Download or read book Evolution Games and Economic Behaviour written by Fernando Vega-Redondo and published by OUP Oxford. This book was released on 1996-09-26 with total page 220 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This textbook for advanced undergraduate and postgraduate students of Evolutionary Game Theory covers recent developments in the field, with an emphasis on economic contexts and applications. It begins with the basic ideas as they originated within the field of theoretical biology and then proceeds to the formulation of a theoretical framework that is suitable for the study of social and economic phenomena from an evolutionary perspective. Core topics include the Evolutionary Stable Strategy (EES) and Replicator Dynamics (RD), deterministic dynamic models, and stochastic perturbations. A set of short appendices presents some of the technical material referred to in the main text. Evolutionary theory is widely viewed as one of the most promising appraoches to understanding bounded rationality, learning, and change in complex social environments. New avenues of research are suggested by Vega-Redondo, and plentiful exmples illustrate the theory's potential applications. The recent boom experienced by this dscipline makes the book's systematic presentation of its essential contributions vital reading for newcomer to the field.
Download or read book Evolution Games and Economic Behaviour written by Fernando Vega-Redondo and published by Oxford University Press. This book was released on 1996-09-26 with total page 222 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This textbook for advanced undergraduate and postgraduate students of Evolutionary Game Theory covers recent developments in the field, with an emphasis on economic contexts and applications. It begins with the basic ideas as they originated within the field of theoretical biology and then proceeds to the formulation of a theoretical framework that is suitable for the study of social and economic phenomena from an evolutionary perspective. Core topics include the EvolutionaryStable Strategy (EES) and Replicator Dynamics (RD), deterministic dynamic models, and stochastic perturbations. A set of short appendices presents some of the technical material referred to in the main text.Evolutionary theory is widely viewed as one of the most promising appraoches to understanding bounded rationality, learning, and change in complex social environments. New avenues of research are suggested by Vega-Redondo, and plentiful exmples illustrate the theory's potential applications. The recent boom experienced by this dscipline makes the book's systematic presentation of its essential contributions vital reading for newcomer to the field.
Download or read book Population Games and Evolutionary Dynamics written by William H. Sandholm and published by MIT Press. This book was released on 2010-12-17 with total page 618 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Evolutionary game theory studies the behaviour of large populations of strategically interacting agents & is used by economists to predict in settings where traditional assumptions about the rationality of agents & knowledge may be inapplicable.
Download or read book Evolution and the Theory of Games written by John Maynard Smith and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 1982-10-21 with total page 244 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This 1982 book is an account of an alternative way of thinking about evolution and the theory of games.
Download or read book Evolutionary Games and Equilibrium Selection written by Larry Samuelson and published by MIT Press. This book was released on 1997 with total page 332 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The author examines the interplay between evolutionary game theory and the equilibrium selection problem in noncooperative games. Evolutionary game theory is one of the most active and rapidly growing areas of research in economics. Unlike traditional game theory models, which assume that all players are fully rational and have complete knowledge of details of the game, evolutionary models assume that people choose their strategies through a trial-and-error learning process in which they gradually discover that some strategies work better than others. In games that are repeated many times, low-payoff strategies tend to be weeded out, and an equilibrium may emerge. Larry Samuelson has been one of the main contributors to the evolutionary game theory literature. In Evolutionary Games and Equilibrium Selection, he examines the interplay between evolutionary game theory and the equilibrium selection problem in noncooperative games. After providing an overview of the basic issues of game theory and a presentation of the basic models, the book addresses evolutionary stability, the dynamics of sample paths, the ultimatum game, drift, noise, backward and forward induction, and strict Nash equilibria.
Download or read book The Theory of Learning in Games written by Drew Fudenberg and published by MIT Press. This book was released on 1998 with total page 304 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This work explains that equilibrium is the long-run outcome of a process in which non-fully rational players search for optimality over time. The models they e×plore provide a foundation for equilibrium theory and suggest ways for economists to evaluate and modify traditional equilibrium concepts.
