Download or read book An Experimental Study on Strategic Preference Formation in Two sided Matching Markets written by Natsumi Shimada and published by . This book was released on 2022 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We study an experiment of the students-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism (DA) in matching markets where firms are matched with students. We investigated the two different situations: (i) Students know firms' preferences and firms submit their true preference, (ii) Students know firms' preferences and firms submit a higher ranking to students who give them higher ranking. This experiment confirms that the matching results under DA in uence students' preference formation, which decreases the degree of stability. If firms do not submit their true preferences, students also do not submit their true preferences. As a result, the situation induces instability. Moreover, we find the new pattern of submitted preferences - compromise strategy. If there is an extreme option, students will tend to prefer the in-between option.

Download or read book Computational and experimental analyses of two sided matching markets written by Mustafa Utku Unver and published by . This book was released on 2000 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Essays on the Analysis and Implications of Two sided Matching Markets written by James W. Boudreau and published by . This book was released on 2009 with total page 224 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Incentives and Market based Institutions written by Clayton Ray Featherstone and published by Stanford University. This book was released on 2010 with total page 149 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In this dissertation, we will study three market-based institutions and the incentives that govern them. The first institution is that of centralized school choice, which has become increasingly important over the past decade. Students submit ordinal rankings over schools and a central mechanism uses those rankings to assign students. We study an important mechanism that is seen in the field, the Boston mechanism, and another mechanism with nice theoretical properties, the Deferred acceptance mechanism (DA), that has been adopted in several large school districts. One of the biggest reasons that DA is theoretically nice is that it makes truthful preference revelation a dominant strategy for the students. In a lab experiment, we show that students fail to truthfully reveal their rankings over schools when it is profitable to do so (under Boston), but tell the truth when it is not (under DA). In this sense, the experiment confirms the intuition that designers of school choice mechanisms should be worried about strategic manipulation of preference reports. We also, however, look at a different preference environment where truth-telling is a Bayes- Nash equilibrium under Boston and a dominant strategy equilibrium under DA. What's more, under this environment, given truthful revelation, Boston yields outcomes that stochastically dominant those of DA from the interim perspective that considers others' preferences unknown. In this environment, we see truth-telling rates that are not significantly different, which means that we might be able to implement better outcomes if we look to mechanisms that implement truth-telling as a Bayes-Nash equilibrium, instead of as a dominant strategy. Next, we look at two-sided labor matches, such as the one used by the National Residency Matching Program (NRMP) to match newly-minted doctors to residency programs. Again, we see two major types of mechanisms -- priority mechanisms that try to implement potential matches in a particular order, and Deferred Acceptance mechanisms, which rely on the Gale-Shapley algorithm. Relative to truthful preference revelation, DA is ex post stable, while priority mechanisms are not. Ex post stability intuitively prevents unraveling. In equilibrium, though, we do not expect truthful preference revelation, and in fact, this leads to instability in the equilibria of both mechanisms. Still, in the field, we see that priority mechanisms tend to unravel, while DA mechanisms do not. This is a puzzle which can be resolved if agents truthfully reveal under DA, in spite of the fact that they could profit by deviating. In the lab, we show that this is exactly what we see, which provides a complementary explanation for the success of DA to the core-convergence-based explanations. Finally, we look at long-distance trade without enforcement. When we think of pre-modern trade, a major problem was the worry that agents carrying goods might abscond with those goods instead of carrying them to their intended destinations. Explanations in the literature have tended to rely on models of reputation. These models, in turn, rely on the theory of infinitely repeated games. This is usually justified via the thought that traders formed some sort of tightly knit community or had some sort of dynastic continuation. We look at the question of finite trade. Although the conventional wisdom is that finite trade would unravel from the last period, we show a mechanism by which this does not happen. Beyond merely making a technical point, we think this model of finite trade provides a good model with which to think about impersonal trade.

Download or read book Online and Matching Based Market Design written by Federico Echenique and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2023-04-30 with total page 722 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The rich, multi-faceted and multi-disciplinary field of matching-based market design is an active and important one due to its highly successful applications with economic and sociological impact. Its home is economics, but with intimate connections to algorithm design and operations research. With chapters contributed by over fifty top researchers from all three disciplines, this volume is unique in its breadth and depth, while still being a cohesive and unified picture of the field, suitable for the uninitiated as well as the expert. It explains the dominant ideas from computer science and economics underlying the most important results on market design and introduces the main algorithmic questions and combinatorial structures. Methodologies and applications from both the pre-Internet and post-Internet eras are covered in detail. Key chapters discuss the basic notions of efficiency, fairness and incentives, and the way market design seeks solutions guided by normative criteria borrowed from social choice theory.

