Download or read book Exclusive Dealing written by Gregg Frasco and published by University Press of America. This book was released on 1991 with total page 236 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book will be of interest to all decision-makers and analysts concerned with supply contracts. The primary focus of this study is on one particular type of supply contract, namely, the exclusive dealing contract. Its essence is the agreement by a seller (or a lessor) and/or buyer (or lessee) to transact only with the other party for the duration of the contract. This analysis attempts to discern the economic reasons why that type of supply contract was utilized in individual cases, and to aggregate the results in a systematic fashion. It covers all the federal antitrust cases involving exclusive dealing that reached the Court of Appeals level and/or the Supreme Court through 1986. For the interested reader, careful referencing and an extensive bibliography provide easy access to treatments that are more theoretically disposed.
Download or read book Exclusive Dealing and Vertical Integration written by Edward C. Gallick and published by . This book was released on 1984 with total page 164 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Fidelity Rebates in Competition Law written by Miroslava Marinova and published by Kluwer Law International B.V.. This book was released on 2018-11-07 with total page 226 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book examines the treatment of fdelity rebates as one of the most controversial topics in EU competition law. The controversy arose from the lack of clarity as to how to distinguish between rebates that constitute a legitimate business practice and those that might have anticompetitive e?ects, as the same type of rebates could be pro-competitive or anticompetitive depending on their e?ects on competition. This book clarifes the appropriate treatment of fdelity rebates under EU competition law by o?ering original insights on the way in which abusive rebates should be identifed, taking into account the wealth of EU case law in this area, the economics' literature and the perspective of US antitrust law. The critical discussion on the case law is centred on the idea as to whether the as efcient competitor (AEC) test is an important part of the assessment of fdelity rebates and in which circumstances it could be used as one tool among others. The analysis treats such issues and topics as the following: – What motivated the EU Courts to treat fdelity rebates as illegal ‘by object'? – Why has this case law drawn so much criticism from academics and other commentators? – What can we learn from the economic theories of exclusive dealing and fdelity rebates, and whether the strict approach of the Courts can be supported by economic empirical studies? – What is the meaning attached to the notion of an ‘e?ects-based' approach as an expression of the reform of Article 102? – Why is the controversy regarding the treatment of fdelity rebates still a live issue after the Intel and the Post Danmark II judgments? – In which circumstances the price-cost test can be used as a reliable tool to distinguish between anticompetitive and pro-competitive fdelity rebates? – Can we evaluate the e?ect of fdelity rebates without necessarily carrying out a price-cost test? – Can we consider the AEC test as a single unifying test for all types of exclusionary abuses? – What can we learn about the application of the AEC test in fdelity rebate cases from the recent US case law? A concluding chapter provides an original perspective and also policy recommendations on how the abusive character of fdelity rebates should be assessed including an appropriate legal test that is administrable, creates predictability and legal certainty and minimises the risk of errors and the cost of those mistakes. This book takes a giant step towards improving the understanding of the legal treatment of fdelity rebates and understanding as to whether the treatment of fdelity rebates could be e?ects-based, without necessarily carrying out an AEC test. It will also contribute signifcantly to the practical work of enforcement agencies, courts and private entities and their advisors. book's parallel study of US and EU competition law.
