Download or read book Intelligence and National Security Policymaking on Iraq written by James P. Pfiffner and published by Texas A&M University Press. This book was released on 2008 with total page 320 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: "Drawing on the unusually extensive official documentation that has emerged through multiple inquiries on both sides of the Atlantic, as well as insider accounts of CIA deliberations, the contributors to this volume offer careful and insightful analyses of the national security decision-making process, the foreign policy roles of the President and Prime Minister, the roles of Congress and Parliament, the management and limits of intelligence, the shaping of public opinion, and the ethics of humanitarian military intervention. The book also discusses the dilemmas faced by Australia, a junior ally in the War on Terror, and their implications for Australian intelligence."--BOOK JACKET.

Download or read book U S National Security and Foreign Policymaking After 9 11 written by M. Kent Bolton and published by Rowman & Littlefield. This book was released on 2008 with total page 452 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Examines the external, societal, and governmental sources of change to US national-security policymaking that were begun by 9/11, memorialized by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (2004). This book chronicles the manifold changes and what caused them.

Download or read book Intelligence and U S Foreign Policy written by Paul R. Pillar and published by Columbia University Press. This book was released on 2011-09-06 with total page 433 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A career of nearly three decades with the CIA and the National Intelligence Council showed Paul R. Pillar that intelligence reforms, especially measures enacted since 9/11, can be deeply misguided. They often miss the sources that underwrite failed policy and misperceive our ability to read outside influences. They also misconceive the intelligence-policy relationship and promote changes that weaken intelligence-gathering operations. In this book, Pillar confronts the intelligence myths Americans have come to rely on to explain national tragedies, including the belief that intelligence drives major national security decisions and can be fixed to avoid future failures. Pillar believes these assumptions waste critical resources and create harmful policies, diverting attention away from smarter reform, and they keep Americans from recognizing the limits of obtainable knowledge. Pillar revisits U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War and highlights the small role intelligence played in those decisions, and he demonstrates the negligible effect that America's most notorious intelligence failures had on U.S. policy and interests. He then reviews in detail the events of 9/11 and the 2003 invasion of Iraq, condemning the 9/11 commission and the George W. Bush administration for their portrayals of the role of intelligence. Pillar offers an original approach to better informing U.S. policy, which involves insulating intelligence management from politicization and reducing the politically appointed layer in the executive branch to combat slanted perceptions of foreign threats. Pillar concludes with principles for adapting foreign policy to inevitable uncertainties.

Download or read book The National Security Enterprise written by Roger Z. George and published by Georgetown University Press. This book was released on 2011-01-01 with total page 385 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Recent breakdowns in American national security have exposed the weaknesses of the nation’s vast overlapping security and foreign policy bureaucracy and the often dysfunctional interagency process. In the literature of national security studies, however, surprisingly little attention is given to the specific dynamics or underlying organizational cultures that often drive the bureaucratic politics of U.S. security policy. The National Security Enterprise offers a broad overview and analysis of the many government agencies involved in national security issues, the interagency process, Congressional checks and balances, and the influence of private sector organizations. The chapters cover the National Security Council, the Departments of Defense and State, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of Homeland Security, and the Office of Management and Budget. The book also focuses on the roles of Congress, the Supreme Court, and outside players in the national security process like the media, think tanks, and lobbyists. Each chapter details the organizational culture and personality of these institutions so that readers can better understand the mindsets that drive these organizations and their roles in the policy process. Many of the contributors to this volume are long-time practitioners who have spent most of their careers working for these organizations. As such, they offer unique insights into how diplomats, military officers, civilian analysts, spies, and law enforcement officials are distinct breeds of policymakers and political actors. To illustrate how different agencies can behave in the face of a common challenge, contributors reflect in detail on their respective agency’s behavior during the Iraq War. This impressive volume is suitable for academic studies at both the undergraduate and graduate level; ideal for U.S. government, military, and national security training programs; and useful for practitioners and specialists in national security studies.

Download or read book Fixing the Facts written by Joshua Rovner and published by Cornell University Press. This book was released on 2011-07-26 with total page 276 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Rovner explores the complex interaction between intelligence and policy and shines a spotlight on the problem of politicization.

Download or read book Enemies of Intelligence written by Richard K. Betts and published by Columbia University Press. This book was released on 2007 with total page 266 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Citing the events of 9/11 and the false assessment of Saddams weapons arsenal, one of the nations foremost political scientists illuminates the paradoxes and problems that frustrate the intelligence process, and outlines strategies for better intelligence gathering and assessment.

