Download or read book Incentives in Random Matching Markets written by Joana Pais and published by . This book was released on 2005 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Incentives in Decentralized Random Matching Markets written by and published by . This book was released on 2006 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Incentives in Matching Markets Counting and Comparing Manipulating Agents written by Somouaoga Bankoungou and published by . This book was released on 2021 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Information Transmission and Incentives in Markets written by Matti Suominen and published by . This book was released on 1997 with total page 128 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Incentives and Stability in Large Two Sided Matching Markets written by Fuhito Kojima and published by . This book was released on 2007 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The paper analyzes the scope for manipulation in many-to-one matching markets (college admission problems) under the student-optimal stable mechanism when the number of participants is large and the length of the preference list is bounded. Under a mild independence assumption on the distribution of preferences for students, the fraction of colleges that have incentives to misrepresent their preferences approaches zero as the market becomes large. We show that truthful reporting is an approximate equilibrium under the student-optimal stable mechanism in large markets that are sufficiently thick, a condition that allows for certain types of heterogeneity in the distribution of student preferences.

Download or read book Fundamentals of Computation Theory written by Evripidis Bampis and published by Springer Nature. This book was released on 2021-09-11 with total page 476 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book constitutes the proceedings of the 23rd International Symposium on Fundamentals of Computation Theory, FCT 2021, held in Athens, Greece, in September 2021. The 30 full papers included in this volume were carefully reviewed and selected from 94 submissions. In addition, the book contains 2 invited talks. The papers cover topics of all aspects of theoretical computer science, in particular algorithms, complexity, formal and logical methods.

Download or read book Market Microstructure and Incentives to Invest written by Daniel F. Spulber and published by . This book was released on 2002 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Market organization significantly affects total output and incentives for firms to invest. I compare three types of market organization. In a market with search and random matching, total output is excessive and there are incentives for inefficient underinvestment. In a market with a monopoly dealer, total output is insufficient and underinvestment also occurs. Competition between the search market and the dealer market improves incentives to invest, and competition between dealers yields efficient total output and investment. This suggests that additional entry of wholesalers and other interbusiness dealers should stimulate aggregate business investment.

Download or read book Industrial Organization written by Paul Belleflamme and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2010-01-07 with total page 725 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Industrial Organization: Markets and Strategies provides an up-to-date account of modern industrial organization that blends theory with real-world applications. Written in a clear and accessible style, it acquaints the reader with the most important models for understanding strategies chosen by firms with market power and shows how such firms adapt to different market environments. It covers a wide range of topics including recent developments on product bundling, branding strategies, restrictions in vertical supply relationships, intellectual property protection, and two-sided markets, to name just a few. Models are presented in detail and the main results are summarized as lessons. Formal theory is complemented throughout by real-world cases that show students how it applies to actual organizational settings. The book is accompanied by a website containing a number of additional resources for lecturers and students, including exercises, answers to review questions, case material and slides.

Download or read book Random Matching and Trade Relationships in Decentralized Markets written by Dorothea K. Herreiner and published by . This book was released on 2001 with total page 198 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book The Theory of the Firm written by Daniel F. Spulber and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2009-04-13 with total page 542 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The Theory of the Firm presents an innovative general analysis of the economics of the firm.

Download or read book Two Sided Matching written by Alvin E. Roth and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 1992-06-26 with total page 288 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Two-sided matching provides a model of search processes such as those between firms and workers in labor markets or between buyers and sellers in auctions. This book gives a comprehensive account of recent results concerning the game-theoretic analysis of two-sided matching. The focus of the book is on the stability of outcomes, on the incentives that different rules of organization give to agents, and on the constraints that these incentives impose on the ways such markets can be organized. The results for this wide range of related models and matching situations help clarify which conclusions depend on particular modeling assumptions and market conditions, and which are robust over a wide range of conditions. 'This book chronicles one of the outstanding success stories of the theory of games, a story in which the authors have played a major role: the theory and practice of matching markets ... The authors are to be warmly congratulated for this fine piece of work, which is quite unique in the game-theoretic literature.' From the Foreword by Robert Aumann

