Download or read book Role of the Strategic Air Command in Forcing the Soviet Decision to Withdraw Missiles from Cuba written by Gerald Linscheid and published by . This book was released on 1964 with total page 102 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Essence of Decision written by Graham T. Allison and published by Addison Wesley Publishing Company. This book was released on 1971 with total page 360 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Examines the political decisions made during the Missile Crisis.
Download or read book Strategic Air Command and the Alert Program written by Henry M. Narducci and published by . This book was released on 1988 with total page 44 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Continuing Lessons of the Cuban Missile Crisis October 1962 Report on Khrushchev s Gamble Missile Deployment Kennedy s Objectives and Strategy The Role of Intelligence Successes and Failures written by U. S. Military and published by . This book was released on 2017-11-10 with total page 64 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This study examines the lessons that can still be learned from the famous Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. In what was the most serious "clash" during the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union came dangerously close to thermonuclear war when their Superpower rivalry manifested itself with the placement of nuclear weapons on the Island of Cuba in October 1962. This potentially cataclysmic incident brought policy makers on both sides to seriously question their use of diplomacy, intelligence, nuclear weapons, military force, and to moderate their somewhat simplistic foreign policy rhetoric of national interests. Both sides had advanced to the edge of the precipice overlooking nuclear war, and had stepped back; staunchly determined to avoid any possibilities of a reoccurrence. In an article written by Mr. Eliot A. Cohen, " Why We Should Stop Studying the Cuban Missile Crisis" Mr. Cohen argues that this incident should no longer be considered by political-military students of history as the classic case model for national security decision-making. Mr. Cohen argues that "the Cuban Missile Crisis is and will remain singularly un-representative of post-war crises, and it offers precious little historical guidance for American statesmen today." I disagree with Mr. Cohen. I believe there are many lessons that can still be learned from the Cuban Missile Crisis. First, in the absence of another incident of this magnitude between the Superpowers, what other event can be considered representative of effective crisis management and national security decision making? Secondly, the strategic intelligence advantage that President John F. Kennedy held over his adversary, Nikita Khrushchev, proved to be a decisive difference. Kennedy knew when Khrushchev was lying, what his capabilities were, and just as important, what they were not. Additionally, in this day and age of high-tech, "Third Wave" theories of our national ability to depend upon technical intelligence collection and information warfare, Colonel Oleg Penkovsky stands as a classic example of the value of human intelligence operations. Without the information on Soviet missiles, launchers, and associated equipment that Colonel Penkovsky provided to the Central Intelligence Agency, American intelligence analysts could not have assured President Kennedy that he had three days to think about the problem and his options. In those three days, Kennedy wisely chose to continue his dialogue with Khrushchev, a dialogue that ended in a Soviet agreement to remove the missiles from Cuba.
Download or read book Role of Aerospace Power in Forcing the Soviet Decision to Withdraw Offensive Weapons from Cuba written by Jack T. Davis and published by . This book was released on 1964 with total page 74 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Cuba and the Missile Crisis The Soviet Decision to Deploy Nuclear Missiles written by Ralf Käcks and published by GRIN Verlag. This book was released on 2002-11-11 with total page 32 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Seminar paper from the year 1999 in the subject History of Germany - Postwar Period, Cold War, grade: 1 (A), University of Kassel (FB 8), course: The United States in the 1960s, language: English, abstract: It might perhaps be correct to say that never in history has any historical event assembled such great importance in all of its aspects, and been studied in such depth. I believe that is fully understandable, because never before had humankind been so close to the brink of nuclear holocaust. This short statement by Oleg Troyanovsky reveals that the Cuban missile crisis is indeed one of the most studied subjects in U.S. and Cold War history. Ever since the thirteen days in October 1962 there has been a lively discussion about the origins and the management of the crisis. Despite an enormous range of opinions, and an incredible output of books and articles by participants and scholars of the crisis, most of the approaches were limited to studying the events from an American perspective. However, during the last decade the discussion has continued due to the declassification of secret American documents. In fact it gained new speed after they became available for scholars to review. One issue that has been heavily disputed since 1962 is the reason for the Soviet missile deployment to Cuba. Even after more than 35 years, it is unclear why Nikita Khrushchev ordered nuclear missiles to be sent to Cuba. Even President John F. Kennedy and his advisers in the Executive Committee (ExComm) could not agree on the reason for the missile deployment. The official Soviet explanation states that the missiles were sent to defend Fidel Castro′s revolution and to deter American aggression in Cuba. However, this theory has been vigorously dismissed as facesaving propaganda for the test-of-will theory which states that the Soviets wanted to probe America′s resolve in Cold War politics. I will show in this paper that Khruschev did not send the missiles to Cuba because he wanted to directly challenge Kennedy, but rather two reasons were responsible for stationing strategic missiles 90 miles off the U.S. coast. After reconsidering the defense-of-Cuba theme it becomes apparent that the Soviets and the Cubans believed that the deployment of troops and finally nuclear missiles was necessary to save Cuba. This threat perception was not known to the United States. Secondly, American nuclear policy and the Soviet perception of the nuclear situation led to the deployment of Medium Range Ballistic Missiles (MRBMs) and Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBMs).
