Download or read book Review of Direct Matching Markets and the Deferred Acceptance Algorithm written by Serge L. Wind and published by . This book was released on 2013 with total page 19 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Alvin E. Roth and Lloyd S. Shapley were awarded the 2012 Nobel Prize in Economic Science "for the theory of stable allocations and the practice of market design;" (Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, 2012).This paper, motivated by a desire to understand their accomplishments, reviews successful matching processes adopted in particular market institutions. In some situations, the standard market mechanism - which adjusts prices and allocates resources by allowing supply to equal demand - cannot be utilized to directly match two sets of agents in markets with prices often unavailable. The deferred acceptance matching algorithm - originally designed by Gale and Shapley (1962) for the college admissions problem - was imbued with several optimum properties, including Pareto optimality for the students, and was subsequently adapted for specific market institutions by Roth; (Roth, 1985).Designing optimal matching algorithms has been heavily influenced by the practice of adopting and implementing market-specific designs which recognize characteristics of specific markets and sets of agents, rather than directly applying the theory of simple markets; (Roth, 2010). The deferred acceptance matching algorithm and its adaptations and extensions serve as the most highly-preferred stable mechanism to assign matchings in several two-sided markets, such as the medical residency and school choice problems. The deferred acceptance procedure has been successfully linked to other direct-matching market designs.

Download or read book Two Sided Matching written by Alvin E. Roth and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 1992-06-26 with total page 288 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Two-sided matching provides a model of search processes such as those between firms and workers in labor markets or between buyers and sellers in auctions. This book gives a comprehensive account of recent results concerning the game-theoretic analysis of two-sided matching. The focus of the book is on the stability of outcomes, on the incentives that different rules of organization give to agents, and on the constraints that these incentives impose on the ways such markets can be organized. The results for this wide range of related models and matching situations help clarify which conclusions depend on particular modeling assumptions and market conditions, and which are robust over a wide range of conditions. 'This book chronicles one of the outstanding success stories of the theory of games, a story in which the authors have played a major role: the theory and practice of matching markets ... The authors are to be warmly congratulated for this fine piece of work, which is quite unique in the game-theoretic literature.' From the Foreword by Robert Aumann

Download or read book Deferred Acceptance Algorithms written by Alvin E. Roth and published by . This book was released on 2010 with total page 50 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The deferred acceptance algorithm proposed by Gale and Shapley (1962) has had a profound influence on market design, both directly, by being adapted into practical matching mechanisms, and, indirectly, by raising new theoretical questions. Deferred acceptance algorithms are at the basis of a number of labor market clearinghouses around the world, and have recently been implemented in school choice systems in Boston and New York City. In addition, the study of markets that have failed in ways that can be fixed with centralized mechanisms has led to a deeper understanding of some of the tasks a marketplace needs to accomplish to perform well. In particular, marketplaces work well when they provide thickness to the market, help it deal with the congestion that thickness can bring, and make it safe for participants to act effectively on their preferences. Centralized clearinghouses organized around the deferred acceptance algorithm can have these properties, and this has sometimes allowed failed markets to be reorganized.

Download or read book Online and Matching Based Market Design written by Federico Echenique and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2023-05-31 with total page 721 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Written by more than fifty top researchers, this text comprehensively covers a major inter-disciplinary field and its important applications.

Download or read book Who Gets What and why written by Alvin E. Roth and published by Houghton Mifflin Harcourt. This book was released on 2015 with total page 275 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A Nobel laureate reveals the often surprising rules that govern a vast array of activities -- both mundane and life-changing -- in which money may play little or no role. If you've ever sought a job or hired someone, applied to college or guided your child into a good kindergarten, asked someone out on a date or been asked out, you've participated in a kind of market. Most of the study of economics deals with commodity markets, where the price of a good connects sellers and buyers. But what about other kinds of "goods," like a spot in the Yale freshman class or a position at Google? This is the territory of matching markets, where "sellers" and "buyers" must choose each other, and price isn't the only factor determining who gets what. Alvin E. Roth is one of the world's leading experts on matching markets. He has even designed several of them, including the exchange that places medical students in residencies and the system that increases the number of kidney transplants by better matching donors to patients. In Who Gets What -- And Why, Roth reveals the matching markets hidden around us and shows how to recognize a good match and make smarter, more confident decisions.