Download or read book Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics written by Josef Hofbauer and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 1998-05-28 with total page 356 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Every form of behaviour is shaped by trial and error. Such stepwise adaptation can occur through individual learning or through natural selection, the basis of evolution. Since the work of Maynard Smith and others, it has been realised how game theory can model this process. Evolutionary game theory replaces the static solutions of classical game theory by a dynamical approach centred not on the concept of rational players but on the population dynamics of behavioural programmes. In this book the authors investigate the nonlinear dynamics of the self-regulation of social and economic behaviour, and of the closely related interactions between species in ecological communities. Replicator equations describe how successful strategies spread and thereby create new conditions which can alter the basis of their success, i.e. to enable us to understand the strategic and genetic foundations of the endless chronicle of invasions and extinctions which punctuate evolution. In short, evolutionary game theory describes when to escalate a conflict, how to elicit cooperation, why to expect a balance of the sexes, and how to understand natural selection in mathematical terms.
Download or read book Evolution Games and God written by Martin A. Nowak and published by Harvard University Press. This book was released on 2013-05-07 with total page 398 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: According to the reigning competition-driven model of evolution, selfish behaviors that maximize an organism’s reproductive potential offer a fitness advantage over self-sacrificing behaviors—rendering unselfish behavior for the sake of others a mystery that requires extra explanation. Evolution, Games, and God addresses this conundrum by exploring how cooperation, working alongside mutation and natural selection, plays a critical role in populations from microbes to human societies. Inheriting a tendency to cooperate, argue the contributors to this book, may be as beneficial as the self-preserving instincts usually thought to be decisive in evolutionary dynamics. Assembling experts in mathematical biology, history of science, psychology, philosophy, and theology, Martin Nowak and Sarah Coakley take an interdisciplinary approach to the terms “cooperation” and “altruism.” Using game theory, the authors elucidate mechanisms by which cooperation—a form of working together in which one individual benefits at the cost of another—arises through natural selection. They then examine altruism—cooperation which includes the sometimes conscious choice to act sacrificially for the collective good—as a key concept in scientific attempts to explain the origins of morality. Discoveries in cooperation go beyond the spread of genes in a population to include the spread of cultural transformations such as languages, ethics, and religious systems of meaning. The authors resist the presumption that theology and evolutionary theory are inevitably at odds. Rather, in rationally presenting a number of theological interpretations of the phenomena of cooperation and altruism, they find evolutionary explanation and theology to be strongly compatible.
Download or read book Theory of Games and Economic Behavior written by John Von Neumann and published by Diana. This book was released on 2020-01-29 with total page 660 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This is the classic work upon which modern-day game theory is based. What began as a modest proposal that a mathematician and an economist write a short paper together blossomed, when Princeton University Press published Theory of Games and Economic Behavior. In it, John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern conceived a groundbreaking mathematical theory of economic and social organization, based on a theory of games of strategy. Not only would this revolutionize economics, but the entirely new field of scientific inquiry it yielded--game theory--has since been widely used to analyze a host of real-world phenomena from arms races to optimal policy choices of presidential candidates, from vaccination policy to major league baseball salary negotiations. And it is today established throughout both the social sciences and a wide range of other sciences.
Download or read book The World the Game Theorists Made written by Paul Erickson and published by University of Chicago Press. This book was released on 2015-11-04 with total page 397 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Today, game theory is central to our understanding of capitalist markets, the evolution of social behavior in animals, and much more. Both the social and biological sciences have seemingly fused around the game. Yet the ascendancy of game theory and theories of rational choice more generally remains a rich source of misunderstanding. To gain a better grasp of the widespread dispersion of game theory and the mathematics of rational choice, Paul Erickson uncovers its history during the poorly understood period between the publication of John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern s seminal "Theory of Games and Economic Behavior" in 1944 and the theory s revival in economics in the 1980s. "The World the Game Theorists Made "reveals how the mathematics of rational choice was a common, flexible language that could facilitate wide-ranging debate on some of the great issues of the time. Because it so actively persists in the sciences and public life, assessing the significance of game theory for the postwar sciences is especially critical now."
