Download or read book Analysts Conflict of Interest and Biases in Earnings Forecasts written by Louis Kuo Chi Chan and published by . This book was released on 2003 with total page 34 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Analysts' earnings forecasts are influenced by their desire to win investment banking clients. We hypothesize that the equity bull market of the 1990s, along with the boom in investment banking business, exacerbated analysts' conflict of interest and their incentives to adjust strategically forecasts to avoid earnings disappointments. We document shifts in the distribution of earnings surprises, the market's response to surprises and forecast revisions, and in the predictability of non-negative surprises. Further confirmation is based on subsamples where conflicts of interest are more pronounced, including growth stocks and stocks with consecutive non-negative surprises; however shifts are less notable in international markets
Download or read book Analysts Conflict of Interest and Biases in Earnings Forecasts written by Louis K.C. Chan and published by . This book was released on 2010 with total page 48 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Analysts' earnings forecasts are influenced by their desire to win investment banking clients. We hypothesize that the equity bull market of the 1990s, along with the boom in investment banking business, exacerbated analysts' conflict of interest and their incentives to adjust strategically forecasts to avoid earnings disappointments. We document shifts in the distribution of earnings surprises, the market's response to surprises and forecast revisions, and in the predictability of non-negative surprises. Further confirmation is based on subsamples where conflicts of interest are more pronounced, including growth stocks and stocks with consecutive non-negative surprises; however shifts are less notable in international markets.
Download or read book Analysts Conflict of Interest and Biases in Earnings Forecast written by Louis K.C. Chan and published by . This book was released on 2003 with total page 34 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Conflict of Interest Reforms and Investment Bank Analysts Research Biases written by Yuyan Guan and published by . This book was released on 2016 with total page 49 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This study examines the consequences of the series of reforms targeting investment-banking-related conflicts of interest. We compare and contrast optimism biases in analysts' stock recommendations and earnings forecasts across different types of analyst firms in the post-reform period 2004-2007 versus the pre-reform period 1998-2001. We document a significant reduction in the relative optimism of sanctioned investment bank analysts' stock recommendations, but not their earnings forecasts. Moreover, we find little change in the profitability of their stock recommendations, but detect a drop in the accuracy of earnings forecasts made by investment bank analysts. In sum, the reforms achieve the objective of mitigating the apparent optimism in investment bank stock recommendations, but they do not provide benefit to investors in terms of more profitable recommendations or more accurate earnings forecasts.
Download or read book Managerial Behavior and the Bias in Analysts Earnings Forecasts written by Lawrence D. Brown and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Managerial behavior differs considerably when managers report quarterly profits versus losses. When they report profits, managers seek to just meet or slightly beat analyst estimates. When they report losses, managers do not attempt to meet or slightly beat analyst estimates. Instead, managers often do not forewarn analysts of impending losses, and the analyst's signed error is likely to be negative and extreme (i.e., a measured optimistic bias). Brown (1997 Financial Analysts Journal) shows that the optimistic bias in analyst earnings forecasts has been mitigated over time, and that it is less pronounced for larger firms and firms followed by many analysts. In the present study, I offer three explanations for these temporal and cross-sectional phenomena. First, the frequency of profits versus losses may differ temporally and/or cross-sectionally. Since an optimistic bias in analyst forecasts is less likely to occur when firms report profits, an optimistic bias is less likely to be observed in samples possessing a relatively greater frequency of profits. Second, the tendency to report profits that just meet or slightly beat analyst estimates may differ temporally and/or cross-sectionally. A greater tendency to 'manage profits' (and analyst estimates) in this manner reduces the measured optimistic bias in analyst forecasts. Third, the tendency to forewarn analysts of impending losses may differ temporally and/or cross-sectionally. A greater tendency to 'manage losses' in this manner also reduces the measured optimistic bias in analyst forecasts. I provide the following temporal evidence. The optimistic bias in analyst forecasts pertains to both the entire sample and the losses sub-sample. In contrast, a pessimistic bias exists for the 85.3% of the sample that consists of reported profits. The temporal decrease in the optimistic bias documented by Brown (1997) pertains to both losses and profits. Analysts have gotten better at predicting the sign of a loss (i.e., they are much more likely to predict that a loss will occur than they used to), and they have reduced the number of extreme negative errors they make by two-thirds. Managers are much more likely to report profits that exactly meet or slightly beat analyst estimates than they used to. In contrast, they are less likely to report profits that fall a little short of analyst estimates than they used to. I conclude that the temporal reduction in optimistic bias is attributable to an increased tendency to manage both profits and losses. I find no evidence that there exists a temporal change in the profits-losses mix (using the I/B/E/S definition of reported quarterly profits and losses). I document the following cross-sectional evidence. The principle reason that larger firms have relatively less optimistic bias is that they are far less likely to report losses. A secondary reason that larger firms have relatively less optimistic bias is that their managers are relatively more likely to report profits that slightly beat analyst estimates. The principle reason that firms followed by more analysts have relatively less optimistic bias is that they are far less likely to report losses. A secondary reason that firms followed by more analysts have relatively less optimistic bias is that their managers are relatively more likely to report profits that exactly meet analyst estimates or beat them by one penny. I find no evidence that managers of larger firms or firms followed by more analysts are relatively more likely to forewarn analysts of impending losses. I conclude that cross-sectional differences in bias arise primarily from differential 'loss frequencies,' and secondarily from differential 'profits management.' The paper discusses implications of the results for studies of analysts forecast bias, earnings management, and capital markets. It concludes with caveats and directions for future research.
