Download or read book Stochastic Choice and Noisy Beliefs in Games written by Evan Friedman and published by . This book was released on 2022 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We conduct an experiment in which we elicit subjects' beliefs over opponents' behavior multiple times for a given game without feedback. We find that the large majority of individual subjects have stochastic belief reports, which we argue cannot be explained by learning or measurement error. Using both actions and beliefs data, we directly test the axioms underlying equilibrium models with “noisy actions” (quantal response equilibrium) and “noisy beliefs” (noisy belief equilibrium). We find that, while both types of noise are important in explaining observed behaviors, there are systematic violations of the axioms. We discuss possible explanations and some implications for modelling stochastic choice in games.
Download or read book Quantal Response Equilibrium written by Jacob K. Goeree and published by Princeton University Press. This book was released on 2016-06-28 with total page 322 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Quantal Response Equilibrium presents a stochastic theory of games that unites probabilistic choice models developed in psychology and statistics with the Nash equilibrium approach of classical game theory. Nash equilibrium assumes precise and perfect decision making in games, but human behavior is inherently stochastic and people realize that the behavior of others is not perfectly predictable. In contrast, QRE models choice behavior as probabilistic and extends classical game theory into a more realistic and useful framework with broad applications for economics, political science, management, and other social sciences. Quantal Response Equilibrium spans the range from basic theoretical foundations to examples of how the principles yield useful predictions and insights in strategic settings, including voting, bargaining, auctions, public goods provision, and more. The approach provides a natural framework for estimating the effects of behavioral factors like altruism, reciprocity, risk aversion, judgment fallacies, and impatience. New theoretical results push the frontiers of models that include heterogeneity, learning, and well-specified behavioral modifications of rational choice and rational expectations. The empirical relevance of the theory is enhanced by discussion of data from controlled laboratory experiments, along with a detailed users' guide for estimation techniques. Quantal Response Equilibrium makes pioneering game-theoretic methods and interdisciplinary applications available to a wide audience.
Download or read book Stochasticity in Games written by Evan Kyle Friedman and published by . This book was released on 2020 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We show that NBE generates similar predictions as QRE such as the "own-payoff effect", and yet is more consistent with the empirically documented effects of changes in payoff magnitude. Unlike QRE, NBE is a refinement of rationalizability and invariant to affine transformations of payoffs. Chapter 2, joint with Jeremy Ward, studies an equilibrium model in which there is both "noisy actions" and "noisy beliefs". The model primitives are an action-map, which determines a distribution of actions given beliefs, and a belief-map, which determines a distribution of beliefs given opponents' behavior. These are restricted to satisfy the axioms of QRE and NBE, respectively, which are simply stochastic generalizations of "best response" and "correct beliefs". In our laboratory experiment, we collect actions data and elicit beliefs for each game within a family of asymmetric 2-player games. These games have systematically varied payoffs, allowing us to "trace out" both the action- and belief-maps.
Download or read book A Neural Model of Stochastic Choice in a Mixed Strategy Game written by Ryan Webb and published by . This book was released on 2013 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In strategic games with a unique mixed strategy equilibrium, players face both an incentive to best-respond to valuations and to act unpredictably. We developed a model of how neural circuitry represents a balance between these two incentives in the course of a decision. Choice is modelled as the result of the interaction between action value input from upstream brain areas and the noise inherent in neuronal networks: large differences in action valuations between options lead to reliable best-response choices whereas small differences result in a choice selection process dominated by noise. Action value input was measured in superior colliculus activity while monkeys played a saccade version of matching pennies. We found that model simulations based on these measures exhibit similar choice biases as found in behavioural data. Deviations from the mixed equilibrium strategy were predicted by the action value measurements within the model. This yields a neural choice mechanism that is capable of implementing both critical aspects of equilibrium formation in strategic games: best-response and stochastic behaviour.
Download or read book The Consistent Preferences Approach to Deductive Reasoning in Games written by Geir B. Asheim and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2010-07-07 with total page 203 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: During the last decade I have explored the consequences of what I have chosen to call the 'consistent preferences' approach to deductive reasoning in games. To a great extent this work has been done in coop eration with my co-authors Martin Dufwenberg, Andres Perea, and Ylva Sovik, and it has lead to a series of journal articles. This book presents the results of this research program. Since the present format permits a more extensive motivation for and presentation of the analysis, it is my hope that the content will be of interest to a wider audience than the corresponding journal articles can reach. In addition to active researcher in the field, it is intended for graduate students and others that wish to study epistemic conditions for equilibrium and rationalizability concepts in game theory. Structure of the book This book consists of twelve chapters. The main interactions between the chapters are illustrated in Table 0.1. As Table 0.1 indicates, the chapters can be organized into four dif ferent parts. Chapters 1 and 2 motivate the subsequent analysis by introducing the 'consistent preferences' approach, and by presenting ex amples and concepts that are revisited throughout the book. Chapters 3 and 4 present the decision-theoretic framework and the belief operators that are used in later chapters. Chapters 5, 6, 10, and 11 analyze games in the strategic form, while the remaining chapters-Chapters 7, 8, 9, and 12-are concerned with games in the extensive form.
