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Book Imperfect Central Bank Communication

Download or read book Imperfect Central Bank Communication written by Spencer Dale and published by . This book was released on 2008 with total page 36 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Much of the information communicated by central banks is noisy or imperfect. This paper considers the potential benefits and limitations of central bank communications in a model of imperfect knowledge and learning. It is shown that the value of communicating imperfect information is ambiguous. There is a risk that the central bank can distract the public; this means that the central bank may prefer to focus its communication policies on the information it knows most about. Indeed, conveying more certain information may improve the public's understanding to the extent that it "crowds out" a role for communicating imperfect information.

Book Communication of Central Bank Thinking and Inflation Dynamics

Download or read book Communication of Central Bank Thinking and Inflation Dynamics written by Man-Keung Tang and published by International Monetary Fund. This book was released on 2011-08-01 with total page 34 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper studies the role of central bank communication of its economic assessment in shaping inflation dynamics. Imperfect information about the central bank's assessment - or the basis for monetary policy decisions - could complicate the private sector's learning about its policy response function. We show how clear central bank communication, which facilitates agents' understanding of policy reasoning, could bring about less volatile inflation and interest rate dynamics, and afford the authorities with greater policy flexibility. We then estimate a simple monetary model to fit the Mexican economy, and use the suggested paramters to illustrate the model's quantitative implications in scenarios where the timing, nature and persistence of shocks are uncertain.

Book The Oxford Handbook of the Economics of Central Banking

Download or read book The Oxford Handbook of the Economics of Central Banking written by David G. Mayes and published by Oxford Handbooks. This book was released on 2019-03-15 with total page 809 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: "The Handbook reflects the state of the art in the theory and practice of central banking. It covers all the essential areas that have come under scrutiny since the global financial crisis of 2007-9"--

Book Monetary Policy Committees  Learning and Communication

Download or read book Monetary Policy Committees Learning and Communication written by Anke Weber and published by International Monetary Fund. This book was released on 2010-04-01 with total page 43 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper considers optimal communication by monetary policy committees in a model of imperfect knowledge and learning. The main policy implications are that there may be costs to central bank communication if the public is perpetually learning about the committee's decision-making process and policy preferences. When committee members have heterogeneous policy preferences, welfare is greater under majority voting than under consensus decision-making. Furthermore, central bank communication under majority voting is more likely to be beneficial in this case. It is also shown that a chairman with stable policy preferences who carries significant weight in the monetary policy decision-making process is welfare enhancing.

Book Clarity of Central Bank Communication About Inflation

Download or read book Clarity of Central Bank Communication About Inflation written by Mr.Ales Bulir and published by International Monetary Fund. This book was released on 2012-01-01 with total page 24 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper examines whether the clarity of central bank communication about inflation has changed with the economic environment. We use readability statistics and content analysis to study the clarity of communication on the inflation outlook by seven central banks between 1997 and 2010. Overall, we find no strong indications that central banks were less clear in explaining their policies when faced with higher uncertainty or a less favorable inflation outlook. The global financial crisis, however, did have a negative impact on clarity of central bank communication.

Book Information  Central Bank Communication  and Aggregate Fluctuations

Download or read book Information Central Bank Communication and Aggregate Fluctuations written by Rhys Reginald Mendes and published by . This book was released on 2008 with total page 242 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This thesis examines two closely related issues: (1) the ability of imperfect information models to explain some aspects of business cycle dynamics, and (2) the interaction between central bank communications and monetary policy. These issues are related because central bank communications can only be studied in models with imperfect information.In chapter 1, I investigate the ability of a noisy rational expectations model to generate plausible macroeconomic dynamics. The model allows for imperfect, heterogeneous information, and signal extraction from endogenous variables. I find that imperfect information significantly improves the model's ability to generate persistent, hump-shaped responses to a transitory monetary policy shock. This is achieved without the need for mechanical frictions. In addition, the model generates realistic inflation forecast errors.Chapter 2 explores the relationship between central bank statements about future policy and the degree of commitment. I allow the central bank to make (possibly vague) statements about its expected future policy. I begin by assuming that the central bank adopts a loss function which internalizes the bygone costs of deviating from such a pre-announced policy action. The resulting policy is a convex combination of pure discretion and full commitment. As the precision of central bank statements increases, this policy converges to the full commitment policy. I then show that this type of commitment to internalize bygone costs is sustainable only for moderate degrees of precision.Chapter 3 studies the impact of central bank communications about the state of the economy. In particular, I examine the extent to which increased central bank transparency creates a meaningful trade-off between beneficially conveying fundamental information and adversely contaminating observed data with the central bank's opinion. This question is addressed in a variant of the model from chapter 1. In this environment, both the central bank and private agents learn about the state of the economy from observations of endogenous variables. By making the central bank learn from endogenous variables, I am able to study the impact of communications precision on the bank's signal extraction problem.