Download or read book Impact of the Cuban Missile Crisis written by Larry Slawson and published by Larry Slawson via PublishDrive. This book was released on 2019-05-02 with total page 18 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This eBook analyzes the impact and legacy of the Cuban Missile Crisis through an analysis of the political figures that made the event possible.
Download or read book Alert Operations and the Strategic Air Command 1957 1991 written by and published by DIANE Publishing. This book was released on 1993-05 with total page 107 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A history of the SAC, which "entered the battle" in March 1956 and had relied on the alert force as its primary tactic since October 1957. SAC has accomplished its mission and is retired. The weapon systems it operated were transferred to several new Air Force commands. Black and white photos.
Download or read book Cordon of Steel written by Curtis A. Utz and published by . This book was released on 2005-01-01 with total page 56 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This study is a dramatic example of how the U.S. Navy's multipurpose ships and aircraft, flexible task organization, and great mobility enabled President Kennedy to protect national interests in one of the most serious confrontations of the Cold War. Curtis A. Utz is currently a historian in the Naval Historical Center's Contemporary History Branch.
Download or read book Bull in a China Shop General Curtis E LeMay s Military Advice to the President During the Cuban Missile Crisis Impact of LeMay s Experiences Organizational Influences Communist Presence written by U. S. Military and published by . This book was released on 2017-04-23 with total page 90 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This report examines the personal experiences and organizational factors which influenced General LeMay's advice to the president during this crucial time in American history, and relates the role the chief of staff's recommendation played as the crisis unfolded. Beginning with his assignment as Army Air Forces Deputy Chief of Staff for Research and Development, and culminating as Air Force chief of staff, General LeMay's experiences taught him the importance of constant vigilance in an uncertain world. The general also observed a Soviet propensity to acquiesce in the face of American resolve, and believed that escalation of a conflict into an all-out war between the two powers was highly unlikely. The organizations around General LeMay also shaped his advice to the president. Tactical Air Command's readiness to execute operations against Cuba, coupled with the Air Staff's ability to support combat organizations in the field bolstered General LeMay's confidence, while the Joint Chiefs of Staff served to encourage the general to think more broadly about the range of military options available to solve the Cuban Missile Crisis. On 19 October 1962, three days after he learned that the Soviet Union was positioning offensive ballistic missiles in Cuba, President John F. Kennedy met with his Joint Chiefs of Staff to hear their recommendations on ways to resolve the emerging crisis. Consistent with popular belief, the most outspoken member of the joint chiefs in advocating aggressive action was General Curtis E. LeMay, Air Force chief of staff. These personal experiences and organizational factors caused the Air Force chief of staff to view the crisis differently than the president. General LeMay believed that the crisis was an opportunity to resolve the issue of communist presence in Cuba, while President Kennedy felt, more modestly, that the best he could do was continue to manage a tense geo-political environment at the height of the Cold War. These divergent views fostered a civil-military gap during the crisis which lingered long afterwards. Strategy harmonizes military power and political purpose, and civil-military rifts serve to make this effort exceedingly difficult. A reflection on General LeMay's military advice to President Kennedy during the Cuban Missile Crisis highlights the importance of this endeavor.
