Download or read book Two Essays on Information Sharing in Supply Chains written by Quan Tian and published by . This book was released on 2013 with total page 94 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Essays on the Value of Information Sharing in Decentralized Supply Chains written by Noam Shamir and published by . This book was released on 2010 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This dissertation is comprised of three essays that explore various research questions related to incentives for information sharing in decentralized supply chains. The first essay, in chapter 2, introduces a new motivation for information sharing in decentralized supply chains - as a mechanism to achieve truthful information sharing and reduce signaling costs. In this essay I study a two echelon supply chain with one manufacturer selling a homogenous product to n price setting competing retailers, and each retailer is endowed with private information about the potential market demand. I first examine the incentives of the retailers to share information when the shared information is verifiable, and I demonstrate that the retailers have an incentive to share information with each other but conceal this information from the manufacturer. However, when the retailers share non-verifiable information, I show that by means of pure communication (cheap talk) no information can be exchanged. In order to overcome the problem of sharing non-verifiable information and induce the retailers to share information truthfully as their strategic choice, two signaling games are analyzed. In the first one, information is shared only between the retailers, and in the second, information is shared in a credible manner with the manufacturer as well. The emphasis of this paper is to understand the effect of exposing the manufacturer to the shared information on the ability of the retailers to reach an information sharing equilibrium. I show that under some conditions, when the retailers share non-verifiable information, they prefer to share this information with the manufacturer. As opposed to conventional wisdom, I also demonstrate that the supply chain can be better-off under settings of asymmetric information when the retailers choose to share their private information with the manufacturer. The second essay, in chapter 3, explores the value of observing demand information in a repeated procurement model between a manufacturer and his supplier. In many supply chain relationships that last over multiple periods, information about hidden properties of the supply chain partners can be revealed during the course of the relationship. This essay examines how the availability of such information affects the contracting scheme between a supplier and his manufacturer in a relationship that lasts over two selling seasons. At the beginning of the first selling season the manufacturer observes private information about the demand distribution, whereas the supplier who is less familiar with the market is endowed only with the prior distribution of the market condition. When the supplier cannot observe the demand realization during the first selling period, under many circumstances he offers a contract that induces the manufacturer to reveal the market condition in the first selling season. In contrast with the case in which no information is available to the supplier, the opportunity to observe demand realization during the first selling season can result in the supplier offering the manufacturer a contract that does not induce the manufacturer to reveal his private information during the first selling season and then offer a second period contract which is based on the first selling season demand realization. I show that when the supplier chooses to offer such a contract the manufacturer becomes worse off, and it has an ambiguous effect on the performance of the supply chain. Although sharing demand information with the supplier makes the manufacturer worse off, the manufacturer is always willing to share such information with his supplier. The third essay, in chapter 4, examines the incentives of retailers, looking to establish a cartel, to share information with their mutual manufacturer. Many researchers have emphasized the importance of communication to establish a cartel. Sharing information among the cartel members allows the cartel to coordinate on the optimal pricing scheme and monitor for possible deviations from the cartel strategy. Anti-trust authorities view information sharing practices as a possible signal for collusion, and economists asked whether information sharing between competing firms should be banned. In this essay I demonstrate how, even without direct information sharing between the cartel members, the retailers are able to exchange information about the market condition by sharing information with their mutual manufacturer. When the retailers share information with their manufacturer, the manufacturer uses the shared information to set the wholesale price to match the market condition. The retailers use the posted wholesale price to solve their coordination problem and set the monopoly price. When the manufacturer faces the decision whether to receive information from the retailers he weighs the trade-off between receiving information about the market, which helps him to set the wholesale price, and assisting the retailers to establish a cartel, which limits his sold quantity. When the retailers need to make this decision they weigh the fact that the posted wholesale price can solve their coordination problems against providing the manufacturer with better information. I demonstrate that there are cases in which both the retailers and the manufacturer are better-off sharing information, and that vertical information sharing can facilitate horizontal tacit collusion.

