Download or read book Competitive Insurance Markets Under Adverse Selection and Capacity Constraints written by Roman Inderst and published by . This book was released on 1999 with total page 36 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Optimality and Equilibrium In a Competitive Insurance Market Under Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard written by Joseph E. Stiglitz and published by . This book was released on 2013 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper analyzes optimal and equilibrium insurance contracts under adverse selection and moral hazard, comparing them with those under a single informational asymmetry. The complex interactions of self-selection and moral hazard constraints have important consequences. We develop an analytic approach that allows a characterization of equilibrium and optimal (Pareto Optimal (PO), and Utilitarian optimal (UO)) allocations. Among the results : (i) a PO allocation may involve "shirking" (not only less care in accident avoidance than is possible, but less care compared to the case of pure moral hazard) either by high risk individuals in the case of single-crossing preference or by one or both types in the case of multi-crossing preference (as may naturally be the case under the double informational asymmetry); and (ii) while an equilibrium, which is unique (even under multi-crossing preferences) if it exists, is more likely to exist as the non-shirking constraint for low-risk type gets more stringent (i.e. when low risk individuals shirk with lower levels of insurance). We also show that a pooling equilibrium, which is not feasible under pure adverse selection, may exist when individuals differ in risk aversion (as well as in accident probability) or when the provision of insurance is non-exclusive (i.e. individuals can purchase insurance from more than one firm). Furthermore, while with pure adverse selection, UO always entails pooling with complete insurance (in the standard model), with adverse selection and moral hazard, all PO allocations may entail separation and the UO may entail incomplete insurance. We show further that, in general, any PO allocation can be implemented by a basic pooling insurance provided by the government and a supplemental separating contracts that can be offered by the market, although, in the presence of moral hazard, a tax needs to be imposed upon the market provision. The analysis suggests that two commonly obser.
Download or read book Equilibrium in a Competitive Insurance Market Under Adverse Selection with Endogenous Information written by Joseph E. Stiglitz and published by . This book was released on 2017 with total page 67 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper investigates the existence and nature of equilibrium in a competitive insurance market under adverse selection with endogenously determined information structures. Rothschild-Stiglitz (RS) characterized the self-selection equilibrium under the assumption of exclusivity, enforcement of which required full information about contracts purchased. By contrast, the Akerlof price equilibrium described a situation where the insurance firm has no information about sales to a particular individual. We show that with more plausible information assumptions -- no insurance firm has full information but at least knows how much he has sold to any particular individual -- neither the RS quantity constrained equilibrium nor the Akerlof price equilibrium are sustainable. But when the information structure itself is endogenous -- firms and consumers decide what information about insurance purchases to reveal to whom -- there always exists a Nash equilibrium. Strategies for firms consist of insurance contracts to offer and information-revelation strategies; for customers -- buying as well as information revelation strategies. The equilibrium set of insurance contracts is unique: the low risk individual obtains insurance corresponding to the pooling contract most preferred by him; the high risk individual, that plus (undisclosed) supplemental insurance at his own actuarial odds resulting in his being fully insured. Equilibrium information revelation strategies of firms entail some but not complete information sharing. However, in equilibrium all individuals are induced to tell the truth. The paper shows how the analysis extends to cases where there are more than two groups of individuals and where firms can offer multiple insurance contracts.
Download or read book Competitive Failures in Insurance Markets written by and published by . This book was released on 2006 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Adverse Selection in Competitive Search Equilibrium written by Veronica Guerrieri and published by . This book was released on 2009 with total page 37 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We extend the concept of competitive search equilibrium to environments with private information, and in particular adverse selection. Principals (e.g. employers or agents who want to buy assets) post contracts, which we model as revelation mechanisms. Agents (e.g. workers, or asset holders) have private information about the potential gains from trade. Agents observe the posted contracts and decide where to apply, trading off the contracts' terms of trade against the probability of matching, which depends in general on the principals' capacity constraints and market search frictions. We characterize equilibrium as the solution to a constrained optimization problem, and prove that principals offer separating contracts to attract different types of agents. We then present a series of applications, including models of signaling, insurance, and lemons. These illustrate the usefulness and generality of the approach, and serve to contrast our findings with standard results in both the contract and search literatures.
Download or read book Time Risk Precommitment Adverse Selection in Competitive Insurance Markets written by and published by . This book was released on 2003 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Time Risk Precommitment and Adverse Selection in Competitive Insurance Markets written by Mark V. Pauly and published by . This book was released on 2003 with total page 21 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This informal paper explores models of competitve insurance market equilibrium when individuals of initially similar apparent risk experience divergence in risk levels over time. The information structrue is modeled in three alternative ways: all insurers and insureds know risk at any point in time, current insurer and insured know risk, and only the individual knows risk. Insurers always know the average risk. It is shown that some models lead to "backloading" of premiums in which initial period expected expense, and that other models lead to "frontloading" of premiums and policy provisions of "guaranteed renewability." Finally, it is shown that guaranteed renewability greatly reduces the possibility of adverse selection.