Download or read book Evolutionary Games and Poverty Traps written by Edgar J. Sánchez Carrera and published by Cambridge Scholars Publishing. This book was released on 2015-11-25 with total page 144 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book explores how persistent states of underdevelopment can arise in strategic environments in which players are imitative rather than fully rational. Standard growth theory teaches that poverty traps are stable, low-level balanced growth paths to which economies gravitate due to adverse initial conditions or poor equilibrium selection. In other words, societies fail to take off into sustained growth because they started out as poor, with, for example, low longevity or poor human capital, or because they cannot invent institutions that successfully coordinate their investments. Evolutionary Games and Poverty Traps explains this pernicious form of coordination failure as a game between economic agents, such as, for example, firms investing in research and development and workers investing in human capital. Rates of return on research and development depend on average human capital, and rates of return on human capital depend on aggregate research and development spending. The outcome is a self-confirming equilibrium in evolutionary stable strategies in which unsuccessful players imitate successful ones. This equilibrium is particularly interesting in that in poor economies with a large fraction of low-human-capital workers or low research and development firms, imitative strategies do not support a take-off into sustained growth. To achieve such a take-off, society should subsidize the cost of education or research and development until the economy builds a critical mass of human capital or research and development.
Download or read book Behavioral Game Theory written by Colin F. Camerer and published by Princeton University Press. This book was released on 2011-09-05 with total page 569 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Game theory, the formalized study of strategy, began in the 1940s by asking how emotionless geniuses should play games, but ignored until recently how average people with emotions and limited foresight actually play games. This book marks the first substantial and authoritative effort to close this gap. Colin Camerer, one of the field's leading figures, uses psychological principles and hundreds of experiments to develop mathematical theories of reciprocity, limited strategizing, and learning, which help predict what real people and companies do in strategic situations. Unifying a wealth of information from ongoing studies in strategic behavior, he takes the experimental science of behavioral economics a major step forward. He does so in lucid, friendly prose. Behavioral game theory has three ingredients that come clearly into focus in this book: mathematical theories of how moral obligation and vengeance affect the way people bargain and trust each other; a theory of how limits in the brain constrain the number of steps of "I think he thinks . . ." reasoning people naturally do; and a theory of how people learn from experience to make better strategic decisions. Strategic interactions that can be explained by behavioral game theory include bargaining, games of bluffing as in sports and poker, strikes, how conventions help coordinate a joint activity, price competition and patent races, and building up reputations for trustworthiness or ruthlessness in business or life. While there are many books on standard game theory that address the way ideally rational actors operate, Behavioral Game Theory stands alone in blending experimental evidence and psychology in a mathematical theory of normal strategic behavior. It is must reading for anyone who seeks a more complete understanding of strategic thinking, from professional economists to scholars and students of economics, management studies, psychology, political science, anthropology, and biology.
Download or read book Encyclopedia of Complexity and Systems Science written by and published by Springer. This book was released on 2009-06-26 with total page 10398 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This encyclopedia provides an authoritative single source for understanding and applying the concepts of complexity theory together with the tools and measures for analyzing complex systems in all fields of science and engineering. It links fundamental concepts of mathematics and computational sciences to applications in the physical sciences, engineering, biomedicine, economics and the social sciences.
Download or read book Microeconomics written by Samuel Bowles and published by Princeton University Press. This book was released on 2009-12-13 with total page 608 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In this novel introduction to modern microeconomic theory, Samuel Bowles returns to the classical economists' interest in the wealth and poverty of nations and people, the workings of the institutions of capitalist economies, and the coevolution of individual preferences and the structures of markets, firms, and other institutions. Using recent advances in evolutionary game theory, contract theory, behavioral experiments, and the modeling of dynamic processes, he develops a theory of how economic institutions shape individual behavior, and how institutions evolve due to individual actions, technological change, and chance events. Topics addressed include institutional innovation, social preferences, nonmarket social interactions, social capital, equilibrium unemployment, credit constraints, economic power, generalized increasing returns, disequilibrium outcomes, and path dependency. Each chapter is introduced by empirical puzzles or historical episodes illuminated by the modeling that follows, and the book closes with sets of problems to be solved by readers seeking to improve their mathematical modeling skills. Complementing standard mathematical analysis are agent-based computer simulations of complex evolving systems that are available online so that readers can experiment with the models. Bowles concludes with the time-honored challenge of "getting the rules right," providing an evaluation of markets, states, and communities as contrasting and yet sometimes synergistic structures of governance. Must reading for students and scholars not only in economics but across the behavioral sciences, this engagingly written and compelling exposition of the new microeconomics moves the field beyond the conventional models of prices and markets toward a more accurate and policy-relevant portrayal of human social behavior.
