Download or read book Understanding an Insurgency Achieving the United States Strategic Objectives in Afghanistan written by and published by . This book was released on 2009 with total page 57 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The problems in Afghanistan are not simple and there is no single solution. Indeed, the problems in Afghanistan are not limited to Afghanistan. Instead, the problems extend to all of Afghanistan' immediate neighbors as well as, among others, the United States, NATO, Russia, Iran, and India. However, perhaps nowhere is the problem more pronounced than in Pakistan. Pakistan' relationships with Afghanistan and the rest of the world are heavily influenced by Pakistan's fears that it is isolated against an existential threat in India and its distrust of the United States. This fear has led Pakistan to pursue policies that have further complicated the situation in Afghanistan and created domestic turmoil that causes Pakistan to view the Taliban and its border region with Afghanistan from a different perspective than the United States. Given the specific context of Afghanistan, the United States and its allies must utilize both direct and indirect approaches and capitalize on their diplomatic, information operations, military, and economic resources in order to achieve its strategic objectives in the region. With respect to diplomacy, the United States must engage with Pakistan and the other nations in the region in order to assuage Pakistani fears of isolation at the hands of India and its distrust of the United States. The information instrument should be directed at the citizens and governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan, the Taliban and al Qaeda, the citizens and governments of the other Central Asian nations, and major regional players such as the European Union (EU), NATO, Saudi Arabia, China, Iran, and Russia. These messages should focus on delegitimizing al Qaeda's ideology and actions; separating the Taliban, which is a regional insurgency, from al Qaeda, which is a global insurgency; espousing a U.S. position that is oriented on a long-term commitment to.
Download or read book U S Strategy for Pakistan and Afghanistan written by Richard Lee Armitage and published by Council on Foreign Relations. This book was released on 2010 with total page 83 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The Council on Foreign Relations sponsors Independent Task Forces to assess issues of current and critical importance to U.S. foreign policy and provide policymakers with concrete judgments and recommendations. Diverse in backgrounds and perspectives, Task Force members aim to reach a meaningful consensus on policy through private and non-partisan deliberations. Once launched, Task Forces are independent of CFR and solely responsible for the content of their reports. Task Force members are asked to join a consensus signifying that they endorse "the general policy thrust and judgments reached by the group, though not necessarily every finding and recommendation." Each Task Force member also has the option of putting forward an additional or a dissenting view. Members' affiliations are listed for identification purposes only and do not imply institutional endorsement. Task Force observers participate in discussions, but are not asked to join the consensus. --Book Jacket.
Download or read book The Nature of Insurgency in Afghanistan and the Regional Power Politics written by Zahid Nawaz Mann and published by . This book was released on 2010 with total page 117 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This study explores the Afghan imbroglio from two angles: understanding the peculiar nature of insurgency being faced by the U.S. and NATO, and the ongoing power politics and conflicting interests of Afghanistan's neighbors and other important actors in the conflict. After nine years of a bloody Afghan conflict, which has engulfed the neighboring nuclear armed Pakistan as well, the U.S. is far from achieving its desired objectives in Afghanistan and the region. The U.S. strategy employed, so far, reflects serious deficiencies that encourage the insurgents to regroup for an organized resistance against the world's mightiest military coalition. Two important factors generally ignored by many analysts are: the impact of outstanding regional disputes and politics on the war, and the willingness of important actors in the conflict to help achieve its resolution. Due to the region's geo-strategic significance, major powers have conflicting economic and political interests beyond just fighting al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan. By developing a better understanding of the nature of insurgency in Afghanistan and of the broader regional politics, the international community may yet find a respectable solution to an extremely complex situation in Afghanistan, a country surrounded by nuclear-armed rivals.
Download or read book War in Afghanistan written by Catherine Dale and published by Nimble Books. This book was released on 2010-06 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Discusses the Afghan War from its inception to the present date and examines a number of key strategic and operational issues facing the U.S. Government regarding its further engagement in the war.
Download or read book Corruption in Conflict written by John F. Sopko and published by . This book was released on 2016-11-23 with total page 164 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This report examines how the U.S. government -- primarily the Departments of Defense (DOD), State, Treasury, and Justice (DOJ), and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) -- understood the risks of corruption in Afghanistan, how the U.S. response to corruption evolved, and the effectiveness of that response. The report identifies lessons to inform U.S. policies and actions at the onset of and throughout a contingency operation and makes recommendations for both legislative and executive branch action. This analysis reveals that corruption substantially undermined the U.S. mission in Afghanistan from the very beginning of Operation Enduring Freedom. It concludes that failure to effectively address the problem means that U.S. reconstruction programs, at best, will continue to be subverted by systemic corruption and, at worst, will fail. Figures and tables.. This is a print on demand report.