Download or read book Exclusive Dealing the Theory of the Firm and Raising Rivals Costs written by Alan J. Meese and published by . This book was released on 2008 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: For several decades antitrust courts were extremely hostile to exclusive dealing agreements, banning such contracts, regardless of their benefits, whenever the manufacturer held a significant market share. The FTC went even further, banning such agreements whenever the manufacturer had a non-trivial share of its market. This article attributes the original hostility to exclusive dealing contracts to neoclassical price theory's technological theory of the firm and its derivative model of workable competition. According to price theory, firms existed to allocate resource and realize efficiencies of a technological nature that, by their nature, arose within the firm. At the same time, price theory identified no beneficial explanation for partial ᑼontractualň integration. The result was the so-called Ňworkable competitionň model, which privileged Ňunilateralň ᑼompetition on the meritsň over ᑼoncertedň ᑼontractual integration, the latter of which was presumed to have market power origins. The article then recounts two responses to this hostility. The first response, from Ňwithinň price theory, came from the Chicago School, which argued that a firm with market power could only realize one monopoly profit, with the result that exclusive dealing contracts could not ᑾnhanceň the power that a firm otherwise possessed. Unlike, say, the Chicago School account of minimum resale price maintenance, this attack on conventional wisdom offered no affirmative wealth-creating reason that firms would adopt such agreements. Instead, Chicagoans simply inferred that such agreements produced benefits because they supposedly could not create harms. The second response ő Transaction Cost Economics or TCE ő sought to undermine price theory itself, or at least its conception of the firm and other non-standard contracts. Unlike the Chicago School, TCE offered to explain how exclusive dealing within and between firms produced benefits. In particular, TCE argued that complete and partial integration was a method of reducing or eliminating the costs of relying upon unbridled markets to conduct economic activity, particularly costs flowing from anticipated opportunism. Exclusive dealing, it was said, was no exception, and economists have identified several beneficial effects that such contracts can create. Unlike the Chicago School, TCE did not contend that exclusive dealing contracts could never reduce welfare. Still, TCE helped undermine the unmitigated hostility that once characterized antitrust's attitude toward exclusive dealing contracts. Raising Rivals'Costs (RRC) theory, it is shown, filled the void left by price theory's discredited lesson that exclusive dealing agreements were almost always harmful. That is, RRC offered a coherent and plausible theory regarding how such agreements may, in certain circumstances, raise the costs of rivals and facilitate the acquisition or protection of market power. The article ends by attempting to integrate the lessons of TCE and RRC theory with a view toward developing a standard for evaluating exclusive dealing arrangements that reflects the lessons of both paradigms, neither of which purports to exclude the other as a useful tool for interpreting such agreements. The essay critiques certain aspects of modern rule reason analysis as applied to exclusive dealing arrangements. Thus, it is argued, mere significant foreclosure of rivals from portions of the marketplace should not establish a prima facie case requiring the defendant to establish that the restraint produces benefits. Nor should courts allow plaintiffs to establish a prima facie case based simply upon a showing that such contracts result in prices that are higher than those that existed before the restraint. Moreover, if courts allow plaintiffs to establish a prima facie case based upon such showings, then there is no basis for lancingň the benefits that the defendant proves against harms that are presumed once a plaintiff makes out a prima facie case, as such balancing depends upon the assumption that benefits coexist with harms, harms not logically presumed once the defendant shows that the restraint produces significant benefits. Instead, the essay concludes, plaintiffs seeking to establish a prima facie case should be required to establish the numerous conditions, including relevant input markets, output markets, and barriers to entry, that are necessary to any raising rivals' costs strategy. Once the plaintiff establishes such a case, the defendant should be allowed to establish that the arrangement produces benefits. Those who embrace a Ňpurchaser welfareň approach to antitrust have not explained how courts should go about balancing the harms produced by such agreements against their benefits, given that such agreements might harm some consumers while benefitting others. At the same time, those who embrace a Ňsocialň or Ňtotal welfareň approach to antitrust may be content if courts declare Ňlawfulň any such agreement that produces significant benefits.
Download or read book An Industry Study Approach to the Problem of Exclusive Dealing written by Allen V. Kneese and published by . This book was released on 1956 with total page 762 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book An Evidence based Approach to Exclusive Dealing and Loyalty Discounts written by Joshua D. Wright and published by . This book was released on 2009 with total page 12 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Exclusive Dealing and Entry when Buyers Compete written by Chiara Fumagalli and published by . This book was released on 2002 with total page 28 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book When Does Exclusive Dealing Intensify Competition for Distribution Comment on Klein and Murphy written by Hans Zenger and published by . This book was released on 2011 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In a recent article in this Journal, Benjamin Klein and Kevin M. Murphy argue that exclusive dealing contracts are pro-competitive because exclusivity intensifies manufacturer competition for distribution and thereby decreases wholesale prices. This is an important pro-competitive effect of exclusive dealing, which explains why the practice can benefit consumers. However, it is important to understand when this effect is important, and when it is not. For that purpose, this note extends the Klein and Murphy model to allow for asymmetric firms, so one firm can be dominant in the market. It is shown that the existence and strength of pro-competitive benefits depends on the degree of competition among manufacturers. The larger the market power of the producer that engages in exclusive dealing, the smaller the effect outlined by Klein and Murphy. Hence, the efficiency-enhancing gains from exclusive dealing are least significant precisely when the danger of anti-competitive foreclosure is largest.