Download or read book Two Sided Matching written by Alvin E. Roth and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 1990 with total page 288 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Two-sided matching provides a model of search processes such as those between firms and workers in labor markets or between buyers and sellers in auctions. This book gives a comprehensive account of recent results concerning the game-theoretic analysis of two-sided matching. The focus of the book is on the stability of outcomes, on the incentives that different rules of organization give to agents, and on the constraints that these incentives impose on the ways such markets can be organized. The results for this wide range of related models and matching situations help clarify which conclusions depend on particular modeling assumptions and market conditions, and which are robust over a wide range of conditions.

Download or read book Algorithmics of Matching Under Preferences written by David F. Manlove and published by World Scientific. This book was released on 2013 with total page 524 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Matching problems with preferences are all around us OCo they arise when agents seek to be allocated to one another on the basis of ranked preferences over potential outcomes. Efficient algorithms are needed for producing matchings that optimise the satisfaction of the agents according to their preference lists.In recent years there has been a sharp increase in the study of algorithmic aspects of matching problems with preferences, partly reflecting the growing number of applications of these problems worldwide. This book describes the most important results in this area, providing a timely update to The Stable Marriage Problem: Structure and Algorithms (D Gusfield and R W Irving, MIT Press, 1989) in connection with stable matching problems, whilst also broadening the scope to include matching problems with preferences under a range of alternative optimality criteria."

Download or read book Who Gets What And Why The Hidden World of Matchmaking and Market Design written by Alvin Roth and published by HarperCollins UK. This book was released on 2015-06-02 with total page 256 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: How our lives are shaped not only by the choices we make, but by the choices we have.

Download or read book Optimal Truncation in Matching Markets written by Peter Coles and published by . This book was released on with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Microeconomic Foundations II written by David M. Kreps and published by Princeton University Press. This book was released on 2023-01-03 with total page 799 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A cutting-edge introduction to key topics in modern economic theory for first-year graduate students in economics and related fields Volume II of Microeconomic Foundations introduces models and methods at the center of modern microeconomic theory. In this textbook, David Kreps, a leading economic theorist, emphasizes foundational material, concentrating on seminal work that provides perspective on how and why the theory developed. Because noncooperative game theory is the chief tool of modeling and analyzing microeconomic phenomena, the book stresses the applications of game theory to economics. And throughout, it underscores why theory is most useful when it supports rather than supplants economic intuition. Introduces first-year graduate students to the models and methods at the core of microeconomic theory today Covers an extensive range of topics, including the agency theory, market signaling, relational contracting, bilateral bargaining, auctions, matching markets, and mechanism design Stresses the use—and misuse—of theory in studying economic phenomena and shows why theory should support, not replace, economic intuition Includes extensive appendices reviewing the essential concepts of noncooperative game theory, with guidance about how it should and shouldn’t be used Features free online supplements, including chapter outlines and overviews, solutions to all the problems in the book, and more