Download or read book Essays in Collaborative Supply Chains written by Rong.? Liu and published by . This book was released on 2006 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Information Sharing in Supply Chains written by Jason Shiu Kong Lau and published by Erich Schmidt Verlag GmbH & Co KG. This book was released on 2007 with total page 284 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Supply Chain Information Sharing in the Context of Agency Theory Perspective written by and published by GRIN Verlag. This book was released on 2021-04-20 with total page 61 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Master's Thesis from the year 2020 in the subject Business economics - Business Management, Corporate Governance, grade: 2,0, University of Kassel, language: English, abstract: The purpose of this paper is to empirically demonstrate how information sharing is addressing issues of agency theory behaviour in the context of different supply chains. The contribution of this research is, on the one hand, to gain insights of multi-tier supply chain relationship structures of different companies. They aim is to analyse the transparency along the supply chain, which is affected by different behaviour of parties to each other. Afterwards, it is important to draw a conclusion of how supply chain information sharing addresses these issues of agency theory behaviour. Covid-19 is a pandemic that has led to a breakdown in supply chains. One of the reasons for this was the selfish behaviour of many consumers, who bought goods in mass quantities, which leads to empty shelves for the community. Especially in situations like these, it becomes clear how important it is to maintain a resilient supply chain, which can adapt quickly to unpredictable circumstances. A supply chain, which consists of at least of three parties, depends on every single member along the chain. In this way, it becomes more and more important to select the right supplier. Unfortunately, it is not easy to find the right supplier, as many individuals and organisations are driven by opportunistic behaviour and bounded rationality.

Download or read book Supply Chain Coordination in Case of Asymmetric Information written by Guido Vogt and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2011-07-05 with total page 208 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Information sharing is frequently promoted as a mean to improve the supply chain performance. This work shows the results of behavioral experiments, in which the participants share private information in order to influence the contract terms in a Just-in-Time environment. It is shown that the impact of information sharing is ambiguous, and dependent on several factors, such as contract flexibility and complexity or the interacting behavioral types. The experimental results form the basis for a behavioral principal-agent model that gives valuable insights on how the interaction of trust, trustworthiness and the information sharing strategy impacts the supply chain performance.

Download or read book Essays on Supply Chain Coordination written by Valery Pavlov and published by . This book was released on 2009 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A supply chain, which typically employs decentralized decision-making, is coordinated if in the equilibrium firms make decisions that are system-wide optimal. Such decisions, called the first-best, would be made if the supply chain were centralized so that a single decision-maker could force all firms to take recommended actions. Under decentralized decision-making, in order to implement first-best one needs to impose a proper structure of incentives. Supply chain literature, building upon developments in mechanism design, proposes various coordination schemes in the applied business contexts. However, the empirical evidence, coming both from the real world and laboratory experiments, confronts many theoretical predictions. In particular, theoretically optimal contracts are notably more complex than those used in the real world. More importantly, in laboratory experiments the theoretically optimal contracts not just fail to coordinate but, ironically, perform very close to the Double Marginalization benchmark. Thus, legitimate concerns regarding ability of the proposed schemes to coordinate in applied contexts arise. This dissertation focuses on some of the factors leading to coordination failures and investigates their impact on the performance of a supply chain. Chapter "Contingent contract" analyzes a scenario when externalities, created by the third parties, force supply chain partners to use contracts contingent on revealed information. Most of the supply chain literature on coordination deals with perfect information models. The assumption of perfect information is usually justified by instances of information sharing, observed in practice. Researchers conjecture that information sharing ensures perfect information. However, there exists empirical evidence that even under the ultimate form of information sharing, when parties implement "open book accounting", revealed information may not be true. Unfortunately, there is always a possibility to misrepresent information. Notably, under perfect information sharing supply chain partners are likely to find themselves in a situation when they essentially have no choice other than to use a contract that delivers first-best provided that "open books" contain truth. The model of this chapter analyzes performance of a supplier-buyer supply chain under the assumption that questioning each other's reports is prohibitively costly, while parties are aware of possible misrepresentation. Therefore, no matter who offers a contract, it cannot be a screening contract or anything else except a contingent contract that delivers "first-best", given revealed information. The outcome of the arising Bayesian game is distribution-specific, and can be very different from the conjectured performance of a "coordinating" contract. Chapter "Fairness and coordination failures in supply chain contracts" addresses a gap between performance of the contracts suggested by the standard theory, which assumes fully rational profit-maximizing players, and existing data, obtained in the experimental tests of coordinating contracts. Numerous experimental studies find that human decision-makers are neither perfectly rational nor profit-maximizers. While various behavioral factors, such as risk- and loss-aversion, counter-factual payoffs and more general social preferences can greatly affect contracting outcomes, they cannot fully explain the existing data. In the controlled laboratory environment, it is possible to either completely eliminate some of these factors, or, at least, to significantly mitigate and control for them. What is not possible to eliminate, is the players' attitude to contracting outcomes, most commonly called "fairness concerns". The existing models, incorporating fairness concerns into models, assume fairness concerns of players is common knowledge. Realistically, how much a particular person cares about fairness cannot be easily observed or measured and, in fact, is not known to anybody else except that person. In other words, fairness concerns are private information. Therefore, the model presented here takes the next step and treats fairness concerns as private information of players. Given the resulting information asymmetry, it is not surprising that coordination of a dyadic channel with a contract is, in general, no longer possible. At the same time, is possible to coordinate a channel with just a wholesale price contract in case the retailer is sufficiently averse to making higher profit than the supplier. However, we show that when the contract choice is endogenous, the supplier will not choose a wholesale price contract but, instead, a profit-maximizing contract that does not coordinate. The results of the experiment that tests the model's predictions, as well as some underlying assumptions and competing theories, provide strong support for the theory and show that fairness organizes the data very well. Chapter "Competition and contracting in supply chains" presents a simple and, in many respects, robust coordination mechanism. Its performance approaches first-best asymptotically in a setting with one supplier and multiple retailers. By introducing horizontal (Bertrand) competition among the retailers the supplier not only induces retailers to make first-best decisions, but also does it by means of the simplest possible linear pricing scheme. Competition does the entire coordinating job, whereas a wholesale price contract suffices to extract all profit of the competing retailers. Although Bertrand competition is not a new concept, little has been known about its actual performance in the contacting context. It turns out that a competition-based mechanism is not only extremely simple, but it is also robust to several relaxations of the standard assumptions, any of which is enough destroy a coordinating contract. First, it survives certain types of information asymmetry. In the extreme example of private information used in this chapter, the mechanism coordinates the channel even if the supplier is not aware of the very fact of private information. Second, Chapter "Fairness and coordination failures in supply chain contracts" shows how fairness concerns generally make coordination of a dyadic channel impossible. However, for the competition-based mechanism fairness concerns is not an obstacle. Turning to the methodological aspects, we would like to note that the mainstream literature suggests coordinating contracts resulting from models that assume the supplier's ability to make a "take-it-or-leave-it" offer. Credibility of such models has been long debated in the literature. Critics insist that the "take-it-or-leave-it" offer is either not a credible threat in the bilateral monopoly or it is a shortcut, implicitly implying perfect competition on the retailers' side. Allowing for competition explicitly not only avoids this criticism but also brings fuller insights, non-available otherwise.

