Download or read book Fair Division and Collective Welfare written by Herve Moulin and published by MIT Press. This book was released on 2004-08-20 with total page 302 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The concept of fair division is as old as civil society itself. Aristotle's "equal treatment of equals" was the first step toward a formal definition of distributive fairness. The concept of collective welfare, more than two centuries old, is a pillar of modern economic analysis. Reflecting fifty years of research, this book examines the contribution of modern microeconomic thinking to distributive justice. Taking the modern axiomatic approach, it compares normative arguments of distributive justice and their relation to efficiency and collective welfare. The book begins with the epistemological status of the axiomatic approach and the four classic principles of distributive justice: compensation, reward, exogenous rights, and fitness. It then presents the simple ideas of equal gains, equal losses, and proportional gains and losses. The book discusses three cardinal interpretations of collective welfare: Bentham's "utilitarian" proposal to maximize the sum of individual utilities, the Nash product, and the egalitarian leximin ordering. It also discusses the two main ordinal definitions of collective welfare: the majority relation and the Borda scoring method. The Shapley value is the single most important contribution of game theory to distributive justice. A formula to divide jointly produced costs or benefits fairly, it is especially useful when the pattern of externalities renders useless the simple ideas of equality and proportionality. The book ends with two versatile methods for dividing commodities efficiently and fairly when only ordinal preferences matter: competitive equilibrium with equal incomes and egalitarian equivalence. The book contains a wealth of empirical examples and exercises.

Download or read book Handbook of Computational Social Choice written by Felix Brandt and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2016-04-25 with total page 553 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The rapidly growing field of computational social choice, at the intersection of computer science and economics, deals with the computational aspects of collective decision making. This handbook, written by thirty-six prominent members of the computational social choice community, covers the field comprehensively. Chapters devoted to each of the field's major themes offer detailed introductions. Topics include voting theory (such as the computational complexity of winner determination and manipulation in elections), fair allocation (such as algorithms for dividing divisible and indivisible goods), coalition formation (such as matching and hedonic games), and many more. Graduate students, researchers, and professionals in computer science, economics, mathematics, political science, and philosophy will benefit from this accessible and self-contained book.

Download or read book Algorithmic Decision Theory written by Francesca Rossi and published by Springer. This book was released on 2009-10-13 with total page 460 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This volume contains the papers presented at ADT 2009, the first International Conference on Algorithmic Decision Theory. The conference was held in San Servolo, a small island of the Venice lagoon, during October 20-23, 2009. The program of the conference included oral presentations, posters, invited talks, and tutorials. The conference received 65 submissions of which 39 papers were accepted (9 papers were posters). The topics of these papers range from computational social choice preference modeling, from uncertainty to preference learning, from multi-criteria decision making to game theory.

Download or read book Economics and Computation written by Jörg Rothe and published by Springer Nature. This book was released on 2024 with total page 779 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This textbook connects three vibrant areas at the interface between economics and computer science: algorithmic game theory, computational social choice, and fair division. It thus offers an interdisciplinary treatment of collective decision making from an economic and computational perspective. Part I introduces to algorithmic game theory, focusing on both noncooperative and cooperative game theory. Part II introduces to computational social choice, focusing on both preference aggregation (voting) and judgment aggregation. Part III introduces to fair division, focusing on the division of both a single divisible resource ("cake-cutting") and multiple indivisible and unshareable resources ("multiagent resource allocation"). In all these parts, much weight is given to the algorithmic and complexity-theoretic aspects of problems arising in these areas, and the interconnections between the three parts are of central interest.

Download or read book Fair Division written by Steven J. Brams and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 1996-02-23 with total page 292 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Cutting a cake, dividing up the property in an estate, determining the borders in an international dispute - such problems of fair division are ubiquitous. Fair Division treats all these problems and many more through a rigorous analysis of a variety of procedures for allocating goods (or 'bads' like chores), or deciding who wins on what issues, when there are disputes. Starting with an analysis of the well-known cake-cutting procedure, 'I cut, you choose', the authors show how it has been adapted in a number of fields and then analyze fair-division procedures applicable to situations in which there are more than two parties, or there is more than one good to be divided. In particular they focus on procedures which provide 'envy-free' allocations, in which everybody thinks he or she has received the largest portion and hence does not envy anybody else. They also discuss the fairness of different auction and election procedures.

