Download or read book Information Incentives and the Economics of Control written by G. C. Archibald and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 1992-09-24 with total page 26 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This 1992 book examines alternative methods for achieving optimality without all the apparatus of economic planning (such as information retrieval, computation of solutions, and separate implementation systems), or a vain reliance on sufficiently 'perfect' competition. All rely entirely on the self-interest of economic agents and voluntary contract.
Download or read book Incentives written by Donald E. Campbell and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2018-02-22 with total page 699 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book examines incentives at work to see how and how well coordination is achieved by motivating individual decision makers.
Download or read book An Introduction to the Economics of Information written by Inés Macho-Stadler and published by Oxford University Press. This book was released on 1996-10-03 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In this revised second edition, An Introduction to the Economics of Information covers the consequences for the character and efficiency of the interaction between individuals and organizations when one party has more or better information on some aspect of the relationship. This is the condition of asymmetric information, under which the information gap will be exploited if, by doing so, the better-informed party can achieve some advantage. The book is written for a one-semester course for advanced undergraduates taking specialized course options, and for first-year postgraduate students of economics or business. After an introduction to the subject and the presentation of a benchmark model in which both parties share the same information throughout the relationship, chapters are devoted to the three main asymmetric information topics of Moral Hazard, Adverse Selection, and Signalling. The wide range of economic situations where the conclusions are applied includes such areas as finance, regulation, insurance, labour economics, health economics, and even politics. Each chapter presents the basic theory before moving on to applications and advanced topics. The problems are presented in the same framework throughout to allow easy comparison of the different results. This new edition incorporates extended exercises to test the student's understanding of the material, and to develop the tools and skills provided by the main text to solve other, original problems.
Download or read book Agency Theory Information and Incentives written by Günter Bamberg and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2012-12-06 with total page 538 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Agency Theory is a new branch of economics which focusses on the roles of information and of incentives when individuals cooperate with respect to the utilisation of resources. Basic approaches are coming from microeco nomic theory as well as from risk analysis. Among the broad variety of ap plications are: the many designs of contractual arrangements, organiza tions, and institutions as well as the manifold aspects of the separation of ownership and control so fundamental for business finance. After some twenty years of intensive research in the field of information economics it might be timely to present the most basic issues, questions, models, and applications. This volume Agency Theory, Information, and Incentives offers introductory surveys as well as results of individual rese arch that seem to shape that field of information economics appropriately. Some 30 authors were invited to present their subjects in such a way that students could easily become acquainted with the main ideas of informa tion economics. So the aim of Agency Theory, Information, and Incentives is to introduce students at an intermediate level and to accompany their work in classes on microeconomics, information economics, organization, management theory, and business finance. The topics selected form the eight sections of the book: 1. Agency Theory and Risk Sharing 2. Information and Incentives 3. Capital Markets and Moral Hazard 4. Financial Contracting and Dividends 5. External Accounting and Auditing 6. Coordination in Groups 7. Property Rights and Fairness 8. Agency Costs.
Download or read book An Introduction to the Economics of Information written by Inés Macho Stadler and published by . This book was released on 1997 with total page 277 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Information Incentives and Economic Mechanisms written by Theodore Groves and published by U of Minnesota Press. This book was released on 1987 with total page 410 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Printbegrænsninger: Der kan printes 10 sider ad gangen og max. 40 sider pr. session
Download or read book Incentives written by Donald E. Campbell and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2018-02-22 with total page 700 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: When incentives work well, individuals prosper. When incentives are poor, the pursuit of self-interest is self-defeating. This book is wholly devoted to the topical subject of incentives from individual, collective, and institutional standpoints. This third edition is fully updated and expanded, including a new section on the 2007–08 financial crisis and a new chapter on networks as well as specific applications of school placement for students, search engine ad auctions, pollution permits, and more. Using worked examples and lucid general theory in its analysis, and seasoned with references to current and past events, Incentives: Motivation and the Economics of Information examines: the performance of agents hired to carry out specific tasks, from taxi drivers to CEOs; the performance of institutions, from voting schemes to medical panels deciding who gets kidney transplants; a wide range of market transactions, from auctions to labor markets to the entire economy. Suitable for advanced undergraduate and graduate students studying incentives as part of courses in microeconomics, economic theory, managerial economics, political economy, and related areas of social science.