Download or read book Fundamentals of American Law written by New York University. School of Law and published by . This book was released on 1996 with total page 738 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The American legal system today is the most significant in the world, yet until the publication of Fundamentals of American Law, there has been no book that provides both the basic rules on the theoretical understanding necessary to comprehend. This book is not simply the work of a singleauthor, but a collection of especially written essays, each by an expert in the field, all of whom are on the faculty of New York University School of Law, which is recognized as one of the elite law schools in America and which offers this book as an element of its unique Global Law SchoolProgramme.The book is written specifically for foreign lawyers and law students who have a need to deal with American Law generally, but are not seeking to become specialists in any one area. For them, it is vital to understand the basic principles of a wide range of American legal fields so they can act asinformed intermediaries between their public or private clients and their American counterparts. The book not only provides the reader with a solid foundation in American law, but will also serve as a basic reference book for the fundamentals, even as some of the details change over the years.Although initially conceived to fill a void for foreign lawyers, the book is also ideally suited for others who have a significant need to understand the basic principles of American Law and to interact with American lawyers. For this reason it will be an ideal course text for students of business,accountancy, political science, or public administration, where the enquiring student will constantly find intersections with the law.The book is more than a compendium of legal principles. Each chapter explains not only what the law is, but why it is that way. It sets forth the policy considerations in institutional factors that produce a particular law so the reader can make an independent judgement about its wisdom and perhapsits adaptibility to other cultures.
Download or read book Exclusive Dealing written by B. Douglas Bernheim and published by . This book was released on 2000 with total page 46 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In this paper, we provide a conceptual framework for understanding the phenomenon of exclusive dealing, and we explore the motivations for and effects of its use. For a broad class of models, we characterize the outcome of a contracting game in which manufacturers may employ exclusive dealing provisions in their contracts. We then apply this characterization to a sequence of specialized settings. We demonstrate that exclusionary contractual provisions may be irrelevant, anticompetitive or efficiency-enhancing, depending upon the setting. More specifically, we exhibit the potential for anticompetitive effects in non-coincident markets (that is, markets other than the ones in which exclusive dealing is practiced), and we explore the potential for the enhancement of efficiency in a setting where common representation gives rise to incentive conflicts. In each instance, we describe the manner in which equilibrium outcomes would be altered by a ban on exclusive dealing. We demonstrate that a ban may have surprisingly subtle and unintended effects.
Download or read book Antitrust Law written by Keith N. Hylton and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2003-03-27 with total page 436 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Preface p. xi 1 Economics p. 1 I. Definitions p. 1 II. Perfect Competition Versus Monopoly p. 9 III. Further Topics p. 21 2 Law and Policy p. 27 I. Some Interpretation Issues p. 28 II. Enacting the Antitrust Law p. 30 III. What Should Antitrust Law Aim to Do? p. 40 3 Enforcement p. 43 I. Optimal Enforcement Theory p. 43 II. Enforcement Provision of the Antitrust Laws p. 47 Appendix p. 64 4 Cartels p. 68 I. Cartels p. 68 II. Conscious Parallelism p. 73 III. Conclusion p. 89 5 Development of Section 1 Doctrine p. 90 I. The Sherman Act Versus the Common Law p. 90 II. Rule of Reason and Per-Se Rule p. 104 III. Conclusion p. 112 6 Rule of Reason and Per-Se Rule p. 113 I. The Case for Price Fixing p. 113 II. Per-Se and Rule of Reason Analysis: Further Developments p. 116 III. Per-Se Versus Rule of Reason Tests: Understanding the Supreme Court's Justification for the Per-Se Rule p. 129 7 Agreement p. 132 I. The Development of Inference Doctrine p. 133 II. Rejection of Unilateral Contract Theory p. 140 8 Facilitating Mechanisms p. 144 I. Data Dissemination Cases p. 145 II. Basing Point Pricing and Related Practices p. 154 III. Basing Point Pricing: Economics p. 160 9 Boycotts p. 166 I. Pre-Socony p. 166 II. Post-Socony p. 170 III. Post-BMI/Sylvania p. 181 IV. Conclusion p. 184 10 Monopolization p. 186 I. Development of Section 2 Doctrine p. 186 II. Leveraging and Essential Facility Cases p. 202 III. Predatory Pricing p. 212 IV. Conclusion p. 228 11 Power p. 230 I. Measuring Market Power p. 230 