Download or read book Conflicts of Interest and Analyst Behavior written by Armen Hovakimian and published by . This book was released on 2009 with total page 41 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Recent efforts of regulators have helped neutralize analysts' conflict of interest. Analysts tended to make overly optimistic earnings forecasts prior to Regulation FD and the Global Analyst Research Settlement. Regulation FD made analysts less dependent on insider information and, thereby, diminished analysts' motives to inflate their forecasts. The impact of Regulation FD is more apparent for firms with less informational transparency. The Global Settlement had an even bigger impact on analyst behavior. After the Global Settlement, the mean forecast bias declined significantly, whereas the median forecast bias essentially disappeared. These results are not limited to 12 banks covered by the Global Settlement, but are similar for all analysts.
Download or read book Bias in European Analysts Earnings Forecasts written by Stan Beckers and published by . This book was released on 2004 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Forecasting company earnings is a difficult and hazardous task. In an efficient market where analysts learn from past mistakes, there should be no persistent and systematic biases in consensus earnings accuracy. Previous research has already established how some (single) individual-company characteristics systematically influence forecast accuracy. So far, however, the effect on consensus earnings biases of a company's sector and country affiliation combined with a range of other fundamental characteristics has remained largely unexplored. Using data for 1993-2002, this article disentangles and quantifies for a broad universe of European stocks how the number of analysts following a stock, the dispersion of their forecasts, the volatility of earnings, the sector and country classification of the covered company, and its market capitalization influence the accuracy of the consensus earnings forecast.
Download or read book Analyst Conflicts and Research Quality written by Anup Agrawal and published by . This book was released on 2006 with total page 46 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper examines whether the quality of stock analysts' forecasts is related to conflicts of interest from investment banking and brokerage. We consider four aspects of forecast quality: accuracy, bias and revision frequency of quarterly earnings per share (EPS) forecasts, and relative optimism in long-term earnings growth (LTG) forecasts. Using a unique dataset that contains the annual revenue breakdown of analysts' employers among investment banking, brokerage, and other businesses over the 1994-2003 period, we uncover two main findings. First, accuracy and bias in quarterly forecasts appear to be unrelated to conflict magnitudes, after controlling for forecast age, firm resources and analyst characteristics. Second, relative optimism in LTG forecasts and the frequency of revision of quarterly EPS forecasts are positively related to the importance of brokerage business to analysts' employers. Additional tests suggest that the frequency of quarterly forecast revisions is positively related to analysts' trade generation incentives. Our findings suggest that contrary to popular belief, conflicts from brokerage, rather than from investment banking, play an important role in shaping analysts' forecasting behavior.
Download or read book The Effect of Issuing Biased Earnings Forecasts on Analysts Access to Management and Survival written by Bin Ke and published by . This book was released on 2006 with total page 63 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This study offers evidence on the earnings forecast bias analysts use to please firm management and the associated benefits they obtain from issuing such biased forecasts in the years prior to Regulation Fair Disclosure. Analysts who issue initial optimistic earnings forecasts followed by pessimistic earnings forecasts before the earnings announcement produce more accurate earnings forecasts and are less likely to be fired by their employers. The effect of such biased earnings forecasts on forecast accuracy and firing is stronger for analysts who follow firms with heavy insider selling and hard-to-predict earnings. The above results hold regardless of whether a brokerage firm has investment banking business or not. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that analysts use biased earnings forecasts to curry favor with firm management in order to obtain better access to management's private information.