Download or read book Social dilemmas institutions and the evolution of cooperation written by Ben Jann and published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co KG. This book was released on 2017-09-11 with total page 584 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The question of how cooperation and social order can evolve from a Hobbesian state of nature of a “war of all against all” has always been at the core of social scientific inquiry. Social dilemmas are the main analytical paradigm used by social scientists to explain competition, cooperation, and conflict in human groups. The formal analysis of social dilemmas allows for identifying the conditions under which cooperation evolves or unravels. This knowledge informs the design of institutions that promote cooperative behavior. Yet to gain practical relevance in policymaking and institutional design, predictions derived from the analysis of social dilemmas must be put to an empirical test. The collection of articles in this book gives an overview of state-of-the-art research on social dilemmas, institutions, and the evolution of cooperation. It covers theoretical contributions and offers a broad range of examples on how theoretical insights can be empirically verified and applied to cooperation problems in everyday life. By bringing together a group of distinguished scholars, the book fills an important gap in sociological scholarship and addresses some of the most interesting questions of human sociality.

Download or read book Handbook of Industrial Organization written by and published by Elsevier. This book was released on 2021-12-09 with total page 784 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Handbook of Industrial Organization Volume 4 highlights new advances in the field, with this new volume presenting interesting chapters. Each chapter is written by an international board of authors. - Part of the renowned Handbooks in Economics series - Chapters are contributed by some of the leading experts in their fields - A source, reference and teaching supplement for industrial organizations or industrial economists

Download or read book Algorithmics Of Matching Under Preferences written by David Manlove and published by World Scientific. This book was released on 2013-03-20 with total page 524 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Matching problems with preferences are all around us: they arise when agents seek to be allocated to one another on the basis of ranked preferences over potential outcomes. Efficient algorithms are needed for producing matchings that optimise the satisfaction of the agents according to their preference lists.In recent years there has been a sharp increase in the study of algorithmic aspects of matching problems with preferences, partly reflecting the growing number of applications of these problems worldwide. The importance of the research area was recognised in 2012 through the award of the Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences to Alvin Roth and Lloyd Shapley.This book describes the most important results in this area, providing a timely update to The Stable Marriage Problem: Structure and Algorithms (D Gusfield and R W Irving, MIT Press, 1989) in connection with stable matching problems, whilst also broadening the scope to include matching problems with preferences under a range of alternative optimality criteria.

Download or read book Web and Internet Economics written by Xujin Chen and published by Springer Nature. This book was released on 2020-12-05 with total page 476 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book constitutes the proceedings of the 16th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics, WINE 2020, held in Beijing, China, in December 2020. The 31 full papers presented together with 11 abstracts were carefully reviewed and selected from 136 submissions. The issues in theoretical computer science, artificial intelligence, operations research are of particular importance in the Web and the Internet that enable the interaction of large and diverse populations. The Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE) is an interdisciplinary forum for the exchange of ideas and results on incentives and computation arising from these various fields.

