Download or read book The Impact of Incomplete Contracts on Economics written by Philippe Aghion and published by Oxford University Press. This book was released on 2015-12-22 with total page 224 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The 1986 article by Sanford J. Grossman and Oliver D. Hart titled "A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration" has provided a framework for understanding how firm boundaries are defined and how they affect economic performance. The property rights approach has provided a formal way to introduce incomplete contracting ideas into economic modeling. The Impact of Incomplete Contracts on Economics collects papers and opinion pieces on the impact that this property right approach to the firm has had on the economics profession.
Download or read book Allocation Information and Markets written by John Eatwell and published by Springer. This book was released on 1989-09-21 with total page 321 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This is an extract from the 4-volume dictionary of economics, a reference book which aims to define the subject of economics today. 1300 subject entries in the complete work cover the broad themes of economic theory. This volume concentrates on the topic of allocation information and markets.
Download or read book Economic Analysis of Contract Law written by Sugata Bag and published by Springer. This book was released on 2018-01-24 with total page 215 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book examines the main issues arising in economic analysis of contract law with special attention given to the incomplete contracts. It discusses both the main features of contract law as they relate to the problem of economic exchange, and how the relevant legal rules and the institutions can be analysed from an economic perspective. Evaluate the welfare impacts, analyses the effects and the desirability of different breach remedies and examines the optimal incentive structure of party-designed liquidated damages under the different dimensions of informational asymmetry. Overall the book aims to contribute to the legal debate over the adoption of the specific breach remedies when the breach victim’s expectation interest is difficult to assess, and to the debate over courts' reluctance to implement large penalties in the event of breach of contracts.
Download or read book Firms Contracts and Financial Structure written by Oliver Hart and published by Clarendon Press. This book was released on 1995-10-05 with total page 244 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book provides a framework for thinking about economic instiutions such as firms. The basic idea is that institutions arise in situations where people write incomplete contracts and where the allocation of power or control is therefore important. Power and control are not standard concepts in economic theory. The book begins by pointing out that traditional approaches cannot explain on the one hand why all transactions do not take place in one huge firm and on the other hand why firms matter at all. An incomplete contracting or property rights approach is then developed. It is argued that this approach can throw light on the boundaries of firms and on the meaning of asset ownership. In the remainder of the book, incomplete contacting ideas are applied to understand firms' financial decisions, in particular, the nature of debt and equity (why equity has votes and creditors have foreclosure rights); the capital structure decisions of public companies; optimal bankruptcy procedure; and the allocation of voting rights across a company's shares. The book is written in a fairly non-technical style and includes many examples. It is aimed at advanced undergraduate and graduate students, academic and business economists, and lawyers as well as those with an interest in corporate finance, privatization and regulation, and transitional issues in Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, and China. Little background knowledge is required, since the concepts are developed as the book progresses and the existing literature is fully reviewed.
Download or read book More is Less written by Maija Halonen-Akatwijuka and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2024-05-23 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Why are contracts incomplete? Transaction costs and bounded rationality cannot be a total explanation since states of the world are often describable, foreseeable, and yet are not mentioned in a contract. Asymmetric information theories also have limitations. We offer an explanation based on 'contracts as reference points'. Including a contingency of the form, 'The buyer will require a good in event E', has a benefit and a cost. The benefit is that if E occurs there is less to argue about; the cost is that the additional reference point provided by the outcome in E can hinder (re)negotiation in states outside E. We show that if parties agree about a reasonable division of surplus, an incomplete contract is strictly superior to a contingent contract. If parties have different views about the division of surplus, an incomplete contract can be superior if including a contingency would lead to divergent reference points.
Download or read book Contract Theory written by Patrick Bolton and published by MIT Press. This book was released on 2004-12-10 with total page 746 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A comprehensive introduction to contract theory, emphasizing common themes and methodologies as well as applications in key areas. Despite the vast research literature on topics relating to contract theory, only a few of the field's core ideas are covered in microeconomics textbooks. This long-awaited book fills the need for a comprehensive textbook on contract theory suitable for use at the graduate and advanced undergraduate levels. It covers the areas of agency theory, information economics, and organization theory, highlighting common themes and methodologies and presenting the main ideas in an accessible way. It also presents many applications in all areas of economics, especially labor economics, industrial organization, and corporate finance. The book emphasizes applications rather than general theorems while providing self-contained, intuitive treatment of the simple models analyzed. In this way, it can also serve as a reference for researchers interested in building contract-theoretic models in applied contexts.The book covers all the major topics in contract theory taught in most graduate courses. It begins by discussing such basic ideas in incentive and information theory as screening, signaling, and moral hazard. Subsequent sections treat multilateral contracting with private information or hidden actions, covering auction theory, bilateral trade under private information, and the theory of the internal organization of firms; long-term contracts with private information or hidden actions; and incomplete contracts, the theory of ownership and control, and contracting with externalities. Each chapter ends with a guide to the relevant literature. Exercises appear in a separate chapter at the end of the book.
