Download or read book Optimal Multi Object Auctions written by Mark Armstrong and published by . This book was released on 2001 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper analyses optimal auctions of several objects. In the first model bidders have a binary distribution over their valuations for each object, in which case the optimal auction is efficient. The optimal auction takes one of two formats: either objects are sold in independent auctions, or a degree of bundling is introduced in the sense that the probability a bidder wins one object is increasing in her value for the other. The format of the optimal auction may depend upon the number of bidders. In the second model the restriction to binary distributions is relaxed, and the optimal auction is then inefficient.
Download or read book Optimal Multi Object Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers written by Cagri S. Kumru and published by . This book was released on 2008 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We analyse the optimal auction of multiple non-identical objects when buyers are risk averse. We show that the auction formats that yield the maximum revenue in the risk neutral case are no longer optimal. In particular, selling the goods independently does not maximize the seller's revenue. We observe that the seller's incentive for bundling arises solely due to the risk aversion of the buyers. The optimal auction which remains weakly efficient has the following properties: The seller perfectly insures all buyers against the risk of losing the objects(s) for which they have high valuation. While the buyers who have high valuation for both objects are compensated if they do not win either object, the buyers who have low valuation for both objects incur a positive payment to the seller in the same event.
Download or read book Ascending price Multiple object Auctions written by Flavio M. Menezes and published by . This book was released on 1993 with total page 38 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Negotiation Auctions and Market Engineering written by Henner Gimpel and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2008-02-05 with total page 242 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book contains a selection of papers presented at the International Seminar "Negotiation and Market Engineering", held at Dagstuhl Castle, Germany, in November 2006. The 17 revised full papers presented were carefully selected and reviewed. The papers deal with the complexity of negotiations, auctions, and markets as economic, social, and IT systems. The authors give a broad overview on the major issues to be addressed and the methodologies used to approach them.
Download or read book Auctions of Identical Objects with Single unit Demands written by Flavio M. Menezes and published by . This book was released on 1999 with total page 42 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Bidding Lower with Higher Values in Multi object Auctions written by David McAdams and published by . This book was released on 2002 with total page 22 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Multi-object auctions differ in an important way from single-object auctions. When bidders have multi-object demand, equilibria can exist in which bids decrease as values increase! Consider a model with n bidders who receive affiliated one-dimensional types t and whose marginal values are non-decreasing in t and strictly increasing in own type ti. In the first-price auction of a single object, all equilibria are monotone (over the range of types that win with positive probability) in that each bidder's equilibrium bid is non-decreasing in type. On the other hand, some or all equilibria may be non-monotone in many multi-object auctions. In particular, examples are provided for the as-bid and uniform-price auctions of identical objects in which (i) some bidder reduces his bids on all units as his type increases in all equilibria and (ii) symmetric bidders all reduce their bids on some units in all equilibria, and for the as-bid auction of non-identical objects in which (iii) bidders have independent types and some bidder reduces his bids on some packages in all equilibria. Fundamentally, this difference in the structure of equilibria is due to the fact that payoffs fail to satisfy strategic complementarity and/or modularity in these multi-object auctions.
Download or read book Optimal Bidding Algorithms Against Cheating in Multiple Object Auctions written by Lei Tan and published by . This book was released on 1996 with total page 74 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Multi object Auctions with a Single Bundle Bidding for Perfect Complements written by Tomomi Matsui and published by . This book was released on 2003 with total page 17 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book A Primer on Auction Design Management and Strategy written by David J. Salant and published by MIT Press. This book was released on 2014-12-26 with total page 199 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A guide to modeling and analyzing auctions, with the applications of game theory and auction theory to real-world auction decision making. Auctions are highly structured market transactions primarily used in thin markets (markets with few participants and infrequent transactions). In auctions, unlike most other markets, offers and counteroffers are typically made within a structure defined by a set of rigid and comprehensive rules. Because auctions are essentially complex negotiations that occur within a fully defined and rigid set of rules, they can be analyzed by game theoretic models more accurately and completely than can most other types of market transactions. This book offers a guide for modeling, analyzing, and predicting the outcomes of auctions, focusing on the application of game theory and auction theory to real-world auction design and decision making. After a brief introduction to fundamental concepts from game theory, the book explains some of the more significant results from the auction theory literature, including the revenue (or payoff) equivalence theorem, the winner's curse, and optimal auction design. Chapters on auction practice follow, addressing collusion, competition, information disclosure, and other basic principles of auction management, with some discussion of auction experiments and simulations. Finally, the book covers auction experience, with most of the discussion centered on energy and telecommunications auctions, which have become the proving ground for many new auction designs. A clear and concise introduction to auctions, auction design, and auction strategy, this Primer will be an essential resource for students, researchers, and practitioners.
Download or read book Auctions written by Paul Klemperer and published by Princeton University Press. This book was released on 2018-06-05 with total page 263 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Governments use them to sell everything from oilfields to pollution permits, and to privatize companies; consumers rely on them to buy baseball tickets and hotel rooms, and economic theorists employ them to explain booms and busts. Auctions make up many of the world's most important markets; and this book describes how auction theory has also become an invaluable tool for understanding economics. Auctions: Theory and Practice provides a non-technical introduction to auction theory, and emphasises its practical application. Although there are many extremely successful auction markets, there have also been some notable fiascos, and Klemperer provides many examples. He discusses the successes and failures of the one-hundred-billion dollar "third-generation" mobile-phone license auctions; he, jointly with Ken Binmore, designed the first of these. Klemperer also demonstrates the surprising power of auction theory to explain seemingly unconnected issues such as the intensity of different forms of industrial competition, the costs of litigation, and even stock trading 'frenzies' and financial crashes. Engagingly written, the book makes the subject exciting not only to economics students but to anyone interested in auctions and their role in economics.