Download or read book War Will and Warlords written by and published by Government Printing Office. This book was released on with total page 292 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Compares the reasons for and the responses to the insurgencies in Afghanistan and Pakistan since October 2001. Also examines the lack of security and the support of insurgent groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan since the 1970s that explain the rise of the Pakistan-supported Taliban. Explores the border tribal areas between the two countries and how they influence regional stability and U.S. security. Explains the implications of what happened during this 10-year period to provide candid insights on the prospects and risks associated with bringing a durable stability to this area of the world.
Download or read book Unity of Effort written by Christopher Jon Lamb and published by DIANE Publishing. This book was released on 2009 with total page 12 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This study ascribes the lack of progress in Afghanistan more to forces and donors working at cross-purposes than to insufficient resources. The authors call for an indirect approach that emphasizes working through indigenous forces. They cite U.S. special operations forces (SOF) failure to support counterinsurgency objectives as an example of military units working at cross-purposes. The authors recommend three ways to improve unity of effort: all Operation ¿Enduring Freedom¿ forces (except SOF) should be merged into one common mission with international forces; decisionmaking authority between U.S. military and civilian leaders should be clarified; and SOF operations must focus on the indirect approach. Illustrations.
Download or read book Strategic Framework for U S Efforts in Afghanistan written by Charles Michael Johnson and published by DIANE Publishing. This book was released on 2010-10 with total page 15 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The U.S. and its international partners from over 40 nations have been engaged in efforts to secure, stabilize, and rebuild Afghanistan since 2001. In an effort to establish clear and specific U.S. strategic goals, the President of the U.S., in March 2009, outlined the U.S. Strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan. This strategy emphasizes a strategic goal to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan and prevent their return. This report: (1) identifies and describes key U.S. and international strategies and plans that collectively guide U.S. efforts in Afghanistan; (2) provides examples and information about key efforts to assist Afghanistan; and (3) identifies oversight issues that Congress may wish to consider in its work.
Download or read book What Went Wrong in Afghanistan written by Metin Gurcan and published by Helion and Company. This book was released on 2016-08-19 with total page 139 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Since 20 December 2001 - the date which marked the authorization of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to assist the Afghan Government - hundreds of thousands of coalition soldiers from around 50 different states have physically been and served in Afghanistan. Roughly 20 rotation periods have been experienced; billions of US dollars have been spent; and almost 3,500 coalition soldiers and 7,400 Afghani security personnel have fallen for Afghanistan. In this badly-managed success story, the true determiner of both tactical outcomes on the ground and strategic results was always the tribal and rural parts of Muslim-populated Afghanistan. Although there has emerged a vast literature on counterinsurgency theories and tactics, we still lack reliable information about the motivations and aspirations of the residents of Tribalised Rural Muslim Environments (TRMEs) that make up most of Afghanistan. The aim of this book is to describe some on-the-ground problems of counterinsurgency (COIN) efforts in TRMEs - specifically in rural Afghanistan - and then to propose how these efforts might be improved. Along the way, it will be necessary to challenge many current assumptions about the conduct of counterinsurgency in Afghanistan. Most generally, the book will show how counterinsurgency succeeds or fails at the local level (at the level of tactical decisions by small-unit leaders) and that these decisions cannot be successful without understanding the culture and perspective of those who live in TRMEs. Although engaging issues of culture, the author is not an anthropologist or an academic of any kind. He is a Muslim who spent his childhood in a TRME - a remote village in Turkey - and he offers his observations on the basis of 15 years' worth of field experience as a Turkish Special Forces officer serving in rural Iraq, Turkey, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Afghanistan. Cultures in these areas are not the same, but there are sufficient similarities to suggest some overall characteristics of TRMEs and some general problems of COIN efforts in these environments. In summary, this book not only challenges some of the fundamentals of traditional counterinsurgency wisdom and emphasizes the importance of the tactical level - a rarely-studied field from the COIN perspective - but also blends the firsthand field experiences of the author with deep analyses. In this sense, it is not solely an autobiography, but something much more.