Download or read book Incentives in One sided Matching Problems with Ordinal Preferences written by Hadi Hosseini and published by . This book was released on 2016 with total page 179 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: One of the core problems in multiagent systems is how to efficiently allocate a set of indivisible resources to a group of self-interested agents that compete over scarce and limited alternatives. In these settings, mechanism design approaches such as matching mechanisms and auctions are often applied to guarantee fairness and efficiency while preventing agents from manipulating the outcomes. In many multiagent resource allocation problems, the use of monetary transfers or explicit markets are forbidden because of ethical or legal issues. One-sided matching mechanisms exploit various randomization and algorithmic techniques to satisfy certain desirable properties, while incentivizing self-interested agents to report their private preferences truthfully. In the first part of this thesis, we focus on deterministic and randomized matching mechanisms in one-shot settings. We investigate the class of deterministic matching mechanisms when there is a quota to be fulfilled. Building on past results in artificial intelligence and economics, we show that when preferences are lexicographic, serial dictatorship mechanisms (and their sequential dictatorship counterparts) characterize the set of all possible matching mechanisms with desirable economic properties, enabling social planners to remedy the inherent unfairness in deterministic allocation mechanisms by assigning quotas according to some fairness criteria (such as seniority or priority). Extending the quota mechanisms to randomized settings, we show that this class of mechanisms are envyfree, strategyproof, and ex post efficient for any number of agents and objects and any quota system, proving that the well-studied Random Serial Dictatorship (RSD) is also envyfree in this domain. The next contribution of this thesis is providing a systemic empirical study of the two widely adopted randomized mechanisms, namely Random Serial Dictatorship (RSD) and the Probabilistic Serial Rule (PS). We investigate various properties of these two mechanisms such as efficiency, strategyproofness, and envyfreeness under various preference assumptions (e.g. general ordinal preferences, lexicographic preferences, and risk attitudes). The empirical findings in this thesis complement the theoretical guarantees of matching mechanisms, shedding light on practical implications of deploying each of the given mechanisms. In the second part of this thesis, we address the issues of designing truthful matching mechanisms in dynamic settings. Many multiagent domains require reasoning over time and are inherently dynamic rather than static. We initiate the study of matching problems where agents' private preferences evolve stochastically over time, and decisions have to be made in each period. To adequately evaluate the quality of outcomes in dynamic settings, we propose a generic stochastic decision process and show that, in contrast to static settings, traditional mechanisms are easily manipulable. We introduce a number of properties that we argue are important for matching mechanisms in dynamic settings and propose a new mechanism that maintains a history of pairwise interactions between agents, and adapts the priority orderings of agents in each period based on this history. We show that our mechanism is globally strategyproof in certain settings (e.g. when there are 2 agents or when the planning horizon is bounded), and even when the mechanism is manipulable, the manipulative actions taken by an agent will often result in a Pareto improvement in general. Thus, we make the argument that while manipulative behavior may still be unavoidable, it is not necessarily at the cost to other agents. To circumvent the issues of incentive design in dynamic settings, we formulate the dynamic matching problem as a Multiagent MDP where agents have particular underlying utility functions (e.g. linear positional utility functions), and show that the impossibility results still exist in this restricted setting. Nevertheless, we introduce a few classes of problems with restricted preference dynamics for which positive results exist. Finally, we propose an algorithmic solution for agents with single-minded preferences that satisfies strategyproofness, Pareto efficiency, and weak non-bossiness in one-shot settings, and show that even though this mechanism is manipulable in dynamic settings, any unilateral deviation would benefit all participating agents.

Download or read book The Handbook of Market Design written by Nir Vulkan and published by OUP Oxford. This book was released on 2013-08-29 with total page 706 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Economists often look at markets as given, and try to make predictions about who will do what and what will happen in these markets. Market design, by contrast, does not take markets as given; instead, it combines insights from economic and game theory together with common sense and lessons learned from empirical work and experimental analysis to aid in the design and implementation of actual markets In recent years the field has grown dramatically, partially because of the successful wave of spectrum auctions in the US and in Europe, which have been designed by a number of prominent economists, and partially because of the increase use of the Internet as the platform over which markets are designed and run There is now a large number of applications and a growing theoretical literature. The Handbook of Market Design brings together the latest research from leading experts to provide a comprehensive description of applied market design over the last two decades In particular, it surveys matching markets: environments where there is a need to match large two-sided populations to one another, such as medical residents and hospitals, law clerks and judges, or patients and kidney donors It also examines a number of applications related to electronic markets, e-commerce, and the effect of the Internet on competition between exchanges.