Download or read book Balance Sheet written by John S. Duffield and published by Stanford University Press. This book was released on 2009-07-06 with total page 265 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The last six years have witnessed a virtually unending debate over U.S. policy toward Iraq, a debate that is likely to continue well into the new administration and perhaps the next, notwithstanding recent improvements on the ground. Too often, however, the debate has been narrowly framed in terms of the situation in Iraq and what steps the United States should take there next, leaving the broader impact of the war on American interests largely overlooked. Ultimately, though, the success and failure of the war will have to be judged in terms of its overall contribution to U.S. national security, including those repercussions that extend far beyond the borders of Iraq. This book addresses this gap by providing a comprehensive evaluation of the consequences of the Iraq war for the national security of the United States. It is aimed at both those who have not yet made up their minds about the merits of the war and those who wish to ground their opinions in a clearer understanding of what effects the war has actually had. Balance Sheet examines both how the war has advanced or retarded the achievement of other important goals of U.S. national security policy and its impact on the ability of the United States to pursue its security interests now and in the future. Individual chapters by expert authors address such key issues as the war on terror, nuclear non-proliferation, stability in the Middle East, the health of the U.S. military, America's standing in the world, and U.S. public opinion. By doing justice to the full range of stakes involved, this book not only reframes the debate over the Iraq war but provides a necessary foundation for future U.S. policymaking toward Iraq and beyond.

Download or read book Intelligence and national security policymaking on Iraq written by James Pfiffner and published by Manchester University Press. This book was released on 2018-07-30 with total page 311 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The decision to go to war in Iraq has had historic repercussions throughout the world. The editors of this volume bring together scholarly analysis of the decision-making in the U.S and U.K. that led to the war, inside accounts of CIA decision-making, and key speeches and documents related to going to war. The book presents a fascinating case study of decision-making at the highest levels in the United States and Britain as their leaders planned to go to war in Iraq. Just as the Cuban Missile Crisis has been used for decades as a case study in good decision-making, the decision to go to war in Iraq will be analysed for years to come for lessons about what can go wrong in decisions about war. The book presents a fascinating and truly comparative perspective on how President Bush and Prime Minister Blair took their countries to war in Iraq. Each had to convince his legislature and public that war was necessary, and both used intelligence in questionable ways to do so. This book brings together some of the best scholarship and most relevant documents on these important decisions that will reverberate for decades to come.

Download or read book Report on Whether Public Statements Regarding Iraq by U S Government Officials Were Substantiated by Intelligence Information Together with Additional and Minority Views written by John D. Rockefeller and published by DIANE Publishing. This book was released on 2009-05 with total page 172 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Assesses ¿whether public statements and reports and testimony regarding Iraq by U.S. Gov¿t. officials made between the Gulf War period and the commencement of Operation Iraqi Freedom were substantiated by intelligence info.¿ The Committee reviewed 5 major policy speeches by Admin. officials regarding: the threats posed by Iraq, Iraqi weapons of mass destruction programs, Iraqi ties to terrorist groups, and possible consequences of a U.S. invasion of Iraq. The Committee selected particular statements that pertained to 8 categories: nuclear weapons, biological weapons, chemical weapons, weapons of mass destruction (generally), methods of delivery, links to terrorism, regime intent, and assessments about the post-war situation in Iraq.

Download or read book Why Intelligence Fails written by Robert Jervis and published by Cornell University Press. This book was released on 2010-12-15 with total page 249 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The U.S. government spends enormous resources each year on the gathering and analysis of intelligence, yet the history of American foreign policy is littered with missteps and misunderstandings that have resulted from intelligence failures. In Why Intelligence Fails, Robert Jervis examines the politics and psychology of two of the more spectacular intelligence failures in recent memory: the mistaken belief that the regime of the Shah in Iran was secure and stable in 1978, and the claim that Iraq had active WMD programs in 2002. The Iran case is based on a recently declassified report Jervis was commissioned to undertake by CIA thirty years ago and includes memoranda written by CIA officials in response to Jervis's findings. The Iraq case, also grounded in a review of the intelligence community's performance, is based on close readings of both classified and declassified documents, though Jervis's conclusions are entirely supported by evidence that has been declassified. In both cases, Jervis finds not only that intelligence was badly flawed but also that later explanations—analysts were bowing to political pressure and telling the White House what it wanted to hear or were willfully blind—were also incorrect. Proponents of these explanations claimed that initial errors were compounded by groupthink, lack of coordination within the government, and failure to share information. Policy prescriptions, including the recent establishment of a Director of National Intelligence, were supposed to remedy the situation. In Jervis's estimation, neither the explanations nor the prescriptions are adequate. The inferences that intelligence drew were actually quite plausible given the information available. Errors arose, he concludes, from insufficient attention to the ways in which information should be gathered and interpreted, a lack of self-awareness about the factors that led to the judgments, and an organizational culture that failed to probe for weaknesses and explore alternatives. Evaluating the inherent tensions between the methods and aims of intelligence personnel and policymakers from a unique insider's perspective, Jervis forcefully criticizes recent proposals for improving the performance of the intelligence community and discusses ways in which future analysis can be improved.