Download or read book An Empirical Investigation of Bias in Analysts Earnings Forecasts written by Hakan Saraoglu and published by . This book was released on 1996 with total page 318 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Biased Forecasts or Biased Earnings The Role of Reported Earnings in Explaining Apparent Bias and Over Underreaction in Analysts Earnings Forecasts written by Jeffery S. Abarbanell and published by . This book was released on 2012 with total page 52 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We demonstrate the role of three empirical properties of cross-sectional distributions of analysts' forecast errors in generating evidence pertinent to three important and heretofore separately analyzed phenomena studied in the analyst earnings forecast literature: purported bias (intentional or unintentional) in analysts' earnings forecasts, forecaster over/underreaction to information in prior realizations of economic variables, and positive serial correlation in analysts' forecast errors. The empirical properties of interest include: the existence of two statistically influential asymmetries found in the tail and the middle of typical forecast error distributions, the fact that a relatively small number of observations comprise these asymmetries and, the unusual character of the reported earnings benchmark used in the calculation of the forecast errors that fall into the two asymmetries that is associated with firm recognition of unexpected accruals. We discuss competing explanations for the presence of these properties of forecast error distributions and their implications for conclusions about analyst forecast rationality that are pertinent to researchers, regulators, and investors concerned with the incentives and judgments of analysts.Previously titled quot;Biased Forecasts or Biased Earnings? The Role of Earnings Management in Explaining Apparent Optimism and Inefficiency in Analysts' Earnings Forecastsquot.
Download or read book Are Markets Rational written by Seung-Woog Kwag and published by . This book was released on 2002 with total page 110 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Bias in Analysts Earnings Forecasts written by Seung-Woog (Austin) Kwag and published by . This book was released on 2003 with total page 39 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: If either economic incentives or psychological phenomena cause the bias in analysts' forecasts to persist long enough, it would be potentially discoverable and exploitable by investors. quot;Exploitationquot; in this context implies that investors, through examination of historical forecasting performance, can more or less reliably estimate the direction and extent of bias, and impute unbiased estimates for themselves, given analysts' forecasts. The absence of persistence in forecast errors would suggest that analysts' own behavior ultimately quot;self-correctsquot; within a time frame that eliminates the possibility that the patterns could be exploited by investors. We use two look-back methods that capture salient features of analysts' past forecasting behavior to form quintile portfolios that describe the range of analysts' forecasting behavior. Parametric and nonparametric tests are performed to determine whether the two portfolio formation methods provide predictive power with respect to subsequent forecast errors. The findings support a conclusion that analysts' behaviors in both optimistic and pessimistic extremes do not entirely self-correct, leaving open the possibility that investors may find historical forecast errors useful in making inferences about current forecasts.
Download or read book Analyst Disagreement Forecast Bias and Stock Returns written by Anna Scherbina and published by . This book was released on 2004 with total page 32 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: I present evidence of inefficient information processing in equity markets by documenting that biases in analysts' earnings forecasts are reflected in stock prices. In particular, I show that investors fail to fully account for optimistic bias associated with analyst disagreement. This bias arises for two reasons. First, analysts issue more optimistic forecasts when earnings are uncertain. Second, analysts with sufficiently low earnings expectations who choose to keep quiet introduce an optimistic bias in the mean reported forecast that is increasing in the underlying disagreement. Indicators of the missing negative opinions predict earnings surprises and stock returns. By selling stocks with high analyst disagreement institutions exert correcting pressure on prices.
Download or read book Bias in Analysts Earnings Forecasts as an Explanation for the Long Run Underperformance of Stocks Following Equity Offerings written by Ashiq Ali and published by . This book was released on 2006 with total page 34 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: For firms conducting initial or seasoned equity offerings, recent studies document that their stock returns are lower than those of non-issuers for about five years following the issue, and this underperformance is greater for small issuers. This study shows that analysts' earnings forecasts have greater optimistic bias for issuers than for non-issuers during the five year period. Moreover, the incremental optimistic bias is greater for small issuers. This result is consistent with the Loughran and Ritter (1995) conjecture that one of the reasons for the long-run underperformance of issuers' stocks is optimistic bias in the market's expectations of these firms' earnings.
Download or read book Accuracy Bias and Dispersion in Analysts Earnings Forecasts the Case of Cross listed Foreign Firms written by Somnath Das (Saudagaran, Shahrokh M.) and published by . This book was released on with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Share Pledging and Bias in Analyst Earnings Forecasts written by 徐悠 and published by . This book was released on 2020 with total page 73 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
