Download or read book Intertemporal Pricing and Price Discrimination written by Thanasis Stengos and published by . This book was released on 2003 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Dynamic Pricing written by Mark Stenius Roberts and published by . This book was released on 1977 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Intertemporal Price Discrimination with Time Varying Valuations written by Victor F. Araman and published by . This book was released on 2020 with total page 41 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A firm that sells a non perishable product considers intertemporal price discrimination in the objective of maximizing the long-run average revenue. Each period, a number of interested customers approach the firm and can either purchase on arrival, or remain in the system for a period of time. During this time, each customer's valuation changes following a discrete and homogenous Markov chain. Customers leave the system if they either purchase at some point, or their valuations reach an absorbing state v0. We show that, in this context, cyclic strategies are optimal, or nearly optimal. When the pace of intertemporal pricing is constrained to be comparable to customers patience level, we have a good control on the cycle length and on the structure of the optimizing cyclic policies. We also obtain an algorithm that yields the optimal (or near optimal) cyclic solutions in polynomial time in the number of prices. We cast part of our results in a general framework of optimizing the long-run average revenues for a class of payoffs that we call weakly coupled, in which the revenue per period depends on a finite number of neighboring prices.
Download or read book Intertemporal price discrimination and sticky prices written by Louis Phlips and published by . This book was released on 1977 with total page 30 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Intertemporal Price Discrimination with Multiple Products written by Jean-Charles Rochet and published by . This book was released on 2017 with total page 52 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We study the multiproduct monopoly profit maximisation problem for a seller who can commit to a dynamic pricing strategy. We show that if consumers' valuations are not strongly-ordered then optimality for the seller requires intertemporal price discrimination and it can be implemented by dynamic pricing on the cross-sell to the bundle. If consumers are perfectly negatively correlated, reducing the cross-sell price at a single point in time is optimal. For general valuations we show that if the cross-partial derivative of the profit function is negative then dynamic pricing on the cross-sell is more profitable than fixing prices. So we show that the celebrated Stokey (1979) no-discrimination-across-time result does not extend to multiple good sellers when consumers' valuations are drawn from the tilted uniform, the shifted uniform, the exponential, or the normal distribution. We extend our results to welfare, to complementarities in demand, and to the determination of optimal discount schedules.
Download or read book Intertemporal Price Discrimination written by Damien Matthews and published by . This book was released on 2003 with total page 128 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Intertemporal Price Discrimination Via Reference Price Effects written by Zizhuo Wang and published by . This book was released on 2015 with total page 21 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We consider the dynamic pricing problem a monopolistic seller faces when customers arrive in heterogeneous time periods and their purchase decisions are affected by reference prices formed from their past purchase experiences. We illustrate that a new form of price discrimination opportunity exists in such situations, where the seller's optimal pricing strategy is a cyclic one, even when the customers are loss-neutral and their demand functions are identical. This result differs from those in prior studies where the optimal price paths are shown to be asymptotically constant when customer arrival times are homogeneous or when there are no reference price effects, thus is unique due to the interaction between the heterogeneous arrivals and the reference price effects. We also provide the length of the cycle when the demand function is linear. In this era where customer information becomes easier accessible, our results suggest the seller consider this new dimension of price discrimination in conjunction with the old ones, in order to take advantage of the full power of customer data.
Download or read book Intertemporal price discrimination in storable goods markets written by Igal Hendel and published by . This book was released on 2011 with total page 36 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Abstract: We study intertemporal price discrimination when consumers can store for future consumption needs. To make the problem tractable we offer a simple model of demand dynamics, which we estimate using market level data. Optimal pricing involves temporary price reductions that enable sellers to discriminate between price sensitive consumers, who anticipate future needs, and less price-sensitive consumers. We empirically quantify the impact of intertemporal price discrimination on profits and welfare. We find that sales: (1) capture 25-30% of the profit gap between non-discriminatory and third degree price discrimination profits, and (2) increase total welfare
Download or read book Effects of Cost Information Transparency on Intertemporal Price Discrimination written by Baojun Jiang and published by . This book was released on 2020 with total page 47 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A firm's product-cost information is increasingly transparent to consumers as the firm itself or third parties publish such information, which reduces consumers' uncertainty for the product's cost. Using a dynamic model of firm pricing with forward-looking consumer choices, this paper assesses how cost transparency affects the firm's intertemporal price discrimination and profit, as well as the consumers' strategic waiting decisions and surplus. Ceteris paribus, if consumers believe a durable product has a lower cost, they will expect a larger future price drop and tend to delay purchases, impeding the firm's ability to engage in intertemporal price discrimination. Without cost transparency, consumers may infer products with higher prices to have higher costs, giving a low-cost firm incentive to mimic a high-cost firm's high price to encourage consumers to buy early. In contrast, a high-cost firm may choose to distort its price to avoid a low-cost firm's price mimicry. Cost transparency reveals the product's true cost to consumers, limiting the low-cost firm's ability to mimic prices. Thus, cost transparency will benefit (harm) a firm with a high (low) cost. In equilibrium, cost transparency will increase the firm's sales volume and induce more consumers to buy the product earlier instead of later, attenuating strategic waiting by consumers. We also find that cost transparency can lead to higher prices and hurt consumers if the firm has a high cost. In expectation, cost transparency leads to higher firm profits and consumer surplus, facilitating a firm's new-product innovation.
