Download or read book Essays on Matching Markets with Correlated Preferences written by Onur Burak Celik and published by . This book was released on 2009 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Essays on the Analysis and Implications of Two sided Matching Markets written by James W. Boudreau and published by . This book was released on 2009 with total page 224 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Models of Matching Markets written by Sangram Vilasrao Kadam and published by . This book was released on 2016 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The structure, length, and characteristics of matching markets affect the outcomes for their participants. This dissertation attempts to fill the lacuna in our understanding about matching markets on three dimensions through three essays. The first essay highlights the role of constraints at the interviewing stage of matching markets where participants have to make choices even before they discover their own preferences entirely. Two results stand out from this setting. When preferences are ex-ante aligned, relaxing the interviewing constraints for one side of the market improves the welfare for everyone on the other side. Moreover, such interventions can lead to a decrease in the number of matched agents. The second essay elucidates the importance of rematching opportunities when relationships last over multiple periods. It identifies sufficient conditions for existence of a stable matching which accommodates the form of preferences we expect to see in multi-period environments. Preferences with inter-temporal complementarities, desire for variety and a status-quo bias are included in this setting. The third essay furthers our understanding while connecting two of the sufficient conditions in a specialized matching with contracts setting. It provides a novel linkage by providing a constructive way of arriving at a preference condition starting from another and thus proving that the later implies the former.
Download or read book Matching Markets with Correlated Preferences written by Onur Celik and published by LAP Lambert Academic Publishing. This book was released on 2010-04 with total page 60 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The objective of this dissertation is to explore, via simulations, the effect of correlation in the preference lists on the aggregate satisfaction of the participants in the marriage matching model and the roommates problem. In the first chapter, a general methodology is presented to introduce correlation in the preference lists that can be used in any kind of matching market. The second chapter focuses on the simplest two-sided and one-to-one matching market, that is, a marriage matching model, using the men-propose Gale and Shapley algorithm. The third chapter focuses on a one-sided matching market, namely the roommates problem, using the extended version of the Gale and Shapley algorithm. For each of the matching markets in question, a measure to quantify the level of the correlation is also provided which enables us to sort the preference profiles according to their correlation levels and makes it possible to do statistical analysis.Results show that the correlation is an important factor that affects the aggregate satisfaction levels of the participants.
Download or read book Essays on Matching Markets written by Alexander Westkamp and published by . This book was released on 2009 with total page 140 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Essays on Matching Theory and Behavioral Market Design written by Siqi Pan and published by . This book was released on 2017 with total page 112 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This dissertation focuses on the design and implementation of matching markets where transfers are not available, such as college admissions, school choice, and certain labor markets. The results contribute to the literature from both a theoretical and a behavioral perspective, and may have policy implications for the design of some real-life matching markets. Chapter 1, “Exploding Offers and Unraveling in Two-Sided Matching Markets,” studies the unraveling problem prevalent in many two-sided matching markets that occurs when transactions become inefficiently early. In a two-period decentralized model, I examine whether the use of exploding offers can affect agents' early moving incentives. The results show that when the culture of the market allows firms to make exploding offers, unraveling is more likely to occur, leading to a less socially desirable matching outcome. A market with an excess supply of labor is less vulnerable to the presence of exploding offers; yet the conclusion is ambiguous for a market with a greater degree of uncertainty in early stages, which depends on the specific information structure. While a policy banning exploding offers tends to be supported by high quality firms and workers, it can be opposed by those of lower quality. This explains the prevalence of exploding offers in practice. Chapter 2, “Constrained School Choice and Information Acquisition,” investigates a common practice of many school choice programs in the field, where the length of students' submitted preference lists are constrained. In an environment where students have incomplete information about others’ preferences, I theoretically study the effect of such a constraint under both a Deferred Acceptance mechanism (DA) and a Boston mechanism (BOS). The result shows that ex-ante stability can only be ensured under an unconstrained DA, but not under a constrained DA, an unconstrained BOS, or a constrained BOS. In a lab experiment, I find that the constraint also affects students’ information acquisition behavior. Specifically, when faced with a constraint, students tend to acquire less wasteful information and distribute more efforts to acquire relevant information under DA; such an effect is not significant under BOS. Overall, the constraint has a negative effect on efficiency and stability under both mechanisms. Chapter 3, “Targeted Advertising on Competing Platforms,” is jointly written with Huanxing Yang. We investigate targeted advertising in two-sided markets. Each of the two competing platforms has single-homing consumers on one side and multi-homing advertising firms on the other. We focus on how asymmetry in platforms’ targeting abilities translates into asymmetric equilibrium outcomes, and how changes in targeting ability affect the price and volume of ads, consumer welfare, and advertising firms' profits. We also compare social incentives and equilibrium incentives in investing in targeting ability. Chapter 4, “The Instability of Matching with Overconfident Agents: Laboratory and Field Investigations,” focuses on centralized college admissions markets where students are evaluated and allocated based on their performance on a standardized exam. A single exam’s measurement error causes the exam-based priorities to deviate from colleges' aptitude-based preferences: a student who underperforms in one exam may lose her placement at a preferred college to someone with a lower aptitude. The previous literature proposes a solution of combining a Boston algorithm with pre-exam preference submission. Under the assumption that students have perfect knowledge of their relative aptitudes before taking the exam, the suggested mechanism intends to trigger a self-sorting process, with students of higher (lower) aptitudes targeting more (less) preferred colleges. However, in a laboratory experiment, I find that such a self-sorting process is skewed by overconfidence, which leads to a welfare loss larger than the purported benefits. Moreover, the mechanism introduces unfairness by rewarding overconfidence and punishing underconfidence, thus serving as a gender penalty for women. I also analyze field data from Chinese high schools; the results suggest similar conclusions as in the lab.