Download or read book Static and Dynamic Theoretical Studies on Improving Matching Design written by Asefeh Salarinezhad and published by . This book was released on 2021 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This thesis consists of three independent papers on market design and matching theory. Each paper addresses a different matching model and environment, and together they represent a significant range of real-life matching problems which have not received enough attention. In the first paper, we consider a new matching model to assign agents and objects on two sides of the market to each other. The new feature is that agents have consecutive acceptance intervals which are based on an exogenously given commonly known ranking of the objects. Each agent finds acceptable a consecutive set of objects with respect to this objective common ranking of the objects. Each agent has an individual preference ranking of the objects in her acceptance interval, which is determined independently of the common ranking of the objects. The main objective is to find new matching rules (algorithms) which are simpler and more efficient than the complicated conventional general algorithms for achieving a maximum matching which is Pareto-optimal, exploiting the special structure of consecutive acceptance intervals which are a common feature of many real-life matching problems. Our main algorithm, the Block Serial Dictatorship Rule, starts with finding an ordering of agents based only on the acceptance interval structure and thus it is preference profile independent. This ordering is then used as a basis for a Serial Dictatorship which always finds a maximum Pareto-optimal matching, regardless of the agents' preferences, for the solvable interval profiles that we characterize in the paper. These rules are also group strategy-proof. In the second paper, I consider a matching model with minimum quotas for one side of the market. The main objective is to find algorithms which respect minimum quotas and find matchings which are both nonwasteful and fair if there exists such a matching. Otherwise, the algorithms find either fair or nonwasteful matchings. My algorithms, CNWF and FCNW (constrained nonwasteful fair and fair constrained nonwasteful), start with finding the range of possible matchings when there are minimum quotas. Then, using an innovative graph, they select the matchings which are both fair and nonwasteful, and if there do not exist such matchings, CNWF selects a constrained nonwasteful matching with a maximum degree of fairness, and FCNW selects a fair matching with a maximum degree of nonwastefulness. Furthermore, I show that my algorithms are applicable to the case where there are different types of agents, which is a key factor for matching markets that are concerned with diversity. Compared to the existing algorithms my algorithms are unified and more intuitive. In the third paper, I consider a novel matching model in a dynamic environment. I define a dynamic environment in which the market is open for more than one period. At the beginning of each period new agents enter the market and the matched agents leave at the end. My model is motivated by couple match-making but the results apply to other similar matching markets as well. The main objective is to find an appropriate genderneutral algorithm with nice properties. I introduce a new algorithm which is based on the DA (Deferred Acceptance) algorithm and whose structure provides an opportunity to find two-sided optimal matchings, considering the requirements and characteristics of this dynamic marriage problem. The novel structure of my algorithm, DM (Dynamic Marriage), allows both sides to make offers simultaneously and selects a matching which is optimal for both sides in a realistic dynamic setup whenever such a matching exists, and otherwise the algorithm finds a matching without favouring either side. This property makes the matching fair in the sense that it gives both sides a fair chance. I also study the dynamic strategy-proofness of the algorithm, as well as its stability and efficiency properties. Compared to previous algorithms that apply to the marriage problem in a static or dynamic environment, my algorithm is more realistic since it allows for realistic dynamic preferences and for real-life marriage considerations. Furthermore, it is more integrated regarding the optimality of the two sides than other algorithms and avoids some of the common issues of dynamic algorithms.

Download or read book Microeconomic Foundations II written by David M. Kreps and published by Princeton University Press. This book was released on 2023-05-23 with total page 800 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A cutting-edge introduction to key topics in modern economic theory for first-year graduate students in economics and related fields Volume II of Microeconomic Foundations introduces models and methods at the center of modern microeconomic theory. In this textbook, David Kreps, a leading economic theorist, emphasizes foundational material, concentrating on seminal work that provides perspective on how and why the theory developed. Because noncooperative game theory is the chief tool of modeling and analyzing microeconomic phenomena, the book stresses the applications of game theory to economics. And throughout, it underscores why theory is most useful when it supports rather than supplants economic intuition. Introduces first-year graduate students to the models and methods at the core of microeconomic theory today Covers an extensive range of topics, including the agency theory, market signaling, relational contracting, bilateral bargaining, auctions, matching markets, and mechanism design Stresses the use—and misuse—of theory in studying economic phenomena and shows why theory should support, not replace, economic intuition Includes extensive appendices reviewing the essential concepts of noncooperative game theory, with guidance about how it should and shouldn’t be used Features free online supplements, including chapter outlines and overviews, solutions to all the problems in the book, and more

Download or read book The Stable Marriage Problem written by Dan Gusfield and published by . This book was released on 1989 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book probes the stable marriage problem and its variants as a rich source of problems and ideas that illustrate both the design and analysis of efficient algorithms. It covers the most recent structural and algorithmic work on stable matching problems, simplifies and unifies many earlier proofs, strengthens several earlier results, and presents new results and more efficient algorithms.The authors develop the structure of the set of stable matchings in the stable marriage problem in a more general and algebraic context than has been done previously; they discuss the problem's structure in terms of rings of sets, which allows many of the most useful features to be seen as features of a more general set of problems. The relationship between the structure of the stable marriage problem and the more general stable roommates problem is demonstrated, revealing many commonalities.The results the authors obtain provide an algorithmic response to the practical, and political, problems created by the asymmetry inherent in the Gale Shapley solutions, leading to alternative methods and better compromises than are provided by the Gale Shapley method. And, in contrast to Donald Knuth's earlier work which primarily focused on the application of mathematics to the analysis of algorithms, this book illustrates the productive and almost inseparable relationship between mathematical insight and the design of efficient algorithms.Dan Gusfield is Associate Professor of Computer Science at the University of California, Davis. Robert W. Irving is Senior Lecturer in Computing Science at the University of Glasgow. The Stable Marriage Problem is included in the Foundations of Computing Series, edited by Michael Garey and Albert Meyer.