Download or read book Competitive Insurance Markets and Adverse Selection in the Lab written by Dorra Riahi and published by . This book was released on 2010 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Time Riks Precommitment and Adverse Selection in Competitive Insurance Markets written by and published by . This book was released on 2003 with total page 21 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Handbook of Insurance written by Georges Dionne and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2013-12-02 with total page 1133 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This new edition of the Handbook of Insurance reviews the last forty years of research developments in insurance and its related fields. A single reference source for professors, researchers, graduate students, regulators, consultants and practitioners, the book starts with the history and foundations of risk and insurance theory, followed by a review of prevention and precaution, asymmetric information, risk management, insurance pricing, new financial innovations, reinsurance, corporate governance, capital allocation, securitization, systemic risk, insurance regulation, the industrial organization of insurance markets and other insurance market applications. It ends with health insurance, longevity risk, long-term care insurance, life insurance financial products and social insurance. This second version of the Handbook contains 15 new chapters. Each of the 37 chapters has been written by leading authorities in risk and insurance research, all contributions have been peer reviewed, and each chapter can be read independently of the others.
Download or read book Selected Works of Joseph E Stiglitz written by Joseph E. Stiglitz and published by Oxford University Press. This book was released on 2009 with total page 767 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The first in a series of six volumes containing a selection of Joseph Stiglitz's most important and widely cited work, this volume includes a number of seminal papers on the economics of information. The volume contains substantial additional original commentary by Joseph Stiglitz on his work and the field more generally.
Download or read book The Microeconomics of Insurance written by Ray Rees and published by Now Publishers Inc. This book was released on 2008 with total page 178 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In this relatively short survey, we present the core elements of the microeconomic analysis of insurance markets at a level suitable for senior undergraduate and graduate economics students. The aim of this analysis is to understand how insurance markets work, what their fundamental economic functions are, and how efficiently they may be expected to carry these out.
Download or read book Employment and Health Benefits written by Institute of Medicine and published by National Academies Press. This book was released on 1993-02-01 with total page 381 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The United States is unique among economically advanced nations in its reliance on employers to provide health benefits voluntarily for workers and their families. Although it is well known that this system fails to reach millions of these individuals as well as others who have no connection to the work place, the system has other weaknesses. It also has many advantages. Because most proposals for health care reform assume some continued role for employers, this book makes an important contribution by describing the strength and limitations of the current system of employment-based health benefits. It provides the data and analysis needed to understand the historical, social, and economic dynamics that have shaped present-day arrangements and outlines what might be done to overcome some of the access, value, and equity problems associated with current employer, insurer, and government policies and practices. Health insurance terminology is often perplexing, and this volume defines essential concepts clearly and carefully. Using an array of primary sources, it provides a store of information on who is covered for what services at what costs, on how programs vary by employer size and industry, and on what governments doâ€"and do not doâ€"to oversee employment-based health programs. A case study adapted from real organizations' experiences illustrates some of the practical challenges in designing, managing, and revising benefit programs. The sometimes unintended and unwanted consequences of employer practices for workers and health care providers are explored. Understanding the concepts of risk, biased risk selection, and risk segmentation is fundamental to sound health care reform. This volume thoroughly examines these key concepts and how they complicate efforts to achieve efficiency and equity in health coverage and health care. With health care reform at the forefront of public attention, this volume will be important to policymakers and regulators, employee benefit managers and other executives, trade associations, and decisionmakers in the health insurance industry, as well as analysts, researchers, and students of health policy.
Download or read book Intermediate Microeconomics written by Patrick M. Emerson and published by . This book was released on 2019 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Ibss Economics 2001 written by Compiled by the British Library of Political and Economic Science and published by Psychology Press. This book was released on 2002-12 with total page 708 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: IBSS is the essential tool for librarians, university departments, research institutions and any public or private institution whose work requires access to up-to-date and comprehensive knowledge of the social sciences.
Download or read book Market Structure of the Health Insurance Industry written by D. Andrew Austin and published by DIANE Publishing. This book was released on 2010-04 with total page 65 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Moral Hazard in Health Insurance written by Amy Finkelstein and published by Columbia University Press. This book was released on 2014-12-02 with total page 161 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Addressing the challenge of covering heath care expenses—while minimizing economic risks. Moral hazard—the tendency to change behavior when the cost of that behavior will be borne by others—is a particularly tricky question when considering health care. Kenneth J. Arrow’s seminal 1963 paper on this topic (included in this volume) was one of the first to explore the implication of moral hazard for health care, and Amy Finkelstein—recognized as one of the world’s foremost experts on the topic—here examines this issue in the context of contemporary American health care policy. Drawing on research from both the original RAND Health Insurance Experiment and her own research, including a 2008 Health Insurance Experiment in Oregon, Finkelstein presents compelling evidence that health insurance does indeed affect medical spending and encourages policy solutions that acknowledge and account for this. The volume also features commentaries and insights from other renowned economists, including an introduction by Joseph P. Newhouse that provides context for the discussion, a commentary from Jonathan Gruber that considers provider-side moral hazard, and reflections from Joseph E. Stiglitz and Kenneth J. Arrow. “Reads like a fireside chat among a group of distinguished, articulate health economists.” —Choice