II. Determinants of Market Power p. 235 III. Substitutability and the Relevant Market: Cellophane p. 237 IV. Multimarket Monopoly and the Relevant Market: Alcoa p. 239 V. Measuring Power: Guidelines p. 243 12 Attempts p. 244 I. The Swift Formula and Modern Doctrine p. 244 II. Dangerous Probability Requirement p. 248 13 Vertical Restraints p. 252 I. Resale Price Maintenance p. 252 II. Vertical Nonprice Restraints p. 262 III. Manufacturer Retains Title p. 267 IV. Agreement p. 270 14 Tying and Exclusive Dealing p. 279 I. Introduction p. 279 II. Early Cases p. 284 III. Development of Per-Se Rule p. 286 IV. Tension Between Rule of Reason Arguments and Per-Se Rule p. 295 V. Technological Tying p. 301 VI. Exclusive Dealing p. 303 Appendix p. 307 15 Horizontal Mergers p. 311 I. Reasons for Merging and Implications for Law p. 311 II. Horizontal Merger Law p. 317 III. Conclusion p. 330 Appendix p. 330 16 Mergers, Vertical and Conglomerate p. 333 I. Vertical Mergers p. 333 II. Conglomerate Mergers p. 344 III. Concluding Remarks p. 351 17 Antitrust and the State p. 352 I. Noerr-Pennington Doctrine p. 354 II. Parker Doctrine p. 371 III. Some Final Comments: Error Costs and Immunity Doctrines p. 375 Index p. 379.
Download or read book Exclusive Dealing and Vertical Integration written by Edward C. Gallick and published by . This book was released on 1984 with total page 168 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Exclusive Dealing Contracts and Their Relation to Tying Contracts written by Gregg Peter Frasco and published by . This book was released on 1988 with total page 1014 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Exclusionary Practices written by Chiara Fumagalli and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2018-01-11 with total page 652 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The most controversial area in competition policy is that of exclusionary practices, where actions are taken by dominant firms to deter competitors from challenging their market positions. Economists have been struggling to explain such conduct and to guide policy-makers in designing sensible enforcement rules. In this book, authors Chiara Fumagalli, Massimo Motta, and Claudio Calcagno explore predatory pricing, rebates, exclusive dealing, tying, and vertical foreclosure, through a blend of theory and practice. They develop a general framework which builds on and extends existing economic theories, drawing upon case law, discussions of cases and other practical considerations to identify workable criteria that can guide competition authorities to assess exclusionary practices. Along with analyses of policy implications and insights applied to case studies, the book provides practitioners with non-technical discussions of the issues at hand, while guiding economics students with dedicated technical sections with rigorous formal models.
Download or read book Antitrust Law Developments sixth written by Jonathan M. Jacobson and published by American Bar Association. This book was released on 2007 with total page 2036 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Rev. ed. of : Antitrust law developments (fifth). c2002.
Download or read book Statutes and Court Decisions Pertaining to the Federal Trade Commission written by United States. Federal Trade Commission and published by . This book was released on 1957 with total page 898 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Economics of Regulation and Antitrust fifth edition written by W. Kip Viscusi and published by MIT Press. This book was released on 2018-08-14 with total page 1001 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A thoroughly revised and updated edition of the leading textbook on government and business policy, presenting the key principles underlying sound regulatory and antitrust policy. Regulation and antitrust are key elements of government policy. This new edition of the leading textbook on government and business policy explains how the latest theoretical and empirical economic tools can be employed to analyze pressing regulatory and antitrust issues. The book departs from the common emphasis on institutions, focusing instead on the relevant underlying economic issues, using state-of-the-art analysis to assess the appropriate design of regulatory and antitrust policy. Extensive case studies illustrate fundamental principles and provide insight on key issues in regulation and antitrust policy. This fifth edition has been thoroughly revised and updated, reflecting both the latest developments in economic analysis and recent economic events. The text examines regulatory practices through the end of the Obama and beginning of the Trump administrations. New material includes coverage of global competition and the activities of the European Commission; recent mergers, including Comcast-NBC Universal; antitrust in the new economy, including investigations into Microsoft and Google; the financial crisis of 2007–2008 and the Dodd-Frank Act; the FDA approval process; climate change policies; and behavioral economics as a tool for designing regulatory strategies.