Download or read book Revealed Preferences Models for Reconstructing and Analysing Partnerships in Two Sided Matching Market written by Shuchi Goyal and published by . This book was released on 2023 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Many social processes studied by demographers can be viewed as two-sided matching markets. For example, heterosexual marriages, job searching, and residency assignments for medical school graduates all require members of two disjoint groups to mutually consent to form a relationship, or ``match.'' Yet the underlying mechanisms dictating such processes are often opaque. Demographers require statistical models for partnership formation that separate the underlying preferences individuals have for various types of partners from the availability of such partners. To address this need, in my dissertation I develop a revealed preferences model (RPM) which captures the complex interplay between discrete characteristics, both observed and unobserved, of individuals and the availabilities of potential partners to form a stable set of partnerships in networks of different sizes. The major contribution of this work is the introduction of a model that not only estimates partnership outcomes in a two-sided matching market, but also is flexible enough to handle realistic data drawn from various sampling schemes and population types. Contextualizing the problem in the heterosexual marriage market setting, in the first two chapters I present background information on the two-sided matching market problem and and introduce the revealed preferences model novel statistical methodology to compute point estimates for preferences parameters. I validate the approaches with multiple simulation studies and demonstrate RPM's key novel contribution, the ability to recover societal preferences for partners independent of the types of partners available. I additionally use these simulation studies to conduct a comprehensive study of model performance under different conditions, such as varying population and sample sizes and different sampling schemes. To facilitate the use of the model in practical settings, I propose additional novel tools such as bootstrap procedures for bias-correcting parameter estimation and empirical and analytical approaches for computing uncertainty intervals for the preference parameter estimates. I discuss the process of model selection and propose several methods for assessing the goodness-of-fit, including quantitative and visual procedures. To my knowledge this is the first time these procedures have been discussed in literature. To aid continued development of models for two-sided matching markets, I present a review of the two major frameworks that have been hypothesized as underlying the partnership process. While developments in marriage modeling under these different frameworks have continued in parallel over the last several years, this is the first time that the assumptions and implications of the two frameworks have been compared clearly side-by-side using consistent notation. I bridge the gap in literature between the two settings by demonstrating how RPM can be adapted to model the marriage process in either scenario. Throughout the dissertation, I continue to validate the proposed procedures through extensive simulation studies, and I show how the model can be applied and interpreted given survey data from the 2008 Survey on Income and Program Participation.

Download or read book Reciprocal Preferences in Matching Markets written by Timm Opitz and published by . This book was released on 2023 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Agents with reciprocal preferences prefer to be matched to a partner who also likes to collaborate with them. In this paper, we introduce and formalize reciprocal preferences, apply them to matching markets, and analyze the implications for mechanism design. Formally, the preferences of an agent can depend on the preferences of potential partners and there is incomplete information about thepartners' preferences. We find that there is no stable mechanism in standard two-sided markets. Observing the final allocation of the mechanism enables agents to learn about each other's preferences, leading to instability. However, in a school choice setting with one side of the market being non-strategic, modified versions of the deferred acceptance mechanism can achieve stability. These results provide insights into non-standard preferences in matching markets, and their implications for efficient information and mechanism design.

Download or read book The Handbook of Market Design written by Nir Vulkan and published by OUP Oxford. This book was released on 2013-08-29 with total page 706 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Economists often look at markets as given, and try to make predictions about who will do what and what will happen in these markets. Market design, by contrast, does not take markets as given; instead, it combines insights from economic and game theory together with common sense and lessons learned from empirical work and experimental analysis to aid in the design and implementation of actual markets In recent years the field has grown dramatically, partially because of the successful wave of spectrum auctions in the US and in Europe, which have been designed by a number of prominent economists, and partially because of the increase use of the Internet as the platform over which markets are designed and run There is now a large number of applications and a growing theoretical literature. The Handbook of Market Design brings together the latest research from leading experts to provide a comprehensive description of applied market design over the last two decades In particular, it surveys matching markets: environments where there is a need to match large two-sided populations to one another, such as medical residents and hospitals, law clerks and judges, or patients and kidney donors It also examines a number of applications related to electronic markets, e-commerce, and the effect of the Internet on competition between exchanges.