Download or read book Stochastic Games and Applications written by Abraham Neyman and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2012-12-06 with total page 466 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This volume is based on lectures given at the NATO Advanced Study Institute on "Stochastic Games and Applications," which took place at Stony Brook, NY, USA, July 1999. It gives the editors great pleasure to present it on the occasion of L.S. Shapley's eightieth birthday, and on the fiftieth "birthday" of his seminal paper "Stochastic Games," with which this volume opens. We wish to thank NATO for the grant that made the Institute and this volume possible, and the Center for Game Theory in Economics of the State University of New York at Stony Brook for hosting this event. We also wish to thank the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel, for providing continuing financial support, without which this project would never have been completed. In particular, we are grateful to our editorial assistant Mike Borns, whose work has been indispensable. We also would like to acknowledge the support of the Ecole Poly tech nique, Paris, and the Israel Science Foundation. March 2003 Abraham Neyman and Sylvain Sorin ix STOCHASTIC GAMES L.S. SHAPLEY University of California at Los Angeles Los Angeles, USA 1. Introduction In a stochastic game the play proceeds by steps from position to position, according to transition probabilities controlled jointly by the two players.
Download or read book Stochastic Games and Related Concepts written by T. Parthasarathy and published by Springer Nature. This book was released on 2020-12-08 with total page 127 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book discusses stochastic game theory and related concepts. Topics focused upon in the book include matrix games, finite, infinite, and undiscounted stochastic games, n-player cooperative games, minimax theorem, and more. In addition to important definitions and theorems, the book provides readers with a range of problem-solving techniques and exercises. This book is of value to graduate students and readers of probability and statistics alike.
Download or read book Handbook of Experimental Game Theory written by C. M. Capra and published by Edward Elgar Publishing. This book was released on 2020-10-30 with total page 448 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The aim of this Handbook is twofold: to educate and to inspire. It is meant for researchers and graduate students who are interested in taking a data-based and behavioral approach to the study of game theory. Educators and students of economics will find the Handbook useful as a companion book to conventional upper-level game theory textbooks, enabling them to compare and contrast actual behavior with theoretical predictions. Researchers and non-specialists will find valuable examples of laboratory and field experiments that test game theoretic propositions and suggest new ways of modeling strategic behavior. Chapters are organized into several sections; each section concludes with an inspirational chapter, offering suggestions on new directions and cutting-edge topics of research in experimental game theory.
Download or read book Coordination and Continuous Stochastic Choice written by Stephen E. Morris and published by . This book was released on 2021 with total page 53 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Players receive a return to investment that is increasing in the proportion of others who invest and the state, and incur a small cost for acquiring information about the state. Their information is reflected in a stochastic choice rule, specifying the probability of a signal leading to investment. If discontinuous stochastic choice rules are infinitely costly, there is a unique equilibrium as costs become small, in which actions are a best response to a uniform (Laplacian) belief over the proportion of others investing. Infeasibility of discontinuous stochastic choice rules captures the idea that it is impossible to perfectly distinguish states that are arbitrarily close together and is both empirically documented and satisfied by many natural micro-founded cost functionals on information. Our results generalize global game selection results (Carlsson and van Damme (1993) and Morris and Shin (2003)), and establish that they do not depend on the specific additive noise information structure.
Download or read book Discrete Gambling and Stochastic Games written by Ashok P. Maitra and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2012-12-06 with total page 249 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The theory of probability began in the seventeenth century with attempts to calculate the odds of winning in certain games of chance. However, it was not until the middle of the twentieth century that mathematicians de veloped general techniques for maximizing the chances of beating a casino or winning against an intelligent opponent. These methods of finding op timal strategies for a player are at the heart of the modern theories of stochastic control and stochastic games. There are numerous applications to engineering and the social sciences, but the liveliest intuition still comes from gambling. The now classic work How to Gamble If You Must: Inequalities for Stochastic Processes by Dubins and Savage (1965) uses gambling termi nology and examples to develop an elegant, deep, and quite general theory of discrete-time stochastic control. A gambler "controls" the stochastic pro cess of his or her successive fortunes by choosing which games to play and what bets to make.
Download or read book Markets Games and Strategic Behavior written by Charles A. Holt and published by Princeton University Press. This book was released on 2019-03-19 with total page 695 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: First edition published: Boston: Pearson Addison Wesley, 2007.
