Download or read book Deposit Insurance in Developing Countries written by Samuel H. Talley and published by . This book was released on 1989 with total page 115 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Deposit Insurance Around the Globe written by Asl? Demirgüç-Kunt and published by World Bank Publications. This book was released on 2001 with total page 42 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Explicit deposit insurance has been spreading rapidly in recent years, even to countries with low levels of financial and institutional development. Economic theory indicates that deposit-insurance design features interact--for good or ill--with country-specific elements of the financial and governmental contracting environment. This paper documents the extent of cross-country differences in deposit-insurance design and reviews empirical evidence on how particular design features affect private market discipline, banking stability, financial development, and the effectiveness of crisis resolution. This evidence challenges the wisdom of encouraging countries to adopt explicit deposit insurance without first stopping to assess and remedy weaknesses in their informational and supervisory environments.
Download or read book Deposit Insurance Around the World written by Aslı Demirgüç-Kunt and published by MIT Press. This book was released on 2008 with total page 415 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Explicit deposit insurance (DI) is widely held to be a crucial element of modern financial safety nets. This book draws on an original cross-country dataset on DI systems and design features to examine the impact of DI on banking behavior and assess the policy complications that emerge in developing countries.
Download or read book Deposit Insurance in Developing Countries written by Samuel Talley and published by . This book was released on 2017 with total page 120 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: About a dozen developing countries have deposit insurance systems and several others are considering establishing them. These systems are typically created to prevent contagious bank runs, to provide a formal national mechanism for handling failing banks, and to protect small depositors from losses when banks fail. Without a deposit insurance system, many developing nations in recent years have extended implicit deposit protection to depositors on a discretionary, ad hoc basis. Deposit insurance systems have several advantages over these implicit protection schemes. Deposit insurance probably gives the banking system more protection against bank runs, provides more protection for small depositors, and provides a faster, smoother administrative process. On the other hand, deposit insurance probably creates more moral hazard for depositors, thereby contributing to the erosion of market discipline and increased bank risk-taking. Deposit insurance also tends to be a more expensive mechanism for protecting depositors because it offers less freedom of action to policymakers than an implicit scheme. Finally, developing countries often do not adequately fund their deposit insurance schemes. As a result, the systems often lack credibility in the marketplace and bank supervisors may be unable to close insolvent banks because the insurer would be unable to pay off insured depositors.
Download or read book How Deposit Insurance Affects Financial Depth written by Robert J. Cull and published by World Bank Publications. This book was released on 1998 with total page 36 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: January 1998 Whether the adoption of explicit deposit insurance strengthens financial markets or weakens them depends on the circumstances in which it is adopted. Adopting it to counteract instability appears to have little (or negative) effect. Adopting it when government credibility and institutional development are high appears to have a positive effect on financial depth. Should we expect deposit insurance to have a positive effect on development of the financial sector? All insurance pools individual risks: premiums are paid into a fund from which losses are met. In most circumstances, a residual claimant to the fund (typically a private insurance company) loses money when losses exceed premiums. Claimants that underprice risk tend to go bankrupt. With most deposit insurance, however, the residual claimant is a government agency with very different incentives. If the premiums paid by member banks cannot cover current fund expenditures, the taxpayer makes up the shortfall. Facing little threat of insolvency, there is less incentive for administrative agencies to price risk accurately. In the United States, researchers have found that the combination of increasing competition in banking services and underpriced deposit insurance led to riskier banking portfolios without commensurate increases in bank capital. Deposit insurance may facilitate risk-taking, with negative consequences for the health of the financial system. On the positive side, insurance may give depositors increased confidence in the formal financial sector-which may decrease the likelihood of bank runs and increase financial depth. Indeed, simple bivariate correlations between explicit insurance and financial depth are positive. But when one also controls for income and inflation, that relationship disappears-in fact, the partial correlation between changes in subsequent financial depth and the adoption of explicit insurance is negative (and quite pronounced). Counterintuitive though it may be, that stylized fact may be partially explained by the political and economic factors that motivated the decision to establish an explicit scheme. The circumstances surrounding decisions about deposit insurance are associated with different movements in subsequent financial depth. Adopting explicit deposit insurance to counteract instability in the financial sector does not appear to solve the problem. The typical reaction to that type of decision has been negative, at least with regard to financial depth in the three years after the program's inception. Adopting explicit deposit insurance when government credibility and institutional development were high appears to have had a positive effect on financial depth. This paper-a product of the Development Research Group- part of a larger effort in the group to study the design, implementation, and effects of deposit insurance programs.