Book Information  Central Bank Communication  and Aggregate Fluctuations

Download or read book Information Central Bank Communication and Aggregate Fluctuations written by Rhys R. Mendes and published by . This book was released on with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Book The Long Journey of Central Bank Communication

Download or read book The Long Journey of Central Bank Communication written by Otmar Issing and published by MIT Press. This book was released on 2019-10-01 with total page 103 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A leading economist and former central banker discusses the evolution of central bank communication from secretiveness to transparency and accountability. Central bank communication has evolved from secretiveness to transparency and accountability—from a reluctance to give out any information at all to the belief in communication as a panacea for effective policy. In this book, Otmar Issing, himself a former central banker, discusses the journey toward transparency in central bank communication. Issing traces the development of transparency, examining the Bank of England as an example of extreme reticence and European Central Bank's President Mario Draghi as a practitioner of effective communication. He argues that the ultimate goal of central bank communication is to make monetary policy more effective, and describes the practice and theory of communication as an evolutionary process. For a long time, the Federal Reserve never made its monetary policy decisions public; the European Central Bank, on the other hand, had to adopt a modern communication strategy from the outset. Issing discusses the importance of guiding expectations in central bank communication, and points to financial markets as the most important recipients of this communication. He discusses the obligations of accountability and transparency, although he notes that total transparency is a “mirage.” Issing argues that the central message to the public must always be that the stability of a nation's currency is the bank's priority.

Book Central Bank Communication  Decision Making  and Governance

Download or read book Central Bank Communication Decision Making and Governance written by Pierre L. Siklos and published by MIT Press. This book was released on 2013-05-31 with total page 327 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Experts analyze the recent emphasis on central communication as an additional policy and accountability device. In recent years central bankers have placed new emphasis on communication with financial markets and the general public. They have done this not only through the traditional channel of monetary policy pronouncements but also by increasing the quantity of information they make public. Yet as central banks strive to provide more and clearer information about the outlook for the economy, they must balance their capacity to steer economic expectations with their natural caution about committing to future monetary policy paths. This volume offers a variety of perspectives on the economic implications of increased central bank communication. Contributors offer theoretical analyses of the effect of central bank communication on the general macroeconomic environment; consider a variety of novel empirical approaches to the issue; and analyze communication, decision making, and governance practices of the Greenspan-era U.S. Federal Reserve, the fledgling European Central Bank, and a variety of smaller central banks, including those of the Czech Republic, Sweden, England, and New Zealand. Contributors Helge Berger, Michelle Bligh, Marianna Blix-Grimaldi, Aleš Bulíř, Robert Chirinko, Martin Čihák, Christopher Curran, Paul De Grauwe, Jakob de Haan, Michael Ehrmann, Marcel Fratzscher, Petra Geraats, Gregory Hess, Roman Horváth, David-Jan Jansen, Özer Karagedikli, Michael Lamla, David Mayes, Alberto Montagnoli, Pierre L. Siklos, Kateřina Šmídková, Jan-Egbert Sturm, Jan Zápal

Book Transparency and Monetary Policy with Imperfect Common Knowledge

Download or read book Transparency and Monetary Policy with Imperfect Common Knowledge written by Mr.Mauro Roca and published by International Monetary Fund. This book was released on 2010-04-01 with total page 28 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Is it desirable that central banks be more transparent in the communication of sensible information when agents have diverse private information? In practice, there exists some consensus about the benefits of acting in this way. However, other studies warn that increasing the precision of public information may raise the volatility of some aggregate variables - in particular, the price level - due to the disproportionate influence that it exerts on agents' decisions, and that this, in turn, will have negative effects on welfare. This paper studies the welfare effects of varying levels of transparency in a model of price-setting under monopolistic competition and imperfect common knowledge. Our results indicate that more precise public information never leads to a reduction of welfare in this framework. We find that the beneficial effects of decreased imperfect common knowledge due to a more precise common signal always compensates the potential rise in aggregate volatility. Moreover, we show that, in contrast to what has previously been assumed, the variability of the aggregate price level has no detrimental welfare effects in this model.

Book Clarity of Central Bank Communication About Inflation

Download or read book Clarity of Central Bank Communication About Inflation written by Aleš Bulíř and published by . This book was released on 2015 with total page 26 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper examines whether the clarity of central bank communication about inflation has changed with the economic environment. We use readability statistics and content analysis to study the clarity of communication on the inflation outlook by seven central banks between 1997 and 2010. Overall, we find no strong indications that central banks were less clear in explaining their policies when faced with higher uncertainty or a less favorable inflation outlook. The global financial crisis, however, did have a negative impact on clarity of central bank communication.

