Steven Metz and published by Strategic Studies Institute. This book was released on 2010 with total page 70 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: One of the defining characteristics of strategy making in the Bush administration was the treatment of any decision involving transnational terrorism as a crisis with a limited slate of participants and a minimal role for professional expertise except on operational and technical considerations. When the administration broke from its predecessors and chose to approach the Iraq issue as part of the war on terrorism rather than as simply an element of regional stability, it shifted to a crisis decision mode. This was unusual since the Iraq conflict did not meet the usual requirements for a crisis: a very high threat and limited decision time. This initial volume provides a review of decisions made by senior military and civilian leaders during the several years thus far of the war in Iraq, and focuses on the how and why certain decisions were made.--
Download or read book Decision Making in Operation Iraqi Freedom written by Steven Metz and published by . This book was released on 2010 with total page 78 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: By the time Fred Kagan penned the comment cited above, victory had already long been the wrong word to describe whatever outcome was going to befall the American adventure in Iraq. An argument can be made that victory-success against military foes in war-was an appropriate term in April 2003, when U.S. military forces deposed Saddam Hussein, but a military-only victory was far out of reach by 2007. The goal of victory articulated by Kagan and President George W. Bush perhaps still had merit in galvanizing public support of the war.2 However, the better goal- particularly by late 2006, when a virulent insurgency and sectarian violence were raging in Iraq's cities- was some semblance of strategic success, which would not come about purely by military action. That success would necessarily include a significant military component, but also required a broader approach that would support Iraq's economic, political, and societal development. Just as victory over Adolf Hitler in World War II required the Marshall Plan to cement the achievements of combat in Europe, the "victory" of 2003 in Iraq would require by 2007 much more than just military force to produce conditions that would ultimately be helpful to advancing American interests in the Middle East. The military component of the 2007 effort to achieve a positive result in Iraq became popularly known as "the surge." In this second volume of the Strategic Studies Institute's Operation IRAQI FREEDOM Key Decisions Monograph Series, Dr. Steven Metz covers this critical decision in the Iraq war, but correctly posits that the surge was only part of a broad strategic shift that produced the success-still tenuous-of 2008 and beyond. In doing so, Dr. Metz debunks some of the "surge triumphalism." In this view, the surge was almost solely responsible for the improvements in security that enabled the emerging positive results in Iraq. General David Petraeus-the man whose name became synonymous with the surge-sees it differently. General Petraeus, who led the surge of troops into Iraq in 2007, freely admits that the success of the surge was due to a confluence of factors. Those factors include Iraqis tiring of both Sunni and Shi'a extremists, Iraqi Security Forces achieving at least limited capacity to provide security, and the U.S. military's growth in tactical and operational prowess in counterinsurgency. Dr. Metz argues that a "perfect storm" of conditions, accompanied by "good thinking, good luck, and good timing," were what allowed the success of the strategic shift that he describes. Dr. Metz may give short shrift to President George W. Bush's resolve and to the skill that General Petraeus and other senior leaders brought to the surge-or the strategic shift-but he presents a solid case against using the surge as a model for future operations, including in Afghanistan. Without similar conditions-and good thinking, luck, and timing- the surge of troops in Afghanistan may not produce anything like the positive strategic results that appear to be emerging in Iraq.
Download or read book After the War in Iraq written by Shai Feldman and published by Liverpool University Press. This book was released on 2003 with total page 226 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Feldman (Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv U., Israel) presents 14 papers (all penned by his colleagues at the Center) exploring different ramifications of the war for global, regional, and Israeli politics. Topics include Israel's ability to win a war with Syria using the same "shock and awe" tactics of the United States, lessons to be drawn from "embedding" journalists, and the reaction of the Israeli public to the war.
Download or read book Strategic Reflections written by George W. Casey and published by . This book was released on 2012 with total page 232 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Operation Iraqi Freedom written by Walt L. Perry and published by Rand Corporation. This book was released on 2015 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Summarizes a report on the planning and execution of operations in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM through June 2004. Recommends changes to Army plans, operational concepts, doctrine, and Title 10 functions.
Download or read book Decisionmaking in Operation Iraqi Freedom written by Steven Metz and published by . This book was released on 2010-02-26 with total page 88 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Understanding the ways that military leaders advise those who exercise civilian control over the military is important for the continuing prosecution of that war, but also for the inevitable next time that the United States considers embarking on such an endeavor. A second objective of this series is to provide military and civilian leaders a clearer picture of what they must do to ensure that U.S. Armed Forces are properly prepared-with strategy, doctrine, force structure, equipment, training, and leadership-for future operations. Literature about the war in Iraq is already extensive, although-as the Foreword states-the definitive history of the war is still undoubtedly years away. However, most of the writing-by policymakers, journalists, scholars, and other students of national security issues-focuses on the effects of various decisions, not on the decisions themselves. For example, there is ample writing about how the 2003 decision to "de-Ba'athify" the Iraqi government was executed and what effects it had. How that decision was made, though, has been studied less. With this series, SSI intends to make a valuable addition to the literature on the war in Iraq by addressing the how and why of various key strategic decisions that were made over the past 8-plus years of planning and fighting. Some of the effects will inevitably be discussed as well, but the focus will clearly be on the decisionmaking processes, not the subsequent results. The facts and data presented and the ensuing analysis will identify the nature of the decisionmaking process involved as either idiosyncratic or systemic. Idiosyncratic decisions can be made based on the circumstances of a particular situation; a unique decision might have been required by the facts on the ground. The sectarian divisions, the long years of repression under Saddam, and the history of American inaction after Operation DESERT STORM in 1991- among other factors-might have combined to create distinctive conditions that led decisionmakers down idiosyncratic paths. The early years of the Iraq conflict offer several examples of another idiosyncrasy: the personalities of the different people making the key decisions. Different people viewing the same facts of a situation might draw different conclusions and make different decisions. Some key people making decisions about Iraq made dramatically different decisions than would have been expected of other reasonable people. At the very top of the pile is the strong personality of former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, balanced somewhat by equally forceful Secretary of State Colin Powell. Coordination of the activities of their two Departments, though, was left to National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, perhaps hopelessly outweighed-at least in public-by these two longtime players in major national security issues. Whether challenges in decisionmaking were idiosyncratic by personality or situation, though, differentiating them from systemic challenges is clearly important. Some analysts and pundits argue for procedural changes, either by executive fiat or legislative action, that are not supported by the relevant facts of the particular decision involved. One is the continuing call for a Goldwater-Nichols Act for the entire interagency. 1 Attempting to address idiosyncratic issues through systemic changes may not be the right approach; this monograph series should help identify the nature of the factors-processes or personalities- that led to certain decisions and to suggest ways to address any shortcomings.
