Download or read book Putting Out The Fire In Afghanistan written by Major Patrick Pascall and published by Pickle Partners Publishing. This book was released on 2014-08-15 with total page 101 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This monograph develops an alternative approach to counterinsurgency, and explains how the current narratives in the field of counterinsurgency are not completely accurate. Counterinsurgents only need to properly understand the environment and then concentrate their efforts in that critical area of the insurgency identified as the sustainer of that insurgency. The U.S. counterinsurgency (COIN) plan does not need to address all those lines of effort not directly related to the root cause of an insurgency, as those efforts may actually fuel the insurgency due to building unrealistic expectations among the populace. This monograph also develops the analogy that the four elements necessary for a fire (fuel, oxygen, heat, chain reaction) parallel the necessary elements of an insurgency (the fuel representing unresponsive government, oxygen representing existing structures/vulnerability, heat representing political/diplomatic factors, chain reaction representing the information environment, and the population). Like a fire, if one has a proper understanding of the environment, and can clearly identify the true sustainer of the insurgency (the root problem), then one only need to remove that one element from the equation, and that insurgency will be unsustainable. Having a simple approach will not only allow the counterinsurgents to better utilize their resources-in an Economy of Force-and allow them to Mass their power on one clear Objective, it will also remind counterinsurgents of the other Principle of War that has proven to be so critical in complex environments-simplicity.
Download or read book Putting Out the Fire in Afghanistan The Fire Model of Counterinsurgency Focusing Efforts to Make an Insurgency Unsustainable written by and published by . This book was released on 2009 with total page 80 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This monograph develops an alternative approach to counterinsurgency, and explains how the current narratives in the field of counterinsurgency are not completely accurate. Counterinsurgents only need to properly understand the environment and then concentrate their efforts in that critical area of the insurgency identified as the sustainer of that insurgency. The U.S. counterinsurgency (COIN) plan does not need to address all those lines of effort not directly related to the root cause of an insurgency, as those efforts may actually fuel the insurgency due to building unrealistic expectations among the populace. This monograph also develops the analogy that the four elements necessary for a fire (fuel, oxygen, heat, chain reaction) parallel the necessary elements of an insurgency (the fuel representing unresponsive government, oxygen representing existing structures/vulnerability, heat representing political/diplomatic factors, chain reaction representing the information environment, and the population). Like a fire, if one has a proper understanding of the environment, and can clearly identify the true sustainer of the insurgency (the root problem), then one only need to remove that one element from the equation, and that insurgency will be unsustainable. Having a simple approach will not only allow the counterinsurgents to better utilize their resources- in an Economy of Force- and allow them to Mass their power on one clear Objective, it will also remind counterinsurgents of the other Principle of War that has proven to be so critical in complex environments- simplicity.
Download or read book Putting the Fire Out in Afghanistan The Fire Model of Counterinsurgency Focusing Efforts to Make an Insurgency Unsustainable written by and published by . This book was released on 2009 with total page 79 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This monograph develops an alternative approach to counterinsurgency, and explains how the current narratives in the field of counterinsurgency are not completely accurate. Counterinsurgents only need to properly understand the environment and then concentrate their efforts in that critical area of the insurgency identified as the sustainer of that insurgency. The U.S. counterinsurgency (COIN) plan does not need to address all those lines of effort not directly related to the root cause of an insurgency, as those efforts may actually fuel the insurgency due to building unrealistic expectations among the populace. This monograph also develops the analogy that the four elements necessary for a fire (fuel, oxygen, heat, chain reaction) parallel the necessary elements of an insurgency (the fuel representing unresponsive government, oxygen representing existing structures/vulnerability, heat representing political/diplomatic factors, chain reaction representing the information environment, and the population). Like a fire, if one has a proper understanding of the environment, and can clearly identify the true sustainer of the insurgency (the root problem), then one only need to remove that one element from the equation, and that insurgency will be unsustainable. Having a simple approach will not only allow the counterinsurgents to better utilize their resources in an Economy of Force and allow them to Mass their power on one clear Objective, it will also remind counterinsurgents of the other Principle of War that has proven to be so critical in complex environments-simplicity.
Download or read book Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan written by Seth G. Jones and published by Rand Corporation. This book was released on 2008 with total page 176 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This study explores the nature of the insurgency in Afghanistan, the key challenges and successes of the U.S.-led counterinsurgency campaign, and the capabilities necessary to wage effective counterinsurgency operations. By examining the key lessons from all insurgencies since World War II, it finds that most policymakers repeatedly underestimate the importance of indigenous actors to counterinsurgency efforts. The U.S. should focus its resources on helping improve the capacity of the indigenous government and indigenous security forces to wage counterinsurgency. It has not always done this well. The U.S. military-along with U.S. civilian agencies and other coalition partners-is more likely to be successful in counterinsurgency warfare the more capable and legitimate the indigenous security forces (especially the police), the better the governance capacity of the local state, and the less external support that insurgents receive.