Download or read book Buying National Security written by Gordon Adams and published by Routledge. This book was released on 2010-02-11 with total page 365 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Examines the planning and budgeting processes of the United States. This title describes the planning and resource integration activities of the White House, reviews the adequacy of the structures and process and makes proposals for ways both might be reformed to fit the demands of the 21st century security environment.

Download or read book Combating Proliferation written by Jason D. Ellis and published by JHU Press. This book was released on 2007-02-23 with total page 338 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Selected by Choice Magazine as an Outstanding Academic Title The intelligence community's flawed assessment of Iraq's weapons systems—and the Bush administration's decision to go to war in part based on those assessments—illustrates the political and policy challenges of combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In this comprehensive assessment, defense policy specialists Jason Ellis and Geoffrey Kiefer find disturbing trends in both the collection and analysis of intelligence and in its use in the development and implementation of security policy. Analyzing a broad range of recent case studies—Pakistan's development of nuclear weapons, North Korea's defiance of U.N. watchdogs, Russia's transfer of nuclear and missile technology to Iran and China's to Pakistan, the Soviet biological warfare program, weapons inspections in Iraq, and others—the authors find that intelligence collection and analysis relating to WMD proliferation are becoming more difficult, that policy toward rogue states and regional allies requires difficult tradeoffs, and that using military action to fight nuclear proliferation presents intractable operational challenges. Ellis and Kiefer reveal that decisions to use—or overlook—intelligence are often made for starkly political reasons. They document the Bush administration's policy shift from nonproliferation, which emphasizes diplomatic tools such as sanctions and demarches, to counterproliferation, which at times employs interventionist and preemptive actions. They conclude with cogent recommendations for intelligence services and policy makers.

Download or read book Report of the Select Committee on Intelligence on the U S Intelligence Community s Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq Together with Additional Views written by United States. Congress. Senate. Select Committee on Intelligence and published by Select Committee on Intelligence. This book was released on 2004 with total page 534 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence presents its report on prewar intelligence regarding Iraq, which contains numerous documents from various U.S. intelligence agencies regarding possible weapons of mass destruction, and other issues relating to Iraq.

Download or read book The failure of US intelligence in Iraq written by Robert Fiedler and published by GRIN Verlag. This book was released on 2010-12-22 with total page 11 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Essay aus dem Jahr 2008 im Fachbereich Politik - Region: Naher Osten, Vorderer Orient, Macquarie University, Sprache: Deutsch, Abstract: United States (US) intelligence efforts are massive by any standards. More than 20.000 employees work for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), another 21.000 for the National Security Agency (NSA) and another 8500 for the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA). In 2004, the US government invested more than US$ 35 billion into intelligence and additionally numerous analysts work on intelligence in other governmental agencies with an associated intelligence function as well as in non-governmental institutions. Therefore, one might say that the US intelligence community (IC) is one of the most professionalized and effective intelligence frameworks worldwide. Hence, it is not surprisingly that reams of successes were achieved, even though many of them will remain unknown since the IC will keep operations and methods classified. Yet, despite outstanding financial and human resources, the IC produced many serious intelligence failures. Beginning with the German attack on the Soviet Union and Pear Harbour in 1941 until the failure to foresee the devastating terrorist acts of 9/11 failures are an element of intelligence work in the United States. However, one of the most serious failure of intelligence has been the preparation to the coalition led invasion in Iraq in 2003. The US intelligence community faces severe criticism and accusations of intended wrong information on the case of Iraq. However, in the following this paper will argue that the failure of intelligence resulted from a combination of bureaucratic obscurities and political intended production of customized intelligence. Furthermore, the reliance on doubtful information and the demotion of traditional intelligence processes led to the failure of intelligence in the advance of the Iraq war.

