Download or read book An Analysis of the Effect of Using Lump Sum Payments for the U S Marine Corps Selective Reenlistment Bonus Program written by David L. Ross and published by . This book was released on 2000-03-01 with total page 93 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This thesis examines the estimated effects on enlisted retention in the Marine Corps of changing the Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) payment method to lump sum. The thesis surveys the literature on personal discount rates (PDR) and on models of enlisted retention. The thesis analyzes the potential effect of the payment method on retention of Zone A eligible personnel using a range of PDRs and retention elasticities estimated by the Center for Naval Analyses. The NPV of a lump sum payment was compared to that of the current payment method using the actual SRB multiples for each USMC Occupational Field. The results indicate Zone A first-term Marine retention will increase between 6. 8 percent and 11.7 percent if the SRB payment were made in lump sum. The effect of switching to a lump sum payment was also analyzed using the Annualized Cost of Leaving (ACOL) model. The ACOL model estimates reinforced the estimates predicted by this thesis. Finally, a Monte Carlo simulation was run in Microsoft Excel to estimate the probabilities of attaining a given number of Marines across all Occupational Fields. The Monte Carlo simulation runs show an increased probability of obtaining a given number of first-term Marines by changing the SRB payment method to lump sum.
Download or read book An Analysis of the Retention Effect of Using Lump Sum Payments for the U S Marine Corps Selective Reenlistment Bonus Program written by David L. Ross and published by . This book was released on 2000 with total page 82 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This thesis examines the estimated effects on enlisted retention in the Marine Corps of changing the Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) payment method to lump sum. The thesis surveys the literature on personal discount rates (PDR) and on models of enlisted retention. The thesis analyzes the potential effect of the payment method on retention of Zone A eligible personnel using a range of PDRs and retention elasticities estimated by the Center for Naval Analyses. The NPV of a lump sum payment was compared to that of the current payment method using the actual SRB multiples for each USMC Occupational Field. The results indicate Zone A first-term Marine retention will increase between 6. 8 percent and 11.7 percent if the SRB payment were made in lump sum. The effect of switching to a lump sum payment was also analyzed using the Annualized Cost of Leaving (ACOL) model. The ACOL model estimates reinforced the estimates predicted by this thesis. Finally, a Monte Carlo simulation was run in Microsoft Excel to estimate the probabilities of attaining a given number of Marines across all Occupational Fields. The Monte Carlo simulation runs show an increased probability of obtaining a given number of first-term Marines by changing the SRB payment method to lump sum.
Download or read book An Analysis of the Effect of the U S Marine Corps Lump Sum Selective Reenlistment Bonus Program on Reenlistment Decisions written by Robert W. Barry, Jr. and published by . This book was released on 2001-12-01 with total page 126 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This thesis analyzes the effect of the United States Marine Corps instituting a lump sum Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) Program on reenlistment decisions of first-term enlisted Marines, Between fiscal year 1982 and fiscal year 2000, Zone A reenlistees were paid 50 percent of their SRB on the date of reenlistment, and the remaining 50 percent was paid in annual installments over the reenlistment contract period. In fiscal year 2001, under the new program Marines received 100 percent of the SRB upon reenlisting The thesis surveys the literature on models of enlisted retention, The thesis empirically examines the impact of personal characteristics, civilian pay, unemployment, and the lump sum bonus on reenlistment decisions, Marine retention probabilities under the lump sum payment program are compared to the probabilities under the standard partial-annuity payment system The results show that the lump sum bonus is associated to a 5,8 percentage point increase in the reenlistment probability, A one-level increase in the SRB multiple during fiscal year 2001 is related to a reenlistment rate increase of 2,6 percentage points,