Download or read book The Last Card written by Timothy Andrews Sayle and published by Cornell University Press. This book was released on 2019-09-15 with total page 417 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This is the real story of how George W. Bush came to double-down on Iraq in the highest stakes gamble of his entire presidency. Drawing on extensive interviews with nearly thirty senior officials, including President Bush himself, The Last Card offers an unprecedented look into the process by which Bush overruled much of the military leadership and many of his trusted advisors, and authorized the deployment of roughly 30,000 additional troops to the warzone in a bid to save Iraq from collapse in 2007. The adoption of a new counterinsurgency strategy and surge of new troops into Iraq altered the American posture in the Middle East for a decade to come. In The Last Card we have access to the deliberations among the decision-makers on Bush's national security team as they embarked on that course. In their own words, President George W. Bush, Vice President Dick Cheney, National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, White House Chief of Staff Joshua Bolten, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, and others, recount the debates and disputes that informed the process as President Bush weighed the historical lessons of Vietnam against the perceived strategic imperatives in the Middle East. For a president who had earlier vowed never to dictate military strategy to generals, the deliberations in the Oval Office and Situation Room in 2006 constituted a trying and fateful moment. Even a president at war is bound by rules of consensus and limited by the risk of constitutional crisis. What is to be achieved in the warzone must also be possible in Washington, D.C. Bush risked losing public esteem and courted political ruin by refusing to disengage from the costly war in Iraq. The Last Card is a portrait of leadership—firm and daring if flawed—in the Bush White House. The personal perspectives from men and women who served at the White House, Foggy Bottom, the Pentagon, and in Baghdad, are complemented by critical assessments written by leading scholars in the field of international security. Taken together, the candid interviews and probing essays are a first draft of the history of the surge and new chapter in the history of the American presidency.
Download or read book Understanding the U S Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan written by Beth Bailey and published by NYU Press. This book was released on 2015-12-18 with total page 376 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: "Understanding the United States' wars in Iraq and Afghanistan is essential to understanding the United States in the first decade of the new millennium and beyond. These wars were pivotal to American foreign policy and international relations. They raised critical ethical and legal questions; they provoked debates over policy, strategy, and war planning; they helped to shape American domestic politics. And they highlighted a profound division among the American people: While more than two million Americans served in Iraq and Afghanistan, the vast majority of American and their families remained untouched by and frequently barely aware of the wars conducted in their name, far from American shores, in regions about which they knew little. Understanding the U.S. Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan gives us the first book-length, expert historical analysis of these wars. It examines the lessons and legacies of wars whose outcomes may not be clear for decades."--Back cover.
Download or read book Illusions of Victory written by Carter Malkasian and published by Oxford University Press. This book was released on 2017-07-19 with total page 281 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In the immediate aftermath of the 2007 "Surge" of American troops in Iraq, the defeat of al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) in Anbar Province was widely hailed as one of America's signature victories. US Marines and soldiers fought for years there, in grinding battles such as Fallujah and Ramadi that define the experience of Iraq. Eventually, the fractious tribal sheiks in that province, with the help of American troops, united in an "Awakening" that dealt AQI a stunning defeat. The Awakening's success argued that the United States could intervene in a war-torn country and, with the right strategy, bring stability and peace. It seemed to exemplify snatching victory from the jaws of defeat. A decade later, the situation in Anbar Province is dramatically different. In 2014, much of Anbar fell to the AQI's successor organization, the Islamic State, which swept through the region with shocking ease. In Illusions of Victory, Carter Malkasian looks at the wreckage to explain why the Awakening's initial promise proved misleading and why victory was unsustainable. Malkasian begins by tracing the origins of the Awakening, then turns his attention to what happened in its wake. After the United States left, Iraq's Shi'a government sidelined Sunni leaders throughout the country. AQI, brought back to life as the Islamic State, expanded in northern and western Iraq and quickly found a receptive audience among marginalized Sunnis. In short order, the progress that had resulted from the Awakening fell apart. Malkasian draws many lessons from Anbar. Chief among them, the most stunning of victories may not last. The fact that the leading model of success fell apart severely damages the idea that the United States can send the military to a country for a few years and create lasting peace. Even the most successful example was bound to deeper social, sectarian, and religious forces insensitive to temporary boots on the ground. From today's perspective, rather than decisive success, Anbar exemplifies how intervention itself is a costly, long-term project. The most brilliant victory could not escape this wisdom.