Download or read book Three Empirical Essays on Internet Auctions written by and published by . This book was released on 2008 with total page 190 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Essays on Internet Auctions written by Abdel-Hameed Hamdy Nawar and published by . This book was released on 2003 with total page 158 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Essays on Internet Auctions written by Ilke Onur and published by . This book was released on 2005 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Collecting and the Internet written by Susan Koppelman and published by McFarland. This book was released on 2014-10-01 with total page 221 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The Internet has had a profound effect on collecting—because of the Web, collectibles are now more readily available, collections more easily displayed for a wider audience, and collectors’ online communities are larger and often quite intimate. In addition, the Web has added new items to the pantheon of collectibles, including digital bits that, whether considered virtual or material, are nevertheless collectible. In this work, essays discuss the age-old habit of collecting and its modern relationship with the Internet. Topics include individually authored websites, online auctions, watches, eyewear, Kelly dolls, the gambler’s rush of online acquisition, mp3s, collecting friends via online social networking sites, and online museums, among others.

Download or read book Essays on Late Bidding in Internet Auctions written by Ying Zhang and published by . This book was released on 2011 with total page 65 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Empirical studies have documented that buyers in internet auctions tend to bid immediately before the scheduled closing time. This practice of late bidding is often called sniping. My dissertation investigates this phenomenon from both theoretical and empirical aspects. The first chapter of my dissertation studies a second-price independent private value auction with two risk-neutral buyers who can submit a single bid either early or late. Early bids are received by the auctioneer with probability one, but late bids are received with a probability less than one. I prove that there can exist a symmetric cutoff equilibrium in which high-value buyers always bid early and low-value buyers bid late as long as their opponent has not bid early. A sufficient condition is then identified for the existence of the cutoff equilibrium with late bidding. Finally, I illustrate the equilibrium with examples from the beta distribution on values. The second chapter of my dissertation empirically investigates the impact of late bidding on the final price of internet auctions. Using a dataset collected from eBay, I estimate the time after which late bidding has a differential impact on the final price. The time is estimated as a structural break in the data using a method proposed by Bai (1997). The break point occurs approximately three minutes before the close of the auction. The empirical findings indicate that buyers who won auctions by bidding in the last three minutes were typically more experienced than other winners and that they won the auctions for used items at lower prices. The third chapter of my dissertation extends the first chapter by introducing an uncertainty on the number of buyers through a Poisson arrival process. In addition, I investigate the impact of late bidding on the seller's expected revenue and provide numerical comparative statics for the equilibrium.

Download or read book Essays on Internet Auction written by Xiaogang Che and published by . This book was released on 2012 with total page 172 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Essays on Auction Mechanisms and Resource Allocation in Keyword Advertising written by Jianqing Chen and published by . This book was released on 2008 with total page 298 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Advances in information technology have created radically new business models, most notably the integration of advertising with keyword-based targeting, or "keyword advertising." Keyword advertising has two main variations: advertising based on keywords employed by users in search engines, often known as "sponsored links," and advertising based on keywords embedded in the content users view, often known as "contextual advertising." Keyword advertising providers such as Google and Yahoo! use auctions to allocate advertising slots. This dissertation examines the design of keyword auctions. It consists of three essays. The first essay "Ex-Ante Information and the Design of Keyword Auctions" focuses on how to incorporate available information into auction design. In our keyword auction model, advertisers bid their willingness-to-pay per click on their advertisements, and the advertising provider can weigh advertisers' bids differently and require different minimum bids based on advertisers' click-generating potential. We study the impact and design of such weighting schemes and minimum-bids policies. We find that weighting scheme determines how advertisers with different click-generating potential match in equilibrium. Minimum bids exclude low-valuation advertisers and at the same time may distort the equilibrium matching. The efficient design of keyword auctions requires weighting advertisers' bids by their expected click-through-rates, and requires the same minimum weighted bids. The revenue-maximizing weighting scheme may or may not favor advertisers with low click-generating potential. The revenue-maximizing minimum-bid policy differs from those prescribed in the standard auction design literature. Keyword auctions that employ the revenue-maximizing weighting scheme and differentiated minimum bid policy can generate higher revenue than standard fixed-payment auctions. The dynamics of bidders' performance is examined in the second essay, "Keyword Auctions, Unit-price Contracts, and the Role of Commitment." We extend earlier static models by allowing bidders with lower performance levels to improve their performance at a certain cost. We examine the impact of the weighting scheme on overall bidder performance, the auction efficiency, and the auctioneer's revenue, and derive the revenue-maximizing and efficient policy accordingly. Moreover, the possible upgrade in bidders' performance levels gives the auctioneer an incentive to modify the auction rules over time, as is confirmed by the practice of Yahoo! And Google. We thus compare the auctioneer's revenue-maximizing policies when she is fully committed to the auction rule and when not, and show that she should give less preferential treatment to low-performance advertisers when she is fully committed. In the third essay, "How to Slice the Pie? Optimal Share Structure Design in Keyword Auctions," we study the design of share structures in keyword auctions. Auctions for keyword advertising resources can be viewed as share auctions in which the highest bidder gets the largest share, the second highest bidder gets the second largest share, and so on. A share structure problem arises in such a setting regarding how much resources to set aside for the highest bidder, for the second highest bidder, etc. We address this problem under a general specification and derive implications on how the optimal share structure should change with bidders' price elasticity of demand for exposure, their valuation distribution, total resources, and minimum bids.

Download or read book Online Auctions written by Yu Zhang and published by . This book was released on 2010 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This dissertation, which consists of three essays, studies online auctions both theoretically and empirically. The first essay studies a special online auction format used by eBay, "Buy-It- Now" (BIN) auctions, in which bidders are allowed to buy the item at a fixed BIN price set by the seller and end the auction immediately. I construct a two-stage model in which the BIN price is only available to one group of bidders. I find that bidders cutoff is lower in this model, which means, bidders are more likely to accept the BIN option, compared with the models assuming all bidders are offered the BIN. The results explain the high frequency of bidders accepting BIN price, and may also help explain the popularity of temporary BIN auctions in online auction sites, such as eBay, where BIN option is only offered to early bidders. In the second essay, I study how bidders' risk attitude and time preference affect their behavior in Buy-It-Now auctions. I consider two cases, when both bidders enter the auction at the same time (homogenous bidders) thus BIN option is offered to both of them, and when two bidders enter the auction at two different stages (heterogenous bidders) thus the BIN option is only offered to the early bidder. Bidders' optimal strategies are derived explicitly in both cases. In particular, given bidders' risk attitude and time preference, the cutoff valuation, such that a bidder will accept BIN if his valuation is higher than the cutoff valuation and reject it otherwise, is calculated. I find that the cutoff valuation in the case of heterogenous bidders is lower than that in the case of homogenous bidders. The third essay focuses on the empirical modeling of the price processes of online auctions. I generalize the monotone series estimator to model the pooled price processes. Then I apply the model and the estimator to eBay auction data of a palm PDA. The results are shown to capture closely the overall pattern of observed price dynamics. In particular, early bidding, mid-auction draught, and sniping are well approximated by the estimated price curve.

Download or read book Three Essays on Auction and Information Markets written by Ricardo Ungo and published by . This book was released on 2003 with total page 172 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book The Next Digital Decade written by Berin Szoka and published by TechFreedom. This book was released on 2011-06-10 with total page 578 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Essays on Auctions written by Marta Stryszowska and published by . This book was released on 2006 with total page 107 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Four Essays on Auction Mechanisms written by Tim Grebe and published by . This book was released on 2009 with total page 115 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book A Collection of Service Essays written by Harry Katzan Jr and published by iUniverse. This book was released on 2018-02-23 with total page 161 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book is a collection of papers written by the author on the subject of service. They all have been peer reviewed and written for a diverse variety of reasons. Some papers have been modified to suit a general audience, and others have simply been improved. There are some formatting differences due to the basic requirements of the various venues. The subject matter can be viewed as three separate sections: introductory, foundational, and applicative. The introductory papers are quite simple and give a gentle introduction to what the discipline of service is all about. The foundational papers provide a basis for the study of the concepts and methods of the service discipline. The applicative papers are general in nature so as to provide insight to what does and can go on in the world of service. Papers 1 and 2 fall into the first category. Papers 3, 4, and 5 are in the second category, and the remainder are in the third group. The table of contents is unique in that the entries give an abstract to the respective paper. This is an aid to a selection and gives a summary of the subject matter. The papers were assembled to support two recent books on the subject of service.

Download or read book Essays in Online Retail Markets and Auction Markets written by Jicheng Liu and published by . This book was released on 2015 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Chapter 1: "Does Information Change Bidders' Value Distribution in eBayMotor Auctions?"In eBay Motor auctions, sellers voluntarily disclose information of the car to increasethe selling prices (Lewis(2010)). An increase in the number of potential bidders or achange of potential bidders' value distribution can explain this phenomenon. This paperfirst tests whether the information disclosure influences bidders' value distribution byproposing a likelihood ratio test in an eBay auction model with an application to eBayMotor auctions. The test result shows that the bidders' value distribution is not affectedby different information disclosure levels measured by the number of photos providedby sellers in the application to eBay Motor auctions. By exploiting the bidders' valuedistribution estimates, I also calculate the consumer surplus, the mean of consumersurplus is 48% of the selling price which shows how much the online auction marketcan benefit consumers.Chapter 2: "Consumer Search in the Online Movie DVD Market"In this paper, I study the consumers' online search behavior that has been documentedthoroughly in the industrial organization literature. Using unique features of Comscoreconsumer search behavior data and transaction data, I focus on the online movie DVDretail industry. I find several features of consumer search behavior in this specificmarket. Particularly, consumer makes her purchase decision on both price and otherretailer's specific features or its quality.I estimate search costs in a nonsequential search model describing the web browsing andpurchasing behavior. Consumer knows the price distribution and she can ascertain theexact price of each retailer by searching on the firm website. Following the canonicalsearch model, a consumer has two decision steps in each period. First, each consumermakes a choice set decision on how many retailers' websites to visit. After gaininginformation on the exact price of each retailer in the choice set, consumer maximizes her utility over the retailers in her choice set. The estimation result shows the averagesearch costs are around $2.73 for an individual to search a firm's website before eachtransaction.Chapter 3: "A Structural Model of Search with Learning: Application to theOnline Movie DVD Retail Market"Much of the demand literature uses search costs to explain consumer behavior andfirms' pricing strategy in the online retail industry. However, some dynamic featuresof consumer search behavior are not captured. For example, novel web behavioraldata indicates that the consumers' search sets or "consideration sets" change over time.Such evidence of behavior change of consumers is consistent with a consumer learningmodel. Consumers are usually not certain about the firm's quality, for example theavailable service, before their visit to the firm's website. Therefore, the consumer'ssearch decision is a trade-off between higher expected maximum utility from a largersearch set and higher search cost. The decision depends on consumer's informationabout the quality of the firms.In this paper I develop a dynamic discrete choice model where consumers choose theirsearch sets and then make the purchase decision from the firms in their search sets ineach period. Each consumer's search decision is a dynamic process which depends onher endogenous belief evolution on quality.I estimate the dynamic model using the ComScore consumer level search and purchasebehavior data for the movie DVD retail market. The estimation results suggest thatsearch cost is sizable and there exists consumer heterogeneity in firms' quality belief.Consumers are learning about the firms quality very slowly which plays an importantrole in explaining the frequent search behavior change of consumers.Counterfactual experiments suggest that search costs and consumer learning have ahuge impact on the market shares of firms. The industry leader Amazon would have12% less share absent search cost. In addition, I compare the effects of different pricingstrategies of firms. The market share of Amazon shrinks by 2% if Amazon matchesthe price of ColumbiaHouse which has the second largest market share. The marketshare of the leading firm Amazon increases from 35.16% to 68.07% if a consumer hasone-search learning process.

Download or read book Essays on Multi item Auctions written by Rao Fu and published by . This book was released on 2011 with total page 194 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In this dissertation, I explore bidders' behavior in multiple auctions which are conducted sequentially or simultaneously. The first and the second chapters examine buyers' bidding behaviors in an environment of multiple simultaneous auctions and show that the wildly-used assumption of proxy bidding is inappropriate in the multiple auction setting. The first chapter proposes two models which try to describe online auction platforms. One model has a fixed ending time and the other does not. I show that incremental bidding strategy can arise out of equilibrium and weakly dominate the proxy bidding strategy. Late bidding is also discussed. I use the data I collect from eBay to test these theoretical predictions in the second chapter. The estimation results basically support the theory part. Incremental bidders who switch among different auctions are more likely to win and have higher payoffs than proxy bidders. The third essay studies the procurement auctions in the Texas school milk market. I define score functions to map the bids from multiple dimensions to one dimension and analyze the factors that may affect the bids of school milk suppliers. After considering the impacts of these factors including backlogs and cost synergies, I can still find some evidences for existence of collusion among the bidders.

Download or read book Three Essays on All pay Auctions written by Minbo Xu and published by . This book was released on 2013 with total page 232 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The dissertation includes three research papers on all-pay auctions. The first paper (Chapter 1) considers an all-pay auction for a product in which there is an option for bidders to guarantee purchases at a seller specified posted price P at any time. We find the symmetric pure-strategy equilibria in the first- and second-price all-pay auctions (also called war of attrition) with a buy-price option. Under these equilibria the buy-price option will affect high-value bidders' behavior, and improve their welfare. At the same time, the seller can select the optimal posted price to collect more revenue, and the Revenue Equivalence Theorem holds as well. The second paper (Chapter 2) conducts empirical analysis on online penny auctions, which are seen as an adaptation of the famous dollar auction and as "the evil stepchild of game theory and behavioral economics." We use the complete bid and bidder history at a website to study if penny auctions can sustain excessive profits over time. The overwhelming majority of new bidders lose money, but they quit quickly. A very small percentage of bidders are experienced and strategically sophisticated, but they earn substantial profits. Our evidence thus suggests that penny auctions cannot sustain excessive profits without attracting a revolving door of new customers who will lose money. The third paper (Chapter 3) proposes a nonparametric estimation approach to empirical analysis of the war of attrition. In order to construct a tractable model, we consider the uncertain competition and derive a structural model with a stochastic number of bidders. We admit the contamination from observables and introduce a deconvolution problem with heteroscedastic errors into the nonparametric approach. By a two-step nonparametric procedure, we can attain a consistent estimator of the distribution of bidders' private values from the observables. Finally, we apply the estimation procedure to field data from penny auctions.

Download or read book Mathematics of the Internet written by Brenda Dietrich and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2001-12-14 with total page 190 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The use of the internet for commerce has spawned a variety of auctions, marketplaces, and exchanges for trading everything from bandwidth to books. Mechanisms for bidding agents, dynamic pricing, and combinatorial bids are being implemented in support of internet-based auctions, giving rise to new versions of optimization and resource allocation models. This volume, a collection of papers from an IMA "Hot Topics" workshop in internet auctions, includes descriptions of real and proposed auctions, complete with mathematical model formulations, theoretical results, solution approaches, and computational studies. This volume also provides a mathematical programming perspective on open questions in auction theory, and provides a glimpse of the growing area of dynamic pricing.