Download or read book Dynamic Incentive Contracts Under Parameter Uncertainty written by Boyan Jovanovic and published by . This book was released on 2010 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We analyze a long-term contracting problem involving common uncertainty about a parameter capturing the productivity of the relationship, and featuring a hidden action for the agent. We develop an approach that works for any utility function when the parameter and noise are normally distributed and when the effort and noise affect output additively. We then analytically solve for the optimal contract when the agent has exponential utility. We find that the Pareto frontier shifts out as information about the agent's quality improves. In the standard spot-market setup, by contrast, when the parameter measures the agent's 'quality', the Pareto frontier shifts inwards with better information. Commitment is therefore more valuable when quality is known more precisely. Incentives then are easier to provide because the agent has less room to manipulate the beliefs of the principal. Moreover, in contrast to results under one-period commitment, wage volatility declines as experience accumulates.
Download or read book Dynamic Incentive Contracts Under Parameter Uncertainty written by Julien Prat and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page 49 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We analyze a long-term contracting problem involving common uncertainty about a parameter capturing the productivity of the relationship, and featuring a hidden action for the agent. We develop an approach that works for any utility function when the parameter and noise are normally distributed and when the effort and noise affect output additively. We then analytically solve for the optimal contract when the agent has exponential utility. We find that the Pareto frontier shifts out as information about the agent's quality improves. In the standard spot-market setup, by contrast, when the parameter measures the agent's 'quality', the Pareto frontier shifts inwards with better information. Commitment is therefore more valuable when quality is known more precisely. Incentives then are easier to provide because the agent has less room to manipulate the beliefs of the principal. Moreover, in contrast to results under one-period commitment, wage volatility declines as experience accumulates.
Download or read book Contract Theory in Continuous Time Models written by Jakša Cvitanic and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2012-09-26 with total page 258 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In recent years there has been a significant increase of interest in continuous-time Principal-Agent models, or contract theory, and their applications. Continuous-time models provide a powerful and elegant framework for solving stochastic optimization problems of finding the optimal contracts between two parties, under various assumptions on the information they have access to, and the effect they have on the underlying "profit/loss" values. This monograph surveys recent results of the theory in a systematic way, using the approach of the so-called Stochastic Maximum Principle, in models driven by Brownian Motion. Optimal contracts are characterized via a system of Forward-Backward Stochastic Differential Equations. In a number of interesting special cases these can be solved explicitly, enabling derivation of many qualitative economic conclusions.
Download or read book Dynamic Incentive Contracts with Uncorrelated Private Information and History Dependent Outcomes written by Gaudet, Gérard and published by Montréal : CIRANO. This book was released on 1995 with total page 22 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book TIMELINESS ACCURACY AND RELEVANCE IN DYNAMIC INCENTIVE CONTRACTS written by PETER O. CHRISTENSEN; GERALD A. FELTHAM; CHRISTIAN. and published by . This book was released on 2022 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Timeliness, Accuracy, and Relevance in Dynamic Incentive Contracts examines managerial performance measures from the perspective of timeliness, accuracy, and relevance in multi-period incentive problems. The authors use a simple linear framework where managerial actions do not affect risk and compare and contrast consumption risk for a manager's preferences with single and multiple consumption dates, respectively.Both full commitment to and renegotiation of long-term contracts are considered. Under full commitment, timely and accurate information is usually relevant and desirable; the only differences arise from the modeling of managerial preferences, through the manager's consumption risk. In particular, the timeliness of performance reports can be irrelevant; then, delaying reports is desirable if it can increase their accuracy. Under renegotiation of long-term contracts, the timeliness of information release relative to renegotiation is essential. Any information released prior to renegotiation is incorporated into an ex post efficient (renegotiated) contract and is particularly useful in insuring the manager against future consumption risk. Delayed reporting destroys this insurance value and can make late reports irrelevant, independent of the modeling of managerial preferences. But timely reports can create ex ante inefficient action incentives for managers, and then accuracy can be costly as well.