Download or read book Essays on Matching Theory and Behavioral Market Design written by Siqi Pan and published by . This book was released on 2017 with total page 112 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This dissertation focuses on the design and implementation of matching markets where transfers are not available, such as college admissions, school choice, and certain labor markets. The results contribute to the literature from both a theoretical and a behavioral perspective, and may have policy implications for the design of some real-life matching markets. Chapter 1, “Exploding Offers and Unraveling in Two-Sided Matching Markets,” studies the unraveling problem prevalent in many two-sided matching markets that occurs when transactions become inefficiently early. In a two-period decentralized model, I examine whether the use of exploding offers can affect agents' early moving incentives. The results show that when the culture of the market allows firms to make exploding offers, unraveling is more likely to occur, leading to a less socially desirable matching outcome. A market with an excess supply of labor is less vulnerable to the presence of exploding offers; yet the conclusion is ambiguous for a market with a greater degree of uncertainty in early stages, which depends on the specific information structure. While a policy banning exploding offers tends to be supported by high quality firms and workers, it can be opposed by those of lower quality. This explains the prevalence of exploding offers in practice. Chapter 2, “Constrained School Choice and Information Acquisition,” investigates a common practice of many school choice programs in the field, where the length of students' submitted preference lists are constrained. In an environment where students have incomplete information about others’ preferences, I theoretically study the effect of such a constraint under both a Deferred Acceptance mechanism (DA) and a Boston mechanism (BOS). The result shows that ex-ante stability can only be ensured under an unconstrained DA, but not under a constrained DA, an unconstrained BOS, or a constrained BOS. In a lab experiment, I find that the constraint also affects students’ information acquisition behavior. Specifically, when faced with a constraint, students tend to acquire less wasteful information and distribute more efforts to acquire relevant information under DA; such an effect is not significant under BOS. Overall, the constraint has a negative effect on efficiency and stability under both mechanisms. Chapter 3, “Targeted Advertising on Competing Platforms,” is jointly written with Huanxing Yang. We investigate targeted advertising in two-sided markets. Each of the two competing platforms has single-homing consumers on one side and multi-homing advertising firms on the other. We focus on how asymmetry in platforms’ targeting abilities translates into asymmetric equilibrium outcomes, and how changes in targeting ability affect the price and volume of ads, consumer welfare, and advertising firms' profits. We also compare social incentives and equilibrium incentives in investing in targeting ability. Chapter 4, “The Instability of Matching with Overconfident Agents: Laboratory and Field Investigations,” focuses on centralized college admissions markets where students are evaluated and allocated based on their performance on a standardized exam. A single exam’s measurement error causes the exam-based priorities to deviate from colleges' aptitude-based preferences: a student who underperforms in one exam may lose her placement at a preferred college to someone with a lower aptitude. The previous literature proposes a solution of combining a Boston algorithm with pre-exam preference submission. Under the assumption that students have perfect knowledge of their relative aptitudes before taking the exam, the suggested mechanism intends to trigger a self-sorting process, with students of higher (lower) aptitudes targeting more (less) preferred colleges. However, in a laboratory experiment, I find that such a self-sorting process is skewed by overconfidence, which leads to a welfare loss larger than the purported benefits. Moreover, the mechanism introduces unfairness by rewarding overconfidence and punishing underconfidence, thus serving as a gender penalty for women. I also analyze field data from Chinese high schools; the results suggest similar conclusions as in the lab.

Download or read book Two Sided Matching written by Alvin E. Roth and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 1992-06-26 with total page 288 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Two-sided matching provides a model of search processes such as those between firms and workers in labor markets or between buyers and sellers in auctions. This book gives a comprehensive account of recent results concerning the game-theoretic analysis of two-sided matching. The focus of the book is on the stability of outcomes, on the incentives that different rules of organization give to agents, and on the constraints that these incentives impose on the ways such markets can be organized. The results for this wide range of related models and matching situations help clarify which conclusions depend on particular modeling assumptions and market conditions, and which are robust over a wide range of conditions. 'This book chronicles one of the outstanding success stories of the theory of games, a story in which the authors have played a major role: the theory and practice of matching markets ... The authors are to be warmly congratulated for this fine piece of work, which is quite unique in the game-theoretic literature.' From the Foreword by Robert Aumann

Download or read book Identification and Estimation in Two Sided Matching Markets written by Nikhil Agarwal and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page 64 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We study estimation and non-parametric identification of preferences in two-sided matching markets using data from a single market with many agents. We consider a model in which preferences of each side of the market are vertical, utility is non-transferable and the observed matches are pairwise stable. We show that preferences are not identified with data on one-to-one matches but are non-parametrically identified when data from many-to-one matches are observed. The additional empirical content in many-to-one matches is illustrated by comparing two simulated objective functions, one that does and the other that does not use information available in many-to-one matching. We also prove consistency of a method of moments estimator for a parametric model under a data generating process in which the size of the matching market increases, but data only on one market is observed. Since matches in a single market are interdependent, our proof of consistency cannot rely on observations of independent matches. Finally, we present Monte Carlo studies of a simulation based estimator.

