Download or read book Sponsored Search Auctions written by Song Yao and published by Now Publishers Inc. This book was released on 2009 with total page 66 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Sponsored Search Auctions reviews current academic research on this nascent topic with a focus on future practical and research opportunities

Download or read book Sponsored Search and Sequential Auctions written by Emmanuel Lorenzon and published by . This book was released on 2016 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This thesis is a collection of three essays in theoretical auction analysis. Chapter 1 considersbid delegation in the GSP auction mechanism. In a game involving side-contracts and a compensationpolicy set by an agency, the first-best collusive outcome is achieved. We offer a characterization of the implementablebid profiles for the two-position game with three players. Chapter 2 considers the sequentialsale of an object to two buyers: one knows his private information and the other buyer does not. Buyershave a multi-unit demand and private valuations for each unit are perfectly correlated. An asymmetricequilibrium exists when the uninformed player adopts an aggressive bidding strategy. Conversely, hisinformed opponent behaves more conservatively by using bid shading. The bidding behaviour of theuninformed bidder is driven by the opportunity to learn his private valuation for free. This dynamic is atthe root of the decline in the equilibrium price across both sales. In chapter 3, information is observableduring the first-stage auction in a sequential-move game in which the first-mover bidder is observed byhis opponent. A separating equilibrium exists in which the informed bidder bids aggressively when he isthe first-mover which entails a non-participation strategy from his uninformed competitor. Conversely,the latter adopts a conservative behaviour when he is the first-mover. A pooling equilibrium in which theinformed bidder blurs his valuation can only exist if his uninformed opponent adopts a non-participatingstrategy.

Download or read book Budget Constraints and Optimization in Sponsored Search Auctions written by Yanwu Yang and published by Elsevier. This book was released on 2013-11-23 with total page 213 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The Intelligent Systems Series publishes reference works and handbooks in three core sub-topic areas: Intelligent Automation, Intelligent Transportation Systems, and Intelligent Computing. They include theoretical studies, design methods, and real-world implementations and applications. The series' readership is broad, but focuses on engineering, electronics, and computer science. Budget constraints and optimization in sponsored search auctions takes into account consideration of the entire life cycle of campaigns for researchers and developers working on search systems and ROI maximization. The highly experienced authors compiled their knowledge and experience to provide insight, algorithms and development techniques for successful optimized/constrained systems. The book presents a cutting-edge budget optimization approach that embraces three-level budget decisions in the life cycle of search auctions: allocation across markets at the system level, distribution over temporal slots at the campaign level, and real-time adjustment at the keyword level. Delivers a systematic overview and technique for understanding budget constraints and ROI optimization in sponsored search auction systems, including algorithms and developer guides for a range of scenarios Explores effects of constraints on mechanisms, bidding and keyword strategies, and the strategies for budget optimization that developers can employ An informative reference source for both software and systems developers working in the search auctions, marketing and sales strategy optimization, services development for online marketing and advertisement, e-commerce, social and economic networking

Download or read book Essays on Optimal Bidding Strategies in Sponsored Search Advertising Auctions written by Prabirendra Chatterjee and published by . This book was released on 2013 with total page 102 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In this dissertation, I model generalized second price (GSP) auction for keyword search to analyze the optimal bidding strategies of the participating advertisers. The results also apply to a more general setting where multiple goods are being auctioned off. The study in chapter 3 examines the bidding strategies of the advertisers in a complete information static GSP auction. The results show that unlike in standard second price auction, truthful bidding is never a dominant strategy in general second price auction. In chapter 4, I have developed a model of static incomplete information GSP auction. I characterize all possible pure strategy Bayes-Nash equilibrium of the game and show that the consideration of the click through rates ratio plays a key role in determining the equilibrium bidding strategies for the advertisers. Specifically, I find that when the click through rates ratio exceeds a critical value, there will be no pure strategy Bayes-Nash equilibrium. The analysis also reveals that in a game of static incomplete information no asymmetric bidding equilibrium would prevail. The study in chapter 5 analyzes a model of incomplete information dynamic GSP auction. I find that in a dynamic game, the existence of both separating strategy equilibrium and pooling strategy equilibrium would depend upon critical values of click through rates ratio. I also prove that the advertisers with high valuation for a keyword will either reveal their identities at the very beginning or at the very end of this dynamic game. The results also show that when search engines do not publish the bidding history (i.e. there is 'minimum disclosure of information'), the advertisers will never try to mimic each other or in other words, there will be no pooling strategy equilibrium.