Download or read book Incentives and Political Economy written by Jean-Jacques Laffont and published by OUP Oxford. This book was released on 2000-03-30 with total page 272 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Mainstream economics has only recently recognized the need to incorporate political constraints into economic analysis intended for policy advisors. "Incentives and Political Economy" uses recent advances in contract theory to build a normative approach to constitutional design in economic environments. It is written by one of Europe's leading theorists. The first part of the book remains in the tradition of benevolent constitutional design with complete contracting. It treats politicians as informed supervisors and studies how the Constitution should control them, in particular to avoid capture by interest groups. Incentive theories for the separation of powers or systems of checks and balances are developed. The second part of the book recognizes the incompleteness of the constitutional contract which leaves a lot of discretion to the politicians selected by the electoral process. Asymmetric information associates information rents with economic policies and the political game becomes a game of costly redistribution of those rents. Professor Laffont investigates the trade-offs between an inflexible constitution which leaves little discretion to politicians but sacrifices ex post efficiency and a constitution weighted towards ex post efficiency but also giving considerable discretion to politicians to pursue private agendas. The final part of the book reconsiders the modeling of collusion given asymmetric information. It proposes a new approach to characterizing incentives constraints for group behaviour when asymmetric information is non-verifiable. This provides a methodology to characterize the optimal constitutional response to activities of interest groups and to study the design of any institutions in which group behavior is important.
Download or read book Incentives and Political Economy written by Jean-Jacques Laffont and published by Oxford University Press. This book was released on 2000-03-30 with total page 270 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Mainstream economics has recognized only recently the necessity to incorporate political constraints into economic analysis intended for policy advisors. Incentives and Political Economy uses recent advances in contract theory to build a normative approach to constitutional design in economic environments.The first part of the book remains in the tradition of benevolent constitutional design with complete contracting. It treats politicians as informed supervisors and studies how the Constitution should control them, in particular to avoid capture by interest groups. Incentive theories for the separation of powers or systems of checks and balances are developed.The second part of the book recognises the incompleteness of the constitutional contract which leaves discretion to the politicans selected by the electoral process. Asymmetric information associates information rents with economic policies and the political game becomes a game of costly redistribution of those rents. Professor Laffont investigates the trade-offs between an inflexible constitution which leaves little discretion to politicians but sacrifices ex post efficiency and a constitutionweighted towards ex post efficiency but also giving considerable discretion to politicians to pursue private agendas.The final part of the book reconsiders the modeling of collusion given asymmetric information. It proposes a new approach to characterizing incentives constraints for group behaviour when asymmetric information is non-verifiable. This provides a methodology to characterise the optimal constitutional response to activities of interest groups and to study the design of any institution in which group behavior is important.
Download or read book The Economics of Control written by Abba P. Lerner and published by . This book was released on 1946 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Economic Incentives for Stormwater Control written by Hale W. Thurston and published by CRC Press. This book was released on 2011-08-03 with total page 258 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Dealing with stormwater runoff in urban areas is a problem that is getting bigger and more expensive. As we cover porous surfaces with impervious structures—commercial buildings, parking lots, roads, and houses—finding places for rainwater and snowmelt to soak in becomes harder. Many landscapers, architects, planners, and others have proposed that the use of "green" localized management practices, such as rain gardens and bio-swales, may function as well as traditional "gray" pipes and basins at reducing the effects of stormwater runoff, and do so in a way that is more attractive in the landscape—and possibly also less expensive. To make stormwater management practices work, however, communities need to know the real costs and policy makers need to give people incentives to adopt the best practices. Economic Incentives for Stormwater Control addresses the true costs and benefits of stormwater management practices (SMPs) and examines the incentives that can be used to encourage their adoption. Highlighting the economic aspects, this practical book offers case studies of the application of various stormwater runoff control policies. It also presents the theory behind the different mechanisms used and illustrates successes and potential obstacles to implementation. The book covers: Efficient use of "green" SMPs Low-impact development (LID) style new construction Green infrastructure Property prices and incentive mechanisms to encourage homeowners to retain stormwater on their property Legal, economic, and hydrological issues associated with various incentive mechanisms In-lieu fees and cap-and-trade incentives Primarily concerned with the sociodemographic and economic aspects of people’s participation in stormwater runoff control, this accessible volume explores opportunities available to municipalities, stormwater managers, and stakeholder groups to enact sustainable, effective stormwater management practices.