Download or read book Foundations of Incomplete Contracts written by Oliver D. Hart and published by . This book was released on 1998 with total page 64 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In the last few years a new area has emerged in economic theory, which goes under the heading of However, almost since its inception, the theory has been under attack for its lack of rigorous foundations. In this paper, we evaluate some of the criticisms that have been made of the theory, in particular, those in Maskin and Tirole (1998a). In doing so, we develop a model that provides a rigorous foundation for the idea that contracts are incomplete.
Download or read book Theory of Incomplete Markets written by Michael Magill and published by MIT Press. This book was released on 2002 with total page 566 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Theory of incompl. markets/M. Magill, M. Quinzii. - V.1.
Download or read book The Economics of Contracts written by Bernard Salanié and published by MIT Press. This book was released on 2005-03-11 with total page 257 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A concise introduction to the theory of contracts, emphasizing basic tools that allow the reader to understand the main theoretical models; revised and updated throughout for this edition.
Download or read book The Costs and Benefits of Ownership written by Sanford J. Grossman and published by . This book was released on 1984 with total page 76 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Incomplete Contracts and the Product Style written by and published by . This book was released on 2005 with total page 35 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Choice Complexity and Ignorance written by Brian J. Loasby and published by CUP Archive. This book was released on 1976-04-15 with total page 266 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book The Economics of Contracts written by Eric Brousseau and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2002-10-17 with total page 604 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A 2002 survey of economics of contracts appealing to scholars in economics, management and law.
Download or read book Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation written by Oliver D. Hart and published by . This book was released on 1985 with total page 76 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book The Economics of Contracts second edition written by Bernard Salanie and published by MIT Press. This book was released on 2005-03-11 with total page 257 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A concise introduction to the theory of contracts, emphasizing basic tools that allow the reader to understand the main theoretical models; revised and updated throughout for this edition. The theory of contracts grew out of the failure of the general equilibrium model to account for the strategic interactions among agents that arise from informational asymmetries. This popular text, revised and updated throughout for the second edition, serves as a concise and rigorous introduction to the theory of contracts for graduate students and professional economists. The book presents the main models of the theory of contracts, particularly the basic models of adverse selection, signaling, and moral hazard. It emphasizes the methods used to analyze the models, but also includes brief introductions to many of the applications in different fields of economics. The goal is to give readers the tools to understand the basic models and create their own. For the second edition, major changes have been made to chapter 3, on examples and extensions for the adverse selection model, which now includes more thorough discussions of multiprincipals, collusion, and multidimensional adverse selection, and to chapter 5, on moral hazard, with the limited liability model, career concerns, and common agency added to its topics. Two chapters have been completely rewritten: chapter 7, on the theory of incomplete contracts, and chapter 8, on the empirical literature in the theory of contracts. An appendix presents concepts of noncooperative game theory to supplement chapters 4 and 6. Exercises follow chapters 2 through 5. Praise for the previous edition: “The Economics of Contracts offers an excellent introduction to agency models. Written by one of the leading young researchers in contact theory, it is rigorous, clear, concise, and up-to-date. Researchers and students who want to learn about the economics of incentives will want to read this primer.”—Jean Tirole, Institut D'Économie Industrielle, Universite des Sciences Sociales, France “Students will find this a very useful introduction to the ideas of contract theory. Salanié has managed to summarize a large amount of material in a relatively short number of pages in a highly accessible and readable manner.”—Oliver Hart, Professor of Economics, Harvard University
Download or read book The Hold Up Problem and Incomplete Contracts written by Patrick W. Schmitz and published by . This book was released on 2001 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Contract theory is one of the most active fields of research in contemporary microeconomics. One of the reasons why it has been particularly popular in recent years may be the fact that many economists think that the incomplete contracts approach as pioneered by Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990) can help to answer important questions regarding the boundaries of the firm, which have been raised by Coase (1937) and more recently by Williamson (1985). In the meantime, the incomplete contract paradigm has been fruitfully applied to many relevant economic topics which are no longer restricted to the theory of the firm. However, several economic theorists still feel uncomfortable about important issues surrounding the incomplete contracts approach. Such concerns have lead some researchers to a renewed interest in the more traditional theory of complete contracts, which is closely related to the theory of implementation or mechanism design. This article complements existing surveys on contract theory in two ways. First, the surveys that I am aware of are of a quite technical nature and therefore difficult to access for readers who are not already specialists in the field. In contrast, while trying to be as rigorous as necessary, this paper presents all ideas verbally without any mathematical pyrotechnics. Second, instead of attempting to be exhaustive and to provide final answers, this paper is focused on some specific topics which received particular attention by researchers in recent years and puts emphasis on open questions that should be addressed in future research.
Download or read book The Nature of the Firm written by Oliver E. Williamson and published by Oxford University Press, USA. This book was released on 1993 with total page 260 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This volume features a series of essays which arose from a conference on economics, addressing the question: what is the nature of the firm in economic analysis? This paperback edition includes the Nobel Lecture of R.N. Case.