Download or read book Networks Crowds and Markets written by David Easley and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2010-07-19 with total page 745 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Are all film stars linked to Kevin Bacon? Why do the stock markets rise and fall sharply on the strength of a vague rumour? How does gossip spread so quickly? Are we all related through six degrees of separation? There is a growing awareness of the complex networks that pervade modern society. We see them in the rapid growth of the internet, the ease of global communication, the swift spread of news and information, and in the way epidemics and financial crises develop with startling speed and intensity. This introductory book on the new science of networks takes an interdisciplinary approach, using economics, sociology, computing, information science and applied mathematics to address fundamental questions about the links that connect us, and the ways that our decisions can have consequences for others.

Download or read book Sequential Auctions with Continuation Costs written by Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans and published by . This book was released on 1993 with total page 32 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Bid Coordination in Sponsored Search Auctions written by Francesco Decarolis and published by . This book was released on 2023 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Bid delegation to specialized intermediaries is common in the auction systems used to sell internet advertising. When the same intermediary concentrates the demand for ad space from competing advertisers, its incentive to coordinate client bids might alter the functioning of the auctions. This study develops a methodology to detect bid coordination, and presents a strategy to estimate a bound on the search engine revenue losses imposed by coordination relative to a counterfactual benchmark of competitive bidding. Using proprietary data from auctions held on a major search engine, coordination is detected in 55 percent of the cases of delegated bidding that we observed, and the associated upper bound on the search engine’s revenue loss ranges between 5.3 and 10.4 percent.

Download or read book Putting Auction Theory to Work written by Paul Milgrom and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2004-01-12 with total page 378 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book provides a comprehensive introduction to modern auction theory and its important new applications. It is written by a leading economic theorist whose suggestions guided the creation of the new spectrum auction designs. Aimed at graduate students and professionals in economics, the book gives the most up-to-date treatments of both traditional theories of 'optimal auctions' and newer theories of multi-unit auctions and package auctions, and shows by example how these theories are used. The analysis explores the limitations of prominent older designs, such as the Vickrey auction design, and evaluates the practical responses to those limitations. It explores the tension between the traditional theory of auctions with a fixed set of bidders, in which the seller seeks to squeeze as much revenue as possible from the fixed set, and the theory of auctions with endogenous entry, in which bidder profits must be respected to encourage participation.

Download or read book Understanding Sponsored Search written by Jim Jansen and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2011-07-25 with total page 299 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book addresses the underlying foundational elements, both theoretical and methodological, of sponsored search. As such, the contents are less affected by the ever-changing implementation aspects of technology. Rather than focusing on the how, this book examines what causes the how. Why do certain keywords work, while others do not? Why does that ad work well, when others that are similar do not? Why does a key phrase cost a given amount? Why do we measure what we do in keyword advertising? This book speaks to that curiosity to understand why we do what we do in sponsored search. The content flows through the major components of any sponsored search effort, regardless of the underlying technology or client or product. The book addresses keywords, ads, consumers, pricing, competitors, analytics, branding, marketing and advertising, integrating these separate components into an incorporated whole. The focus is on the critical elements, with ample illustrations and with enough detail to lead the interested reader to further inquiry.

Download or read book To Score Or Not to Score Estimates of a Sponsored Search Auction Model written by Yu-Wei Hsieh and published by . This book was released on 2018 with total page 27 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Using data from "WebsiteX", one of the largest online marketplaces in the world, we estimate a structural model of sponsored search auctions where bidders have heterogeneous click-through curves. Unlike earlier studies, our model accommodates two stylized empirical facts: the advertiser prominence eff ect and the position paradox. Using our estimates, we simulate the e ffects of introducing bid-scoring to the auctions. We fi nd that scoring reduces equilibrium per-click prices, but boosts the number of clicks by sorting prestigious merchants to the top positions. Overall there is only a very modest reduction in total revenues from introducing bid-scoring, despite the intent to reward high-quality merchants with price discounts. Methodologically, this paper also illustrates an application of a novel "approximate Bayesian" estimation method to a structural multi-item auction model.