Download or read book Advances in Economics and Econometrics Volume 1 written by Bo Honoré and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2017-11-02 with total page 425 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This is the first of two volumes containing papers and commentaries presented at the Eleventh World Congress of the Econometric Society, held in Montreal, Canada in August 2015. These papers provide state-of-the-art guides to the most important recent research in economics. The book includes surveys and interpretations of key developments in economics and econometrics, and discussion of future directions for a wide variety of topics, covering both theory and application. These volumes provide a unique, accessible survey of progress on the discipline, written by leading specialists in their fields. The first volume includes theoretical and applied papers addressing topics such as dynamic mechanism design, agency problems, and networks.

Download or read book Advanced Wireless Networks written by Savo G. Glisic and published by John Wiley & Sons. This book was released on 2016-08-08 with total page 848 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The third edition of this popular reference covers enabling technologies for building up 5G wireless networks. Due to extensive research and complexity of the incoming solutions for the next generation of wireless networks it is anticipated that the industry will select a subset of these results and leave some advanced technologies to be implemented later,. This new edition presents a carefully chosen combination of the candidate network architectures and the required tools for their analysis. Due to the complexity of the technology, the discussion on 5G will be extensive and it will be difficult to reach consensus on the new global standard. The discussion will have to include the vendors, operators, regulators as well as the research and academic community in the field. Having a comprehensive book will help many participants to join actively the discussion and make meaningful contribution to shaping the new standard.

Download or read book Matching with Transfers written by Pierre-André Chiappori and published by Princeton University Press. This book was released on 2020-05-26 with total page 262 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Over the past few decades, matching models, which use mathematical frameworks to analyze allocation mechanisms for heterogeneous products and individuals, have attracted renewed attention in both theoretical and applied economics. These models have been used in many contexts, from labor markets to organ donations, but recent work has tended to focus on "nontransferable" cases rather than matching models with transfers. In this important book, Pierre-André Chiappori fills a gap in the literature by presenting a clear and elegant overview of matching with transfers and provides a set of tools that enable the analysis of matching patterns in equilibrium, as well as a series of extensions. He then applies these tools to the field of family economics and shows how analysis of matching patterns and of the incentives thus generated can contribute to our understanding of long-term economic trends, including inequality and the demand for higher education.

Download or read book Market Design written by Guillaume Haeringer and published by MIT Press. This book was released on 2018-03-02 with total page 393 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A broad overview of market mechanisms, with an emphasis on the interplay between theory and real-life applications; examples range from eBay auctions to school choice. This book offers an introduction to market design, providing students with a broad overview of issues related to the design and analysis of market mechanisms. It defines a market as a demand and a supply, without specifying a price system or mechanism. This allows the text to analyze a broad set of situations—including such unconventional markets as college admissions and organ donation—and forces readers to pay attention to details that might otherwise be overlooked. Students often complain that microeconomics is too abstract and disconnected from reality; the study of market design shows how theory can help solve existing, real-life problems. The book focuses on the interplay between theory and applications. To keep the text as accessible as possible, special effort has been made to minimize formal description of the models while emphasizing the intuitive, with detailed explanations and resolution of examples. Appendixes offer general reviews of elements of game theory and mechanism design that are related to the themes explored in the book, presenting the basic concepts with as many explanations and illustrations as possible. The book covers topics including the basics of simple auctions; eBay auctions; Vickrey–Clarke–Groves auctions; keyword auctions, with examples from Google and Facebook; spectrum auctions; financial markets, with discussions of treasury auctions and IPOs; trading on the stock market; the basic matching model; medical match; assignment problems; probabilistic assignments; school choice; course allocation, with examples from Harvard and Wharton; and kidney exchange.