Download or read book US National Security Reform written by Heidi B. Demarest and published by Taylor & Francis. This book was released on 2018-07-04 with total page 272 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This collection of essays considers the evolution of American institutions and processes for forming and implementing US national security policy, and offers diverse policy prescriptions for reform to confront an evolving and uncertain security environment. Twelve renowned scholars and practitioners of US national security policy take up the question of whether the national security institutions we have are the ones we need to confront an uncertain future. Topics include a characterization of future threats to national security, organizational structure and leadership of national security bureaucracies, the role of the US Congress in national security policy making and oversight, and the importance of strategic planning within the national security enterprise. The book concludes with concrete recommendations for policy makers, most of which can be accomplished under the existing and enduring National Security Act. This book will be of much interest to students of US national security, US foreign policy, Cold War studies, public policy and Internationl Relations in general.

Download or read book The Threatening Storm written by Kenneth Pollack and published by Random House. This book was released on 2003-03-25 with total page 530 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In The Threatening Storm, Kenneth M. Pollack, one of the world’s leading experts on Iraq, provides a masterly insider’s perspective on the crucial issues facing the United States as it moves toward a new confrontation with Saddam Hussein. For the past fifteen years, as an analyst on Iraq for the Central Intelligence Agency and the National Security Council, Kenneth Pollack has studied Saddam as closely as anyone else in the United States. In 1990, he was one of only three CIA analysts to predict the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. As the principal author of the CIA’s history of Iraqi military strategy and operations during the Gulf War, Pollack gained rare insight into the methods and workings of what he believes to be the most brutal regime since Stalinist Russia. Examining all sides of the debate and bringing a keen eye to the military and geopolitical forces at work, Pollack ultimately comes to this controversial conclusion: through our own mistakes, the perfidy of others, and Saddam’s cunning, the United States is left with few good policy options regarding Iraq. Increasingly, the option that makes the most sense is for the United States to launch a full-scale invasion, eradicate Saddam’s weapons of mass destruction, and rebuild Iraq as a prosperous and stable society—for the good of the United States, the Iraqi people, and the entire region. Pollack believed for many years that the United States could prevent Saddam from threatening the stability of the Persian Gulf and the world through containment—a combination of sanctions and limited military operations. Here, Pollack explains why containment is no longer effective, and why other policies intended to deter Saddam ultimately pose a greater risk than confronting him now, before he gains possession of nuclear weapons and returns to his stated goal of dominating the Gulf region. “It is often said that war should be employed only in the last resort,” Pollack writes. “I reluctantly believe that in the case of the threat from Iraq, we have come to the last resort.” Offering a view of the region that has the authority and force of an intelligence report, Pollack outlines what the leaders of neighboring Arab countries are thinking, what is necessary to gain their support for an invasion, how a successful U.S. operation would be mounted, what the likely costs would be, and how Saddam might react. He examines the state of Iraq today—its economy, its armed forces, its political system, the status of its weapons of mass destruction as best we understand them, and the terrifying security apparatus that keeps Saddam in power. Pollack also analyzes the last twenty years of relations between the United States and Iraq to explain how the two countries reached the unhappy standoff that currently prevails. Commanding in its insights and full of detailed information about how leaders on both sides will make their decisions, The Threatening Storm is an essential guide to understanding what may be the crucial foreign policy challenge of our time.

Download or read book Hitting First written by William W. Keller and published by University of Pittsburgh Pre. This book was released on 2006-09-03 with total page 369 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The U.S. war in Iraq was not only an intelligence failure—it was a failure in democratic discourse. Hitting Firstoffers a critical analysis of the political dialogue leading up to the American embrace of preventive war as national policy and as the rationale for the invasion and occupation of Iraq. Taking as its point of departure the important distinction between preemptive and preventive war, the contributors examine how the rhetoric of policy makers conflated these two very different concepts until the public could no longer effectively distinguish between a war of necessity and a war of choice. Although the book focuses on recent events, Hitting First takes into consideration the broader historical, ethical, and legal context of current American policies. Precedents are examined for preventive military action based on conventional as well as nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons threats. The authors also consider recent examples of the rhetoric of "humanitarian intervention," which have tended to undermine traditional notions of national sovereignty, making purportedly "morally justifiable" actions easier to entertain. Intelligence gathering and its use, manipulation, and distortion to suit policy agendas are also analyzed, as are the realities of the application of military force, military requirements to sustain a policy of preventive war, and post-conflict reconstruction.Hitting First presents a timely and essential view of the lessons learned from the failures of the Iraqi conflict, and offers a framework for avoiding future policy breakdowns through a process of deliberative public and governmental debate within a free market of ideas. The critiques and prescriptions offered here provide a unique and valuable perspective on the challenges of formulating and conduct of national security policy while sustaining the principles and institutions of American democracy. This collection will appeal to students and scholars of American foreign policy, international relations, political communication, and ethics.