Download or read book Algorithmic aspects of resource allocation and multiwinner voting theory and experiments written by Kaczmarczyk, Andrzej and published by Universitätsverlag der TU Berlin. This book was released on 2021-12-10 with total page 248 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This thesis is concerned with investigating elements of computational social choice in the light of real-world applications. We contribute to a better understanding of the areas of fair allocation and multiwinner voting. For both areas, inspired by real-world scenarios, we propose several new notions and extensions of existing models. Then, we analyze the complexity of answering the computational questions raised by the introduced concepts. To this end, we look through the lens of parameterized complexity. We identify different parameters which describe natural features specific to the computational problems we investigate. Exploiting the parameters, we successfully develop efficient algorithms for spe- cific cases of the studied problems. We complement our analysis by showing which parameters presumably cannot be utilized for seeking efficient algorithms. Thereby, we provide comprehensive pictures of the computational complexity of the studied problems. Specifically, we concentrate on four topics that we present below, grouped by our two areas of interest. For all but one topic, we present experimental studies based on implementations of newly developed algorithms. We first focus on fair allocation of indivisible resources. In this setting, we consider a collection of indivisible resources and a group of agents. Each agent reports its utility evaluation of every resource and the task is to “fairly” allocate the resources such that each resource is allocated to at most one agent. We concentrate on the two following issues regarding this scenario. The social context in fair allocation of indivisible resources. In many fair allocation settings, it is unlikely that every agent knows all other agents. For example, consider a scenario where the agents represent employees of a large corporation. It is highly unlikely that every employee knows every other employee. Motivated by such settings, we come up with a new model of graph envy-freeness by adapting the classical envy-freeness notion to account for social relations of agents modeled as social networks. We show that if the given social network of agents is simple (for example, if it is a directed acyclic graph), then indeed we can sometimes find fair allocations efficiently. However, we contrast tractability results with showing NP-hardness for several cases, including those in which the given social network has a constant degree. Fair allocations among few agents with bounded rationality. Bounded rationality is the idea that humans, due to cognitive limitations, tend to simplify problems that they face. One of its emanations is that human agents usually tend to report simple utilities over the resources that they want to allocate; for example, agents may categorize the available resources only into two groups of desirable and undesirable ones. Applying techniques for solving integer linear programs, we show that exploiting bounded rationality leads to efficient algorithms for finding envy-free and Pareto-efficient allocations, assuming a small number of agents. Further, we demonstrate that our result actually forms a framework that can be applied to a number of different fairness concepts like envy-freeness up to one good or envy-freeness up to any good. This way, we obtain efficient algorithms for a number of fair allocation problems (assuming few agents with bounded rationality). We also empirically show that our technique is applicable in practice. Further, we study multiwinner voting, where we are given a collection of voters and their preferences over a set of candidates. The outcome of a multiwinner voting rule is a group (or a set of groups in case of ties) of candidates that reflect the voters’ preferences best according to some objective. In this context, we investigate the following themes. The robustness of election outcomes. We study how robust outcomes of multiwinner elections are against possible mistakes made by voters. Assuming that each voter casts a ballot in a form of a ranking of candidates, we represent a mistake by a swap of adjacent candidates in a ballot. We find that for rules such as SNTV, k-Approval, and k-Borda, it is computationally easy to find the minimum number of swaps resulting in a change of an outcome. This task is, however, NP-hard for STV and the Chamberlin-Courant rule. We conclude our study of robustness with experimentally studying the average number of random swaps leading to a change of an outcome for several rules. Strategic voting in multiwinner elections. We ask whether a given group of cooperating voters can manipulate an election outcome in a favorable way. We focus on the k-Approval voting rule and we show that the computational complexity of answering the posed question has a rich structure. We spot several cases for which our problem is polynomial-time solvable. However, we also identify NP-hard cases. For several of them, we show how to circumvent the hardness by fixed-parameter tractability. We also present experimental studies indicating that our algorithms are applicable in practice. Diese Arbeit befasst sich mit der Untersuchung von Themen des Forschungsgebiets Computational Social Choice im Lichte realer Anwendungen. Dabei trägt sie zu einem besseren Verständnis der Bereiche der fairen Zuordnung und der Mehrgewinnerwahlen bei. Für beide Konzepte schlagen wir – inspiriert von realen Anwendungen – verschiedene neue Begriffe und Erweiterungen bestehender