Download or read book Essays on Matching Markets written by Benjamín Tello Bravo and published by . This book was released on 2016 with total page 52 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Essays on Market Design and Experimental Economics written by Eric Samuel Mayefsky and published by Stanford University. This book was released on 2011 with total page 106 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: I explore fundamental behavioral aspects of several market design environments in a variety of projects using both theoretical models and laboratory experiments. I show that human tendencies can drastically shift potential outcomes away from those which would result if individuals were fully 'rational' and unbiased in decision problems similar to those found frequently in the field. I explore two common classes of centralized matching mechanisms--Deferred Acceptance and Priority--which have wildly different success rates in practice despite both being open to manipulation by agents who have incomplete information about the other participants in the match. For this reason, theory predicts both mechanisms in equilibrium will yield match outcomes which are unstable, meaning some agents will desire to renegotiate with one another after receiving their match assignments, and thus reduce participants' confidence in using the match. I provide laboratory evidence that out-of-equilibrium truth telling by agents is substantially more frequent in the Deferred Acceptance environment and thus Deferred Acceptance matches will generally be more stable in practice than matches using a Priority mechanism. This may explain why Deferred Acceptance mechanisms appear to be more viable in the field. I also explore two different models of decentralized two-sided matching environments where establishing scarce signaling methods can improve market outcomes. In a laboratory experiment, I show that allowing potential receiving job offers to send a single signal to their favorite potential employer before job offers are made increases overall match rates in the market, but is potentially damaging to the firms making offers when compared to the market without such a signal. Then, in a theoretical model where pre-offer communication takes the form of an interview process where workers have natural limits on the number of interviews in which they can participate, I show that in many cases firms can benefit themselves and the market as a whole by voluntarily restricting the number of interviews they offer to participate in. While not traditionally thought of as market design problems, voting mechanisms are fundamentally goods allocation problems as well and have many of the same issues as traditional markets do. I explore the effects of voter bias on outcomes in an otherwise standard voting model and find that even slight external pressure on individuals in a committee tasked with coming to a collective decision can destroy the ability of that committee to arrive at the correct result, even when individuals have good information about the best decision to make. Furthermore, the quality of the decision made by such a committee can actually degrade as the committee size increases, in contrast with the canonical Condorcet Jury Theorem which predicts that a committee's ability to choose the right outcome increases quickly as more members are added.
