Download or read book Vertical Restraints and Inter and Intrabrand Competition written by Tommy Staahl Gabrielsen and published by . This book was released on 1996 with total page 50 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Vertical Restrictions Limiting Intrabrand Competition written by American Bar Association. Task Force on Vertical Restrictions Limiting Intrabrand Competition and published by . This book was released on 1977 with total page 136 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Unobservable Vertical Restraints and Interbrand Competition written by Yeongjae Kang and published by . This book was released on 1998 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper presents a model of vertical restraints with unobservable contracts in a market where retailers compete in price and service. The equilibrium contracts under the franchise and the resale price maintenance arrangements are shown to differ in the way they lessen competition between retailers. The franchise contract is more effective for lessening competition in price while the RPM for collusion in service. Consequently, the equilibrium of the manufacturers' vertical restraint selection game depends on the nature of their strategic interaction. An increase in retailer's risk aversion and/or demand uncertainty favors RPM.

Download or read book Vertical Agreements and Competition Law written by Sandra Marco Colino and published by Bloomsbury Publishing. This book was released on 2010-01-02 with total page 222 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book focuses on the current legal framework for vertical agreements in the EU and the US. Over the last ten years, antitrust rules governing these agreements have undergone thorough reform. In the EU, the old sector-specific block exemptions were replaced by Regulation 2790/99, applicable to all sectors of the economy. In addition, changes introduced to the procedural rules have led to the decentralisation of Article 81(3) and the removal of the notification requirement. In like manner, in the US the Supreme Court has gradually taken vertical restraints out of the per se illegality rule. What Sylvania achieved in placing non-price vertical restraints under the rule of reason in the late 1970s, the Khan judgment did for maximum resale price maintenance in 1997, whilst most recently and most significantly in 2007 the Leegin case followed suit for minimum resale price maintenance. The book is divided into four chapters. The first chapter considers the 'double nature' of vertical agreements and the regulatory dilemma. The second chapter explores the most influential economic theories underpinning current regulatory frameworks, and how these theories shape antitrust policy. The third chapter questions the adequacy of the current economic analysis in recent EU and US legislation and court decisions. The fourth chapter analyses how this maturing economic analysis can be reconciled with what commentators and regulators have identified as a key role for competition policy, redressing assumed imbalances between dealers and manufacturers. The author concludes by querying the prevailing logic of protecting sectoral interests above the competitive process.

Download or read book EU and US Competition Law Divided in Unity written by Csongor István Nagy and published by Routledge. This book was released on 2016-04-22 with total page 253 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book examines the structure of the rule on restrictive agreements in the context of vertical intra-brand price and territorial restraints, analysing, comparing and evaluating their treatment in US antitrust and EU competition law. It examines the concept of 'agreement' as the threshold question of the rule on restrictive agreements, the structure and focus of antitrust/competition law analysis, the treatment of vertical intra-brand price and territorial restrictions and their place in the test of antitrust/competition law. The treatment of vertical intra-brand restraints is one of the most controversial issues of contemporary competition law and policy, and there are substantial differences between the world's two leading regimes in this regard. In the US, resale price fixing merits an effects-analysis, while in the EU it is prohibited almost outright. Likewise, territorial protection is treated laxly in the US, while in the EU absolute territorial protection - due to the single market imperative - is strictly prohibited. Using a novel approach of legal analysis, this book will be of interest to academics and scholars of business and commercial law, international and comparative law.

Download or read book Vertical Restraints and Interbrand Competition written by Tommy Staahl Gabrielsen and published by . This book was released on 1994 with total page 29 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Green Paper on Vertical Restraints in Ec Competition Policy written by Basav Sen and published by DIANE Publishing. This book was released on 1999-07 with total page 97 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Reviews EU policy towards vertical restraints -- agree. between producers & distributors that can be used pro-competitively to promote market integration & efficient dist. or anti-competitively to block integration & competition. Addresses the structure of distribution, economic analysis of vertical restraints & the internal market, current procedures & institutional framework, current rules for vertical restraints, & advantages of the present system. Makes a comparison of community law with member state & third country laws applicable to vertical restraints, examines the results of fact finding, & presents options based on the study analysis.