Modelle vor. Anschließend analysieren wir die Komplexität der Beantwortung von Berechnungsfragen, die durch die eingeführten Konzepte aufgeworfen werden. Dabei fokussieren wir uns auf die parametrisierte Komplexität. Hierzu identifizieren wir verschiedene Parameter, welche natürliche Merkmale der von uns untersuchten Berechnungsprobleme beschreiben. Durch die Nutzung dieser Parameter entwickeln wir erfolgreich effiziente Algorithmen für Spezialfälle der untersuchten Probleme. Wir ergänzen unsere Analyse indem wir zeigen, welche Parameter vermutlich nicht verwendet werden können um effiziente Algorithmen zu finden. Dabei zeichnen wir ein umfassendes Bild der Berechnungskomplexität der untersuchten Probleme. Insbesondere konzentrieren wir uns auf vier Themen, die wir, gruppiert nach unseren beiden Schwerpunkten, unten vorstellen. Für alle Themen bis auf eines präsentieren wir Experimente, die auf Implementierungen der von uns neu entwickelten Algorithmen basieren. Wir konzentrieren uns zunächst auf die faire Zuordnung unteilbarer Ressourcen. Hier betrachten wir eine Menge unteilbarer Ressourcen und eine Gruppe von Agenten. Jeder Agent gibt eine Bewertung des Nutzens jeder Ressource ab und die Aufgabe besteht darin, eine "faire" Zuordnung der Ressourcen zu finden, wobei jede Ressource höchstens einem Agenten zugeordnet werden kann. Innerhalb dieses Bereiches konzentrieren wir uns auf die beiden folgenden Problemstellungen. Der soziale Kontext bei der fairen Zuordnung unteilbarer Ressourcen. In vielen Szenarien, in denen Ressourcen zugeordnet werden sollen, ist es unwahrscheinlich, dass jeder Agent alle anderen kennt. Vorstellbar ist beispielsweise ein Szenario, in dem die Agenten Mitarbeiter eines großen Unternehmens repräsentieren. Es ist höchst unwahrscheinlich, dass jeder Mitarbeiter jeden anderen Mitarbeiter kennt. Motiviert durch solche Szenarien entwickeln wir ein neues Modell der graph-basierten Neidfreiheit. Wir erweitern den klassischen Neidfreiheitsbegriff um die sozialen Beziehungen von Agenten, die durch soziale Netzwerke modelliert werden. Einerseits zeigen wir, dass wenn das soziale Netzwerk der Agenten einfach ist (zum Beispiel, wenn es sich um einen gerichteten azyklischen Graph handelt), in manchen Fällen faire Zuordnungen effizient gefunden werden können. Andererseits stellen wir diesen algorithmisch positiven Ergebnissen mehrere NP-schweren Fällen entgegen. Ein Beispiel für einen solchen Fall sind soziale Netzwerke mit einem konstanten Knotengrad. Faire Zuteilung an wenige Agenten mit begrenzter Rationalität. Begrenzte Rationalität beschreibt die Idee, dass Menschen aufgrund kognitiver Grenzen dazu neigen, Probleme, mit denen sie konfrontiert werden, zu vereinfachen. Eine mögliche Folge dieser Grenzen ist, dass menschliche Agenten in der Regel einfache Bewertungen der gewünschten Ressourcen abgeben; beispielsweise könnten Agenten die verfügbaren Ressourcen nur in zwei Gruppen, erwünschte und unerwünschte Ressourcen, kategorisieren. Durch Anwendung von Techniken zum Lösen von Ganzzahligen Linearen Programmen zeigen wir, dass unter der Annahme einer kleinen Anzahl von Agenten die Ausnutzung begrenzter Rationalität dabei hilft, effiziente Algorithmen zum Finden neidfreier und Pareto-effizienter Zuweisungen zu entwickeln. Weiterhin zeigen wir, dass unser Ergebnis ein allgemeines Verfahren liefert, welches auf eine Reihe verschiedener Fairnesskonzepte angewendet werden kann, wie zum Beispiel Neidfreiheit bis auf ein Gut oder Neidfreiheit bis auf irgendein Gut. Auf diese Weise gewinnen wir effiziente Algorithmen für eine Reihe fairer Zuordnungsprobleme (wenige Agenten mit begrenzter Rationalität vorausgesetzt). Darüber hinaus zeigen wir empirisch, dass unsere Technik in der Praxis anwendbar ist. Weiterhin untersuchen wir Mehrgewinnerwahlen, bei denen uns eine Menge von Wählern sowie ihre Präferenzen über eine Reihe von Kandidaten gegeben sind. Das Ergebnis eines Mehrgewinnerwahlverfahrens ist eine Gruppe (oder eine Menge von Gruppen im Falle eines Unentschiedens) von Kandidaten, welche die Präferenzen der Wähler am besten einem bestimmten Ziel folgend widerspiegeln. In diesem Kontext untersuchen wir die folgenden Themen. Die Robustheit von Wahlergebnissen. Wir untersuchen, wie robust die Ergebnisse von Mehrgewinnerwahlen gegenüber möglicher Fehler der Wähler sind. Unter der Annahme, dass jeder Wähler eine Stimme in Form einer Rangliste von Kandidaten abgibt, modellieren wir einen Fehler als einen Tausch benachbarter Kandidaten in der Rangliste. Wir zeigen, dass für Wahlregeln wie SNTV, k-Approval und k-Borda die minimale Anzahl an Vertauschungen, welche zu einer Ergebnisänderung führt, einfach zu berechnen ist. Für STV und die Chamberlin-Courant-Regel ist diese Aufgabe allerdings NP-schwer. Wir schließen unsere Untersuchung der Robustheit unterschiedlicher Wahlregeln ab mit einer experimentellen Evaluierung der durchschnittlichen Anzahl zufälliger Vertauschungen, die zu einer Änderung des Ergebnisses führen. Strategische Abstimmung bei Wahlen mit mehreren Gewinnern. Wir fragen, ob eine bestimmte Gruppe von kooperierenden Wählern ein Wahlergebnis zu ihren Gunsten manipulieren kann. Dabei konzentrieren wir uns auf die k-Approval-Wahlregel. Wir zeigen, dass die Berechnungskomplexität der besagten Manipulation eine reiche Struktur besitzt. Auf der einen Seite identifizieren wir mehrere Fälle in denen das Problem in Polynomzeit lösbar ist. Auf der anderen Seite identifizieren wir jedoch auch NP-schwere Fälle. Für einige von ihnen zeigen wir, wie die Berechnungsschwere durch parametrisierte Algorithmen umgangen werden kann. Wir präsentieren zudem experimentelle Untersuchungen, welche darauf hindeuten, dass unsere Algorithmen in der Praxis anwendbar sind.

