Download or read book Why Do CEOS Reciprocally Sit on Each Other s Boards written by Eliezer M. Fich and published by . This book was released on 2005 with total page 40 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The reciprocal interlocking of chief executive officers (CEOs) is a non-trivial phenomenon of the composition of boards of directors and of corporate governance: among large companies in 1991, about one company in seven was part of a relationship whereby the CEO of one company sat on a second company's board and the second company's CEO sat on the first company's board. We are aware of no previous efforts to explain these reciprocal relationships. We hypothesize that reciprocal CEO interlocks are (a) more likely when a board has more outside directorships, (b) less likely when a CEO has more of his total annual compensation paid in the form of stock options, (c) less likely when a company's board is more active and holds more meetings, (d) less likely when a CEO has a larger ownership share of his company, and (e) more likely when there are more CEOs from other companies as outside directors on a CEO's board. Using a sizable sample of large companies in 1991, we employ simple probit and step probit models to test these hypotheses, with the use of control variables that encompass other company, board, and CEO characteristics. These multivariate analyses support our first three conjectures but do not support the remaining two. Since there is considerable academic and policy debate concerning board composition and the effectiveness of interlocking directorships in general, investigations focusing on reciprocal CEO interlocks, which link the highest ranked executives of two different firms, represent a significant contribution to the knowledge base in this field.
Download or read book Why Do Ceo s Reciprocally Sit on Each Other s Boards written by Eliezer M. Fitch and published by . This book was released on 2008 with total page 39 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The reciprocal interlocking of chief executive officers (CEOs) is a non-trivial phenomenon of the composition of boards of directors and of corporate governance: among large companies in 1991, about one company in seven is part of a relationship whereby the CEO of one company sits on a second company's board and the second company's CEO sits on the first company's board. We are aware of no previous efforts to explain these reciprocal relationships. We hypothesize that reciprocal CEO interlocks are (a) more likely when a board has more outside directorships, (b) less likely when a CEO has more of his total annual compensation paid in the form of stock options, (c) less likely when a company's board is more active and holds more meetings, (d) less likely when a CEO has a larger ownership share of his company, and (e) more likely when there are more CEOs from other companies as outside directors on a CEO's board. Using a sizable sample of largecompanies in 1991, we employ simple probit and step probit models to test these hypotheses, with the use of control variables that encompass other company, board, and CEO characteristics. These multivariate analyses support our first three conjectures but do not support the remaining two.Since there is considerable academic and policy debate concerning board composition and the effectiveness of interlocking directorships in general, investigations focusing on reciprocal CEO interlocks, which link the highest ranked executives of two different firms, represent a significantcontribution to the knowledge base in this field.
Download or read book Explaining Executive Pay written by Lukas Hengartner and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2007-12-31 with total page 224 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Lukas Hengartner shows that both firm complexity and managerial power are associated with higher pay levels. This suggests that top managers are paid for the complexity of their job and that more powerful top managers receive pay in excess of the level that would be optimal for shareholders.
Download or read book Mergers Acquisitions and Corporate Restructurings written by Patrick A. Gaughan and published by John Wiley & Sons. This book was released on 2010-10-19 with total page 674 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Modern restructuring techniques for a global business landscape Mergers, Acquisitions, and Corporate Restructurings, Fifth Edition carefully analyzes the strategies and motives that inspire M&As, the laws and rules that govern the field, as well as the offensive and defensive techniques of hostile acquisitions. Incorporates updated research, graphs, and case studies on the private equity market, ethics, legal frameworks, and corporate governance Expanded and updated chapters on corporate governance, joint ventures and strategic alliances and valuation Expanded global treatment of the field of M&A Shows business managers and financial executives how corporate restructuring can be used successfully in any company Looks at the most effective offensive and defensive tactics in hostile bids Reviews the impact on shareholder wealth on a variety of takeover actions Packed with the most up-to-date research, graphs, and case studies, Mergers, Acquisitions, and Corporate Restructurings, Fifth Edition provides a fresh perspective on M&As in today's global business landscape.
Download or read book Intersections between Corporate and Antitrust Law written by Marco Corradi and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2023-06-08 with total page 353 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Examines the intersections between corporate and antitrust law, focusing on corporate interest, governance, and the financial links among companies.
Download or read book Reciprocally Interlocking Boards of Directors and Executive Compensation written by Kevin F. Hallock and published by . This book was released on 1998 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Is executive compensation influenced by the composition of the board of directors? About 8% of chief executive officers (CEOs) are reciprocally interlocked with another CEO--the current CEO of firm A serves as a director of firm B and the current CEO of firm B serves as a director of firm A. Roughly 20% of firms have at least one current or retired employee sitting on the board of another firm and vice versa. I investigate how these and other features of board composition affect CEO pay by using a sample of 9,804 director positions in America's largest companies. CEOs who lead interlocked firms earn significantly higher compensation. Also, interlocked CEOs tend to head larger firms. After controlling for firm and CEO characteristics, the pay gap is reduced dramatically. However, when firms that are interlocked due to documented business relationships are considered not interlocked, the measured return to interlock is as high as 17%. There also is evidence that the return to interlock was higher in the 1970s than in the early 1990s.
