Download or read book Verification of Arms Reductions written by Jürgen Altmann and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2012-12-06 with total page 239 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Anybody concerned about the maintenance of peace in our world, and in prospects of reaching agreements on arms control and disarmament, is bound to be interested in one of the key pre-conditions for related international treaties: the verification of compliance with such treaties. This book presents an up-to-date exposition of the latest developments in science and practice of international verification. It contains an account of the experience with new practical results of scientific research, devoted to solving verification problems in areas where agreements have not yet been concluded. The authors are scientists and practitioners from governments and research institutes in East and West. This book is required reading for anybody interested in the field: especially for decision-makers, government and military experts, natural scientists, technologists, those working in political and historical science. Among the topics covered are: INF Treaty, nuclear test ban, control of mobile missiles, and fissile material, demilitarization of space, stability and reductions of conventional forces, ban on chemical weapons. From the Reviews: "Verfication of Arms Reductions is packed with information and analysis which is vital for arms-control students, negotiators and other practitioners. The strength of the book lies in the science and technology contributions, but there are comprehensive political analyses also which have been written for longevity and are unlikely to become dated too quickly."

Download or read book The Challenge for Arms Control Verification in the Post New START World written by and published by . This book was released on 2012 with total page 25 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Nuclear weapon arms control treaty verification is a key aspect of any agreement between signatories to establish that the terms and conditions spelled out in the treaty are being met. Historically, arms control negotiations have focused more on the rules and protocols for reducing the numbers of warheads and delivery systems - sometimes resorting to complex and arcane procedures for counting forces - in an attempt to address perceived or real imbalances in a nation's strategic posture that could lead to instability. Verification procedures are generally defined in arms control treaties and supporting documents and tend to focus on technical means and measures designed to ensure that a country is following the terms of the treaty and that it is not liable to engage in deception or outright cheating in an attempt to circumvent the spirit and the letter of the agreement. As the Obama Administration implements the articles, terms, and conditions of the recently ratified and entered-into-force New START treaty, there are already efforts within and outside of government to move well below the specified New START levels of 1550 warheads, 700 deployed strategic delivery vehicles, and 800 deployed and nondeployed strategic launchers (Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) silos, Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) tubes on submarines, and bombers). A number of articles and opinion pieces have appeared that advocate for significantly deeper cuts in the U.S. nuclear stockpile, with some suggesting that unilateral reductions on the part of the U.S. would help coax Russia and others to follow our lead. Papers and studies prepared for the U.S. Department of Defense and at the U.S. Air War College have also been published, suggesting that nuclear forces totaling no more than about 300 warheads would be sufficient to meet U.S. national security and deterrence needs. (Davis 2011, Schaub and Forsyth 2010) Recent articles by James M. Acton and others suggest that the prospects for maintaining U.S. security and minimizing the chances of nuclear war, while deliberately reducing stockpiles to a few hundred weapons, is possible but not without risk. While the question of the appropriate level of cuts to U.S. nuclear forces is being actively debated, a key issue continues to be whether verification procedures are strong enough to ensure that both the U.S. and Russia are fulfilling their obligations under the current New Start treaty and any future arms reduction treaties. A recent opinion piece by Henry Kissinger and Brent Scowcroft (2012) raised a number of issues with respect to governing a policy to enhance strategic stability, including: in deciding on force levels and lower numbers, verification is crucial. Particularly important is a determination of what level of uncertainty threatens the calculation of stability. At present, that level is well within the capabilities of the existing verification systems. We must be certain that projected levels maintain - and when possible, reinforce - that confidence. The strengths and weaknesses of the New START verification regime should inform and give rise to stronger regimes for future arms control agreements. These future arms control agreements will likely need to include other nuclear weapons states and so any verification regime will need to be acceptable to all parties. Currently, China is considered the most challenging party to include in any future arms control agreement and China's willingness to enter into verification regimes such as those implemented in New START may only be possible when it feels it has reached nuclear parity with the U.S. and Russia. Similarly, in keeping with its goals of reaching peer status with the U.S. and Russia, Frieman (2004) suggests that China would be more willing to accept internationally accepted and applied verification regimes rather than bilateral ones. The current verification protocols specified in the New START treaty are considered as the baseline case and are contrasted with possible alternative verification protocols that could be effective in a post-New START era of significant reductions in U.S. and other countries nuclear stockpiles. Of particular concern is the possibility of deception and breakout when declared and observed numbers of weapons are below the level considered to pose an existential threat to the U.S. In a regime of very low stockpile numbers, 'traditional' verification protocols as currently embodied in the New START treaty might prove less than adequate. I introduce and discuss a number of issues that need to be considered in future verification protocols, many of which do not have immediate solutions and so require further study. I also discuss alternatives and enhancements to traditional verification protocols, for example, confidence building measures such as burden sharing against the common threat of weapon of mass destruction (WMD) terrorism, joint research and development.