Download or read book Recognizing the Importance of Intrabrand Competition in High Technology Markets written by Esq. Colonna (Kyle) and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page 20 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: High technology markets are unique, particularly because they innovate at a significantly faster pace than other markets. Due to the increasing complexity of the technology products sold, consumers require adequate customer service in order to form informed decisions with respect to purchases. Current antitrust laws provide for special treatment regarding interbrand competition. However, an increase in interbrand competition may result in a decrease in intrabrand competition. The detrimental effect of a decrease in intrabrand competition is evident when vertical territorial restraints are imposed on large retailers that are lacking in the customer service department. Courts are lacking in uniformity and guidance regarding vertical territorial restraints and the application of the rule of reason. The Supreme Court provided some guidance in "Board of Trade of City of Chicago v. United States", but much of that guidance has gone all but unheeded. As a result, this Comment proposes a three-prong test to assist in defining the "peculiarity factor" set forth by the Supreme Court.

Download or read book Interbrand and Intrabrand Competition in Vertical Restrictions written by Hidehiko Nishiyama and published by . This book was released on 1984 with total page 124 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Resale Price Maintenance and Vertical Territorial Restrictions written by Barbora Jedlicková and published by Edward Elgar Publishing. This book was released on 2016-03-25 with total page 379 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Theoretical discussions among competition lawyers and economists on the approach to Resale resale Price price Maintenance maintenance (RPM) and Vertical vertical Territorial territorial Restrictions restrictions (VTR) have often caused controversy. However, commentators agree that there is a lack of comprehensive study surrounding the topic. This book explores these two forms of anticompetitive conduct from legal, historical, economical, and theoretical points of view, focusing on the EU and US experiences. The author expertly goes beyond the current legal practice to explain, among other things, what approach should apply to RPM and VTR, and why RPM and VTR are introduced in situations where procompetitive theories would not make economic sense, or do not apply in practice. The book takes account of economic values, such as efficiency and welfare, as well as other values, such as freedom, fairness and free competition. Scholars and students of law will find the book’s depth of legal, economic and historical analysis to be a rich contribution to the scholarship. This book will also be of use to EU and US practitioners, and enforcers dealing with RPM and VTR cases.

Download or read book Economic Analyses of Vertical Agreements written by Doris Hildebrand and published by Kluwer Law International B.V.. This book was released on 2005-01-01 with total page 146 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Since the EC Block Exemption Regulation (BER) went into force in June 2000, companies are required to undertake a self-assessment of the possible consequences of their vertical agreements that is, of agreements that arise in a channel of distribution between firms at different levels of trade or industry, i.e., between a manufacturer and wholesaler, between a supplier and customer, or between a licensor of technology and his licensee. Such an assessment can be extremely complex. Although the European Commission has issued regulatory guidelines to facilitate the self-assessment process, there can be little doubt that the in-depth analysis and guidance provided in this book will be greatly welcomed by business people and their counsel. Economic Analyses of Vertical Agreements clarifies the steps, tests, determinations, and evaluations entailed in assessing vertical agreements, especially when an individual examination under Article 81 EC Treaty is required (as it is for all companies with more than a 30% market share in a relevant market). Among the terms and factors thoroughly explained, from the various pertinent points of view, are the following: vertical restraints and their components;exclusive and selective distribution agreements;channel strategies;single branding;free rider rationale; and,the European structured rule of reason in Article 81 EC Treaty The presentation is particularly notable for its wide-ranging discussion of types of vertical restraints and combinations of vertical restraints and how each is impacted by the new vertical agreement rules. The author also discusses the relevant case law of the EC Courts. Companies doing business in Europe and their legal and economic advisers will find here an absorbingly detailed overview of requirements and procedures, a clear analysis against which to measure strategic choices, and an enormously useful handbook to consult at every turn for expert guidance through the assessment of their vertical agreements.