Download or read book Essays on Optimal Dynamic Incentive Contracts written by Carsten Sebastian Pfeil and published by . This book was released on 2011 with total page 150 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Robust Contract Designs written by Yimin Yu and published by . This book was released on 2020 with total page 57 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We consider incentive compensation where the firm has ambiguity on the effort-contingent output distribution: the parameters of the output probability distribution are in an ellipsoidal uncertainty set. The firm evaluates any contract by its worst-case performance over all possible parameters in the uncertainty set. Similarly, the incentive compatible condition for the agent must hold for all possible parameters in the uncertainty set. The firm is financially risk neutral and the agent has limited liability. We find that when the agent is financially risk neutral, the optimal robust contract is a linear contract--paying the agent a base payment and a fixed share of the output. Moreover, the linear contract is the only type of contracts that are robust to the parameter uncertainty. When there is model uncertainty over a general effort-contingent output distribution, we show that a generalized linear contract is uniquely optimal. When the agent is risk-averse and has a piecewise linear utility, the only optimal contract is a piecewise linear contract that consists of progressive fixed payments and linear rewards with progressive commission rates. We also provide the analysis for the trade-off between robustness and worst-case performance and show that our results are robust to a variety of settings, including cases with general lp-norm uncertainty sets, multiple effort levels, etc. Our paper provides a new explanation for the popularity of linear contracts and piecewise linear contracts in practice and introduces a flexible modeling approach for robust contract designs with model uncertainty.
Download or read book Penalizing Success in Dynamic Incentive Contracts written by Tracy R. Lewis and published by . This book was released on 2008 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We examine optimal dynamic incentive contracts when adverse selection and moral hazard problems are present. We find that early success is optimally penalized in the sense that the agent who succeeds early subsequently faces a lower- powered incentive contract. Penalizing success in this manner serves to limit the agent's initial incentive to understate his ability.
Download or read book Sticky Incentives and Dynamic Agency written by John Yiran Zhu and published by . This book was released on 2011 with total page 128 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: I explicitly derive the optimal dynamic incentive contract in a general continuous time agency problem where inducing static first-best action is not always optimal. My framework generates two dynamic contracts new to the literature: (1) a q̀̀uiet-life" arrangement and (2) a suspension-based endogenously renegotiating contract. Both contractual forms induce a mixture of first-best and non-first-best action. These contracts capture common features in many real life arrangements such as ù̀p-or-out", partnership, tenure, hidden compensation and suspension clauses. In applications, I explore the effects of taxes, bargaining and renegotiation on optimal contracting. My technical work produces a new type of incentive scheme I call sticky incentives which underlies the optimal, infrequent-monitoring approach to inducing a mixture of first-best and non-first-best action. Furthermore, I show how differences in patience between the principal and agent factor into optimal contracting.
Download or read book Dynamic Contracting with Moral Hazard Under Incomplete Information written by Teddy Mekonnen and published by . This book was released on 2018 with total page 35 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: I study a continuous time principal-agent model in which an unknown parameter and the agent's hidden effort affect the distribution of observable outcomes. The principal and the agent learn about the parameter by observing past outcomes. The agent's current effort has an implicit long-term effect through the belief dynamics and a deviation in effort creates a persistent disparity between the principal's and the agent's beliefs. This disparity affects the rate of learning as well as how the two evaluate the expected distribution of future outcomes which in turn affects their evaluation of future payoffs. Placing minimal restrictions on how effort and the parameter interact, I derive necessary and sufficient conditions for incentive compatible contracts. In addition to the agent's promised utility, the covariance between the on-path posterior beliefs and the agent's total payoff serves as a second state variable capturing the marginal long-run effects of effort.
Download or read book Complex Systems Multi Sided Incentives and Risk Perception in Companies written by Michael I.C. Nwogugu and published by Springer Nature. This book was released on 2019-09-06 with total page 849 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Most research about financial stability and sustainable growth focuses on the financial sector and macroeconomics and neglects the real sector, microeconomics and psychology issues. Real-sector and financial-sectors linkages are increasing and are a foundation of economic/social/environmental/urban sustainability, given financial crises, noise, internet, “transition economics”, disintermediation, demographics and inequality around the world. Within complex systems theory framework, this book analyses some multi-sided mechanisms and risk-perception that can have symbiotic relationships with financial stability, systemic risk and/or sustainable growth. Within the context of Regret Minimization, MN-Transferable Utility and WTAL, new theories-of-the-firm are developed that consider sustainable growth, price stability, globalization, financial stability and birth-to-death evolutions of firms. This book introduces new behaviour theories pertaining to real estate and intangibles, which can affect the evolutions of risk-taking and risk perception within organizations and investment entities. The chapters address elements of the dilemma of often divergent risk perceptions of, and risk-taking by corporate executives, regulators and investment managers.