Download or read book Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan written by Seth G. Jones and published by Rand Corporation. This book was released on 2008 with total page 176 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This study explores the nature of the insurgency in Afghanistan, the key challenges and successes of the U.S.-led counterinsurgency campaign, and the capabilities necessary to wage effective counterinsurgency operations. By examining the key lessons from all insurgencies since World War II, it finds that most policymakers repeatedly underestimate the importance of indigenous actors to counterinsurgency efforts. The U.S. should focus its resources on helping improve the capacity of the indigenous government and indigenous security forces to wage counterinsurgency. It has not always done this well. The U.S. military-along with U.S. civilian agencies and other coalition partners-is more likely to be successful in counterinsurgency warfare the more capable and legitimate the indigenous security forces (especially the police), the better the governance capacity of the local state, and the less external support that insurgents receive.
Download or read book Reconstructing the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces Lessons from the U S Experience in Afghanistan written by Special Inspector for Afghanistan Reconstruction (U.S.) and published by U.S. Independent Agencies and Commissions. This book was released on 2017-08 with total page 277 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This publication is the second in a series of lessons learned reports which examine how the U.S. government and Departments of Defense, State, and Justice carried out reconstruction programs in Afghanistan. In particular, the report analyzes security sector assistance (SSA) programs to create, train and advise the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) between 2002 and 2016. This publication concludes that the effort to train the ANDSF needs to continue, and provides recommendations for the SSA programs to be improved, based on lessons learned from careful analysis of real reconstruction situations in Afghanistan. The publication states that the United States was never prepared to help create Afghan police and military forces capable of protecting that country from internal and external threats. It is the hope of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), John F. Sopko, that this publication, and other SIGAR reports will create a body of work that can help provide reasonable solutions to help United States agencies and military forces improve reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan. Related items: Counterterrorism publications can be found here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/catalog/counterterrorism Counterinsurgency publications can be found here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/catalog/counterinsurgency Warfare & Military Strategy publications can be found here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/catalog/warfare-military-strategy Afghanistan War publications can be found here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/catalog/afghanistan-war
Download or read book Defining Success in the War on Terrorism written by U. S. Army US Army School for Advanced Military Studies and published by CreateSpace. This book was released on 2014-10-30 with total page 62 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center Towers and the Pentagon The United States conducted combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The U.S. government declared the major combat operations a success and important steps in the war on terrorism. Although it is true that the Taliban and Al Qaeda have been routed, the two groups have reorganized, adapted and are continuing to fight. Al Qaeda's operations were disrupted, yet the organization remains a viable transnational threat. Success in the war on terrorism is, therefore, more than the sum of battles and engagements. To define success in the war on terrorism, measures of success must be determined to achieve the strategic goals. Terrorism is not a unique phenomenon. It is merely a tactic of political violence to achieve a political end. An examination of past insurgencies reveals terrorism as a tactic to produce affects against the ruling government or the populace. Defining success in the war on terrorism requires an understanding of both the insurgent and terrorist operational environment in order to determine success criteria. Dr. Max G. Manwaring developed a theory on counterinsurgencies through an examination of 43 post World War II insurgencies. Manwaring's paradigm provides a model, which is applicable to measuring success in the war on terrorism. While the model is a useful tool for defining success, it requires a thorough understanding of the terrorist and insurgent operational environment. Through examination of two case studies, the Philippines, 1948-1954 and Colombia, 1966 to present, the research assessed the Manwaring paradigm. The comparison revealed the complex operational environment and suggested other relevant factors, not addressed by Dr. Manwaring, for defining success in the war on terrorism. Those factors a systems approach to analyzing insurgencies and terrorist organizations and consideration of political primacy in the use of military and interagency capabilities. There is a significant body of knowledge on insurgencies and terrorism that can be applied to combating terrorism. There is a pressing need for the institutional military to educate the force on insurgency and terrorism. Insurgent and terrorist organizations are complex adaptive systems, which require a holistic campaign plan to defeat. Introducing systems thinking into the military education system will provide planners with the conceptual framework to analyze and develop coherent operational plans to achieve the strategic objectives in the war on terrorism.
