Download or read book Bidding Behavior at Competing Auctions written by Sajid Anwar and published by . This book was released on 2005 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The existing auction literature treats on-line auctions as running independently of one another with each bidder choosing to participate in only one auction. In fact, in the case of on-line auctions, many substitutable goods are auctioned concurrently and bidders can bid at several auctions at the same time. Recent theoretical research by Peters and Severinov (2001) is highly relevant to the study of bidding behavior in on-line auctions, showing that bidders can gain from the existence of competing auctions. In the light of this work, this paper attempts to provide an empirical assessment of the competing auctions theory. The evidence presented in this paper indicates that a significant proportion of bidders bid across competing auctions and that bidders tend to submit bids at auctions with the lowest standing bid. The paper also shows that winning bidders who bid across competing auctions pay lower prices than winning bidders who do not cross-bid. These findings jointly amount to the first evidence lending empirical support to competing auctions theory.
Download or read book Adaptive Bidding in Single Sided Auctions under Uncertainty written by Clemens van Dinther and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2007-01-10 with total page 245 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This is one of the first books on the use of software agents to simulate bidding behavior in electronic auctions. It introduces market theory and computational economics together, and gives an overview on the most common and up-to-date agent-based simulation methods. The book will help the reader learn more about simulations in economics in general and common agent-based methods and tools in particular.
Download or read book Networks Crowds and Markets written by David Easley and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2010-07-19 with total page 745 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Are all film stars linked to Kevin Bacon? Why do the stock markets rise and fall sharply on the strength of a vague rumour? How does gossip spread so quickly? Are we all related through six degrees of separation? There is a growing awareness of the complex networks that pervade modern society. We see them in the rapid growth of the internet, the ease of global communication, the swift spread of news and information, and in the way epidemics and financial crises develop with startling speed and intensity. This introductory book on the new science of networks takes an interdisciplinary approach, using economics, sociology, computing, information science and applied mathematics to address fundamental questions about the links that connect us, and the ways that our decisions can have consequences for others.
Download or read book The Competitive Pricing Response in Sealed bid Auction Markets written by James L. Smith (professor of economics.) and published by . This book was released on 1978 with total page 56 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Putting Auction Theory to Work written by Paul Milgrom and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2004-01-12 with total page 378 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book provides a comprehensive introduction to modern auction theory and its important new applications. It is written by a leading economic theorist whose suggestions guided the creation of the new spectrum auction designs. Aimed at graduate students and professionals in economics, the book gives the most up-to-date treatments of both traditional theories of 'optimal auctions' and newer theories of multi-unit auctions and package auctions, and shows by example how these theories are used. The analysis explores the limitations of prominent older designs, such as the Vickrey auction design, and evaluates the practical responses to those limitations. It explores the tension between the traditional theory of auctions with a fixed set of bidders, in which the seller seeks to squeeze as much revenue as possible from the fixed set, and the theory of auctions with endogenous entry, in which bidder profits must be respected to encourage participation.
Download or read book Bidding Frenzy written by Gerald Häubl and published by . This book was released on 2018 with total page 55 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This research examines how the intensity of the dynamic competitive interaction with other bidders in ascending auctions influences consumers' willingness to pay for auctioned products. It focuses on one important aspect of this interaction - the speed of competitor reaction. The key hypothesis is that having one's own bids reciprocated by competing bidders more quickly increases one's WTP in an auction. Evidence from five experiments demonstrates this effect and pinpoints the essential aspects of the psychological mechanism that underlies it. In particular, the effect of speed of competitor reaction on bidding behavior (1) is serially mediated by the perception that the auction is more intensely competitive and by a greater desire to win, (2) is distinct from the effects of time pressure and of the auction's duration or overall rate of progression, (3) is not driven by inferences about the auctioned product's market value, (4) is not qualified by the number of competing bidders nor due to any inferences about the latter, and (5) hinges on direct competitive interaction with other human bidders.
Download or read book Auction Theory written by Vijay Krishna and published by Academic Press. This book was released on 2009-09-28 with total page 337 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Auction Theory, Second Edition improves upon his 2002 bestseller with a new chapter on package and position auctions as well as end-of-chapter questions and chapter notes. Complete proofs and new material about collusion complement Krishna’s ability to reveal the basic facts of each theory in a style that is clear, concise, and easy to follow. With the addition of a solutions manual and other teaching aids, the 2e continues to serve as the doorway to relevant theory for most students doing empirical work on auctions. Focuses on key auction types and serves as the doorway to relevant theory for those doing empirical work on auctions New chapter on combinatorial auctions and new analyses of theory-informed applications New chapter-ending exercises and problems of varying difficulties support and reinforce key points
Download or read book Snipers Shills and Sharks written by Ken Steiglitz and published by Princeton University Press. This book was released on 2021-08-10 with total page 300 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Every day on eBay, millions of people buy and sell a vast array of goods, from rare collectibles and antiques to used cars and celebrity memorabilia. The internet auction site is remarkably easy to use, which accounts in part for its huge popularity. But how does eBay really work, and how does it compare to other kinds of auctions? These are questions that led Ken Steiglitz--computer scientist, collector of ancient coins, and a regular eBay user--to examine the site through the revealing lens of auction theory. The result is this book, in which Steiglitz shows us how human behaviors in open markets like eBay can be substantially more complex than those predicted by standard economic theory. In these pages we meet the sniper who outbids you in an auction's closing seconds, the early bidder who treats eBay as if it were an old-fashioned outcry auction, the shill who bids in league with the seller to artificially inflate the price--and other characters as well. Steiglitz guides readers through the fascinating history of auctions, how they functioned in the past and how they work today in online venues like eBay. Drawing on cutting-edge economics as well as his own stories from eBay, he reveals practical auction strategies and introduces readers to the fundamentals of auction theory and the mathematics behind eBay. Complete with exercises and a detailed appendix, this book is a must for sophisticated users of online auctions, and essential reading for students seeking an accessible introduction to the study of auction theory.
Download or read book Internet Auctions written by Ernan Haruvy and published by Now Publishers Inc. This book was released on 2010 with total page 87 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Internet Auctions reviews recent empirical and theoretical works on internet auctions with a focus on internet auction design, formats, and features that are currently debated in the marketing literature.
Download or read book Bidding Behavior in Housing Auctions written by André Kallåk Anundsen and published by . This book was released on 2023 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Using data on more than one million bids from almost 200,000 housing transactions, we examine behavioral patterns uncovered in bidding logs. Norwegian housing transactions are arranged as ascending-bid auctions and bids are made on digital platforms. We use data from these auctions to study individual bidders both within and across auctions with temporal resolution measured in hours and minutes. In this purely empirical study, we focus our attention on how auction outcomes are affected by the degree of competition within the auction. Relative to one-by-one negotiations, we find that auctions with many bidders are associated with shorter bid-expiration deadlines, shorter intervals between subsequent bids, a lower opening bid, smaller bid increments, a reduction in time-one-market, and a higher sell-ask spread. We also find that individual bidders have a higher spread between their first and last bid in auctions with more competition. Finally, we follow repeat-bidders across auctions, and find that bidders tend to increase their maximum bid when they have been unsuccessful in previous auctions.
Download or read book Auction Format Matters written by Mr.Robert Alan Feldman and published by International Monetary Fund. This book was released on 1995-05 with total page 34 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper evaluates the importance of auction format on bidding behavior and seller revenue, focusing on differences in performance under uniform-price and discriminatory-price formats. The analysis is based on a standard benchmark model from which empirically-testable hypotheses are derived on the optimal amount of bid shading that generates revenue equivalence between the two formats. Applying this model to data from the IMF gold auctions run in 1976-80, we find evidence of statistically significant shading in excess of the theoretically-derived optimum under the discriminatory format. This evidence suggests greater seller revenue under the uniform-price format.
Download or read book Does the Absence of Human Sellers Bias Bidding Behavior in Auction Experiments written by Björn Bartling and published by . This book was released on 2017 with total page 19 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper studies the impact of human subjects in the role of a seller on bidding in experimental second-price auctions. Overbidding is a robust finding in second-price auctions, and spite among bidders has been advanced as an explanation. If spite extends to the seller, then the absence of human sellers who receive the auction revenue may bias upwards the bidding behavior in existing experimental auctions. We derive the equilibrium bidding function in a model where bidders have preferences regarding both the payoffs of other bidders and the seller's revenue. Overbidding is optimal when buyers are spiteful only towards other buyers. However, optimal bids are lower and potentially even truthful when spite extends to the seller. We experimentally test the model predictions by exogenously varying the presence of human subjects in the roles of the seller and competing bidders. We do not detect a systematic effect of the presence of a human seller on overbidding. We conclude that overbidding is not an artefact of the standard experimental implementation of second-price auctions in which human sellers are absent.