Download or read book An Analysis of the Effect of the U S Marine Corps Lump Sum Selective Reenlistment Bonus Program on Reenlistment Decisions written by and published by . This book was released on 2001 with total page 126 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This thesis analyzes the effect of the United States Marine Corps instituting a lump sum Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) Program on reenlistment decisions of first-term enlisted Marines, Between fiscal year 1982 and fiscal year 2000, Zone A reenlistees were paid 50 percent of their SRB on the date of reenlistment, and the remaining 50 percent was paid in annual installments over the reenlistment contract period. In fiscal year 2001, under the new program Marines received 100 percent of the SRB upon reenlisting The thesis surveys the literature on models of enlisted retention, The thesis empirically examines the impact of personal characteristics, civilian pay, unemployment, and the lump sum bonus on reenlistment decisions, Marine retention probabilities under the lump sum payment program are compared to the probabilities under the standard partial-annuity payment system The results show that the lump sum bonus is associated to a 5,8 percentage point increase in the reenlistment probability, A one-level increase in the SRB multiple during fiscal year 2001 is related to a reenlistment rate increase of 2,6 percentage points,
Download or read book Cost Benefit Analysis of Lump Sum Bonuses for Zone A Zone B and Zone C Reenlistments Final Report written by and published by . This book was released on 2004 with total page 128 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) program is the primary tool for shaping the career force. The first-term, or Zone A, SRB is key because it is the only point at which recommended and eligible Marines can be denied reenlistment in a skill area (PMOS) if their numbers would exceed requirements. In this paper, we find that SRB multiples have a large effect on reenlistment rates by occupation. Additionally, lump-sum SRBs have a larger effect on reenlistment rates than those paid in timed installments. We estimate a model that includes factors influencing the reenlistment decision separately for Zones A, B, and C. Results suggest that SRBs significantly raise reenlistment rates in all zones. Furthermore, the switch to lump-sum SRBs had fairly dramatic effects on program costs. We estimate the Marine Corps saved $8 million in Zone A and $10.4 to $25.7 million in Zone B by offering lump-sum rather than timed bonuses in FYO3. We estimate predicted reenlistment rates by occupational field and bonus level and a decision model that strength planners can use to set Zone A SRB levels by PMOS. Finally, we compare the relative costs and benefits of SRBs versus lateral moves for filling boatspaces in undermanned areas.
Download or read book Cash Incentives and Military Enlistment Attrition and Reenlistment written by Beth J. Asch and published by RAND Corporation. This book was released on 2010 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: "This monograph provides an empirical analysis of the enlistment, attrition, and reenlistment effects of bonuses, applying statistical models that control for such other factors as recruiting resources, in the case of enlistment and deployments in the case of reenlistment, and demographics. Enlistment and attrition models are estimated for the Army and our reenlistment model approach is twofold. The Army has greatly increased its use of reenlistment bonuses since FY 2004, and we begin by providing an in-depth history of the many changes in its reenlistment bonus program during this decade. We follow this with two independent analyses of the effect of bonuses on Army reenlistment. As we show, the results from the models are consistent, lending credence to the robustness of the estimates. One approach is extended to the Navy, the Marine Corps, and the Air Force, to obtain estimates of the effect of bonuses on reenlistment for all services. We also estimate an enlistment model for the Navy. The estimated models are used to address questions about the cost-effectiveness of bonuses and their effects in offsetting other factors that might adversely affect recruiting and retention, such as changes in the civilian economy and frequent deployments"--P. iii.
Download or read book The Sequential Self selection Auction Mechanism for Selective Reenlistment Bonuses written by and published by . This book was released on 2007 with total page 69 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This thesis explores the potential cost savings for the Marine Corps by replacing the current SRB program with one that uses the format of a Sequential Self-Selection Auction Mechanism (S3AM). The power of predicting behavior based upon opportunity costs is the theoretical underpinning of the Sequential Self-Selection Auction Mechanism (S3AM). The S3AM greatly reduces the payment of economic rent. The payment of economic rent is limited because the Marine Corps would only pay Marines a monetary sum that more closely corresponds to their active duty opportunity cost. In other words, the S3AM would allow the Marine Corps to capture more of the economic surplus, making the SRB process substantially more cost effective. If a S3AM were used in lieu of the current SRB program, the Marine Corps would potentially save money while still meeting endstrength requirements. For example, using the S3AM in FY 2006 would have potentially saved the Marine Corps 1 2,123,885, 6 90,471 and 1 18,390, respectively, for the three Military Occupational Specialties (MOSs) analyzed, based on a four year multiple. This savings would have been realized, if the two and six year S3AM model were used to pay FY 2006 bonuses to the 0311s, 0621s and 5811s that reenlisted.