Download or read book The U S Strategy in Afghanistan and Iraq written by Committee on Armed Services United States Senate and published by . This book was released on 2011-09-22 with total page 92 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The strategy the President charted in December 2009 in his West Point speech is on track to achieving its objectives. These include disrupting, dismantling, and degrading Al Qaeda and training the Afghan security forces to provide security for their country so that Afghanistan will not again serve as a safe haven for extremists plotting attacks against us. As outlined in the West Point speech, the President's strategy called for a surge of an additional 33,000 U.S. troops to Afghanistan to break the insurgency's momentum and help build the capacity of the Afghan security forces; and he stated at that same time that 18 months later, these U.S. surge troops would begin to come home.
Download or read book U S Policy and Strategy Toward Afghanistan After 2014 written by Strategic Studies Strategic Studies Institute and published by CreateSpace. This book was released on 2014-12-17 with total page 58 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: After nearly 13 years, over 2,200 lives lost, and over U.S.$650 billion spent since the United States began its air campaign against Afghanistan's Taliban in October 2001, the end of the long American military campaign in Afghanistan appears to be in sight. Despite the cost and challenges, the reality that Afghanistan still ranks consistently in the bottom 10 countries for human development and corruption, and the uneven but clear progress that the country has made in many areas, the United States will soon scale down its involvement in Afghanistan, and quite possibly pull all uniformed military forces out of Afghanistan quite rapidly. Additionally, the widely reported corruption that exists throughout the Afghan government, the resilient Taliban-led insurgency, and a litany of Western blunders, mishaps, and tragedies have all helped to undermine Western interest in the Afghan War. Recent surveys suggest that public support for the war is dwindling in Western and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member countries, with 75 percent of European respondents and 68 percent of U.S. respondents supporting either withdrawal or immediate troop reductions according to the German Marshall Fund Annual Transatlantic Trends Survey. Alternatively, perhaps the declining interest in Afghanistan is connected to a widespread popular and policymaker belief, especially since the 2011 Abbottabad raid (Operation NEPTUNE SPEAR) that killed Osama bin Laden, that U.S. and NATO war aims in Afghanistan have been achieved, or at least achieved to a sufficient degree given the current fiscal and political climate. This monograph answers six key questions about U.S. policy and strategy for Afghanistan: 1. Did the United States have or develop critical national interests in Afghanistan and its immediate neighborhood on or because of the events of September 11, 2001? 2. Was overall U.S. strategy to pursue those interests successful and appropriate? 3. What outside conditions shaping U.S. involvement in Afghanistan exist now? 4. Do new vital and/or important national interests not met by our earlier strategies exist in this region? 5. What strategy(s) should the United States adopt or emphasize to achieve any vital and/or important national interests in/around Afghanistan? 6. What risks and challenges are associated with new policies and/or strategies?
Download or read book Reconciliation in Afghanistan written by Michael Semple and published by US Institute of Peace Press. This book was released on 2009 with total page 130 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In this timely and thorough volume, Michael Semple analyzes the rationale and effectiveness post-2001 attempts at reconciliation in Afghanistan. He explains the poor performance of these attempts and argues that rethinking is necessary if reconciliation is to help revive prospects for peace and stability in Afghanistan.
Download or read book Understanding War in Afghanistan written by Joseph J. Collins and published by . This book was released on 2011 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Afghanistan Counterinsurgency and the Indirect Approach written by Thomas H. Henriksen and published by . This book was released on 2010 with total page 77 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: "In exploring Counterinsurgency and the Indirect Approach, Dr. Thomas Henriksen assesses several cases where the United States has employed an Indirect Approach toward achieving strategic objectives, and he suggests where this concept has landed short of expectations. In the cases of Vietnam, Somalia, the Philippines, and other countries, he demonstrates that it is often difficult to fit the Indirect Approach doctrine into such a wide variety of strategic and operational environments. His historical narrative cautions against applying a universal model for an Indirect Approach in counterinsurgency (COIN) --for example, the ill-fated use of Montagnard tribes as surrogates in strike operations beyond their local self-defense missions. Moreover, mutual antagonisms between Montagnard and the South Vietnamese population hampered integration of the highland units into the central government's forces. There were difficulties in accommodating the Montagnard ways to the culture of ethnic Vietnamese. This is similar to the challenges of nation building in Iraq and Afghanistan where differing cultures are attempting to be blended into a working sense of nationhood. Just as the ethnic Vietnamese viewed with alarm the arming and training of the Montagnard people, the integrating of Sunni militias, the Sons of Iraq, into Iraq's security effort was an unpopular step in the eyes of Shia security officials."--P. vii.