Download or read book Deposit Insurance in Developing Countries written by Samuel H. Talley and published by . This book was released on 1990 with total page 132 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The pros and cons of deposit insurance systems-- and guidelines for their design.
Download or read book Deposit Insurance and Financial Development written by Robert J. Cull and published by World Bank Publications. This book was released on 2001 with total page 66 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Do deposit insurance programs contribute to financial developmen? Yes, but only if the regulatory environment is sound.
Download or read book Deposit Insurance Around the Globe written by Asli Demirgüç-Kunt and published by . This book was released on 2016 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Developing countries should first address weaknesses in their informational and supervisory environments before adopting explicit deposit insurance.Explicit deposit insurance has been spreading rapidly in recent years, even to countries not advanced in financial and institutional development. Economic theory indicates that deposit insurance design features interact - for good or ill - with country-specific elements of the financial and governmental contracting environment. Demirguc-Kunt and Kane document the extent of cross-country differences in deposit insurance design and review empirical evidence on how design features affect private market discipline, banking stability, financial development, and the effectiveness of crisis resolution. This evidence challenges the wisdom of encouraging countries to adopt explicit deposit insurance without first addressing weaknesses in their informational and supervisory environments.This paper - a product of Finance, Development Research Group - is part of a larger effort in the group to improve the design of deposit insurance systems. The authors may be contacted at [email protected] or [email protected].
Download or read book Deposit Insurance for Developing Countries written by Jeff Kelly and published by . This book was released on 2001 with total page 38 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Modis written by Ms.Edda Zoli and published by International Monetary Fund. This book was released on 2002-12-01 with total page 35 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper argues that an optimal deposit insurance scheme would allow the level of insurance coverage to be determined by the market. Based on this principle, the paper proposes an insurance scheme that minimizes distortions and embodies fairness and credibility, two essential characteristics of a viable and effective deposit insurance scheme. Using a simple model for the determination of the optimal level of insurance coverage, it is shown that the optimal coverage is higher for developing compared to developed countries; a condition that is broadly satisfied by prevailing deposit insurance practices around the world.
Download or read book Bank Runs and Deposit Insurance in Developing Countries written by Rasim Yilmaz and published by . This book was released on 2003 with total page 312 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Pricing of Deposit Insurance written by Luc Laeven and published by World Bank Publications. This book was released on 1983 with total page 76 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Safe and Sound Banking in Developing Countries written by Gerard Caprio and published by World Bank Publications. This book was released on 1997 with total page 34 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Does Deposit Insurance Increase Banking System Stability written by Asl? Demirgüç-Kunt and published by World Bank Publications. This book was released on 1999 with total page 42 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: "Explicit deposit insurance tends to be detrimental to bank stability-- the more so where bank interest rates are deregulated and the institutional environment is weak"--Cover.
Download or read book Challenges in Building Effective Deposit Insurance Systems in Developing Countries written by Jan Philipp Nolte and published by . This book was released on 2017 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The FIRST Lessons Learned Series is a collection of FIRST's technical and functional insights gained from FIRST funded engagements. This knowledge note shares valuable lessons from FIRST-funded DIS projects led by the Finance and Markets Global Practice at the World Bank. The paper addresses some of the most important lessons learned and some of the key challenges faced in building effective deposit insurance systems (DIS) in developing countries.
Download or read book Deposit Insurance written by United States. Government Accountability Office and published by World Bank Publications. This book was released on 1996 with total page 28 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Deposit Insurance System in Developing and Developed Countries written by Talie Said Kassamany and published by . This book was released on 2002 with total page 252 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