Download or read book ECAI 2023 written by K. Gal and published by IOS Press. This book was released on 2023-10-18 with total page 3328 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Artificial intelligence, or AI, now affects the day-to-day life of almost everyone on the planet, and continues to be a perennial hot topic in the news. This book presents the proceedings of ECAI 2023, the 26th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence, and of PAIS 2023, the 12th Conference on Prestigious Applications of Intelligent Systems, held from 30 September to 4 October 2023 and on 3 October 2023 respectively in Kraków, Poland. Since 1974, ECAI has been the premier venue for presenting AI research in Europe, and this annual conference has become the place for researchers and practitioners of AI to discuss the latest trends and challenges in all subfields of AI, and to demonstrate innovative applications and uses of advanced AI technology. ECAI 2023 received 1896 submissions – a record number – of which 1691 were retained for review, ultimately resulting in an acceptance rate of 23%. The 390 papers included here, cover topics including machine learning, natural language processing, multi agent systems, and vision and knowledge representation and reasoning. PAIS 2023 received 17 submissions, of which 10 were accepted after a rigorous review process. Those 10 papers cover topics ranging from fostering better working environments, behavior modeling and citizen science to large language models and neuro-symbolic applications, and are also included here. Presenting a comprehensive overview of current research and developments in AI, the book will be of interest to all those working in the field.