Download or read book Intertemporal Price Discrimination with Complementary Products written by Hui Li and published by . This book was released on 2018 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper studies intertemporal price discrimination (IPD) with complementary products in the context of e-readers and e-books. Using individual-level data (2008-2012), I estimate a dynamic demand model for e-reader adoption and subsequent book quantity, reading format, and retailer choices in several book genres. I use the estimates to simulate a monopolist's optimal dynamic pricing strategies when facing forward-looking consumers. The results illustrate how skimming/penetration pricing incentives for e-readers and harvesting/investing incentives for e-books interact in this novel setting. The optimal joint IPD strategy is skimming for e-readers and investing for e-books. Counterfactual results suggest that combining IPD with complementary product pricing improves firm profitability because it attenuates the limitations of each pricing approach. In a single-product IPD setting, firms' pricing power is limited when consumers anticipate future price changes and delay purchases. Adding complementary products offers firms two pricing instruments; opposite price trajectories provide conflicting incentives for consumers, limiting intertemporal arbitrage. In a static complementary product setting, firms' pricing power is limited when the relative elasticity between the two products is heterogeneous and conflicting among consumers. Adding IPD sorts heterogeneous consumers into different periods and reduces the need to balance across consumer types.
Download or read book Intertemporal Price Discrimination with Forward looking Consumers written by Harikesh Sasikumar Nair and published by . This book was released on 2006 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Intertemporal Price Discrimination in the US Market for 32 bit Video Games written by Harikesh Sasikumar Nair and published by . This book was released on 2005 with total page 150 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Book Value written by Sofronis Clerides and published by . This book was released on 2002 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Publishers produce books in hardcover and paperback versions with different prices and time of market introduction. Analysis of detailed book-level data reveals that (i) market introduction time has a strong effect on sales, suggesting that time is the crucial dimension of discrimination; (ii) differences in markups cannot be explained by cost differences, hence this is an example of price discrimination; and (iii) there is substantial price rigidity across books and over time: prices depend on cost shifters but not on demand shifters. I propose an explanation for this last finding in terms of the nature of the demand curve.
Download or read book Intertemporal Price Discrimination written by Samuel Raisanen and published by . This book was released on 2015 with total page 26 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: When tickets are sold in advance, as with airlines, concerts, theaters and sporting events, in some cases advanced sales are made at a discount and in others a premium is charged. This paper argues that the more preference certain consumers are regarding future purchases the more likely firms will charge premiums. Alternatively, the higher a firms capacity, the more likely advanced purchase discount will be offered. Finally, endogenizing capacity choice, it is then shown that firms with high marginal costs of capacity are likely to choose premium pricing while low marginal costs of capacity results in more frequent discount pricing.
Download or read book The Economics of Price Discrimination written by George Norman and published by Edward Elgar Publishing. This book was released on 1999 with total page 624 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This volume brings together significant articles which have appeared between 1971 and 1997, analyzing the application and effects of price discrimination.
Download or read book Price Discrimination and Intertemporal Self selection written by Mark Bagnoli and published by . This book was released on 1990 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Intertemporal Price Discrimination in Consumer Packaged Goods written by Ryan Mansley and published by . This book was released on 2022 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Temporary price promotions, or sales, are common in many markets. Using retail scanner data, I find that manufacturers, not retailers, control the timing of sales, while retailers exercise some control over the magnitude of the price decrease. I also find that observed sale policy is more consistent with intertemporal price discrimination than with other explanations. I develop an empirically tractable model that is consistent with these facts and use it to show that sales generally improve consumer surplus and total welfare relative to static pricing. I also find that the effects of market concentration on sales are ambiguous; firms must have some degree of market power for sales to occur, but there are also scenarios when an increase in market power can decrease the occurrence of sales or eliminate them entirely.