Book Central Bank Communication  Decision Making  and Governance

Download or read book Central Bank Communication Decision Making and Governance written by Pierre L. Siklos and published by . This book was released on 2013-05-31 with total page 318 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Experts analyze the recent emphasis on central communication as an additional policy and accountability device. In recent years central bankers have placed new emphasis on communication with financial markets and the general public. They have done this not only through the traditional channel of monetary policy pronouncements but also by increasing the quantity of information they make public. Yet as central banks strive to provide more and clearer information about the outlook for the economy, they must balance their capacity to steer economic expectations with their natural caution about committing to future monetary policy paths. This volume offers a variety of perspectives on the economic implications of increased central bank communication. Contributors offer theoretical analyses of the effect of central bank communication on the general macroeconomic environment; consider a variety of novel empirical approaches to the issue; and analyze communication, decision making, and governance practices of the Greenspan-era U.S. Federal Reserve, the fledgling European Central Bank, and a variety of smaller central banks, including those of the Czech Republic, Sweden, England, and New Zealand. Contributors Helge Berger, Michelle Bligh, Marianna Blix-Grimaldi, Ales Bulír, Robert Chirinko, Martin Cihák, Christopher Curran, Paul De Grauwe, Jakob de Haan, Michael Ehrmann, Marcel Fratzscher, Petra Geraats, Gregory Hess, Roman Horváth, David-Jan Jansen, Özer Karagedikli, Michael Lamla, David Mayes, Alberto Montagnoli, Pierre L. Siklos, Katerina Smídková, Jan-Egbert Sturm, Jan Zápal

Book Central Bank Communication  Never Excuse  Never Explain

Download or read book Central Bank Communication Never Excuse Never Explain written by Stephen Patrick Millard and published by . This book was released on 2022 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Book Crafting Consensus

Download or read book Crafting Consensus written by Nicole Baerg and published by Oxford University Press. This book was released on 2020-07-01 with total page 218 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In a world dependent on the constant sharing of information, central bankers increasingly communicate their policies to the mass public. Central bank communications are drafted in monetary policy committee meetings composed of policymakers with differing interests. Despite their differences, committee members must come together, write, and agree to an official policy statement. Once released to the public, central bank communications then affect citizens' actions and ultimately, the economy. But how exactly does this work? In Crafting Consensus, Nicole Baerg explains how the transparency of central bank communication depends on the configuration of committee members' preferences. Baerg argues that monetary policy committees composed of members with differing preferences over inflation are better suited to communicating precise information with the public. These diverse committees produce central bank statements of higher quality and less uncertainty than those from more homogeneous committees. Additionally, she argues that higher quality statements more effectively shape individuals' inflation expectations and move the economy in ways that policymakers intend. Baerg demonstrates that central bankers are not impartial technocrats and that their preferences and the institutional rules where they work matter for understanding the politics of monetary policy and variations in economic performance over time. Conducting empirical analysis from historical archival data, textual analysis, machine-learning, survey experiments, and cross-sectional time-series data, Crafting Consensus offers a new theory of committee decision making and a battery of empirical tests to provide a rich understanding of modern-day central banking.

Book Central Bank Communication with Non experts

Download or read book Central Bank Communication with Non experts written by Michael Ehrmann and published by . This book was released on 2021 with total page 59 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Central banks have intensified their communication with non-experts -- an endeavour which some have argued is bound to fail. This paper studies English and German Twitter traffic about the ECB to understand whether its communication is received by non-experts and how it affects their views. It shows that Twitter traffic is responsive to ECB communication, also for non-experts. For several ECB communication events, Twitter constitutes primarily a channel to relay information: tweets become more factual and the views expressed more moderate and homogeneous. Other communication events, such as former President Draghi's "Whatever it takes" statement, trigger persistent traffic and a divergence in views. Also, ECB-related tweets are more likely to get retweeted or liked if they express stronger or more subjective views. Thus, Twitter also serves as a platform for controversial discussions. The findings suggest that central banks manage to reach non-experts, i.e. their communication is not a road to nowhere.

Book Central Bank Communication with the General Public

Download or read book Central Bank Communication with the General Public written by Alan S. Blinder and published by . This book was released on 2022 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Central banks are increasingly reaching out to the general public to motivate and explain their monetary policy actions. One major aim of this outreach is to guide inflation expectations; another is to ensure accountability and create trust. This article surveys a rapidly-growing literature on central bank communication with the public. We first discuss why and how such communication is more challenging than communicating with expert audiences. Then we survey the empirical evidence on the extent to which this new outreach does in fact affect inflation expectations and trust. On balance, we see some promise in the potential to inform the public better, but many challenges along the way.

Book Informal Central Bank Communication

Download or read book Informal Central Bank Communication written by Annette Vissing-Jorgensen and published by . This book was released on 2020 with total page 12 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Starting from a set of facts on the timing of stock returns relative to Federal Reserve decision-making, I argue that informal communication -- including unattributed communication -- plays a central role in monetary policy communication. This contrasts with the standard communications framework in which communication should be public and on-the-record because it serves to ensure accountability and policy effectiveness. I lay out possible benefits of using unattributed communication as an institution, but these should be weighed against substantial costs: It runs counter to accountability to use unattributed communication, causes frustration among those trying to understand central bank intensions, and enables use of such communication by individual policymakers. Unattributed communication driven by policymaker disagreements is unambiguously welfare reducing, because it reduces policy flexibility and harms the central bank's credibility and decision-making process. I suggest that central banks resist unattributed communication via expensive newsletters and increase consensus-building efforts to reduce disagreement-driven unattributed communication.