Download or read book What Went Wrong in Afghanistan written by Metin Gurcan and published by Helion and Company. This book was released on 2016-08-19 with total page 139 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Since 20 December 2001 - the date which marked the authorization of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to assist the Afghan Government - hundreds of thousands of coalition soldiers from around 50 different states have physically been and served in Afghanistan. Roughly 20 rotation periods have been experienced; billions of US dollars have been spent; and almost 3,500 coalition soldiers and 7,400 Afghani security personnel have fallen for Afghanistan. In this badly-managed success story, the true determiner of both tactical outcomes on the ground and strategic results was always the tribal and rural parts of Muslim-populated Afghanistan. Although there has emerged a vast literature on counterinsurgency theories and tactics, we still lack reliable information about the motivations and aspirations of the residents of Tribalised Rural Muslim Environments (TRMEs) that make up most of Afghanistan. The aim of this book is to describe some on-the-ground problems of counterinsurgency (COIN) efforts in TRMEs - specifically in rural Afghanistan - and then to propose how these efforts might be improved. Along the way, it will be necessary to challenge many current assumptions about the conduct of counterinsurgency in Afghanistan. Most generally, the book will show how counterinsurgency succeeds or fails at the local level (at the level of tactical decisions by small-unit leaders) and that these decisions cannot be successful without understanding the culture and perspective of those who live in TRMEs. Although engaging issues of culture, the author is not an anthropologist or an academic of any kind. He is a Muslim who spent his childhood in a TRME - a remote village in Turkey - and he offers his observations on the basis of 15 years' worth of field experience as a Turkish Special Forces officer serving in rural Iraq, Turkey, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Afghanistan. Cultures in these areas are not the same, but there are sufficient similarities to suggest some overall characteristics of TRMEs and some general problems of COIN efforts in these environments. In summary, this book not only challenges some of the fundamentals of traditional counterinsurgency wisdom and emphasizes the importance of the tactical level - a rarely-studied field from the COIN perspective - but also blends the firsthand field experiences of the author with deep analyses. In this sense, it is not solely an autobiography, but something much more.
Download or read book From Kabul to Baghdad and Back written by John R Ballard and published by Naval Institute Press. This book was released on 2012-10-15 with total page 410 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: From Kabul to Baghdad and Back provides insight into the key strategic decisions of the Afghan and Iraq campaigns as the United States attempted to wage both simultaneously against al-Qaeda and its supporting affiliates. It also evaluates the strategic execution of those military campaigns to identify how well the two operations were conducted in light of their political objectives. The book identifies the elements that made the 2001 military operation to oust the Taliban successful, then with combat operations in Iraq as a standard of comparison, the authors analyze the remainder of the Afghan campaign and the essential problems that plagued that effort, from the decision to go to war with Iraq in 2002, through the ill-fated transition to NATO lead in Afghanistan in 2006, the dismissal of Generals McKiernan and McChrystal, the eventual decision by President Obama to make the Afghan campaign the main effort in the war on extremism, and the final development of drawdown plans following the end of the war in Iraq. No other book successfully compares and contrasts the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan from a national strategic perspective, analyzing the impact of fighting the Iraq War on the success of the United States campaign in Afghanistan. It is also the first book to specifically question several key operational decisions in Afghanistan including: the decision to give NATO the lead in Afghanistan, the decisions to fire Generals McKiernan and McChrystal and the decision to conduct an Iraq War-style surge in Afghanistan. It also compares the Afghan campaigns fought by the Soviet Union and the United States, the counterinsurgency campaigns styles in Iraq and Afghanistan and the leadership of senior American officials in both Iraq and Afghanistan. In the final chapter, the key lessons of the two campaigns are outlined, including the importance of effective strategic decision-making, the utility of population focused counterinsurgency practices, the challenges of building partner capacity during combat, and the mindset required to prosecute modern war.
Download or read book From Stalemate to Settlement written by Colin P. Clarke and published by Rand Corporation. This book was released on 2014-02-10 with total page 93 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Historical insurgencies that ended in settlement after a stalemate have generally followed a seven-step path. A "master narrative" distilled from these cases could help guide and assess the progress toward a negotiated settlement in Afghanistan.
