Download or read book Essays in Corporate Finance written by Tilan Tang and published by . This book was released on 2009 with total page 234 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Essays in corporate finance written by Salvatore Cantale and published by . This book was released on 1997 with total page 64 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Essays on Corporate Finance written by Jing Li (Researcher on corporate finance) and published by . This book was released on 2023 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Essays in Corporate Finance written by Dieter Vanwalleghem and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page 147 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Essays in Corporate Finance written by Bruno d Laranjeira and published by . This book was released on 2011 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This thesis presents two essays in Corporate Finance. In the first essay, I use the August 2007 crisis episode to gauge the effect of financial contracting on real firm behavior. I identify heterogeneity in financial contracting at the onset of the crisis by exploiting ex-ante variation in long-term debt maturity structure. Using a difference-in-differences matching estimator approach, I find that firms whose long-term debt was largely maturing right after the third quarter of 2007 cut their investment-to-capital ratio by 2.5 percentage points more (on a quarterly basis) than otherwise similar firms whose debt was scheduled to mature after 2008. This drop in investment is statistically and economically significant, representing one-third of pre-crisis investment levels. A number of falsification and placebo tests suggest that my inferences are not confounded with other factors. For example, in the absence of a credit contraction, the maturity composition of long-term debt has no effect on investment. Moreover, long-term debt maturity composition had no impact on investment during the crisis for firms for which long-term debt was not a major source of funding. Our analysis highlights the importance of debt maturity for corporate financial policy. More than showing a general association between credit markets and real activity, my analysis shows how the credit channel operates through a specific feature of financial contracting. In the second essay, I analyze how institutional investors choose which Initial Public Offering to invest. Using a sample of IPOs from 1980 to 2004, I show that the reputation of the lead underwriter is the most significant variable in this decision process. Using Carter-Manaster rankings of underwriter reputation, I report that a one point increase in the reputation ranking leads to a 2% increase in institutional investors` holding. Moreover, I test hypotheses about what kind of certification the underwriter is providing. I provide evidence that underwriters certify un-measurable characteristics, in contrast to measurable characteristics, such as those provided in the financial statements of the issuer.
Download or read book Essays in Corporate Finance written by Jin Xu and published by . This book was released on 2007 with total page 312 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Essays in Corporate Finance written by Bina Sharma and published by . This book was released on 2019 with total page 194 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Three Essays in Corporate Finance written by Tareque Nasser and published by . This book was released on 2010 with total page 216 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This dissertation contains three distinct essays in the broad area of corporate finance. The first two essays examine the role of an independent director who is also a blockholder (IDB), a potent governance mechanism, on executive compensation, and corporate financial and investment policies, respectively. The last essay examines insider trading in takeover targets. The first essay examines three issues. First, we investigate the determinants of an IDB's presence in a firm. Second, we examine the relations between IDB presence and (1) the level and structure of CEO compensation, and (2) CEO turnover-performance sensitivity. Third, we analyze if IDB presence is related to firm valuation. Our findings suggest that the presence of an independent blockholder on the board promotes better incentives and monitoring of the CEO, and consequently leads to higher firm valuation. In the second essay, we examine how the presence of an IDB affects: (1) four key financial and investment policy choices of a firm: the levels of cash holdings, dividends, investments and financial leverage, and (2) firm risk. We also examine how the market values IDB presence and changes in various policy choices associated with IDB presence in a firm. We find that firms with IDBs have significantly lower levels of cash holdings, dividend yields, repurchases, and total payout, but higher levels of capital expenditures. We also find that firms with IDBs have lower risk. Overall, IDB presence appears to reduce agency problems between managers and shareholders. The third essay brings large-sample evidence on whether the level and pattern of profitable insider trading before takeover announcements is abnormal for a broad cross-section of targets of takeovers during modern times. We find an interesting and subtle pattern in the average pre-takeover trading behavior of target insiders. While insiders reduce both their purchases and sales below normal levels, their sales reduce more than purchases, leading to an increase in net purchases. This pattern of 'passive' insider trading is confined to the six-month period before takeover announcement, holds for each insider group, for all measures of net purchases examined, and in certain sub-samples with less uncertainty about takeover completion.