Download or read book The Anatomy of Corporate Law A Comparative and Functional Approach written by Reinier Kraakman and published by Oxford University Press, USA. This book was released on 2009-07-23 with total page 344 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This is the second edition of this highly regarded comparative overview of corporate law. It argues that the main function of corporate law is to address conflicts of interests and that, despite economic and social diversity, legal strategies employed across jurisdictions are surprisingly similar.
Download or read book Gender and Corporate Boards written by Scarlett Brown and published by Routledge. This book was released on 2020-01-13 with total page 155 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The lack of women on boards has galvanised much public and policy interest, which has led to many countries introducing quotas for women on boards, or to concerted voluntary action. However the way that directors are appointed remains opaque and prone to the influence of gender. Using a social constructionist understanding of gender and a discourse analysis, Gender and Corporate Boards explores the board appointment process through the experiences of women and men seeking non-executive board roles. The book is unique in that it traces board-ready candidates, who have been vetted by an executive search firm, over an 18-month period. By taking a longitudinal and prospective view rather than retrospective and snapshot, it provides deep analysis of how the board appointment process is gendered. This volume privileges the voices of those who are seeking board roles to show how they make sense of an unpredictable and complex process. Gender and Corporate Boards first analyses how aspirant board candidates see themselves in relation to the market, through exploring their perceptions of the ideal board member and how they position themselves towards this ideal. Second, the book shows how candidates must leverage their networks to get board appointments, and that the process is gendered: women and men receive different benefits from their networks. Third, the book explores how the participants make sense of success and failure and how their justifications are also gendered. The book will be of interest to those seeking to understand dynamics of gender on boards as well as those interested in gender and leadership more broadly.
Download or read book The Interaction Between Competition Law and Corporate Governance written by Florence Thépot and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2019-02-14 with total page 317 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Florence Thépot provides the first systematic account of the interaction between competition law and corporate governance. She challenges the 'black box' conception of the firm- or 'undertaking' - in competition law, as applied to increasingly complex corporate relations. The book opens the 'black box' of the firm to understand the internal drivers of collusive behaviour, and proposes a unified approach to cartel enforcement, based on the agency theory. It explores key issues including corporate compliance programmes, the attribution of liability in corporate groups, and structural links between competitors, and should be read by anyone interested in how the evolution of the corporate landscape impacts competition law.
Download or read book The Academy of Management Annals written by James P. Walsh and published by Taylor & Francis. This book was released on 2007 with total page 750 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The Academy of Management is proud to announce the inaugural volume of The Academy of Management Annals. This exciting new series follows one guiding principle: The advancement of knowledge is possible only by conducting a thorough examination of what is known and unknown in a given field. Such assessments can be accomplished through comprehensive, critical reviews of the literature--crafted by informed scholars who determine when a line of inquiry has gone astray, and how to steer the research back onto the proper path. The Academy of Management Annals provide just such essential reviews. Written by leading management scholars, the reviews are invaluable for ensuring the timeliness of advanced courses, for designing new investigative approaches, and for identifying faulty methodological or conceptual assumptions. The Annals strive each year to synthesize a vast array of primary research, recognizing past principal contributions while illuminating potential future avenues of inquiry. Volume 1 of the Annals explores a wide spectrum of research: corporate control; nonstandard employment; critical management; physical work environments; public administration team learning; emotions in organizations; leadership and health care; creativity at work; business and the environment; and bias in performance appraisals. Ultimately, academic scholars in management and allied fields (e.g., sociology of organizations and organizational psychology) will see The Academy of Management Annals as a valuable resource to turn to for comprehensive, up-to-date information--published in a single volume every year by the preeminent association for management research.
Download or read book Governance and the Market for Corporate Control written by John L. Teall and published by Routledge. This book was released on 2014-02-25 with total page 285 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Governance and the Market for Corporate Control is a textbook for use on business courses dealing with mergers, acquisitions, governance restructuring and corporate control. Three key features distinguish this book from competing texts. First, following up on recent developments in the corporate arena, it places a heavy emphasis on managerial compensation, incentives and corporate performance. Second, its conciseness allows for flexibility of use. Third, its coverage is broad and examines many topics including: significant discussions of corporate governance power and voting managerial compensation takeovers going private transactions corporate restructuring event study methodology. As well as combining theoretical, empirical, quantitative and practitioner-oriented matter, the material in this key book provides the academic foundation necessary to ensure students’ understanding of important concepts.