Download or read book The Evolution of Cooperation written by Robert Axelrod and published by Basic Books. This book was released on 2009-04-29 with total page 258 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A famed political scientist's classic argument for a more cooperative world We assume that, in a world ruled by natural selection, selfishness pays. So why cooperate? In The Evolution of Cooperation, political scientist Robert Axelrod seeks to answer this question. In 1980, he organized the famed Computer Prisoners Dilemma Tournament, which sought to find the optimal strategy for survival in a particular game. Over and over, the simplest strategy, a cooperative program called Tit for Tat, shut out the competition. In other words, cooperation, not unfettered competition, turns out to be our best chance for survival. A vital book for leaders and decision makers, The Evolution of Cooperation reveals how cooperative principles help us think better about everything from military strategy, to political elections, to family dynamics.
Download or read book Evolutionary Game Dynamics written by American Mathematical Society. Short Course and published by American Mathematical Soc.. This book was released on 2011-10-27 with total page 186 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This volume is based on lectures delivered at the 2011 AMS Short Course on Evolutionary Game Dynamics, held January 4-5, 2011 in New Orleans, Louisiana. Evolutionary game theory studies basic types of social interactions in populations of players. It combines the strategic viewpoint of classical game theory (independent rational players trying to outguess each other) with population dynamics (successful strategies increase their frequencies). A substantial part of the appeal of evolutionary game theory comes from its highly diverse applications such as social dilemmas, the evolution of language, or mating behaviour in animals. Moreover, its methods are becoming increasingly popular in computer science, engineering, and control theory. They help to design and control multi-agent systems, often with a large number of agents (for instance, when routing drivers over highway networks or data packets over the Internet). While these fields have traditionally used a top down approach by directly controlling the behaviour of each agent in the system, attention has recently turned to an indirect approach allowing the agents to function independently while providing incentives that lead them to behave in the desired way. Instead of the traditional assumption of equilibrium behaviour, researchers opt increasingly for the evolutionary paradigm and consider the dynamics of behaviour in populations of agents employing simple, myopic decision rules.
Download or read book Evolutionary Game Theory written by Jörgen W. Weibull and published by MIT Press. This book was released on 1997 with total page 292 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Introduces current evolutionary game theory--where ideas from evolutionary biology and rationalistic economics meet--emphasizing the links between static and dynamic approaches and noncooperative game theory. This text introduces current evolutionary game theory--where ideas from evolutionary biology and rationalistic economics meet--emphasizing the links between static and dynamic approaches and noncooperative game theory. Much of the text is devoted to the key concepts of evolutionary stability and replicator dynamics. The former highlights the role of mutations and the latter the mechanisms of selection. Moreover, set-valued static and dynamic stability concepts, as well as processes of social evolution, are discussed. Separate background chapters are devoted to noncooperative game theory and the theory of ordinary differential equations. There are examples throughout as well as individual chapter summaries. Because evolutionary game theory is a fast-moving field that is itself branching out and rapidly evolving, Jörgen Weibull has judiciously focused on clarifying and explaining core elements of the theory in an up-to-date, comprehensive, and self-contained treatment. The result is a text for second-year graduate students in economic theory, other social sciences, and evolutionary biology. The book goes beyond filling the gap between texts by Maynard-Smith and Hofbauer and Sigmund that are currently being used in the field. Evolutionary Game Theory will also serve as an introduction for those embarking on research in this area as well as a reference for those already familiar with the field. Weibull provides an overview of the developments that have taken place in this branch of game theory, discusses the mathematical tools needed to understand the area, describes both the motivation and intuition for the concepts involved, and explains why and how it is relevant to economics.