Download or read book Army SRB Program written by and published by . This book was released on 2006 with total page 44 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: "In this study the effects of Selective Reenlistment Bonuses (SRBs) on Army reenlistments over the 1990-2000 period at Zones A, B, and C at three levels of occupational aggregation - all Army, career management field (CMF), and military occupational specialty (MOS) - were re-estimated to explicitly control for the drawdown in the mid-1990s as well as labor market conditions. In general, the results for Zone A at all levels of occupational aggregation indicate that reenlistment bonuses have a positive and statistically significant effect on Zone A reenlistments. A one-level increase in SRB at Zone A typically increases the reenlistment rate by 3 to 7 percentage points, depending upon the occupation. The results for Zone B are also solid at both the CMF and MOS levels. Results for Zone C, where reenlistment rates are typically very high, were reasonably solid but not quite as good as the Zone A and B results. The results provide the Army with estimates of reenlistment responsiveness to bonus changes for all three zones for all MOS. We also estimated the effect of SRBs on the reenlisting Soldier's choice of length of reenlistment. Increases in the SRB level not only increase reenlistments, but also increase the length of reenlistment. The length of reenlistment effects were incorporated into the SRB Management System to better predict program costs and the additional staff years of contracted service provided by the bonus program."--Stinet.
Download or read book Reenlisting in the Marine Corps written by Aline Quester and published by . This book was released on 1991 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: "First term reenlistment decisions for recommended and eligible Marine in FY 1980 through FY 1990 are analyzed in this research memorandum. Particular attention is given to the retention effects of selective reenlistment bonuses on Marines in different Armed Force Qualification Test (AFQT) score categories. Additionally, reenlistment behavior for marines of different marital statuses, grade, and length of initial enlistment contracts are analyzed. In the recent past, there have been substantial changes in the characteristics of enlisted Marines, as well as change in Marine Corps personal policy. First, enlisted Marines today are both smarter and better educated than they were in the earlier years of the 1980s. Second, although the percentage of recruits who enter the Marine Corps married or with dependents has remained virtually unchanged over time, the Marine Corps has experience substantial increases in the marriage and dependency rate for enlisted personal. Third, first-term enlistment contracted have been lengthened so that marine now average more years of service at the first reenlistment point. Finally, there has been an increase in both time in service (TIS) and time (TIG) for promotions to corporal (Cpl) and sergeant (Sgt). The impact of these changes on reenlistment decisions of first term enlisted personal (zone A decisions) is the subject of this research memorandum."--Abstract
Download or read book Reenlistment Bonuses and First term Retention written by John H. Enns and published by . This book was released on 1977 with total page 84 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: An extension of the methodology and data used in an earlier Rand study (reported in R-1502-ARPA) which developed and estimated a statistical model of reenlistment supply for the Army, Navy, and Air Force for a single year, FY 1971. The present study analyzes four years of reenlistment data (FY 1971-FY 1974) using two regression models to generate an estimate of a four-year average bonus response. It is concluded that (1) selective reenlistment bonuses have the desired positive effect on first-term reenlistment rates; (2) the bonus elasticity under current bonus policy is likely to about 2.0; (3) differences in bonus response between service branches are not large enough to require separate bonus management policies for each service; (4) the different bonus multiples each produce about the same per dollar effect; and (5) there is no evidence of differences between broadly defined occupational groups in bonus response. (Author).
Download or read book The Costs and Benefits of Converting to Lump sum SRBs written by Gerald E. Cox and published by . This book was released on 2012 with total page 60 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) Program is one of the principal force-shaping tools used by the Navy and plays an essential role in mitigating retention problems in critical military specialties. It is also an expensive program: between 2000 and 2007, the Navy's expenditures on SRBs exceeded $150 million per year. It has long been conjectured that the long-term cost of the Navy's SRB program could be reduced if the service were to award lump-sum SRBs (LSSRBs) in place of the current anniversary payment SRBs (APSRBs) in which bonuses are paid in annual increments over the term of reenlistment. The Navy could gain these savings by capitalizing on sailors' strong preferences for receiving immediate rather than deferred payment. Without changing the value that sailors place on these reenlistment incentives, the Navy could offer smaller LSSRBs at the beginning of the term of reenlistment in place of larger APSRBs that are spread across the term of reenlistment.