Download or read book Strategic Air Command SAC and the Alert Program a Brief History Nuclear Weapons Bombers and Tankers Mid Air Refueling B 52 Response to Soviet Cold War Threat Command Post written by Department of Defense and published by . This book was released on 2016-12-11 with total page 45 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This illustrated history of the SAC Alert Force documents the efforts of thousands of dedicated aircrews, missileers, maintenance specialists, and support personnel who worked diligently to give the nation a credible deterrent force during the cold war.Throughout most of its first decade, Strategic Air Command operated from safe sanctuaries located in the United States. This situation began to change in the mid-1950s as the Soviet Union began to build up its long-range bomber force and to develop intercontinental ballistic missiles. Defense planners saw these actions as a conscious effort to project Soviet military power worldwide and to place the United States under the direct threat of nuclear attack. Given the inferiority of Soviet forces to those of the United States, it seemed reasonable to SAC planners that, in the event of war, the Soviets would employ a basic military stratagem to quickly gain superiority, that of surprise.The threats posed by growing Soviet forces and surprise attack demanded immediate attention. Planners at Headquarters Strategic Air Command understood the necessity of an immediate retaliatory response to Soviet aggression. They also knew that to respond effectively, they had to protect the strategic force from surprise destruction on the ground. Their concerns produced extensive studies aimed at neutralizing the threat of surprise attack, assuring a meaningful SAC response, and making the Soviets uncertain of success.SAC planners devised the alert program to safeguard nuclear deterrence. They proposed to keep SAC's bombers and tankers on alert with weapons loaded and crews ready for immediate takeoff. Their goal was to place one-third of the command's aircraft on ground alert at all times. The one-third figure was dictated by training, manpower, and logistical requirements.Having formulated the alert concept, the command next undertook three tests to determine Its feasibility. The 39th Air Division at Hunter AFB, Georgia, conducted the first test, Operation Try Out, from November 1956 to March 1957. This effort proved that ground alert was feasible. Two additional tests worked out problems identified in Operation Try Out and perfected the alert concept. The second test, Operation Watch Tower, was performed by the 825th Air Division at Little Rock AFB, Arkansas, between April and November 1957- The last test, Operation Fresh Approach, fell to the 9th Bombardment Wing at Mountain Home AFB, Idaho, in September 1957.
Download or read book Conversations with Kennedy written by Benjamin C. Bradlee and published by Open Road Media. This book was released on 2014-03-18 with total page 176 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Distinguished journalist Benjamin C. Bradlee’s intimate biography of President John F. Kennedy and his Camelot years. Conversations with Kennedy is legendary reporter and executive Benjamin C. Bradlee’s account of his intimate dialogues with JFK—a man he counted as a confidante and friend. Beginning in 1958, when Kennedy was a US senator running for president, and continuing until 1963, the year that Kennedy died, Bradlee shared a close professional and personal relationship with the charismatic politician. Both men were war veterans, idealists, and up-and-coming American leaders, and they shared values that drove their friendship. Kennedy was a politician equally at home with the bruising intellects he appointed to government posts and his working-class constituents. He respected his complicated father, understood his brothers, admired women, and had few illusions about human nature. Bradlee’s eye for detail reveals JFK’s views on everything from Communism to conservatism to freedom of the press. From parties at the White House to weekends at Palm Beach to JFK’s enduring influence on Bradlee’s own life, this is an in-depth, behind-the-scenes look at the man behind a myth, written by a giant of American journalism.
