Download or read book Law and Economics of Vertical Integration and Control written by Roger D. Blair and published by Academic Press. This book was released on 2014-05-10 with total page 224 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Law and Economics of Vertical Integration and Control focuses on the processes, methodologies, and approaches involved in the law and economics of vertical integration and control. The publication first elaborates on transaction costs, fixed proportions and contractual alternatives, and variable proportions and contractual alternatives. Discussions focus on sales revenue royalties, ownership integration, output royalties, important product-specific services, successive monopoly, advantages and limitations of internal transfers, and transaction cost determinants. The text then examines vertical integration under uncertainty and vertical integration without contractual alternatives. The book ponders on legal treatment of ownership integration and per se illegal contractual controls. Topics include tying arrangements, public policy assessment, resale price maintenance, vertical integration and the Sherman Act, market foreclosure doctrine, and the 1982 Merger Guidelines. The text also takes a look at contractual controls that are not illegal per se, alternative legal rules, and antitrust policy. The publication is a dependable reference for researchers interested in the law and economics of vertical integration and control.
Download or read book Vertical Integration and Monopoly Regulation written by David Dayan and published by . This book was released on 1981 with total page 616 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Vertical Integration and Regulation written by Christoph Kleineberg and published by Springer. This book was released on 2019-01-17 with total page 62 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book investigates under which circumstances vertical unbundling can lead to a more efficient market result. The assessment is based on an interdisciplinary approach combining law and economics. Drawing on the assessment, circumstances are subsequently presented under which unbundling might become necessary. Additionally, less severe means of regulatory intervention are suggested in order to protect competition. Given its scope, the book is chiefly intended for scholars and practitioners in the field of economic policy and regulation law; in addition, it will give interested members of the public a unique opportunity to learn about the underlying rationales of regulation law and regulation economics.
Download or read book Regulation of Access to Vertically integrated Natural Monopolies written by and published by Ministry of Commerce. This book was released on 1995-01-01 with total page 120 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: "An analysis of the experience of telecommunications interconnection negotiations in New Zealand, the Privy Council decision in the case of Telecom Corporatin and Clear Communications, and the implications for the regulation of access to vertically-integrated natural monopoly industries in New Zealand"--P. iii.
Download or read book Vertical Control of Markets written by Frederick R. Warren-Boulton and published by . This book was released on 1978 with total page 248 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book The Antitrust Paradox written by Robert Bork and published by . This book was released on 2021-02-22 with total page 536 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The most important book on antitrust ever written. It shows how antitrust suits adversely affect the consumer by encouraging a costly form of protection for inefficient and uncompetitive small businesses.
Download or read book Vertical Integration and Monopoly Regulation written by Anastassios Gentzoglanis and published by . This book was released on 1981 with total page 208 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Government and Business written by David L. Kaserman and published by Harcourt Brace College Publishers. This book was released on 1995 with total page 664 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book International Economic Association Monopoly and Competition Regulation written by Edward H. Chamberlin and published by Springer. This book was released on 2015-12-31 with total page 556 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Vertical Mergers and Competition with a Regulated Bottleneck Monopoly written by Alexander Galetovic P. and published by . This book was released on 2004 with total page 22 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Monopoly and competition and their regulation written by International Economic Association and published by . This book was released on 1954 with total page 576 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Vertical Integration and Media Regulation in the New Economy written by Christopher S. Yoo and published by . This book was released on 2008 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Recent mergers and academic commentary have placed renewed focus on what has long been one of the central issues in media policy: whether media conglomerates can use vertical integration to harm competition. This Article seeks to move past previous studies, which have explored limited aspects of this issue, and apply the full sweep of modern economic theory to evaluate the regulation of vertical integration in media-related industries. It does so initially by applying the basic static efficiency analyses of vertical integration developed under the Chicago and post-Chicago Schools of antitrust law and economics to three industries: broadcasting, cable television, and cable modem systems. An analysis of the market structure of these industries reveals that the preconditions recognized by both Schools as necessary for vertical integration to harm competition do not exist. In addition, the cost structure of these industries suggests that vertical integration may well lead to efficiencies sufficient to justify allowing such integration to occur. A dynamic efficiency analysis also suggests that attempts to regulate vertical integration in these industries are probably misguided. Growing reliance on compelled access to redress the problems purportedly caused by vertical integration threatens to dampen investment incentives in technologically dynamic industries in which such incentives are particularly important. Not only does forcing a monopolist to share an input deviate from the system of well-defined property rights needed to promote efficient levels of investment, it also deprives new entrants seeking to compete directly with the supposed monopoly bottleneck of their natural strategic partners. The Article also engages a complex web of arguments involving the extent to which technological innovation is affected by market concentration, standardization, and network externalities. A close review of the economic literature reveals that the relationship between these factors is too ambiguous to support the type of simple policy inference needed to prohibit vertical integration as a regulatory matter. The Article concludes with an analysis of the intellectual and institutional obstacles for adopting a more integrated economic approach to vertical integration in these industries.
