Download or read book Uncertainty Microstructure and Bidding Behavior in Internet Auction Marketplaces written by Branimira Stanislavova Slavova and published by . This book was released on 2006 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Adaptive Bidding in Single Sided Auctions under Uncertainty written by Clemens van Dinther and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2007-01-10 with total page 245 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This is one of the first books on the use of software agents to simulate bidding behavior in electronic auctions. It introduces market theory and computational economics together, and gives an overview on the most common and up-to-date agent-based simulation methods. The book will help the reader learn more about simulations in economics in general and common agent-based methods and tools in particular.
Download or read book Posted Price Offers in Internet Auction Markets written by Stefan Seifert and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2006-09-25 with total page 194 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Applying a Market Engineering approach, this book introduces a model of an auction with a posted price offer, and investigates the characteristics of such mechanisms. It discusses the respective equilibrium strategies of sellers and the bidders, providing useful insight into actual behavior. The theoretic results are compared with strategies of students in a controlled experiment. The experimental observations expose shortcomings of standard economic theories and help to further improve electronic markets.
Download or read book Bidding Behavior in Internet Auction Markets written by Radovan Vadovic and published by . This book was released on 2006 with total page 180 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In this dissertation I study bidding behavior in Internet Auction Markets. I focus on practice called"multiple bidding" which occurs when a single bidder places numerous bids throughout the same auction. Multiple bidding appears frequently in the data but the incentives that motivate it are not well understood. In the first chapter I develop a theoretical model in which multiple bidding is an equilibrium behavior by rational bidders. The model has a dynamic auction with two bidders who can search for outside prices while bidding in the auction. Each bidder has a search cost which is her private information. When outside prices are private (independently drawn and identically distributed), then, there is an equilibrium in which bidders with the lower search costs bid only late and always search, while the bidders with higher search costs bid both early and late and search as if they coordinated their search decisions, i.e., the bidder with the lower search cost searches and the other bidder does not. This equilibrium by itself provides an explanation of two frequently occurring bidding patterns (late and multiple bidding). In the second chapter I study experimentally the effect of early bids in dynamic auctions on how bidders search for outside prices. The design has two bidders participating in an ascending clock-auction during which any one of the bidders can pause the auction clock. This I interpret as placing an early bid. Once the auction is paused both bidders can simultaneously search for an alternative outside price. Results indicate that pausing decisions by subjects impact their subsequent searching for outside prices, i.e., whether a subject decides to search or not depends on whether she has paused the auction or not. Subjects behave as if they coordinated their searching decisions: the bidder who pauses the auction also searches with high frequency and the other bidder does not. Because this type of behavior increases both the efficiency and the profitability of the auction we favor the use of policies that promote early bidding inpractice, such as, longer auctions and lower public reserve prices.
Download or read book Mathematics of the Internet written by Brenda Dietrich and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2001-12-14 with total page 190 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The use of the internet for commerce has spawned a variety of auctions, marketplaces, and exchanges for trading everything from bandwidth to books. Mechanisms for bidding agents, dynamic pricing, and combinatorial bids are being implemented in support of internet-based auctions, giving rise to new versions of optimization and resource allocation models. This volume, a collection of papers from an IMA "Hot Topics" workshop in internet auctions, includes descriptions of real and proposed auctions, complete with mathematical model formulations, theoretical results, solution approaches, and computational studies. This volume also provides a mathematical programming perspective on open questions in auction theory, and provides a glimpse of the growing area of dynamic pricing.