Download or read book On the Ground in Afghanistan written by Gerald Meyerle and published by . This book was released on 2012 with total page 202 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Provides a glimpse into what relatively small military units -- teams, platoons, companies, and highly dispersed battalions -- have done to roll back the insurgency in some of the more remote areas of Afghanistan. The book includes 15 vignettes about different units from the U.S. Marines, Army, and Army Special Forces; the British Army and Marines; the Dutch Army and Marines; and the Canadian Army. The case studies cover 10 provinces in Afghanistan's south and east. They describe the diverse conditions the units faced in these provinces, how they responded to these conditions, what worked and what did not, and the successes they achieved. Key themes include: dealing with a localized insurgency; navigating the political terrain; searching for political solutions;l engaging the population and building popular support; and, using reconstruction funds.
Download or read book Rebuilding Afghanistan written by Bradley J. Armstrong and published by . This book was released on 2003-12 with total page 191 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: International efforts to stabilize and reconstruct Afghanistan are confronted by a paradox in their strategy for Operation Enduring Freedom that has crippled their ability to locate and defeat the enemy and establish stability. In their narrowly focused pursuit of the search and destroy mission, coalition military forces have neglected the fundamental principle that guides small wars: the protection of the population and the elimination of the influence of the insurgent forces are paramount to gathering the necessary intelligence to locate the threat. This disregard for the population control has eliminated the coalition's primary source of intelligence, directly impinging on its ability to locate or separate the insurgent from the population and trapping it in an operational quagmire. Additionally, international aid efforts have focused on short-term relief rather than long-term reconstruction, establishing the foundation for continued dependence and instability rather than self- sufficiency. The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the situation in Afghanistan as a form of insurgency using a modification of the systems approach as developed by Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf. Using this analysis, the author develops a framework for stabilization based on elements of successful counterinsurgency strategies taken from an examination of the situations in Vietnam, Malaya, and the Philippines. Chapter I highlights some of the major issues that impede U.S. efforts to achieve its objectives in Afghanistan. Chapter II contains the case studies of Malaya, Vietnam, and the Philippines. Chapter III highlights impediments to unification and stabilization in Afghanistan, namely, ethnic divides, warlords, opium production, central government, and insurgency. In Chapter IV, U.S. strategy in Afghanistan is analyzed in terms of the systems approach: input denial, counter-conversion, counterforce, and strengthening the State. (3 figures, 104 refs.)
Download or read book Afghanistan written by Joint Special Operations and published by . This book was released on 2019-11-29 with total page 104 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Afghanistan, Counterinsurgency, and the Indirect Approach
Download or read book Shades of CORDS in the Kush written by Henry Nuzum and published by Strategic Studies Institute. This book was released on 2010 with total page 148 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: "Counterinsurgency (COIN) requires an integrated military, political, and economic program best developed by teams that field both civilians and soldiers. These units should operate with some independence but under a coherent command. In Vietnam, after several false starts, the United States developed an effective unified organization, Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS), to guide the counterinsurgency. CORDS had three components absent from our efforts in Afghanistan today: sufficient personnel (particularly civilian), numerous teams, and a single chain of command that united the separate COIN programs of the disparate American departments at the district, provincial, regional, and national levels. This paper focuses on the third issue and describes the benefits that unity of command at every level would bring to the American war in Afghanistan. The work begins with a brief introduction to counterinsurgency theory, using a population-centric model, and examines how this warfare challenges the United States. It traces the evolution of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and the country team, describing problems at both levels. Similar efforts in Vietnam are compared, where persistent executive attention finally integrated the government's counterinsurgency campaign under the unified command of the CORDS program. The next section attributes the American tendency towards a segregated response to cultural differences between the primary departments, executive neglect, and societal concepts of war. The paper argues that, in its approach to COIN, the United States has forsaken the military concept of unity of command in favor of 'unity of effort' expressed in multiagency literature. The final sections describe how unified authority would improve our efforts in Afghanistan and propose a model for the future."--Page iii.