Download or read book Essays on Quantitative Analysis of Supply Chain Structures written by Xinjie Shi and published by . This book was released on 2006 with total page 125 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This thesis consists of three separate, but related, essays that deal with the topic of how supply chain structure as well as the use of contracts impact performance of a supply chain. The main focus is the analysis of behavior of indirect-sale supply chains in terms of relative bargaining power and decision rights of the participants. Modeling as Stackelberg games, this thesis explores the existence of Nash equilibriums and the issues surrounding supply chain coordination. In Essay one, "The Role of Decision Structure in Supply Chain Coordination with Stochastic Demand", the analysis focuses on how different supply chain structures affect the choice of contracts in coordination under a generalized setting in which more powerful agent does not necessarily assume the Stackelberg leadership. This study shows that an optimal coordinating contract is based not only upon the overstock liquidation advantage the supplier/retailer may have, but also upon the specific decision hierarchy in the supply chain. In Essay two, "Supply Chain Performance with Power Imbalanced Suppliers", studies the effects of product substitution when suppliers and retailers have an imbalance of decision making power. In particular, we address the questions of structure dominance and why certain supply chain power structures are more stable. Finally, Essay three, "Supply Chain Coordination with Revenue Sharing Contract when Retailer Sells Store-Brand Products", a retailer-dominated supply chain coordination problem is investigated when the retailer sells store-brand products. Among many insights developed, it follows that two-parameter revenue-sharing contracts are preferred to both wholesale-price contacts and one-parameter revenue-sharing contracts in supply chain coordination due to its flexibility in profit division.

Download or read book The Effects of Information Sharing in a Two stage Apparel Supply Chain Using Policy Characterization and Simulation written by Seonghoo Yoon and published by . This book was released on 2007 with total page 203 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Keywords: Information sharing, supply chain management, characterization, simulation, apparel supply chain.