Download or read book An Introduction to Auction Theory written by Flavio M. Menezes and published by OUP Oxford. This book was released on 2004-11-04 with total page 194 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Auction theory is now an important component of an economist's training. The techniques and insights gained from the study of auction theory provide a useful starting point for those who want to venture into the economics of information, mechanism design, and regulatory economics. This book provides a step-by-step, self-contained treatment of the theory of auctions. It allows students and readers with a calculus background to work through all the basic results, covering the basic independent-private-model; the effects of introducing correlation in valuations on equilibrium behaviour and the seller's expected revenue; mechanism design; and the theory of multi-object auctions.
Download or read book Putting Auction Theory to Work written by Paul Milgrom and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2004-01-12 with total page 378 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book provides a comprehensive introduction to modern auction theory and its important new applications. It is written by a leading economic theorist whose suggestions guided the creation of the new spectrum auction designs. Aimed at graduate students and professionals in economics, the book gives the most up-to-date treatments of both traditional theories of 'optimal auctions' and newer theories of multi-unit auctions and package auctions, and shows by example how these theories are used. The analysis explores the limitations of prominent older designs, such as the Vickrey auction design, and evaluates the practical responses to those limitations. It explores the tension between the traditional theory of auctions with a fixed set of bidders, in which the seller seeks to squeeze as much revenue as possible from the fixed set, and the theory of auctions with endogenous entry, in which bidder profits must be respected to encourage participation.
Download or read book Multiple Object Auctions with Budget Constrained Bidders written by Jean-Pierre Benoit and published by . This book was released on 2000 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A seller with two objects faces a group of bidders who are subject to budget constraints. The objects have common values to all bidders, but need not be identical and may be either complements or substitutes. In a simple complete information setting we show: (1) if the objects are sold by means of a sequence of open ascending auctions, then it is always optimal to sell the more valuable object first; (2) the sequential auction yields more revenue than the simultaneous ascending auction used recently by the FCC if the discrepancy in the values is large, or if there are significant complementarities; (3) a hybrid simultaneous-sequential form is revenue superior to the sequential auction; and (4) budget constraints arise endogenously.
Download or read book Pareto Optimality Game Theory and Equilibria written by Panos M. Pardalos and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2008-07-02 with total page 872 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This comprehensive work examines important recent developments and modern applications in the fields of optimization, control, game theory and equilibrium programming. In particular, the concepts of equilibrium and optimality are of immense practical importance affecting decision-making problems regarding policy and strategies, and in understanding and predicting systems in different application domains, ranging from economics and engineering to military applications. The book consists of 29 survey chapters written by distinguished researchers in the above areas.
Download or read book Market Design written by Martin Bichler and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2017-12-21 with total page 297 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The digital economy led to many new services where supply is matched with demand for various types of goods and services. More and more people and organizations are now in a position to design market rules that are being implemented in software. The design of markets is challenging as it needs to consider strategic behavior of market participants, psychological factors, and computational problems in order to implement the objectives of a designer. Market models in economics have not lost their importance, but the recent years have led to many new insights and principles for the design of markets, which are beyond traditional economic theory. This book introduces the fundamentals of market design, an engineering field concerned with the design of real-world markets.
Download or read book Core Pricing in Large Multi Object Auctions written by Andor Goetzendorff and published by . This book was released on 2013 with total page 20 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Motivated by markets for television advertising time-slots, we introduce a new combinatorial auction format, including a general method for approximating core-selecting payments for hard problems. Given the size and complexity of ad markets in practice, an enumerative XOR bidding language (widely discussed in the literature and used in recent government spectrum auctions) grows too quickly to be practical. We therefore propose a compact bidding language for coverage or demographic reach, and investigate the resulting winner determination (a form of multi-knapsack problem) using numerical experiments. For realistic instances of the problem, very good solutions can be found relatively quickly, though closing the integrality gap to find marginally better solutions or prove optimality can take a prohibitively large amount of time. Our subsequent adaptation of the core-selecting payment technique to this environment of nearly-optimal optimization results is a new, practically viable paradigm by which competitive market outcomes can be achieved despite computational limitations.
Download or read book Multi Object Auctions with Package Bidding written by Yan Chen and published by . This book was released on 2010 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The use of package auctions for complex resource allocation has been rapidly increasing in recent years. In this paper, we study two package auction mechanisms in a laboratory setting, a sealed bid Vickrey auction and an ascending version of Vickrey, the iBEA auction. Unlike the single-unit Vickrey auction, where bidders tend to overbid in the laboratory, most of our bidders either underbid or bid their true values. Furthermore, at the aggregate level, while the Vickrey auction generates significantly higher revenue than does iBEA, the iBEA auction generates significantly higher bidder profit and efficiency. Additionally, a significantly larger proportion of iBEA auctions achieves 100% efficiency than does the Vickrey auction. We also find that human bidders learn from their robot opponents when the robot strategies are (myopic) best responses.