Download or read book Seeing Off the Bear written by U. S. Military and published by . This book was released on 2018-04-12 with total page 189 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This U.S. Air Force (USAF) publication examines the subject of Anglo-American air power cooperation during the cold war, presenting material from a major symposium, sponsored by the Air Force Historical Foundation and the Royal Air Force Historical Society, working in close association with the U.S. Air Force History and Museums Program and the RAF Air Historical Branch. The challenge for the symposium's organizers was to strike a balance between scholarly monographs and first-person remembrances, and to include as many of the significant episodes of the Cold War that time allowed. As a result, the panelists addressed an impressive number of important topics and major developments during this critical period in the history of both nations. Perhaps nowhere was the special relationship more visible or significant than in the activities of the airmen and air forces of the two nations. The symposium was a meeting of old friends, some of whose associations dated from World War II. Many of the attendees, as well as participants, experienced some of the most important and dangerous episodes of the Cold War in close association with their opposite numbers in the Royal Air Force or U.S. Air Force. The symposium vividly demonstrated the enduring nature of the singular, close relationship that the USAF and RAF share. Introduction and Welcome * General Bryce Poe II; Air Marshal Sir Frederick Sowrey * Opening Address * General Merrill A. McPeak * Session One: Policy Decisions * Chair: General Bryce Poe II * Introduction * An Initial Response to the Cold War: The Buildup of the U.S. Air Force in the United Kingdom, 1948-1956 * Patrick E. Murray * The Role of Missiles in British Concepts of Defence: The Influence of Duncan Sandys * Cecil James * Cooperation at the Top: A View from a Former Vice Chief of the Air Staff and CINCUKAIR Air Chief Marshal Sir Denis Smallwood * The Deployment of Ground-Launched Cruise Missiles to RAF Greenham Common * Lieutenant Colonel Michael A. Kirtland * Questions and Answers * Luncheon Address * Air Vice Marshal Ron Dick * Session Two: Acquisition * Chair: General Robert T. Marsh * Introduction * RAF Aircraft Procurement, 1950-1965: The American Involvement * Robert Jackson * The Transfer of B-29s to the Royal Air Force Under the Military Defense Assistance Program * William W. Suit * The Origins of the Skybolt Controversy in the Eisenhower Administration * Ronald D. Landa * Questions and Answers * Banquet Address * General Charles A. Horner * Pictorial * Notable Anglo-American Aircraft of the Cold War * Session Three: Crisis Response * Chair: Air Marshal Sir Frederick Sowrey * Introduction * Operation Firedog: Air Support in the Malayan Emergency * Malcolm Postgate * The Anglo-American Origins of Overflying the Soviet Union: The Case of the "Invisible Aircraft" * Donald E. Welzenbach * Anglo-American Air Force Collaboration and the Cuban Missile Crisis: A British Perspective * Stephen Twigge * Further Comments on Command and Control of British Nuclear Forces During the Cuban Missile Crisis * Group Captain Ian Madelin * El Dorado Canyon: The Political and Public Affairs Aftermath * Chief Master Sergeant Jerome E. Schroeder * Some Additional Comments on Crisis Response During the Falklands War * Air Marshal Sir John Curtiss * Questions and Answers * Closing Comments * Air Marshal Sir Frederick Sowrey; General Bryce Poe II
Download or read book Khrushchev Remembers written by and published by . This book was released on 1971 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book The Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited written by J. Nathan and published by Springer. This book was released on 2016-04-30 with total page 310 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited is a comprehensive overview of the great cornucopia of new materials recently released by the Soviet Union, United States, and Cuba. The authors, some of whom were participants in the crisis, have all had a major role in bringing to light either significant reevaluations of the crisis, or in some cases, truly startling revelations of the extant wisdom surrounding much of the crisis. The collection, edited by a long-time student of the crisis, is a coherent, original, and up-to-date work that bears on a moment when the world, for good cause, held its breath in fear that the morning might bring the apocalypse.
Download or read book Soviet Views on the Cuban Missile Crisis written by Ronald R. Pope and published by . This book was released on 1982 with total page 310 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Essence of Decision written by Graham T. Allison and published by Addison-Wesley Longman. This book was released on 1999 with total page 436 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This classic book has been substantially rewritten to reflect the significant new American and Soviet archival sources now available to the researchers. Using the central case of the Cuban missile crisis as a basic frame of reference, The Essence of Decision teaches readers how to compare and contrast perspectives on foreign affairs.