Download or read book Bidding Behavior in Internet Auction Markets written by Radovan Vadovic and published by . This book was released on 2006 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Modeling Online Auctions written by Wolfgang Jank and published by John Wiley & Sons. This book was released on 2010-12-01 with total page 321 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Explore cutting-edge statistical methodologies for collecting, analyzing, and modeling online auction data Online auctions are an increasingly important marketplace, as the new mechanisms and formats underlying these auctions have enabled the capturing and recording of large amounts of bidding data that are used to make important business decisions. As a result, new statistical ideas and innovation are needed to understand bidders, sellers, and prices. Combining methodologies from the fields of statistics, data mining, information systems, and economics, Modeling Online Auctions introduces a new approach to identifying obstacles and asking new questions using online auction data. The authors draw upon their extensive experience to introduce the latest methods for extracting new knowledge from online auction data. Rather than approach the topic from the traditional game-theoretic perspective, the book treats the online auction mechanism as a data generator, outlining methods to collect, explore, model, and forecast data. Topics covered include: Data collection methods for online auctions and related issues that arise in drawing data samples from a Web site Models for bidder and bid arrivals, treating the different approaches for exploring bidder-seller networks Data exploration, such as integration of time series and cross-sectional information; curve clustering; semi-continuous data structures; and data hierarchies The use of functional regression as well as functional differential equation models, spatial models, and stochastic models for capturing relationships in auction data Specialized methods and models for forecasting auction prices and their applications in automated bidding decision rule systems Throughout the book, R and MATLAB software are used for illustrating the discussed techniques. In addition, a related Web site features many of the book's datasets and R and MATLAB code that allow readers to replicate the analyses and learn new methods to apply to their own research. Modeling Online Auctions is a valuable book for graduate-level courses on data mining and applied regression analysis. It is also a one-of-a-kind reference for researchers in the fields of statistics, information systems, business, and marketing who work with electronic data and are looking for new approaches for understanding online auctions and processes. Visit this book's companion website by clicking here
Download or read book Information Dispersion and Auction Prices written by Pai-Ling Yin and published by . This book was released on 2015 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Do bidders behave as auction theory predicts they should? How do bidders (and thus, prices) react to different types of information? This paper derives implications of auction theory with respect to the dispersion of private information signals in an auction. I conduct a survey of non-bidders to construct a measure of information dispersion that is independent of bidding data. This permits joint tests of Bayesian-Nash equilibrium bidder behavior and information structure (common vs. private value) in a sample of eBay auctions for computers. The measure also allows me to separately estimate the price effects of seller reputation and product information. eBay prices appear consistent with Bayesian-Nash common value bidding behavior. Uncertainty about the value of goods due to information dispersed over auction participants plays a larger role than uncertainty about the trustworthiness of the sellers, but both are significant drivers of price. Thus, seller reputation complements, rather than substitutes for, information provided in the auction descriptions by lending credibility to that information, creating an incentive for sellers to reduce uncertainty in their auctions.
Download or read book Understanding and Mitigating Product Uncertainty in Online Auction Marketplaces written by Paul A. Pavlou and published by . This book was released on 2015 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The Internet interface poses a difficulty for buyers in evaluating products online, particularly physical experience and durable goods, such as used cars. This increases buyers' product uncertainty, defined as the buyer's perceived estimate of the variance in product quality based on subjective probabilities about the product's characteristics and whether the product will perform as expected. However, the literature has largely ignored product uncertainty and mostly focused on mitigating buyer's seller uncertainty. To address this void, this study aims to conceptualize the construct of product uncertainty and propose its antecedents and consequences in online auction marketplaces. First, drawing upon the theory of markets with asymmetric information, we propose product uncertainty to be distinct from, yet affected by, seller uncertainty. Second, based on auction pricing theory, we propose that product uncertainty and seller uncertainty negatively affect two key success outcomes of online marketplaces: price premium and transaction activity. Third, following information signaling theory, we propose a set of product information signals to mitigate product uncertainty: (1) online product descriptions (textual, visual, multimedia); (2) third-party product certifications (inspection, history report, warranty); (3) auction posted prices (reserve, starting, buy-it-now); and (4) intrinsic product characteristics (book value and usage). Finally, we propose that the effect of online product descriptions and intrinsic product characteristics on product uncertainty is moderated by seller uncertainty. The proposed model is supported by a unique dataset comprised of a combination of primary (survey) data drawn from 331 buyers who bid upon a used car on eBay Motors, matched with secondary transaction data from the corresponding online auctions. The results distinguish between product and seller uncertainty, show the stronger role of product uncertainty on price premiums and transaction activity compared to seller uncertainty, empirically identify the most influential product information signals, and support the mediating role of product uncertainty. This paper contributes to and has implications for better understanding the nature and role of product uncertainty, identifying mechanisms for mitigating product uncertainty, and demonstrating complementarities between product and seller information signals. The model's generalizability and implications are discussed.
Download or read book Internet Auctions written by Ernan Haruvy and published by Now Publishers Inc. This book was released on 2010 with total page 87 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Internet Auctions reviews recent empirical and theoretical works on internet auctions with a focus on internet auction design, formats, and features that are currently debated in the marketing literature.