Download or read book Monopoly and Competition and Their Regulation written by International Economic Association and published by . This book was released on 1954 with total page 576 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Vertical Integration and Sabotage with a Regulated Bottleneck Monopoly written by Álvaro E. Bustos and published by . This book was released on 2017 with total page 46 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In this paper we systematically study the vertical integration and sabotage decisions of a regulated bottleneck monopoly that sells access to independent downstream firms. Our results reconciliate a set of seemingly contradictory findings of the literature. We show that unless the monopoly's subsidiary is implausible more efficient than the independent firms, vertical integration never benefits consumers. Moreover, sabotage may prompt inefficient vertical integration. In addition, we show that the intensity of sabotage either depends on a relation between the market share of the subsidiary and the elasticity of the derived demand for access or a standard Lerner condition augmented by the direct cost of sabotage. More specifically, if the subsidiary and independent firms coexist in equilibrium, then the intensity of sabotage increases with the subsidiary's size and the intensity of economies of scope but if the monopoly optimally excludes rivals then intensity of sabotage decreases on these same parameters.
Download or read book Using Market Structure to Regulate a Vertically Integrated Monopolist written by Sang Hyup Lee and published by . This book was released on 2016 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A natural monopolist whose cost is private information produces a good which is combined with another good that can be produced by the monopolist or by other firms. The agency that regulates the monopolist can impose any of several different market structures in the industry: integrated monopoly, vertical separation with free entry downstream, or liberalization downstream (both integrated and independent production). When several firms produce downstream, a Cournot quantity-setting game with free entry determines the market price. We derive the optimal contracts to offer the monopolist under all three market structures and examine the influence of downstream cost differences on access prices.We then study the optimal regulatory policy where the regulator can condition the downstream market structure on the monopolist's cost report to the regulator. The optimal regulatory policy awards a monopoly to a low-cost upstream firm, but requires free entry downstream if the monopolist reports high upstream costs. Thus, the choice of market structure is an additional tool to limit rent extraction by the monopolist. Simulation analysis reveals the possibility of significant welfare gains from this additional regulatory tool.
Download or read book Market Dominance and Antitrust Policy written by Michael A. Utton and published by Edward Elgar Publishing. This book was released on 2005-01-01 with total page 342 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Market dominance - encompassing single firm dominance, overt and tacit collusion, mergers and vertical restraints - raises many complex analytical and policy issues, all of which continue to be the subject of theoretical research and policy reform. This second edition of a popular and comprehensive text extends the arguments and combines an analysis of the issues with a discussion of actual policy and case studies. This new edition addresses the recent fundamental changes in antitrust law, especially in the UK and the EU, and reviews some high profile and controversial cases such as the Boeing-McDonnell Douglas merger and the Microsoft monopoly. The author moves on to deal with several unresolved questions including the conflicts between trade and antitrust policy, the foreign take-over of domestic assets and extra-territorial claims made by certain countries.
Download or read book Natural Monopolies in Digital Platform Markets written by Francesco Ducci and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2020-07-23 with total page 203 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Competition policy debates on digital platform markets are often premised on the idea that market fragmentation and the standard forces of competition and entry may provide a potential solution to excessive concentration and market power. In this work, Francesco Ducci provides readers with a different perspective based on the theoretical lens of natural monopoly. Ducci explores this framework through the development of three case studies on horizontal search, e-commerce marketplaces, and ride-hailing platforms, investigating the strength and limit of potential (and often heterogeneous) sources of natural monopoly at play in each industry. Building on these case studies, the book then derives from the application of the natural monopoly framework general policy implications for digital industries by identifying the respective institutional flaws and shortcomings of ex ante and ex post approaches to market power as one of the central challenges in digital platform markets.