Download or read book Essays in Corporate Finance written by Jan K. Mahrt-Smith and published by . This book was released on 1998 with total page 230 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Essays in Corporate Finance written by Alexander William Vedrashko and published by . This book was released on 2007 with total page 290 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Essays in Corporate Finance written by Kangzhen Xie and published by . This book was released on 2010 with total page 156 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This dissertation studies the effects of information asymmetry, financial constraints and stock market valuation on the behavior of firms. The first essay explores the role of deal initiation and bidder asymmetry in determining the use of auction and target premia in merges and acquisitions. The second essay examines the behavior of the segments of conglomerates and single segment firms in the distressed industries. The third essay investigates the incentive of takeover arising from the temporary disparity of stock valuation. While half of all acquisition targets are sold in negotiated deals with only one buyer rather than by auction, the wealth effects for target shareholders are surprisingly similar in both auctions and negotiations. This begs the following questions: why do companies frequently avoid auctions and instead negotiate with just one buyer, and how can targets achieve comparable premia in negotiations? Drawing on Fishman's (1988) model of preemptive bidding and Povel and Singh's (2006) model of asymmetric bidders, I hypothesize that the sales procedure (i.e., auction or negotiation) is most likely determined by the party that initiates the deal. When an acquirer initiates a deal, it prefers a negotiated deal and hence agrees to pay a high premium to preempt the target and other potential bidders from running an auction. I document detailed information on the private bargaining process for 598 deals. I find that most negotiation deals are in fact initiated by the acquirers and that most of the target-initiated deals use an auction, which indicates that targets are using an auction as a mechanism to discover the highest bidder. Moreover, I provide evidence that the targets receive higher excess returns in the deals initiated by the acquirers than in the deals initiated by the targets. I also provide further evidence of preemptive bidding and bidder asymmetry by studying the indicative bids and the business relations between the targets and the acquirers. Hence, target firms are willing to forgo the potential benefits of an auction and agree to a negotiated deal because they are already facing a bidder with a high valuation and are able to get a high price. The second essay uses economic distress in an industry as a natural experiment and tests the alternate theories of conglomeration. We find that segments of conglomerates in distressed industries experience better performance than single segment firms. The distressed segments have higher sales growth, higher R & D expenditure and greater cash flows than single segment firms. Indicating greater financial constraints for single segment firms, the superior performance of segments of conglomerates is confined to the sub-sample of firms without credit ratings and for firms in competitive industries. Single-segment firms reduce their investment in non-cash current assets and significantly increase their cash holdings during periods of industry distress. There is some evidence that the single segment firms that accumulate cash also reduce their R & D expenditure. The diversification discount almost disappears in the years when one of the conglomerate segments is in distress. Overall, our evidence highlights the benefits of conglomerates in enabling segments to avoid financial constraints during periods of industry distress. The third essay studies the effect of valuation difference on merger incentives. There is widespread evidence that bidders are more highly valued than their targets, and that both parties tend to be in temporarily high-valued industries. We find that valuation differences are also extremely important in predicting who will be acquired and when. Our evidence also suggests that the driving force is more a desire to increase earnings per share the (the "bootstrap game" in the classic text of Brealey and Myers) than to exploit market mis-valuation. We find that a firm is more likely to be a target when others in the industry could acquire them in a stock-swap merger that appears accretive to the buyer while paying the target a substantial premium. The resulting measure is similar to the dispersion of valuation multiples within an industry, but is grounded in a specific model of managerial behavior and is empirically much stronger than dispersion. Indeed, it is stronger than any measure in the existing literature, including recent industry merger activity.
Download or read book Two Essays in Corporate Finance written by Daniel Newton Deli and published by . This book was released on 1996 with total page 202 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Three Essays in Corporate Finance written by Xia (Summer). Liu and published by . This book was released on 2022 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Essays on Corporate Finance written by Ezgi Hallioglu Ottolenghi and published by . This book was released on 2017 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Essays in Corporate Finance Theory written by Dan Luo (Researcher in corporate finance theory) and published by . This book was released on 2022 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This dissertation consists of three pieces of research in theoretical corporate finance. The first one studies multi-agent design problems. Agents are concerned about each other's decisions and can communicate strategically with each other. The principal would like to motivate agents' participation decisions by affecting their communication. I employ such a multi-agent perspective on economic design to understand practices such as syndication. The second and the third ones take a more applied approach and study agency problems in specific corporate finance settings. They shed light on information design in corporate governance and dynamic interactions in special purpose acquisition companies (SPACs), respectively.
Download or read book Essays in Corporate Finance and Corporate Governance written by David De Angelis and published by . This book was released on 2012 with total page 192 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: My dissertation contains three essays in corporate finance and corporate governance. The first essay studies the effect of information frictions across corporate hierarchies on internal capital allocation decisions, using the Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX) as a quasi-natural experiment. SOX requires firms to enhance their internal controls to improve the reliability of financial reporting across corporate hierarchies. I find that after SOX, the capital allocation decision in conglomerates is more sensitive to performance as reported by the business segments. The effects are most pronounced when conglomerates are prone to information problems within the organization and least pronounced when they still suffer from internal control weaknesses after SOX. Moreover, conglomerates' productivity and market value relative to stand-alone firms increase after SOX. These results support the argument that inefficiencies in the capital allocation process are partly due to information frictions. My findings also shed light on some unintended effects of SOX on large and complex firms. The second essay is co-authored with Yaniv Grinstein and investigates how firms tie CEO compensation to performance. We take advantage of new compensation disclosure requirements issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission in 2006. Firms vary in their choice of performance measures and horizons, and in their reliance on pre-specified goals. Consistent with optimal contracting theories, we find that firms choose performance measures that are more informative of CEO actions, and rely less on pre-specified goals when it is more costly to contract on CEO actions. The third essay investigates the design of division managers (DMs) incentive contracts again taking advantage of the disclosure requirements. I find that firms do not use relative performance evaluation across divisions and that in general most of DM compensation incentives are associated with firm performance instead of division performance. Furthermore, division performance-based incentives tend to be smaller in complex firms, when within-organization conflicts are potentially more severe. I also find that when the probability of promotion to CEO is lower, DM ownership requirements are more stringent and DM compensation incentives are greater. These results support notions that influence costs as well as promotion-based incentives are important considerations in designing DMs contracts.
Download or read book Three Essays in Corporate Finance written by Hwanki Brian Kim and published by . This book was released on 2018 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