Download or read book Dissertation Abstracts International written by and published by . This book was released on 2009-04 with total page 564 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book The Role of Supply Chain Processes and Information Sharing in Supply Chain Management written by Honggeng Zhou and published by . This book was released on 2003 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Abstract: Supply chain process and information sharing play critical roles in today's supply chain management. Previous research in supply chain management has studied various supply chain processes and different aspects of information sharing separately. Therefore, this dissertation proposes a comprehensive framework to study the relationships among supply chain process, information sharing, supply chain dynamism, and business performance. The dissertation starts with mathematical models and simulation models to better understand the relationships among the variables. The theorems derived from the mathematical models are tested in more generalized supply chain settings. The results from the mathematical models and simulation models provide several managerial insights and help develop the empirical models. The empirical part of this dissertation uses a cross-sectional survey method. Structural equation modeling is used to explore the relationships among five supply chain processes, four aspects of information sharing, supply chain dynamism, and five dimensions of business performance. Responses from 120 executives in manufacturing industries, representing a 18 percent response rate, suggest that both effective supply chain process and effective information sharing are necessary to achieve optimal business performance. When supply chain dynamism increases, effective information sharing becomes more important. Information sharing does not have direct positive impact on business performance, but it has positive impact on business performance through effective supply chain process. Effective supply chain process has positive influence on all performance dimensions, but the degrees of positive influence vary for different performance dimensions. The analytical methodology tests three of the six research hypotheses. The empirical methodology tests five of the six research hypotheses. The analytical and empirical research methodologies corroborate and complement each other. The results of this dissertation research show that both effective supply chain process and effective information sharing are necessary for achieving optimal business performance under alternative supply chain dynamism. Effective information sharing is important for assimilating supply chain dynamics information and using that information to guide the use of effective supply chain process. Effective supply chain process is important for mediating the influence of effective information sharing on business performance. Executives must balance the investment in information sharing and supply chain process.

Download or read book Two essays on trust in supply chain management written by Koray Ozpolat and published by . This book was released on 2011 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Essays on Purchasing and Supply Management written by Daniel Kern and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2011-04-20 with total page 150 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Daniel Kern provides an answer on how to implement the theoretical concepts into day-to-day business of multinational corporations through the empirical validation of SCM models and in-depth casestudies. The four essays cover research on inter-firm collaboration, supply risk management, purchasing competences and research on measuring and benchmarking SCM efforts.

Download or read book Essays on Strategic Interactions Between Firms in the Presence of Competition written by Parshuram Sambhajirao Hotkar and published by . This book was released on 2020 with total page 426 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Strategic interactions between competing players of supply chains are studied in this dissertation in the context of supplier encroachment and forced information sharing. Although there has been extensive study of supplier encroachment, our study is the first to explicitly consider the possibility that a reseller sells more than one product, which occurs often in practice. In the first two essays, we develop a model of two suppliers who sell partially substitutable products through a single reseller, and allow for one of them to introduce its own direct channel. We find that the presence of the second supplier alters many of the existing results about the interactions between a reseller and an encroaching supplier. In the third essay, in the context of drug shortages, we investigate the role of information sharing between manufacturers about their supply disruptions. The quality problems and disruptions in capacity are the most prevalent cause of shortages of sterile injectable drugs. The capacity decision in the manufacturing facility has a significant impact on the availability of the drug, and thereby on the drug shortages. Therefore, we model the capacity decisions of manufacturing firms in terms of reliable and unreliable capacities, and study their impact on the supply of drugs. We quantify the benefit of the mitigation strategies such as forced information sharing and tax subsidies

Download or read book Optimizing Supply Chain Performance written by Michael Roe and published by Springer. This book was released on 2015-07-08 with total page 209 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Optimizing Supply Chain Performance takes industrial case studies from SMEs in China to examine the importance of information sharing and coordinated management as essential mechanisms to improve supply chain performance.

Download or read book Information Sharing in Supply Chain written by Anupam Ghosh and published by LAP Lambert Academic Publishing. This book was released on 2012-03 with total page 152 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: One important reason behind deficient supply chain performance is poor coordination among the companies or organizations that make up the chain. Researchers emphasize that sharing of information is an effective coordination mechanism that can integrate the chain activities and improve overall chain profitability. However, sharing of information is risky as other partners in the chain may behave opportunistically, having gained access to private information. To reduce such risk and succeed in sharing information, firms in the chain need to agree on a set of governance mechanisms that will direct the chain relationship. Though previous research studies emphasize the need of governance mechanisms for information sharing among supply chain members, there is little or no research that has studied the role of governance mechanisms in supply chain information sharing. This research studies the role of three governance mechanisms of trust, bargaining power, and contract in information sharing among members of the supply chain.

Download or read book Measuring Information sharing Behavior written by Xiaowen Bao and published by . This book was released on 2009 with total page 390 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: