Download or read book Bank Regulation CEO Compensation and Boards written by Julian Kolm and published by . This book was released on 2016 with total page 54 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We analyze the limits of regulating bank CEO compensation to reduce risk shifting in the presence of an active board that retains the right to approve new investment strategies. Compensation regulation prevents overinvestment in strategies that increase risk, but it is ineffective in preventing underinvestment in strategies that reduce risk. The regulator optimally combines compensation and capital regulations. In contrast, if the board delegates the choice of strategy to the CEO, compensation regulation is sufficient to prevent both types of risk shifting. Compensation regulation increases shareholders' incentives to implement an active board, which reduces the effectiveness of compensation regulation.
Download or read book Bank Regulation CEO Compensation and Boards written by Julian Kolm and published by . This book was released on 2016 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Executive Compensation and Business Policy Choices at U S Commercial Banks written by Robert DeYoung and published by DIANE Publishing. This book was released on 2010-08 with total page 57 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This study examines whether and how the terms of CEO compensation contracts at large commercial banks between 1994 and 2006 influenced, or were influenced by, the risky business policy decisions made by these firms. The authors find strong evidence that bank CEOs responded to contractual risk-taking incentives by taking more risk; bank boards altered CEO compensation to encourage executives to exploit new growth opportunities; and bank boards set CEO incentives in a manner designed to moderate excessive risk-taking. These relationships are strongest during the second half of the author¿s sample, after deregulation and technological change had expanded banks' capacities for risk-taking. Charts and tables.
Download or read book Regulating Bank CEO Compensation and Active Boards written by Julian Kolm and published by . This book was released on 2016 with total page 55 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We analyze the role of using CEO compensation and capital requirements in bank regulation. With a passive uninformed board that delegates the choice of bank strategy to the CEO, requiring a compensation contract where the CEO receives a fixed fraction of total bank payoff eliminates the risk shifting problem and can implement first best; no additional regulatory limit on bank leverage is needed. With an informed, active board that represents shareholder interests, however, there exists no CEO compensation that assures that the socially optimal level of risk is chosen. The optimal policy mix consists of deferred compensation for the CEO, a bonus cap or a compensation that is linear in total payoff, and a constraint on bank leverage. Regulating CEO compensation allows to relax regulatory capital requirements.
Download or read book Executive Compensation and Business Policy Choices at U S Commercial Banks written by Robert DeYoung and published by . This book was released on 2015 with total page 55 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This study examines whether and how the terms of CEO compensation contracts at large commercial banks between 1994 and 2006 influenced, or were influenced by, the risky business policy decisions made by these firms. We find strong evidence that bank CEOs responded to contractual risktaking incentives by taking more risk; systematic evidence that bank boards altered CEO compensation to encourage executives to exploit new growth opportunities; and more limited evidence that bank boards set CEO incentives in a manner designed to moderate excessive risk-taking. These relationships are strongest during the second half of our sample, after deregulation and technological change had expanded banks' capacities for risk-taking, and for the largest banking companies, which are better strategically positioned to exploit these opportunities.
Download or read book Compensation Structure and Systemic Risk written by United States. Congress. House. Committee on Financial Services and published by . This book was released on 2009 with total page 216 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Executive Pay and Performance written by R. Glenn Hubbard and published by . This book was released on 1994 with total page 44 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper examines an effect of deregulating the market for corporate control on CEO compensation in the banking industry. Given that each state's banking regulation defines the competitiveness of its corporate control market, we examine the effect of a state's interstate banking regulation on the level and structure of bank CEO compensation. Using panel data on 147 banks over the decade of the 1980s, we find evidence supporting the hypothesis that competitive corporate control markets (i.e., where interstate banking is permitted) require talented managers whose levels of compensation are higher. We also find that the compensation-performance relationship is stronger than for managers in markets where interstate banking is not permitted. Further, CEO turnover increases substantially after deregulation, as does the proportion in performance-related compensation. These results suggest strong evidence of a managerial talent market -- that is, one which matches the level and structure of compensation with the competitiveness of the banking environment.
Download or read book The Influence of the Board of Directors on the Executive Compensation in the Banking Industry written by Nesrine Ayadi and published by . This book was released on 2013 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The objective of this study is to examine the effect of the attributes of the board of directors on the compensation of the CEO of thirty European commercial banks. This research uses a technique of static panel data over the period 2004-2009. The study was conducted on a sample of thirty banks in four European countries. The results of our study suggest that the relationship between the size of the Board and the CEO's compensation is positive and statistically significant. Similarly, our results show that the presence of a proportion of independent directors in the Board improves the compensation of the CEO. They also indicate that improving the compensation of the CEO is also due to his power in the Board since he is its chairman. This study shows that the Board of directors acts as the primary mechanism of internal control designed to align the shareholders and managers' conflicting interests. However, the Board has an important role in defining the executives' compensation; therefore, its power depends on the members that compose it. This study also indicates that the independence quality of the board's members affects the compensation policy to improve the CEO's compensation depending on the banking performance. Moreover, this study suggests that the banking performance is related to the CEO's compensation through the attributes of the board. It therefore gives an overview of the impact of a complementary relationship between the board mechanism and that of the CEO's compensation. This study provides an overview on the complementary between the mechanism of the board and the CEO's compensation.
Download or read book The Compensation Committee Handbook written by James F. Reda and published by John Wiley & Sons. This book was released on 2008-03-21 with total page 561 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: NEW AND UPDATED INFORMATION ON THE LAWS AND REGULATIONS AFFECTING EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION Now in a thoroughly updated Third Edition, Compensation Committee Handbook provides a comprehensive review of the complex issues facing compensation committees in the wake of Sarbanes-Oxley. This new and updated edition addresses a full range of functional issues facing compensation committees, including organizing, planning, and best practices tips. As the responsibilities of the compensation committee continue to increase, the need for practical and comprehensive material has become even more imperative. Complete with compliance advice on the latest rules and regulations that have developed since the publication of the last edition, Compensation Committee Handbook, Third Edition provides the most up-to-date and reliable information on: * The latest regulations impacting executive compensation, including new regulations issued by the SEC, recently revised GAAP accounting rules, and the just-finalized IRS regulations impacting the taxation of stock options * The roles and responsibilities of the compensation committee, including best practice tips and techniques * Selecting and training compensation committee members * How to make compensation committees a performance driver for a company * Practical applications, including incentive compensation and equity-based compensation Compensation Committee Handbook, Third Edition will help all compensation committee members and interested professionals succeed in melding highly complex technical information and concepts with both corporate governance principles and sound business judgment.
Download or read book Regulation Subordinated Debt and Incentive Features of CEO Compensation in the Banking Industry written by Kose John and published by . This book was released on 2007 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We study CEO compensation in the banking industry by considering banks' unique claim structure in the presence of two types of agency problems: the standard managerial agency problem and the risk-shifting problem between shareholders and debt holders. We empirically test two hypotheses derived from this framework: that the pay-for-performance sensitivity of bank CEO compensation (1) decreases with the total leverage ratio and (2) increases with the intensity of monitoring provided by regulators and non-depository (subordinated) debt holders. We construct an index of the intensity of outsider monitoring based on four variables: the subordinated debt ratio, subordinated debt rating, nonperforming loan ratio, and BOPEC rating (regulators' assessment of a bank's overall health and financial condition). We find supporting evidence for both hypotheses. Our results hold after controlling for the endogeneity among compensation, leverage, and monitoring; they are robust to various regression specifications and sample criteria.
Download or read book Bank CEOs written by Claudia Curi and published by Springer. This book was released on 2018-05-22 with total page 61 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book thoroughly explores the characteristics and importance of bank CEOs against the backdrop of growing awareness of the social implications of CEO behavior for the performance and stability of the financial and economic system. After an introductory section on the relevance of CEOs in the banking industry, the connections between the bank CEO labor market, contractual incentives, and compensation structures are examined. The focus then turns to empirical findings concerning the impact that bank CEO compensation has on various firm-level outcomes, such as bank performance and strategies. In addition, the relation between CEO turnover and changes in compensation policies since the financial crisis is discussed. A concluding section presents some fresh empirical evidence deriving from an up-to-date database of traits of CEOs operating in the largest European banks. For PhD students and academics, the surveys offer detailed roadmaps on the empirical research landscape and provide suggestions for future work. The writing style ensures that the content will be readily accessible to all industry practitioners.