Download or read book The Social Science Encyclopedia written by Adam Kuper and published by Taylor & Francis. This book was released on 1996 with total page 962 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This reference has been written by an international team of contributors presenting a global understanding of the key issues within social sciences. A board of advisory editors has worked closely with the editors in determining the most important concepts, thinkers and techniques in each field.

Download or read book The Stable Marriage Problem written by Dan Gusfield and published by . This book was released on 1989 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book probes the stable marriage problem and its variants as a rich source of problems and ideas that illustrate both the design and analysis of efficient algorithms. It covers the most recent structural and algorithmic work on stable matching problems, simplifies and unifies many earlier proofs, strengthens several earlier results, and presents new results and more efficient algorithms.The authors develop the structure of the set of stable matchings in the stable marriage problem in a more general and algebraic context than has been done previously; they discuss the problem's structure in terms of rings of sets, which allows many of the most useful features to be seen as features of a more general set of problems. The relationship between the structure of the stable marriage problem and the more general stable roommates problem is demonstrated, revealing many commonalities.The results the authors obtain provide an algorithmic response to the practical, and political, problems created by the asymmetry inherent in the Gale Shapley solutions, leading to alternative methods and better compromises than are provided by the Gale Shapley method. And, in contrast to Donald Knuth's earlier work which primarily focused on the application of mathematics to the analysis of algorithms, this book illustrates the productive and almost inseparable relationship between mathematical insight and the design of efficient algorithms.Dan Gusfield is Associate Professor of Computer Science at the University of California, Davis. Robert W. Irving is Senior Lecturer in Computing Science at the University of Glasgow. The Stable Marriage Problem is included in the Foundations of Computing Series, edited by Michael Garey and Albert Meyer.

Download or read book Unravelling in Two sided Matching Markets and Similarity of Preferences written by Hanna Halaburda and published by . This book was released on 2008 with total page 39 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This study also shows that unravelling leads to a loss of welfare. Thus, any Pareto-optimal mechanism must prevent unravelling. Moreover, the ex-post stable mechanism is Pareto-optimal if and only if it prevents unravelling. In markets where the ex-post stable mechanism unravels, there exist ex-post unstable Pareto-optimal mechanisms that stop unravelling and are preferable to the ex-post stable one.

Download or read book Handbook of Industrial Organization written by Richard Schmalensee and published by North Holland. This book was released on 1989-09-11 with total page 1002 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Determinants of firm and market organization; Analysis of market behavior; Empirical methods and results; International issues and comparision; government intervention in the Marketplace.

Download or read book A General Two sided Matching Market with Discrete Concave Utility Functions written by Satoru Fujishige and published by . This book was released on 2003 with total page 26 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Abstract: "In the theory of two-sided matching markets there are two standard models called the stable marriage model, due to Gale and Shapley, and the assignment model, due to Shapley and Shubik. Recently, Eriksson and Karlander have introduced a hybrid model of these two and Sotomayor also considered the hybrid model with full generality. In this paper, we propose a common generalization of these models by utilizing a framework of discrete convex analysis introduced by Murota, and verify the existence of a stable solution in our general model."

Download or read book An Awareness Model for a Two sided Matching Market written by Xinyuan Zhang and published by . This book was released on 2022 with total page 50 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In demographic studies, the latent preferences for partners during a partnership formation process has long been a crucial problem. However, in practical setting, individuals are usu- ally only aware of a certain subset of potential partners, and these should be separated from preferences when modelling this matching process. In this thesis, we address this issue by constructing an awareness model for matching where individuals are aware of a subset of po- tential partners, and have nontransferable utilities for them based on certain characteristics. We extend Goyal et al.'s framework (2022) to estimate preference and awareness parame- ters, where awareness parameters are estimated based on continuous covariates. We conduct simulation studies in multiple theoretical scenarios to show that under various settings, the model accurately recovers preference and awareness parameters. We also conduct a case study based on recent marriages observed in the 2019 American Community Survey (ACS) data.