Download or read book The Oxford Handbook of Well Being and Public Policy written by Matthew D. Adler and published by Oxford University Press. This book was released on 2016-04-21 with total page 985 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: What are the methodologies for assessing and improving governmental policy in light of well-being? The Oxford Handbook of Well-Being and Public Policy provides a comprehensive, interdisciplinary treatment of this topic. The contributors draw from welfare economics, moral philosophy, and psychology and are leading scholars in these fields. The Handbook includes thirty chapters divided into four Parts. Part I covers the full range of methodologies for evaluating governmental policy and assessing societal condition-including both the leading approaches in current use by policymakers and academics (such as GDP, cost-benefit analysis, cost-effectiveness analysis, inequality and poverty metrics, and the concept of the "social welfare function"), and emerging techniques. Part II focuses on the nature of well-being. What, most fundamentally, determines whether an individual life is better or worse for the person living it? Her happiness? Her preference-satisfaction? Her attainment of various "objective goods"? Part III addresses the measurement of well-being and the thorny topic of interpersonal comparisons. How can we construct a meaningful scale of individual welfare, which allows for comparisons of well-being levels and differences, both within one individual's life, and across lives? Finally, Part IV reviews the major challenges to designing governmental policy around individual well-being.

Download or read book Algorithmic Aspects in Information and Management written by Smita Ghosh and published by Springer Nature. This book was released on with total page 279 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Combinatorial Algorithms written by Cristina Bazgan and published by Springer Nature. This book was released on 2022-05-29 with total page 538 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 33rd International Workshop on Combinatorial Algorithms, IWOCA 2022, which took place as a hybrid event in Trier, Germany, during June 7-9, 2022.The 35 papers presented in these proceedings were carefully reviewed and selected from 86 submissions. They deal with diverse topics related to combinatorial algorithms, such as algorithms and data structures; algorithmic and combinatorical aspects of cryptography and information security; algorithmic game theory and complexity of games; approximation algorithms; complexity theory; combinatorics and graph theory; combinatorial generation, enumeration and counting; combinatorial optimization; combinatorics of words; computational biology; computational geometry; decompositions and combinatorial designs; distributed and network algorithms; experimental combinatorics; fine-grained complexity; graph algorithms and modelling with graphs; graph drawing and graph labelling; network theory and temporal graphs; quantum computing and algorithms for quantum computers; online algorithms; parameterized and exact algorithms; probabilistic andrandomized algorithms; and streaming algorithms.

Download or read book Applied Mathematical Modeling and Analysis in Renewable Energy written by Manoj Sahni and published by CRC Press. This book was released on 2021-10-04 with total page 213 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This reference text introduces latest mathematical modeling techniques and analysis for renewable energy systems. It comprehensively covers important topics including study of combustion characteristics of laser ignited gasoline-air mixture, hierarchical demand response controller, mathematical modeling of an EOQ for a multi-item inventory system, and integration and modeling of small-scale pumped storage with micro optimization model (HOMER). Aimed at graduate students and academic researchers in the fields of electrical engineering, environmental engineering, mechanical engineering, and civil engineering, this text: Discusses applied mathematical modeling techniques in renewable energy. Covers effective storage and generation of power through renewable energy generation sources. Provides real life applications and problems based on renewable energy. Covers new ways of applying mathematical techniques for applications in diverse areas of science and engineering.