Download or read book Three Essays about Matching Markets written by Jan Christoph Schlegel and published by . This book was released on 2017 with total page 104 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Thèse. HEC. 2017
Download or read book Essays on dynamic matching markets written by Morimitsu Kurino and published by . This book was released on 2009 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Essays on Matching Markets written by and published by . This book was released on 2015 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Essays on Signaling and Matching written by Peter A. Coles and published by . This book was released on 2005 with total page 242 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Market Structure and Dynamics written by Qingyun Wu (Researcher in game theory and market design) and published by . This book was released on 2020 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This thesis consists of three self-contained essays that investigate the algebraic structure of matching markets and the stabilization dynamics in decentralized markets. Chapter 2 is based on Wu and Roth (2018). It studies envy-free matchings that naturally arise from workers retiring or companies expanding. We show that the set of envy-free matchings forms a lattice that has a Conway-like join, but not a Conway-like meet. Furthermore, a job hopping process in which companies make offers to their favorite blocking workers, and workers accept their favorite offers, producing a sequence of vacancy chains, is a Tarski operator on this lattice. The fixed points of this Tarski operator correspond to the set of stable matchings; and the steady state matching starting from any given initial state is derived analytically. Chapter 3 is based on Wu (2020). The goal of this chapter, is to provide a systematic approach for analyzing entering classes in the college admissions model. When dealing with a many-to-one matching model, we often convert it into a one-to-one matching problem by assigning each seat of a college to a single student, instead of matching each college to multiple students. The preferences in this new model are significantly correlated and severely restrict the possible changes to entering classes. Through the so-called "rotations" that correspond to the join-irreducible elements in the lattice of stable matchings, we present a unified treatment for several results on entering classes, including the famous "Rural Hospital Theorem". We also show that, the least preferred student in an entering class appears to play a very interesting role. For example, each entering class can be completely characterized by its worst student. Chapter 4 is based on Gu, Roth, and Wu (2020). The motivating question is that, how come some black markets, such as the market for hitmen are well-regulated, but many others like the market for drugs are far from being under our control, even though we try very hard to eliminate them. To understand this, we build a three-dimensional discrete time Markov chain to study how black markets evolve over time, focusing on social repugnance and search frictions. We borrow tools from Markov jump processes, random walks, exponential martingales and optional sampling theory to analyze both the steady state limit and the realizations along the way. In the first part of the chapter, we identify conditions that lead to market survival or extinction. And the second part studies speed of convergence. We show that if a market is going to die eventually, then it dies exponentially fast. This further implies if a market has survived for a long time, then it is likely to survive forever.
Download or read book Essays in Matching Markets written by Colin D. Sullivan and published by . This book was released on 2019 with total page 298 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: I present two experiments exploring failures in matching markets. In the first experiment, I introduce a new experimental paradigm to evaluate employer preferences, called Incentivized Resume Rating (IRR). Employers evaluate resumes they know to be hypothetical in order to be matched with real job seekers, preserving incentives while avoiding the deception necessary in audit studies. I deploy IRR with employers recruiting college seniors from a prestigious school, randomizing human capital characteristics and demographics of hypothetical candidates. I measure both employer preferences for candidates and employer beliefs about the likelihood candidates will accept job offers, avoiding a typical confound in audit studies. I discuss the costs, benefits, and future applications of this new methodology.
Download or read book Essays on Dynamic Matching Markets written by and published by . This book was released on 2009 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This dissertation studies dynamic matching and bargaining games with two-sided private information bargaining. There is a market in which a large number of heterogeneous buyers and sellers search for trading partners to trade with. Traders in the market are randomly matched pairwise. Once a buyer and a seller meet, they bargain following the random-proposer protocol: either the buyer or the seller (randomly chosen) makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the other party. The traders leave once they successfully trade, and the market is continuously replenished with new-born buyers and sellers who voluntarily choose to enter. We study the steady state with positive entry. There are (except the asymmetric information) two kinds of frictions: time discounting and explicit search costs. Chapter 2 addresses existence and uniqueness of equilibrium. It provides a simple necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a nontrivial steady-state equilibrium. The equilibrium is unique if the discount rate is small relative to the search costs. This chapter also analyzes how the composition of frictions affects the patterns of equilibria. It shows that if the discount rate is small relative to the search costs, in equilibrium every meeting results in trade. If the discount rate is relatively large, some meetings do not result in trade. Chapter 3 shows that private information typically deters entry. Because of search externalities, this entry-deterring effect may be socially desirable or undesirable. We provide and interpret a simple condition under which private information improves welfare. Chapter 4 studies the convergence properties of equilibria as frictions vanish. It not only shows that, as frictions vanish, the equilibrium price range collapses to the Walrasian price and the equilibrium welfare converges to the Walrasian welfare level, but also provides the rate of convergence. Under random-proposer bargaining, welfare converges at the fastest possible rate among a.
Download or read book Essays on Interviews and Matching written by Joseph N. Shayani and published by . This book was released on 2022 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This thesis contains three essays on the topic of quantifying the impact of interviews in a matching market. The first two essays are empirical and use novel preference and matching data from the Canadian Residency Matching Service (CaRMS), and the third essay presents a formal identification result. In the first essay, I measure the impact of interviews on employers' preferences, and in the second essay, I measure the impact of reducing interviews on match outcomes. Both essays require me to quantify employers' pre-interview information about their post-interview preferences, but employers observe information unobservable to the econometrician. To address this econometric challenge, I estimate a joint structural model of interview offers and post-interview ranks in which unobservables may be correlated across the two periods, and thereby I use the information contained in post-interview preferences to correct for employers' additional pre-interview information. The third essay presents a non-parametric identification result that formalizes the possibility of using selection (e.g., interview-offer) data and binary outcome (e.g., job-offer) data jointly to correct for the role of unobservable factors in selection.
Download or read book Market Design written by Christoph Schwaiger and published by . This book was released on 2023 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