Download or read book Quantal Response Equilibrium written by Jacob K. Goeree and published by Princeton University Press. This book was released on 2016-06-28 with total page 328 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Quantal Response Equilibrium presents a stochastic theory of games that unites probabilistic choice models developed in psychology and statistics with the Nash equilibrium approach of classical game theory. Nash equilibrium assumes precise and perfect decision making in games, but human behavior is inherently stochastic and people realize that the behavior of others is not perfectly predictable. In contrast, QRE models choice behavior as probabilistic and extends classical game theory into a more realistic and useful framework with broad applications for economics, political science, management, and other social sciences. Quantal Response Equilibrium spans the range from basic theoretical foundations to examples of how the principles yield useful predictions and insights in strategic settings, including voting, bargaining, auctions, public goods provision, and more. The approach provides a natural framework for estimating the effects of behavioral factors like altruism, reciprocity, risk aversion, judgment fallacies, and impatience. New theoretical results push the frontiers of models that include heterogeneity, learning, and well-specified behavioral modifications of rational choice and rational expectations. The empirical relevance of the theory is enhanced by discussion of data from controlled laboratory experiments, along with a detailed users' guide for estimation techniques. Quantal Response Equilibrium makes pioneering game-theoretic methods and interdisciplinary applications available to a wide audience.
Download or read book Game Theory and Behavior written by Jeffrey Carpenter and published by MIT Press. This book was released on 2022-12-06 with total page 725 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: An introduction to game theory that offers not only theoretical tools but also the intuition and behavioral insights to apply these tools to real-world situations. This introductory text on game theory provides students with both the theoretical tools to analyze situations through the logic of game theory and the intuition and behavioral insights to apply these tools to real-world situations. It is unique among game theory texts in offering a clear, formal introduction to standard game theory while incorporating evidence from experimental data and introducing recent behavioral models. Students will not only learn about incentives, how to represent situations as games, and what agents “should” do in these situations, but they will also be presented with evidence that either confirms the theoretical assumptions or suggests a way in which the theory might be updated. Features: Each chapter begins with a motivating example that can be run as an experiment and ends with a discussion of the behavior in the example. Parts I–IV cover the fundamental “nuts and bolts” of any introductory game theory course, including the theory of games, simple games with simultaneous decision making by players, sequential move games, and incomplete information in simultaneous and sequential move games. Parts V–VII apply the tools developed in previous sections to bargaining, cooperative game theory, market design, social dilemmas, and social choice and voting. Part VIII offers a more in-depth discussion of behavioral game theory models including evolutionary and psychological game theory. Instructor resources include solutions to end-of-chapter exercises, worksheets for running each chapter's experimental games using pencil and paper, and the oTree codes for running the games online.
Download or read book Issues in Behavioral Psychology 2013 Edition written by and published by ScholarlyEditions. This book was released on 2013-05-01 with total page 1149 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Issues in Behavioral Psychology / 2013 Edition is a ScholarlyEditions™ book that delivers timely, authoritative, and comprehensive information about Adaptive Behavior. The editors have built Issues in Behavioral Psychology: 2013 Edition on the vast information databases of ScholarlyNews.™ You can expect the information about Adaptive Behavior in this book to be deeper than what you can access anywhere else, as well as consistently reliable, authoritative, informed, and relevant. The content of Issues in Behavioral Psychology: 2013 Edition has been produced by the world’s leading scientists, engineers, analysts, research institutions, and companies. All of the content is from peer-reviewed sources, and all of it is written, assembled, and edited by the editors at ScholarlyEditions™ and available exclusively from us. You now have a source you can cite with authority, confidence, and credibility. More information is available at http://www.ScholarlyEditions.com/.
Download or read book A Game theoretic Approach to the Binary Stochastic Choice Problem written by Itzhak Gilboa and published by . This book was released on 1989 with total page 21 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Handbook of Computational Economics written by Leigh Tesfatsion and published by Elsevier. This book was released on 2006-05-15 with total page 905 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The explosive growth in computational power over the past several decades offers new tools and opportunities for economists. This handbook volume surveys recent research on Agent-based Computational Economics (ACE), the computational study of economic processes modeled as dynamic systems of interacting agents. Empirical referents for "agents" in ACE models can range from individuals or social groups with learning capabilities to physical world features with no cognitive function. Topics covered include: learning; empirical validation; network economics; social dynamics; financial markets; innovation and technological change; organizations; market design; automated markets and trading agents; political economy; social-ecological systems; computational laboratory development; and general methodological issues. *Every volume contains contributions from leading researchers *Each Handbook presents an accurate, self-contained survey of a particular topic *The series provides comprehensive and accessible surveys
Download or read book Eliciting Beliefs in Continuous Choice Games written by Claudia Neri and published by . This book was released on 2015 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper proposes a methodology to implement probabilistic belief elicitation in continuous-choice games. Representing subjective probabilistic beliefs about a continuous variable as a continuous subjective probability distribution, the methodology involves eliciting partial information about the subjective distribution and fitting a parametric distribution on the elicited data. As an illustration, the methodology is applied to a double auction experiment, where traders' beliefs about the bidding choices of other market participants are elicited. Elicited subjective beliefs are found to differ from proxies such as Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE) beliefs and empirical beliefs, both in terms of the forecasts of other traders' bidding choices and in terms of the best-response bidding choices prescribed by beliefs. Elicited subjective beliefs help explain observed bidding choices better than BNE beliefs and empirical beliefs. By extending probabilistic belief elicitation beyond discrete-choice games to continuous-choice games, the proposed methodology enables to investigate the role of beliefs in a wider range of applications.