Download or read book Robust Mechanism Design written by Dirk Bergemann and published by World Scientific. This book was released on 2012 with total page 471 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Foreword by Eric Maskin (Nobel Laureate in Economics, 2007)This volume brings together the collected contributions on the theme of robust mechanism design and robust implementation that Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris have been working on for the past decade. The collection is preceded by a comprehensive introductory essay, specifically written for this volume with the aim of providing the readers with an overview of the research agenda pursued in the collected papers.The introduction selectively presents the main results of the papers, and attempts to illustrate many of them in terms of a common and canonical example, namely a single unit auction with interdependent values. It is our hope that the use of this example facilitates the presentation of the results and that it brings the main insights within the context of an important economic mechanism, namely the generalized second price auction.
Download or read book Strategies for Supply Chain Risk Management written by Yi Li and published by Taylor & Francis. This book was released on 2023-06-16 with total page 187 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Examining the negative consequences that arise from supply chain risks, this book systematically explores firms’ responses to these risks in different situations. In particular, it focuses on sourcing strategies of firms under supply chain risks and the different mitigation tools they use, such as supplier development and multisourcing. Supply chains have expanded extensively because many firms try to take advantage of outsourcing of their raw materials and critical components. Though firms can reap significant benefits due to the widespread use of outsourcing, they have to deal with increasing supply chain risks. In general, supply chain risks are various and may be originated from natural disasters, labor strikes, fires, and so on. These risk incidents can cause serious damage to firms’ profit performance. The analysis and insights from this book can be utilized by firms to alleviate the impact of supply chain risks in the sourcing process. It will also be of interest to researchers and students studying supply chain management.
Download or read book Contract Theory Discrete and Continuous Time Models written by Jaeyoung Sung and published by Springer Nature. This book was released on 2024-01-10 with total page 348 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book provides a self-contained introduction to discrete-time and continuous-time models in contracting theory to advanced undergraduate and graduate students in economics and finance and researchers focusing on closed-form solutions and their economic implications. Discrete-time models are introduced to highlight important elements in both economics and mathematics of contracting problems and to serve as a bridge for continuous-time models and their applications. The book serves as a bridge between the currently two almost separate strands of textbooks on discrete- and continuous-time contracting models This book is written in a manner that makes complex mathematical concepts more accessible to economists. However, it would also be an invaluable tool for applied mathematicians who are looking to learn about possible economic applications of various control methods.
Download or read book Stochastic Controls written by Jiongmin Yong and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2012-12-06 with total page 459 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: As is well known, Pontryagin's maximum principle and Bellman's dynamic programming are the two principal and most commonly used approaches in solving stochastic optimal control problems. * An interesting phenomenon one can observe from the literature is that these two approaches have been developed separately and independently. Since both methods are used to investigate the same problems, a natural question one will ask is the fol lowing: (Q) What is the relationship betwccn the maximum principlc and dy namic programming in stochastic optimal controls? There did exist some researches (prior to the 1980s) on the relationship between these two. Nevertheless, the results usually werestated in heuristic terms and proved under rather restrictive assumptions, which were not satisfied in most cases. In the statement of a Pontryagin-type maximum principle there is an adjoint equation, which is an ordinary differential equation (ODE) in the (finite-dimensional) deterministic case and a stochastic differential equation (SDE) in the stochastic case. The system consisting of the adjoint equa tion, the original state equation, and the maximum condition is referred to as an (extended) Hamiltonian system. On the other hand, in Bellman's dynamic programming, there is a partial differential equation (PDE), of first order in the (finite-dimensional) deterministic case and of second or der in the stochastic case. This is known as a Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation.
Download or read book Systems and Optimization written by Arunabha Bagchi and published by Springer. This book was released on 1985 with total page 224 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book The Oxford Handbook of Quantitative Asset Management written by Bernd Scherer and published by Oxford University Press. This book was released on 2012 with total page 530 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book explores the current state of the art in quantitative investment management across seven key areas. Chapters by academics and practitioners working in leading investment management organizations bring together major theoretical and practical aspects of the field.