Download or read book Arms Control Verification and the New Role of On site Inspection written by Lewis A. Dunn and published by Free Press. This book was released on 1990 with total page 296 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Since enactment of the INF Treaty, on-site inspection to monitor compliance has come to figure prominently in negotiations over strategic arms reductions, conventional force reductions, and specific weapons bans. This volume offers many perspectives on the future of on-site inspection in arms control. Experts in the field offer their evaluations of what on-site inspection can and cannot contribute to the realization of US arms control and national security goals in the coming decade. Annotation copyrighted by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR

Download or read book On site Inspection for Arms Control written by Richard L. Shearer and published by . This book was released on 1984 with total page 84 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty START written by Mark M. Lowenthal and published by . This book was released on 1991 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Reversing the Arms Race written by Frank Von Hippel and published by Routledge. This book was released on 1990 with total page 450 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: First Published in 1990. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

Download or read book Challenges Of Verification written by Heinz Gaertner and published by Routledge. This book was released on 2019-05-20 with total page 109 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Heinz Gaertner argues in this Occasional Paper, one area of arms control in which the NNA and smaller European states can make a significant contribution is verification. This study explores the possibilities for the smaller nations of Europe to make positive contributions to the verification of reductions in conventional forces and arms, a chemica

Download or read book Verification of Nuclear Arms Reductions written by and published by . This book was released on 2009 with total page 12 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Unconventional Approaches to Conventional Arms Control Verification written by John Grin and published by . This book was released on 1990 with total page 304 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Future Verification Challenges for Nuclear Arms Reductions written by and published by . This book was released on 2013 with total page 12 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Nuclear Non proliferation and Arms Control Verification written by Irmgard Niemeyer and published by Springer Nature. This book was released on 2020-03-12 with total page 449 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book strives to take stock of current achievements and existing challenges in nuclear verification, identify the available information and gaps that can act as drivers for exploring new approaches to verification strategies and technologies. With the practical application of the systems concept to nuclear disarmament scenarios and other, non-nuclear verification fields, it investigates, where greater transparency and confidence could be achieved in pursuit of new national or international nonproliferation and arms reduction efforts. A final discussion looks at how, in the absence of formal government-to-government negotiations, experts can take practical steps to advance the technical development of these concepts.

Download or read book Measurement Techniques for the Verification of Excess Weapons Materials written by and published by . This book was released on 1998 with total page 8 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The end of the superpower arms race has resulted in an unprecedented reduction in stockpiles of deployed nuclear weapons. Numerous proposals have been put forward and actions have been taken to ensure the irreversibility of nuclear arms reductions, including unilateral initiatives such as those made by President Clinton in September 1993 to place fissile materials no longer needed for a deterrent under international inspection, and bilateral and multilateral measures currently being negotiated. For the technologist, there is a unique opportunity to develop the technical means to monitor nuclear materials that have been declared excess to nuclear weapons programs, to provide confidence that reductions are taking place and that the released materials are not being used again for nuclear explosive programs. However, because of the sensitive nature of these materials, a fundamental conflict exists between the desire to know that the bulk materials or weapon components in fact represent evidence of warhead reductions, and treaty commitments and national laws that require the protection of weapons design information. This conflict presents a unique challenge to technologists. The flow of excess weapons materials, from deployed warheads through storage, disassembly, component storage, conversion to bulk forms, and disposition, will be described in general terms. Measurement approaches based on the detection of passive or induced radiation will be discussed along with the requirement to protect sensitive information from release to unauthorized parties. Possible uses of measurement methods to assist in the verification of arms reductions will be described. The concept of measuring attributes of items rather than quantitative mass-based inventory verification will be discussed along with associated information-barrier concepts required to protect sensitive information.

Download or read book The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty and Its Verification written by David B. Thomson and published by . This book was released on 1992 with total page 66 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: From the John Holmes Library collection.

Download or read book Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties START I II written by Amy F. Woolf and published by . This book was released on 1996 with total page 15 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Verification Technologies Measures for Monitoring Compliance with the START Treaty written by Thomas Karas and published by DIANE Publishing. This book was released on 2008-07 with total page 23 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Report issued just before a Treaty between the U.S. and the Soviet Union on Strategic Arms Reductions was due to come before the Senate early in 1991 for its consent. The Senate Foreign Relations and House Foreign Affairs Comm. asked for a study centering on the technologies and techniques of monitoring the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, still under negotiation. This is the summary of the first of the reports to be produced by that study. Contents: Context for This Report; Overview of the Arms Control Monitoring Process; Assessing Monitoring Needs and Capabilities; Monitoring Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles; Monitoring Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles; and Monitoring Bombers and Air-Launched Cruise Missiles. Illus.

Download or read book A Handbook of Verification Procedures written by Frank Barnaby and published by . This book was released on 1990 with total page 376 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: An examination of how, in practice, the effective verification of various arms control treaties - including a comprehensive test ban treaty, conventional forces reductions, a fissile material cut-off and a freeze on the development and production of nuclear weapons - can be achieved.

Download or read book Rethinking the Unthinkable written by Ivo H. Daalder and published by Routledge. This book was released on 2014-02-04 with total page 277 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Rethinking the Unthinkable examines the future direction of nuclear arms control in the post-Cold War security environment. Believing that the new environment requires a radical rethinking of the purpose and role of nuclear weapons in international politics, the contributors address many fundamental issues influencing further US, Russian and European nuclear arms reductions. This volume is a product of the Project on Rethinking Arms Control, sponsored by the Center for International and Security Studies in Maryland.