Download or read book Rings in Auctions written by Angelo Artale and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2012-12-06 with total page 176 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In auctions, bidders compete with one another in their attempt to 1 purchase the goods that are up for sale • But buyer competition may be reduced or disappear when a ring of colluding bidders is present. The purpose of the participants to a ring is to eliminate buyer competition and to realize a gain over vendors. When all participants are members of the ring, this is done by purchasing the item at the reserve price and splitting the spoils (the difference between the item market value and the reserve price) among the participants. "The term ring apparently derives from the fact that in a settlement sale following the auction, members of the collusive arrangement form a circle or ring to facilitate observation of their trading behavior by the ring leader" (Cassady jr. (1967)). If the coalition members knew other players' values, the problem faced by the ring might be easily solved: the player with the highest value should submit a serious bid and the other members, on the contrary, only phony bids. However, ring participants do not usually know the values of other members. Therefore, ring members have to find out some mechanism which selects the player who has to bid seriously and, eventually, esta blish side payments paid to each of the losers2.
Download or read book The Effect of Leverage on Bidding Behavior written by Matthew J. Clayton and published by . This book was released on 2008 with total page 35 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper investigates how firms bidding behavior in various auctions is affected by capital structure. A theoretical model is developed where the first price sealed bid and the English auction are examined. We find as debt levels increase, firms tend to decrease their bids. The lower bids give the competition incentives to decrease their bid as well. These results are then investigated empirically using the recent FCC spectrum auctions. Consistent with the theoretical model, larger debt levels of the bidding firm and the competition tend to lead to lower bids. Additional determinants of bidding behavior in these auctions are also analyzed.
Download or read book Common Value Auctions and the Winner s Curse written by John H. Kagel and published by Princeton University Press. This book was released on 2009-04-11 with total page 424 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: An invaluable account of how auctions work—and how to make them work Few forms of market exchange intrigue economists as do auctions, whose theoretical and practical implications are enormous. John Kagel and Dan Levin, complementing their own distinguished research with papers written with other specialists, provide a new focus on common value auctions and the "winner's curse." In such auctions the value of each item is about the same to all bidders, but different bidders have different information about the underlying value. Virtually all auctions have a common value element; among the burgeoning modern-day examples are those organized by Internet companies such as eBay. Winners end up cursing when they realize that they won because their estimates were overly optimistic, which led them to bid too much and lose money as a result. The authors first unveil a fresh survey of experimental data on the winner's curse. Melding theory with the econometric analysis of field data, they assess the design of government auctions, such as the spectrum rights (air wave) auctions that continue to be conducted around the world. The remaining chapters gauge the impact on sellers' revenue of the type of auction used and of inside information, show how bidders learn to avoid the winner's curse, and present comparisons of sophisticated bidders with college sophomores, the usual guinea pigs used in laboratory experiments. Appendixes refine theoretical arguments and, in some cases, present entirely new data. This book is an invaluable, impeccably up-to-date resource on how auctions work--and how to make them work.
Download or read book A Primer on Auction Design Management and Strategy written by David J. Salant and published by MIT Press. This book was released on 2014-12-26 with total page 199 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A guide to modeling and analyzing auctions, with the applications of game theory and auction theory to real-world auction decision making. Auctions are highly structured market transactions primarily used in thin markets (markets with few participants and infrequent transactions). In auctions, unlike most other markets, offers and counteroffers are typically made within a structure defined by a set of rigid and comprehensive rules. Because auctions are essentially complex negotiations that occur within a fully defined and rigid set of rules, they can be analyzed by game theoretic models more accurately and completely than can most other types of market transactions. This book offers a guide for modeling, analyzing, and predicting the outcomes of auctions, focusing on the application of game theory and auction theory to real-world auction design and decision making. After a brief introduction to fundamental concepts from game theory, the book explains some of the more significant results from the auction theory literature, including the revenue (or payoff) equivalence theorem, the winner's curse, and optimal auction design. Chapters on auction practice follow, addressing collusion, competition, information disclosure, and other basic principles of auction management, with some discussion of auction experiments and simulations. Finally, the book covers auction experience, with most of the discussion centered on energy and telecommunications auctions, which have become the proving ground for many new auction designs. A clear and concise introduction to auctions, auction design, and auction strategy, this Primer will be an essential resource for students, researchers, and practitioners.
Download or read book Bidding Playing Or Competing written by Yim Tonia Chu and published by . This book was released on 2000 with total page 110 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