Download or read book Income Distribution in Macroeconomic Models written by Giuseppe Bertola and published by Princeton University Press. This book was released on 2014-09-28 with total page 439 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book looks at the distribution of income and wealth and the effects that this has on the macroeconomy, and vice versa. Is a more equal distribution of income beneficial or harmful for macroeconomic growth, and how does the distribution of wealth evolve in a market economy? Taking stock of results and methods developed in the context of the 1990s revival of growth theory, the authors focus on capital accumulation and long-run growth. They show how rigorous, optimization-based technical tools can be applied, beyond the representative-agent framework of analysis, to account for realistic market imperfections and for political-economic interactions. The treatment is thorough, yet accessible to students and nonspecialist economists, and it offers specialist readers a wide-ranging and innovative treatment of an increasingly important research field. The book follows a single analytical thread through a series of different growth models, allowing readers to appreciate their structure and crucial assumptions. This is particularly useful at a time when the literature on income distribution and growth has developed quickly and in several different directions, becoming difficult to overview.

Download or read book Algorithmic Game Theory written by Guido Schäfer and published by Springer Nature. This book was released on with total page 549 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Putting Auction Theory to Work written by Paul Milgrom and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2004-01-12 with total page 378 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book provides a comprehensive introduction to modern auction theory and its important new applications. It is written by a leading economic theorist whose suggestions guided the creation of the new spectrum auction designs. Aimed at graduate students and professionals in economics, the book gives the most up-to-date treatments of both traditional theories of 'optimal auctions' and newer theories of multi-unit auctions and package auctions, and shows by example how these theories are used. The analysis explores the limitations of prominent older designs, such as the Vickrey auction design, and evaluates the practical responses to those limitations. It explores the tension between the traditional theory of auctions with a fixed set of bidders, in which the seller seeks to squeeze as much revenue as possible from the fixed set, and the theory of auctions with endogenous entry, in which bidder profits must be respected to encourage participation.

Download or read book Algorithmic Game Theory written by Argyrios Deligkas and published by Springer Nature. This book was released on 2023-09-03 with total page 435 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book constitutes the proceedings of the 16th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, SAGT 2023, which took place in Egham, UK, in September 2023. The 26 full papers included in this book were carefully reviewed and selected from 59 submissions. They were organized in topical sections as follows: ​computational aspects and efficiency in games; computational social choice; fair division; matching and mechanism design.

Download or read book ECAI 2010 written by European Coordinating Committee for Artificial Intelligence and published by IOS Press. This book was released on 2010 with total page 1184 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: LC copy bound in 2 v.: v. 1, p. 1-509; v. 2, p. [509]-1153.

Download or read book Models in Microeconomic Theory written by Martin J. Osborne and published by Open Book Publishers. This book was released on 2023-06-26 with total page 382 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Models in Microeconomic Theory covers basic models in current microeconomic theory. Part I (Chapters 1-7) presents models of an economic agent, discussing abstract models of preferences, choice, and decision making under uncertainty, before turning to models of the consumer, the producer, and monopoly. Part II (Chapters 8-14) introduces the concept of equilibrium, beginning, unconventionally, with the models of the jungle and an economy with indivisible goods, and continuing with models of an exchange economy, equilibrium with rational expectations, and an economy with asymmetric information. Part III (Chapters 15-16) provides an introduction to game theory, covering strategic and extensive games and the concepts of Nash equilibrium and subgame perfect equilibrium. Part IV (Chapters 17-20) gives a taste of the topics of mechanism design, matching, the axiomatic analysis of economic systems, and social choice. The book focuses on the concepts of model and equilibrium. It states models and results precisely, and provides proofs for all results. It uses only elementary mathematics (with almost no calculus), although many of the proofs involve sustained logical arguments. It includes about 150 exercises. With its formal but accessible style, this textbook is designed for undergraduate students of microeconomics at intermediate and advanced levels.