Download or read book Executive Pay and Reciprocally Interlocking Boards of Directors written by Kevin F. Hallock and published by . This book was released on 1998 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Is executive compensation influenced by the composition of the Board of Directors? About one in ten Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) is quot;reciprocally interlockedquot; with another CEO -- a current or retired CEO of firm A serves as a director of firm B and a current or retired CEO of firm B serves as a director of firm A. An even larger fraction (20%) of firms have at least one current or retired employee sitting on the board of another firm and vice versa. I investigate how these and other features of board composition affect CEO pay. I use a newly assembled sample of nearly 10,000 director positions in America's largest companies. Chief executives heading interlocked firms earn significantly higher compensation. After controlling for firm and CEO characteristics, however, interlocking directorates are associated with at most 10% higher pay.
Download or read book Information Systems written by Marinos Themistocleous and published by Springer. This book was released on 2019-01-11 with total page 562 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book constitutes selected papers from the 15th European, Mediterranean, and Middle Eastern Conference, EMCIS 2018, held in Limassol, Cyprus, in October 2018. EMCIS is dedicated to the definition and establishment of Information Systems as a discipline of high impact for the methodical community and IS professionals, focusing on approaches that facilitate the identification of innovative research of significant relevance to the IS discipline. The 34 full and 8 short papers presented in this volume were carefully reviewed and selected from a total of 108 submissions. They were organized in topical sections named: blockchain technology and applications; big data and analytics; cloud computing; digital services and social media; e-government; healthcare information systems; IT governance; and management and organizational issues in information systems.
Download or read book Executive Pay and Reciprocally Interlocking Boards of Directors written by Kevin F. Hallock and published by . This book was released on 1995 with total page 62 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Pay without Performance written by Lucian Bebchuk and published by Harvard University Press. This book was released on 2006-09-30 with total page 293 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The company is under-performing, its share price is trailing, and the CEO gets...a multi-million-dollar raise. This story is familiar, for good reason: as this book clearly demonstrates, structural flaws in corporate governance have produced widespread distortions in executive pay. Pay without Performance presents a disconcerting portrait of managers' influence over their own pay--and of a governance system that must fundamentally change if firms are to be managed in the interest of shareholders. Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried demonstrate that corporate boards have persistently failed to negotiate at arm's length with the executives they are meant to oversee. They give a richly detailed account of how pay practices--from option plans to retirement benefits--have decoupled compensation from performance and have camouflaged both the amount and performance-insensitivity of pay. Executives' unwonted influence over their compensation has hurt shareholders by increasing pay levels and, even more importantly, by leading to practices that dilute and distort managers' incentives. This book identifies basic problems with our current reliance on boards as guardians of shareholder interests. And the solution, the authors argue, is not merely to make these boards more independent of executives as recent reforms attempt to do. Rather, boards should also be made more dependent on shareholders by eliminating the arrangements that entrench directors and insulate them from their shareholders. A powerful critique of executive compensation and corporate governance, Pay without Performance points the way to restoring corporate integrity and improving corporate performance.
Download or read book Executive Compensation and Shareholder Value written by Jennifer Carpenter and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2013-04-17 with total page 159 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Executive compensation has gained widespread public attention in recent years, with the pay of top U.S. executives reaching unprecedented levels compared either with past levels, with the remuneration of top executives in other countries, or with the wages and salaries of typical employees. The extraordinary levels of executive compensation have been achieved at a time when U.S. public companies have realized substantial gains in stock market value. Many have cited this as evidence that U.S. executive compensation works well, rewarding managers who make difficult decisions that lead to higher shareholder values, while others have argued that the overly generous salaries and benefits bear little relation to company performance. Recent conceptual and empirical research permits for the first time a truly rigorous debate on these and related issues, which is the subject of this volume.
Download or read book Entrepreneurial Orientation and Strategic Leadership written by Brian S. Anderson and published by Springer Nature. This book was released on 2021-10-23 with total page 100 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book sits at the intersection of two lines of inquiry of critical importance to management researchers—what are the contributory factors to building an entrepreneurial company, and what is senior leadership’s role in this process? Inherently cross-disciplinary, it adopts a behavioral perspective and proposes a research model delineating how various strategic leadership variables influence a firm’s exhibition of entrepreneurial behaviors, captured by the entrepreneurial orientation (EO) construct. While EO research touches briefly on the role of the CEO senior leadership consideration, the field lacks an integrated perspective on how senior leadership decisions enable or constrain EO. To address this gap, the author proposes resource allocation decisions as the central mechanism through which a set of strategic leadership variables causally influence EO. He argues for the superiority of a behavioral view of EO and of strategic leadership, which stands in contrast to the attitudinal perspective on EO and the ex officio perspective on strategic leadership. Opening a rich new stream of inquiry on leadership antecedents to EO, this work will appeal to both entrepreneurship and leadership researchers, unpacking both research gaps and research questions concerning the role of the CEO and top management team, corporate boards, and emerging leadership challenges.