Download or read book Index to Theses with Abstracts Accepted for Higher Degrees by the Universities of Great Britain and Ireland and the Council for National Academic Awards written by and published by . This book was released on 2007 with total page 676 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book An Integrated Model for Whether Who When and How Much in Internet Auctions written by Young-Hoon Park and published by . This book was released on 2015 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We develop a general parametric modeling framework for bidding behavior in Internet auctions. Toward this end, we incorporate and model simultaneously four key components of the bidding process under our integrated framework: Whether an auction will have a bid at all, (if so) who has bid, when they have bid, and how much they have bid over the entire sequence of bids in an auction. This integrated framework is based on a single latent time-varying construct of consumer willingness to bid (WTB), which bidders have and update for a particular auction item over the course of the auction duration. Our modeling approach is also based on a simple yet very general bidding premise: The observed bidder's latent WTB at a specific bid is greater than the outstanding bid; yet, WTB is unconstrained for all other potential bidders. In this manner, we impose no structural assumption on bidder rationality or equilibrium behavior; instead, deriving our model using a probabilistic modeling paradigm. We describe in detail the advantages that our reducted-form approach allows us, and the limitations such an approach also entails. Using a database of notebook auctions from one of the largest Internet auction sites in Korea, we demonstrate that this general (yet parsimonious) model captures the key behavioral aspects of bidding behavior. Furthermore, substantively, through a data-windowing procedure to assess the set of potential bidders for a given auctioned item, we provide a valuable tool for managers at auction sites to conduct their customer relationship management efforts which require them to evaluate the goodness (whether) of the listed auction items and the goodness (who, when, and how much to bid) of the potential bidders in their Internet auctions.
Download or read book Bidding Playing Or Competing written by Yim Tonia Chu and published by . This book was released on 2000 with total page 110 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Behavioral Economics of Internet Auctions written by Jens-Martin Bramsen and published by . This book was released on 2008 with total page 114 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Auction Format Matters written by Mr.Robert Alan Feldman and published by International Monetary Fund. This book was released on 1995-05 with total page 34 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper evaluates the importance of auction format on bidding behavior and seller revenue, focusing on differences in performance under uniform-price and discriminatory-price formats. The analysis is based on a standard benchmark model from which empirically-testable hypotheses are derived on the optimal amount of bid shading that generates revenue equivalence between the two formats. Applying this model to data from the IMF gold auctions run in 1976-80, we find evidence of statistically significant shading in excess of the theoretically-derived optimum under the discriminatory format. This evidence suggests greater seller revenue under the uniform-price format.
Download or read book Internet Auctions With Artificial Adaptive Agents written by John Duffy and published by . This book was released on 2015 with total page 36 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Many internet auction sites implement ascending-bid, second-price auctions. Empirically, last minute or quot;latequot; bidding is frequently observed in quot;hard-closequot; but not in quot;soft-closequot; versions of these auctions. In this paper, we introduce an independent private-value repeated internet auction model to explain this observed difference in bidding behavior. We use finite automata to model the repeated auction strategies. We report results from simulations involving populations of artificial bidders who update their strategies via a genetic algorithm. We show that our model can deliver late or early bidding behavior, depending on the auction closing rule in accordance with the empirical evidence. Among other findings, we observe that hard-close auctions raise less revenue than soft-close auctions. We also investigate interesting properties of the evolving strategies and arrive at some conclusions regarding both auction designs from a market design point of view.
Download or read book Mathematics of the Internet written by Brenda Dietrich and published by Springer. This book was released on 2010-12-03 with total page 162 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The use of the internet for commerce has spawned a variety of auctions, marketplaces, and exchanges for trading everything from bandwidth to books. Mechanisms for bidding agents, dynamic pricing, and combinatorial bids are being implemented in support of internet-based auctions, giving rise to new versions of optimization and resource allocation models. This volume, a collection of papers from an IMA "Hot Topics" workshop in internet auctions, includes descriptions of real and proposed auctions, complete with mathematical model formulations, theoretical results, solution approaches, and computational studies. This volume also provides a mathematical programming perspective on open questions in auction theory, and provides a glimpse of the growing area of dynamic pricing.