Download or read book Synergies and Price Trends in Sequential Auctions written by Flavio F. Menezes and published by . This book was released on 1999 with total page 32 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book A Primer on Auction Design Management and Strategy written by David J. Salant and published by MIT Press. This book was released on 2014-12-19 with total page 199 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A guide to modeling and analyzing auctions, with the applications of game theory and auction theory to real-world auction decision making. Auctions are highly structured market transactions primarily used in thin markets (markets with few participants and infrequent transactions). In auctions, unlike most other markets, offers and counteroffers are typically made within a structure defined by a set of rigid and comprehensive rules. Because auctions are essentially complex negotiations that occur within a fully defined and rigid set of rules, they can be analyzed by game theoretic models more accurately and completely than can most other types of market transactions. This book offers a guide for modeling, analyzing, and predicting the outcomes of auctions, focusing on the application of game theory and auction theory to real-world auction design and decision making. After a brief introduction to fundamental concepts from game theory, the book explains some of the more significant results from the auction theory literature, including the revenue (or payoff) equivalence theorem, the winner's curse, and optimal auction design. Chapters on auction practice follow, addressing collusion, competition, information disclosure, and other basic principles of auction management, with some discussion of auction experiments and simulations. Finally, the book covers auction experience, with most of the discussion centered on energy and telecommunications auctions, which have become the proving ground for many new auction designs. A clear and concise introduction to auctions, auction design, and auction strategy, this Primer will be an essential resource for students, researchers, and practitioners.

Download or read book Negotiation Auctions and Market Engineering written by Henner Gimpel and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2008-02-05 with total page 242 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book contains a selection of papers presented at the International Seminar "Negotiation and Market Engineering", held at Dagstuhl Castle, Germany, in November 2006. The 17 revised full papers presented were carefully selected and reviewed. The papers deal with the complexity of negotiations, auctions, and markets as economic, social, and IT systems. The authors give a broad overview on the major issues to be addressed and the methodologies used to approach them.

Download or read book Combinatorial Auctions written by Peter C. Cramton and published by MIT Press (MA). This book was released on 2006 with total page 678 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A synthesis of theoretical and practical research on combinatorial auctions from the perspectives of economics, operations research, and computer science.

Download or read book An Experimental Study of Sponsored Search Auctions written by Yeon-Koo Che and published by . This book was released on 2015 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We study the Generalized Second Price auctions - a standard method for allocating online search advertising - experimentally, considering both the static environment assumed by the prevailing theory and a dynamic game capturing the salient aspects of real-world search advertising auctions. We find that subjects tend to overbid in both treatments relative to the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves outcome suggested as most plausible by the theory, but that their behavior in the dynamic game resembles the behavior in the static game. Our analysis thus lends support to the use of a static game as modeling proxy, but calls into question the prevailing equilibrium predictions.

Download or read book Simplified Mechanisms With Applications To Sponsored Search and Package Auctions written by Paul R. Milgrom and published by . This book was released on 2015 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A simplified mechanism is a direct mechanism modified by restricting the set of reports or bids. An example is the auction used to place ads on Internet search pages, in which each advertiser bids a single price to determine the allocation of eight or more ad positions on a page. If a simplified mechanism satisfies the quot;best-reply-closurequot; property, then all Nash equilibria of the simplified mechanism are also equilibria of the original direct mechanism. For search advertising auctions, suitable simplifications eliminate inefficient, low-revenue equilibria that are favored in the original direct mechanism when bidding costs are positive.

Download or read book Web and Internet Economics written by Xujin Chen and published by Springer Nature. This book was released on 2020-12-05 with total page 476 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book constitutes the proceedings of the 16th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics, WINE 2020, held in Beijing, China, in December 2020. The 31 full papers presented together with 11 abstracts were carefully reviewed and selected from 136 submissions. The issues in theoretical computer science, artificial intelligence, operations research are of particular importance in the Web and the Internet that enable the interaction of large and diverse populations. The Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE) is an interdisciplinary forum for the exchange of ideas and results on incentives and computation arising from these various fields.