Download or read book Soft Drink Interbrand Competition Act written by United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary. Subcommittee on Antitrust, Monopoly, and Business Rights and published by . This book was released on 1980 with total page 264 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Pricing in Accordance with EC Competition Rules written by Daniel Müller and published by GRIN Verlag. This book was released on 2002-08-02 with total page 31 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Seminar paper from the year 2001 in the subject Law - European and International Law, Intellectual Properties, grade: 68% (entspr. 13 P.), Trinity College Dublin (-), course: Economic & Legal Aspects of Competition Policy, language: English, abstract: Price competition constitutes the most essential form of competition, as different prices for similar products promote the interchangeability of goods. In a competitive market, the price depends on the demand for the product. If there is little demand, the company will have to lower the price it can charge in order to compete with its rivals. Consumers who have choice are more likely to buy the product, which they think, is of good value. Therefore, to stay in the market, companies must seek to produce at minimum costs and to sell the product at a price, which includes a reasonable profit. The function of price competition is to keep prices down to the lowest and to encourage the movement of goods between the Member States . If a good product is sold at an inflated price, consumers might purchase a less appropriate product, which may not satisfy them. Thus price fixing, both horizontal and vertical, is the most obvious infringement of competition law . While horizontal agreements can eliminate inter-brand competition, price fixing between rivals, which also bind distributors (horizontal/vertical agreement) can restrict inter-brand as well as intra-brand competition. Mere vertical agreements, applied by suppliers individually, can cause horizontal effect as well, because it removes competition between distributors. Competition can easily be restricted from a position of dominance. In order to drive smaller companies out of the market or to prevent others from entering, a dominant undertaking can abuse its economic power and charge prices which other firms cannot compete with. The first Common Law country which had to deal with the issue of pricing, were the United States after the introduction of the Sherman Act 1890. In US v. Addyston Pipe and Steel Co. , the Supreme Court held pricing to be illegal per se under sec. 1 of the Sherman Act 1895 . An explanation for this holding can be found in Trenton Potteries : ′The power to fix prices [...] involves power to control the market and to fix arbitrary and unreasonable prices.′ [...]

Download or read book Department of Justice s Vertical Restraints Guidelines written by United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary and published by . This book was released on 1985 with total page 196 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Vertical Restraints Dealers with Power and Antitrust Policy written by Herbert Hovenkamp and published by . This book was released on 2010 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The Supreme Court's Leegin decision has now brought the rule of reason to all purely vertical intrabrand distribution restraints. But the rule of reason does not mean per se legality and occasions for anticompetitive vertically imposed restraints may still arise. Of all those that have been suggested the most plausible are vertical restraints imposed at the behest of a powerful dealer or group (cartel) of dealers. Although a vertical distribution restraint resembles a dealer cartel in that both limit intraband competition, a manufacturer restraining the distribution of its product shuns the excess dealer profits a dealer cartel would seek. Accordingly, a knowledgeable and un-coerced manufacturer who restricts rivalry among dealers must do so for some other reason, such as to facilitate dealer services. In fact, however, manufacturers have been known to restrain intrabrand competition - especially through resale price maintenance - not to achieve more effective distribution but rather to appease dealer interests in excess profits. Whatever the social benefits of a distribution restraint that serves a manufacturer's self-interest, a competition-limiting restraint extracted by dealer power can be harmful. Vertical restraints reflecting dealer power could well be ignored by antitrust law if they were rare, insignificant in magnitude, or readily detected and remedied under other branches of antitrust law. But we doubt that dealer power is that rare and are troubled by an apparent history of price-enhancing resale price maintenance for the benefit of dealers. At least some of the claimed justifications for it actually reflect dealer power, and antitrust rules controlling horizontal combinations cannot themselves prevent those distribution restraints that result from the power of a single dealer. Requiring the plaintiff to prove that the challenged restraint is explained solely and exclusively on cartel, dealer power, or other non-efficiency grounds would be an attractive policy option for those who think such instances are rare. This option allows prompt validation of many such restraints. On the other hand, requiring the defenders to offer a plausible and legitimate business reason for every restraint would allow the antitrust tribunal easily to condemn those restraints obviously lacking justification but would complicate many cases in which dealer power is unlikely. Depending on the restraint, challengers might be required to prove specified indicia of dealer power, or, for legally less favored restraints, such power might be presumed subject to rebuttal by disproof of the same specified indicia. In sum, presumptions must be developed that will both clarify and simplify the fact finding process.

Download or read book Vertical Agreements written by Paul Taylor and published by . This book was released on 2000 with total page 246 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This volume provides a review of reforms of the EC's traditional treatment of vertical agreements.

Download or read book Brands Competition Law and IP written by Deven R. Desai and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2015-07-20 with total page 281 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Introduces the emerging field of brand law and explores its interaction with the economics of modern branding.