Download or read book A Model of Reenlistment Behavior written by and published by . This book was released on 2005 with total page 78 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A logit model was applied to estimate the effect of selective reenlistment bonuses (SRBs) on the retention rates of Army Soldiers. The model was estimated separately by occupational group and by first (zone A), second (zone B) and third term (zone C) reenlistment decisions. An "annualized cost of leaving" (ACOL) variable was constructed to estimate the net financial returns to reenlisting in the Army compared to leaving for the civilian sector. The model was estimated using data on actual reenlistments from the period FYl99O tlirough FY2OOO. The effects of SRBs on reenlistments at Zones A, B, and C were estimated at three levels of occupational aggregation-all Army, CMF, and MOS. After out-of-sample testing, we re-specified and re-estimated the model. In general, the results for Zone A at all levels of occupational aggregation indicate that reenlistment bonuses have a positive and statistically significant effect on Zone A reenlistments. The magnitude of the effect varied by occupation, but a one-level increase in SRB at Zone A typically increases the reenlistment rate by three to seven percentage points, depending upon the occupation. The results for Zone B are also solid at both the CMF and MOS levels. Results for Zone C, where reenlistment rates are typically very high, were reasonably solid but not as good as the Zone A and B results. We were unable to obtain positive, statistically significant ACOL parameter estimates for a small number of occupation groups. Statistically significant effects for demographic control variables and labor market conditions were also obtained.
Download or read book The Effects of Selective Reenlistment Bonuses Part 1 Background and Theoretical Issues written by and published by . This book was released on 1991 with total page 35 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In order to manage its Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) program effectively, the U.S. Army needs reliable information about the effects of SRBs on reenlistment rates at the Military Occupational Speciality (MOS) level. Until recently, research has not addressed the reenlistment decision, bias due to population heterogeneity, and interaction between compensation policy and retention. This research examines these fundamental issues and suggests techniques for their application at the MOS level. It highlights the importance of (1) understanding institutional details of compensation policy, including the role of SRBs; (2) defining random error terms in the empirical analyses; and (3) using longitudinal research data.
Download or read book Military Cash Incentives DOD Should Coordinate and Monitor Its Efforts to Achieve Cost Effective Bonuses and Special Pays written by Brenda S. Farrell and published by DIANE Publishing. This book was released on 2011 with total page 43 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Assesses DoD¿s use of cash incentives to recruit and retain highly qualified individuals for service in the armed forces. It: (1) identifies recent trends in DoD's use of enlistment and reenlistment bonuses; (2) assesses the extent to which the services have processes to determine which occupational specialties require bonuses and whether bonus amounts are optimally set; and (3) determines how much flexibility DoD has in managing selected special and incentive pays for officer and enlisted personnel. The report analyzed service data on bonuses and special and incentive pays, and reviewed relevant guidance and other documentation from DoD and the services. Charts and tables. This is a print on demand report.
Download or read book Military Retention Incentives written by Justin Joffrion and published by . This book was released on 2015 with total page 45 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The limited lateral entry and rigid pay structure for U.S. military personnel present challenges in retaining skilled individuals who have attractive options in the civilian labor market. One tool the services use to address this challenge is the Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB), which offers eligible personnel with particular skills a substantial cash bonus upon reenlistment. However, the sequential nature of the bonus offer and reenlistment process limits the ability to adjust manpower quickly, raising interest in research that estimates the effect of the SRB on retention. While this literature has acknowledged challenges including potential endogeneity of bonus levels, attrition, and reenlistment eligibility, many studies do not address these concerns adequately. This paper uses a comprehensive panel data set on Air Force enlisted personnel to estimate the effect of the SRB on retention rates. We exploit variation in bonus levels within skill groups, control for civilian labor market conditions, and model reenlistment eligibility to avoid common assumptions that lead to biased impact estimates. We find substantial heterogeneity in the effect of the bonus, with the largest effects on first-term service members and those whose skills have not historically received a substantial bonus. We also find evidence that the bonus affects the timing of reenlistment decisions in addition to their frequency.
Download or read book Increasing Efficiency and Incentives for Performance in the Army s Selective Reenlistment Bonus SRB Program written by Beth J. Asch and published by . This book was released on 2021-10-05 with total page 124 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This report documents research and analysis conducted as part of a project entitled Improving the Efficiency and Effectiveness of Special and Incentive Pays in the Army, sponsored by the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs. The purpose of the project was to help the Army determine how to best increase incentives for higher performance among enlisted members and to more efficiently achieve Army retention objectives.