Download or read book The Theory of Incentives written by Jean-Jacques Laffont and published by Princeton University Press. This book was released on 2009-12-27 with total page 436 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Economics has much to do with incentives--not least, incentives to work hard, to produce quality products, to study, to invest, and to save. Although Adam Smith amply confirmed this more than two hundred years ago in his analysis of sharecropping contracts, only in recent decades has a theory begun to emerge to place the topic at the heart of economic thinking. In this book, Jean-Jacques Laffont and David Martimort present the most thorough yet accessible introduction to incentives theory to date. Central to this theory is a simple question as pivotal to modern-day management as it is to economics research: What makes people act in a particular way in an economic or business situation? In seeking an answer, the authors provide the methodological tools to design institutions that can ensure good incentives for economic agents. This book focuses on the principal-agent model, the "simple" situation where a principal, or company, delegates a task to a single agent through a contract--the essence of management and contract theory. How does the owner or manager of a firm align the objectives of its various members to maximize profits? Following a brief historical overview showing how the problem of incentives has come to the fore in the past two centuries, the authors devote the bulk of their work to exploring principal-agent models and various extensions thereof in light of three types of information problems: adverse selection, moral hazard, and non-verifiability. Offering an unprecedented look at a subject vital to industrial organization, labor economics, and behavioral economics, this book is set to become the definitive resource for students, researchers, and others who might find themselves pondering what contracts, and the incentives they embody, are really all about.
Download or read book Essays in the Economics of Information Incentives and the Law written by Aaron Finkle and published by . This book was released on 2004 with total page 96 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Public Decision Making Processes and Asymmetry of Information written by Massimo Marrelli and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2012-12-06 with total page 212 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The problems arising from the existence of asymmetric information in public decision making have been widely explored by economists. Most of the traditional analysis of public sector activities has been reviewed to take accountofthe possible distortions arising from an asymmetric distribution of relevant information among the actors of the public decision-making process. A normative approach has been developed to design incentive schemes which tackle adverse selection and moral hazard problems within public organisations: our understanding of these problems is now much better, and some of the mechanisms designed have had important practical implications. While this analysis is still under way in many fields of public economics, as the papers by Jones and Zanola, and Trimarchi witness, a debate is ongoing on the possible theoretical limitations ofthis approach and on its actual relevance for public sector activities. This book encompasses different contributions to these issues, on both theoretical and practical areas, which were firstly presented at a conference in Catania. The innermost problem in the current discussion arises from the fact that this normative analysis is firmly rooted in the complete contracting framework, with the consequence that, despite the analytical complexities of most models, their results rely on very simplified assumptions. Most complexities of the organisation of public sector, and more generally, of writing "contracts", are therefore swept away.
Download or read book Incentives written by Donald E. Campbell and published by . This book was released on 2006 with total page 604 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Knowledge and Power written by George Gilder and published by Regnery Publishing. This book was released on 2013-06-10 with total page 370 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Ronald Reagan’s most-quoted living author—George Gilder—is back with an all-new paradigm-shifting theory of capitalism that will upturn conventional wisdom, just when our economy desperately needs a new direction. America’s struggling economy needs a better philosophy than the college student's lament: "I can't be out of money, I still have checks in my checkbook!" We’ve tried a government spending spree, and we’ve learned it doesn’t work. Now is the time to rededicate our country to the pursuit of free market capitalism, before we’re buried under a mound of debt and unfunded entitlements. But how do we navigate between government spending that's too big to sustain and financial institutions that are "too big to fail?" In Knowledge and Power, George Gilder proposes a bold new theory on how capitalism produces wealth and how our economy can regain its vitality and its growth. Gilder breaks away from the supply-side model of economics to present a new economic paradigm: the epic conflict between the knowledge of entrepreneurs on one side, and the blunt power of government on the other. The knowledge of entrepreneurs, and their freedom to share and use that knowledge, are the sparks that light up the economy and set its gears in motion. The power of government to regulate, stifle, manipulate, subsidize or suppress knowledge and ideas is the inertia that slows those gears down, or keeps them from turning at all. One of the twentieth century’s defining economic minds has returned with a new philosophy to carry us into the twenty-first. Knowledge and Power is a must-read for fiscal conservatives, business owners, CEOs, investors, and anyone interested in propelling America’s economy to future success.
Download or read book Economic Incentives for Land Use Control written by Frederick H. Rueter and published by . This book was released on 1977 with total page 384 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: