Download or read book Essays in Evolutionary Game Theory written by Jonas Björnerstedt and published by . This book was released on 1995 with total page 167 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Essays in Evolutionary Game Theory written by Joerg Oechssler and published by . This book was released on 1994 with total page 190 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Essays in Evolutionary Game Theory written by Yao-Chye Chiang and published by . This book was released on 1993 with total page 220 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Did Darwin Get It Right written by John Maynard Smith and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2012-12-06 with total page 265 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Now in paperback, Did Darwin Get It Right discusses some of the hottest issues in biology today. Its author, the eminently quotable John Maynard Smith, discusses such fascinating conundrums as how life began, whether the brain works like a computer, why most animals and plants reproduce sexually, and how social behavior evolved out of the context of natural selection--a process which would seem to favor selfishness. A humorous and insightful writer, John Maynard Smith has the special ability to convey the excitement of science, its complexity and fascination, without baffling or boring his readers. In these 28 brief and accessible essays, Maynard ranges widely over such issues as science and the media, the birth of sociobiology, the evolution of animal intelligence and the limitations of evolutionary theory. For his work on the evolution of sex, Smith won the Darwin medal from the Royal Society, and he has pioneered the application of game theory to animal behavior.
Download or read book Essays in Evolutionary Game Theory written by Ratul Lahkar and published by . This book was released on 2007 with total page 180 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Three Essays in Evolutionary Game Theory written by Jack Robles and published by . This book was released on 1996 with total page 148 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Essays in Evolutionary Game Theory written by Ge Jiang and published by . This book was released on 2016 with total page 178 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Essays on Epistemology and Evolutionary Game Theory written by Elias Tsakas and published by . This book was released on 2008 with total page 90 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Essays on Evolutionary Game Theory and Its Applications written by Shota Fujishima and published by . This book was released on 2013 with total page 95 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This dissertation consists of three essays on evolutionary game theory and its applications. The first essay considers mechanism design in the evolutionary game-theoretic framework. The second essay studies equilibrium selection of coordination games by using an evolutionary game-theoretic concept. The third essay formulates a multi-regional economic growth model as an evolutionary game and characterizes the stability of its equilibria under an evolutionary dynamic. The summaries of each essay are provided below. In the first essay, I consider an implementation problem in a class of congestion games with players that have heterogeneous costs of taking actions. One application is to traffic congestion with drivers having heterogeneous time costs. The planner would like to design a price scheme under which the economy converges to an epsilon-optimum from any initial state when he does not have full knowledge of the cost functions, and he can observe only the aggregate strategy distribution. Although the planner would like to internalize the externalities, the informational constraints compel him to estimate their values. Using the optimality and equilibrium conditions, I construct a practical estimation procedure that yields the true values of externalities in the long-run. Moreover, I show that our scheme makes the epsilon-optimum globally stable under the best response dynamic if the externalities among players taking the same action are sufficiently large relative to those among players taking different actions. In the second essay, I study the long-run outcomes of noisy asynchronous repeated games with players that are heterogeneous in in terms of their patience. The players repeatedly play a 2-by-2 coordination game with random pair-wise matching. The games are noisy because the players may make mistakes when choosing their actions and are asynchronous because only one player can move in each period. I characterize the long-run outcomes of Markov perfect equilibrium that are robust to the mistakes and show that if there is a sufficiently patient player, the efficient state can be the unique robust outcome even if it is risk-dominated. Because I need heterogeneity for the result, I argue that it enables the most patient player in effect to be the leader. In the third essay, I consider a microfounded urban growth model with two regions and a mass of mobile workers to study interactions among growth, agglomeration, and urban congestion. Unlike previous research in the urban growth literature, I formulate the model as a one-shot game and take an evolutionary game-theoretic approach for stability analysis. My approach enables us to analyze the stability of nonstationary equilibria in which populations of each region are not constant over time. I show that if both the expenditure share for housing and inter-regional transport cost are small, a stable stationary equilibrium does not exist. Moreover, in such a case, I show that there can exist a stable nonstationary equilibrium in which mobile workers agglomerate in one region at first but some of them migrate to the other region later. I argue that such a nonstationary location pattern is related to return migration.
Download or read book Essays in Evolutionary Game Theory written by Srinivas Arigapudi and published by . This book was released on 2021 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This dissertation consists of three self-contained chapters. The first chapter studies the effect of introducing a bilingual option on the long run equilibrium outcome in a class of two-strategy coordination games with distinct payoff and risk dominant equilibria under the logit choice rule. Existing results show that in the class of two-strategy games under consideration, the inefficient risk dominant equilibrium is selected in the long run under noisy best response models. We show that if the cost of the bilingual option is sufficiently low then the efficient payoff dominant equilibrium will be selected in the long run under the logit choice rule. The second chapter studies a model of stochastic evolution under the probit choice rule. In the small noise double limit, where first the noise level in agents' decisions is taken to zero, and then the population size to infinity, escape from and transitions between equilibria can be described in terms of solutions to continuous optimal control problems. We use resultsfrom optimal control theory to solve the exit cost problem. This is used to determine the most likely exit paths from the initial basin of attraction and also to assess the expected time until the evolutionary process leaves the basin of attraction of a stable equilibrium in a class of three-strategy coordination games. The third chapter (joint work with Yuval Heller and Igal Milchtaich) studies the population dynamics under which each revising agent tests each action k times, with each trial being against a newly drawn opponent, and chooses the action whose mean payoff was highest during the testing phase. When k = 1, defection is globally stable in the prisoner's dilemma.By contrast, when k > 1 we show that, if the gains from defection are not too large, there exists a globally stable state in which agents cooperate with probability between 28% and 50%. Next, we characterize stability of strict equilibria in general games. Our results demonstrate that the empirically plausible case of k > 1 can yield qualitatively different predictions than the case k = 1 commonly studied in the literature.
Download or read book Essays in Evolutionary Game Theory written by and published by . This book was released on 2015 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Essay on Nonlinear evolutionary game dynamics written by Marius Ionut Ochea and published by Rozenberg Publishers. This book was released on 2010 with total page 217 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Exploring Individual Preferences in Economic Contexts written by Niko Noeske and published by . This book was released on 2011 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Fundamentals of Evolutionary Game Theory and its Applications written by Jun Tanimoto and published by Springer. This book was released on 2015-10-23 with total page 223 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book both summarizes the basic theory of evolutionary games and explains their developing applications, giving special attention to the 2-player, 2-strategy game. This game, usually termed a "2×2 game” in the jargon, has been deemed most important because it makes it possible to posit an archetype framework that can be extended to various applications for engineering, the social sciences, and even pure science fields spanning theoretical biology, physics, economics, politics, and information science. The 2×2 game is in fact one of the hottest issues in the field of statistical physics. The book first shows how the fundamental theory of the 2×2 game, based on so-called replicator dynamics, highlights its potential relation with nonlinear dynamical systems. This analytical approach implies that there is a gap between theoretical and reality-based prognoses observed in social systems of humans as well as in those of animal species. The book explains that this perceived gap is the result of an underlying reciprocity mechanism called social viscosity. As a second major point, the book puts a sharp focus on network reciprocity, one of the five fundamental mechanisms for adding social viscosity to a system and one that has been a great concern for study by statistical physicists in the past decade. The book explains how network reciprocity works for emerging cooperation, and readers can clearly understand the existence of substantial mechanics when the term "network reciprocity" is used. In the latter part of the book, readers will find several interesting examples in which evolutionary game theory is applied. One such example is traffic flow analysis. Traffic flow is one of the subjects that fluid dynamics can deal with, although flowing objects do not comprise a pure fluid but, rather, are a set of many particles. Applying the framework of evolutionary games to realistic traffic flows, the book reveals that social dilemma structures lie behind traffic flow.
Download or read book Essays on Game Theory written by The late John F. Nash and published by Edward Elgar Publishing. This book was released on 1996-01-01 with total page 116 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: 'This short volume is very welcome . . . Most importantly, on pages 32-33, the volume reprints as an appendix to the journal article based on Nash's Princeton doctoral dissertation on non-cooperative games a section of the thesis on "motivation and interpretation" that was omitted from the article. An editorial note remarks mildly that "The missing section is of considerable interest". This section, not available in any other published source, makes the present volume indispensable for research libraries . . . Nash's Essays on Game Theory, dating from his years as a Princeton graduate student . . . has a lasting impact on economics and related fields unmatched by any series of articles written in such a brief time . . . To economists, his name will always bring to mind his game theory papers of the early 1950s. It is good to have these conveniently reprinted in this volume.' - Robert W. Dimand, The Economic Journal 'The news that John Nash was to share the 1994 Nobel Prize for Economics with John Harsanyi and Reinhard Selten was doubly welcome. It signalled not only that the brilliant achievements of his youth were to be recognized in a manner consistent with their significance, but that the long illness that clouded his later years had fallen into remission. I hope that this collection of his economic papers will serve as another reminder that John Nash has rejoined the intellectual community to which he has contributed so much.' - From the introduction by Ken Binmore Essays on Game Theory is a unique collection of seven of John Nash's essays which highlight his pioneering contribution to game theory in economics. Featuring a comprehensive introduction by Ken Binmore which explains and summarizes John Nash's achievements in the field of non-cooperative and cooperative game theory, this book will be an indispensable reference for scholars and will be welcomed by those with an interest in game theory and its applications to the social sciences.
Download or read book Evolutionary Game Theory written by J. McKenzie Alexander and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2023-03-31 with total page 115 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Evolutionary game theory originated in population biology from the realisation that frequency-dependent fitness introduced a strategic element into evolution. Since its development, evolutionary game theory has been adopted by many social scientists, and philosophers, to analyse interdependent decision problems played by boundedly rational individuals. Its study has led to theoretical innovations of great interest for the biological and social sciences. For example, theorists have developed a number of dynamical models which can be used to study how populations of interacting individuals change their behaviours over time. In this introduction, this Element covers the two main approaches to evolutionary game theory: the static analysis of evolutionary stability concepts, and the study of dynamical models, their convergence behaviour and rest points. This Element also explores the many fascinating, and complex, connections between the two approaches.
Download or read book Game Theory and Economic Behaviour written by Reinhard Selten (Economist, Germany) and published by Edward Elgar Publishing. This book was released on 1999-03-24 with total page 924 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: 'These two volumes constitute an impressive collection of selected path-breaking works of Professor Selten. . . . Edward Elgar Publications deserve merit for bringing out most frequently-cited and prominent articles of Professor Selten in a conveniently available package.' - K. Ravikumar, Journal of Scientific and Industrial Research In 1994, the Nobel Prize was awarded to Reinhard Selten, John Nash and John Harsanyi, for pioneering analysis in game theory. Selten was the first to refine the Nash equilibrium concept of non-cooperative games for analysing dynamic strategic interaction and to apply these concepts to analyses of oligopoly.