Download or read book Expanding the Qawm Culturally Savvy Counterinsurgency and Nation Building in Afghanistan written by Sean R. Slaughter and published by Createspace Independent Pub. This book was released on 2012-08-25 with total page 86 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This monograph investigates culture and society in Afghanistan and recommends an operational approach leveraging a blend of formal and traditional institutions, working with the propensity of the Afghan system, and building capacity and legitimacy for GIRoA. It examines some commonly misunderstood concepts within Afghan culture such as qawm and tribe, and attempts to correct some of the misconceptions about Afghanistan as a 'tribal' society. It finds that Afghans draw their identity not from the tribe, but from the qawm—a more malleable and locally oriented system. The monograph also examines the intersection of traditional and formal Afghan institutions, Afghan culture, and ISAF intervention in four focus areas: governance and rule of law, security, development and economic growth, and ISAF organization. Afghanistan's chief characteristic is its physical and social complexity, including its variegated terrain, its diverse cultural tapestry, and the interplay between the two. This complex heterogeneity and fragmentation defies a mirror-imaged Western solution or even a singular, templated Afghan solution ostensibly exportable throughout Afghanistan. To manage the complexity of the Afghan system, the monograph recommends an agile, decentralized approach, synchronizing and synergizing efforts at the sub-provincial level, and maintaining an integrated, empowered, enduring presence in the districts. The decentralized approach will enhance counterinsurgency and nation-building efficacy in Afghanistan through a culturally savvy, locally focused, bottom-up system of transformation, setting conditions for qawm expansion as a way to defragment Afghanistan and Afghan society. This monograph will analyze research on the history and culture of Afghanistan and counterinsurgency as well as awareness of current military, interagency, and NGO operations with a particular emphasis on governance, rule of law, security, development, and economic capacity building. The author conducted interviews with military, interagency, and Afghan primary sources—field practitioners, and experts from academia. The author also drew upon personal experience in the field throughout Afghanistan, and his notes from successes and challenges in working with the Afghans and the Coalition. This monograph will explain some of the concepts and intricacies of Afghan culture that are vitally important for the Western counterinsurgent and nation-builder to understand. It will explain cultural patterns and traditional institutions that may be unfamiliar to the non-Afghan. The monograph will then investigate the intersection of Afghan culture with three focus areas—governance and rule of law, security, and development and economic growth—then explore ways to organize for effective counterinsurgency and nation-building. The conclusion provides a summary of cultural and operational lessons learned and recommendations looking forward.
Download or read book Aspiration and Ambivalence written by Vanda Felbab-Brown and published by . This book was released on 2012-11-21 with total page 308 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Why Counterinsurgency Fails written by Dennis de Tray and published by Palgrave Pivot. This book was released on 2019-10-18 with total page 174 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book examines why the U.S. counterinsurgency campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan have failed and presents a solution for future counterinsurgency campaigns that was developed and tested in Afghanistan in the hope that it will spark a conversation that will shape the next counterinsurgency war to U.S. advantage. The author argues that both development assistance and counterinsurgency campaigns - which often go hand in hand - overwhelm weak states with too much money, too many projects, and too many consultants, leading to weaker rather than stronger governments. The solution proposed, was initially developed by David Petraeus but never effectively implemented. Using an insider's perspective, this volume explains the details of this solution and the problem with its mis-implementation in Afghanistan.
Download or read book Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan written by Benjamin P. McCullough and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page 233 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: As the United States moved closer to ending its military involvement in Afghanistan by the end of 2014, intense debate on the relevance and success of the United States' counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy in the country continues. Many observers have been quick to declare the strategy a failure without fully analyzing the critical components of COIN doctrine that are necessary for a campaign to succeed, and the extent to which those components were in place in Afghanistan. This study examines the case of Afghanistan by determining whether the U.S.’s counterinsurgency strategy was successful in achieving the four main objectives identified by FM 3-24 as necessary for COIN’s success. This study also looks at whether or not the United States’ COIN strategy was successful in generating and maintaining the public support needed to carry out a prolonged counterinsurgency operation. By utilizing a mix of deductive logic based on contemporary COIN theory and currently available scholarly resources, government documents, and U.S. and ISAF military field reports, this study seeks to answer whether the counterinsurgency strategy devised by Generals David Petraeus and Stanley McChrystal was successful in achieving the four main objectives needed for the success of this strategy in Afghanistan.
Download or read book Afghanistan Counterinsurgency and the Indirect Approach written by Thomas Henriksen and published by . This book was released on 2010-04 with total page 90 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In exploring Counterinsurgency and the Indirect Approach, Dr. Thomas Henriksen assesses several cases where the United States has employed an Indirect Approach toward achieving strategic objectives, and he suggests where this concept has landed short of expectations. In the cases of Vietnam, Somalia, the Philippines, and other countries, he demonstrates that it is often difficult to fit the Indirect Approach doctrine into such a wide variety of strategic and operational environments.
Download or read book On the Ground in Afghanistan written by Jerry Meyerle and published by CreateSpace. This book was released on 2013-07 with total page 200 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This books provides a glimpse into what relatively small military units-teams, platoons, companies, and highly dispersed battalions-have done to roll back the insurgency in some of the more remote areas of Afghanistan.