Download or read book Handbook on Corporate Governance in Financial Institutions written by Christine A. Mallin and published by Edward Elgar Publishing. This book was released on 2016-05-27 with total page 295 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The global financial crisis has led to more and more focus on corporate governance and financial institutions. There has been much coverage in the media about various corporate governance related issues in banks and other financial institutions, such as executive directors' remuneration and bankers' bonuses, board composition and board diversity. This book, dedicated to the corporate governance of banks and other financial institutions, makes a timely and accessible contribution to the literature in this area. The contributors are experts in their field with in-depth knowledge of the various countries including Italy, the UK, Germany, the US, China, Japan, Brazil, Russia, Australia and Nigeria, plus a chapter on Islamic financial institutions, covered in this book. Overall, the engagingly written chapters highlight many of the shortcomings of corporate governance which have led to financial scandals, whilst indicating areas where corporate governance can be strengthened and improved. Adding depth and accessibility to existing corporate governance books, this Handbook is ideal as a teaching and learning tool for undergraduate and postgraduate students. For directors and the general business and wider stakeholder communities concerned with corporate governance, it is an essential resource. Contributors:C.L. Ahmadjian, K.-J. Chang, M.J. Conyon, F. Cuomo, H. Farag, L. He, H.-Y Liang, I. Love, C.A. Mallin, C. Ogbechie, B. Okhunjanov, G. Pearson, S. Prigge, R.F. Schiozer, O.K. Tam, P.R.S. Terra, A. Zattoni
Download or read book Basel III and CEO Compensation in Banks Pay Structures as a Regulatory Signal written by Christian Eufinger and published by . This book was released on 2013 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper proposes a new regulatory approach that implements capital requirements contingent on managerial compensation. We argue that excessive risk taking in the financial sector originates from the shareholder moral hazard created by government guarantees rather than from corporate governance failures within banks. The idea of the proposed regulation is to utilize the compensation scheme to drive a wedge between the interests of top management and shareholders to counteract shareholder risk-shifting incentives. The decisive advantage of this approach compared to existing regulation is that the regulator does not need to be able to properly measure the bank investment risk, which has been shown to be a difficult task during the 2008-2009 financial crisis.
Download or read book Pay Without Performance written by Lucian A. Bebchuk and published by Harvard University Press. This book was released on 2004 with total page 308 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The company is under-performing, its share price is trailing, and the CEO gets...a multi-million-dollar raise. This story is familiar, for good reason: as this book clearly demonstrates, structural flaws in corporate governance have produced widespread distortions in executive pay. Pay without Performance presents a disconcerting portrait of managers' influence over their own pay--and of a governance system that must fundamentally change if firms are to be managed in the interest of shareholders. Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried demonstrate that corporate boards have persistently failed to negotiate at arm's length with the executives they are meant to oversee. They give a richly detailed account of how pay practices--from option plans to retirement benefits--have decoupled compensation from performance and have camouflaged both the amount and performance-insensitivity of pay. Executives' unwonted influence over their compensation has hurt shareholders by increasing pay levels and, even more importantly, by leading to practices that dilute and distort managers' incentives. This book identifies basic problems with our current reliance on boards as guardians of shareholder interests. And the solution, the authors argue, is not merely to make these boards more independent of executives as recent reforms attempt to do. Rather, boards should also be made more dependent on shareholders by eliminating the arrangements that entrench directors and insulate them from their shareholders. A powerful critique of executive compensation and corporate governance, Pay without Performance points the way to restoring corporate integrity and improving corporate performance.
Download or read book Compensation Committee Handbook written by James F. Reda and published by John Wiley & Sons. This book was released on 2004-10-27 with total page 481 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This Second Edition provides a comprehensive review of the issues facing compensation committees and covers functional issues such as organising, planning, and best practice tips. Compliance advice on the implications of Sarbanes-Oxley and other regulations is addressed along with new requirements on disclosures of financial transactions involving management and principal stockholders.
Download or read book Risk Shifting and the Regulation of Bank CEOs Compensation written by Pierre Chaigneau and published by . This book was released on 2016 with total page 30 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper analyzes the effects of two regulatory mechanisms, namely a regulation of the structure of bank CEOs incentive pay and sanctions for the CEOs of failed banks, on bank risk shifting. We extend a standard model of CEO compensation by incorporating leverage and an investment decision. To the extent that bank depositors and creditors are even partially protected by public guarantees, we show that it is in the interests of bank shareholders to choose more risky investments than would be socially optimal, and therefore to design a CEO contract with excessive risk taking incentives. Thus, we argue that current corporate governance arrangements in the banking sector are not efficient. In this setting, we show that putting in place one of the aforementioned mechanisms could yield the socially optimal outcome at no cost. We also identify some limitations and potential perverse effects of these mechanisms.
Download or read book Economic Policy Review written by and published by . This book was released on 2003 with total page 160 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
