Download or read book Three Essays on Executive Compensation written by Brandon Neil Cline and published by . This book was released on 2005 with total page 278 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Three Essays on Executive Compensation written by Moritz Heimes and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Three Essays on Executive Compensation written by Vaibhav Sharma and published by . This book was released on 2009 with total page 120 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Executive compensation and its potential importance in aligning shareholder and management interests has been an extensively researched area within corporate finance. This thesis studys executive compensation while addressing several unresolved issues in the literature. Essay one examines CEO compensation following spin-offs. The second essay studys changes in CEO salaries and their relation to firm performance. Essay three examines managerial decision horizons for target and acquirer firms in mergers and acquisitions.

Download or read book Three Essays on Executive Compensation written by Robert R. Johnson and published by . This book was released on 1988 with total page 178 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Three Essays on the Regulation of Executive Compensation written by Anamarija Delic and published by . This book was released on 2024 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Three Essays in Executive Compensation written by Zenu Sharma and published by . This book was released on 2009 with total page 244 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Executive Compensation written by Friedrich Kley and published by Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft. This book was released on 2017 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The empirical analyses of data from large German public companies that are presented in this book show that the introduction of long-term orientated remuneration components for corporate executives increases their willingness to invest in riskier investment portfolios, at least in the short term. The study furthermore demonstrates that a payment model which emphasises equity-based remuneration elements is not sufficient to increase executives' long-term orientation. The results of the study's final analysis show that payment of executives in large German public companies has become more consistent across the board in recent years.

Download or read book Three Essays on Executive Compensation Mergers and Acquisitions and Index Changes written by Jie Cai and published by . This book was released on 2005 with total page 274 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Three Essays in Executive Compensation and Corporate Governance written by Swarnodeep Homroy and published by . This book was released on 2013 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Three Essays in Executive Compensation written by Jinsha Zhao and published by . This book was released on 2012 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Three Essays on Corporate Restructurings Executive Compensation and Corporate Governance Mechanisms written by Juan M. Sanchez and published by . This book was released on 2006 with total page 244 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Three Essays on CEO Compensation Risk taking Behavior and Subsequent Firm Performance written by Wanrong Hou and published by . This book was released on 2012 with total page 312 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Three Essays on Earnings Management and Executive Compensation written by Heather Katherine Guthrie and published by . This book was released on 2006 with total page 82 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In chapter 2, I explore the possibility that current shareholders encourage CEOs to manage earnings around equity issuances, as artificially inflated stock prices allow shareholders to obtain external financing at lower cost. My main result establishes that CEOs in well-governed firms are more likely to have large positive discretionary accruals around equity issuances than CEOs in poorly-governed firms. The finding suggests that governance is a double-edged sword: good governance may limit misreporting when it hurts current shareholders, but it may exacerbate misreporting when current shareholders stand to benefit.

Download or read book Three Essays in Executive Compensation written by Randy Beavers and published by . This book was released on 2015 with total page 167 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In essay one, we examine overconfident CEO-directors and find they attend more board meetings, are more active in nominating committees, and have more independent directorships. Attendance is higher when multiple overconfident directors are present on the board. When an overconfident board selects a new CEO after a CEO turnover, they are more likely to appoint a better prepared and more reputable CEO. Overconfident boards are also more likely to select an overconfident CEO. We also find overconfident boards exacerbate the restrained use of debt when an overconfident CEO is present, and we find evidence that the association between CEO-directors and greater CEO pay is driven solely by overconfident CEO-directors on the board. This evidence indicates overconfident CEO-directors exhibit significant influence on the board and over the firm's CEO. In essay two, I analyze the CEO incentives of inside debt in the form of deferred equity compensation in the context of M & A decisions. CEO inside debt holdings are negatively associated with the likelihood of the firm engaging in an M & A. When firms with higher levels of CEO inside debt decide to engage in an acquisition, those acquisitions are non-diversifying, relatively smaller deals, and are paid using a greater portion of stock. The evidence indicates that inside debt incentivizes CEOs to make less risky decisions for the benefit of debt holders and at the expense of shareholders. In essay three, I analyze both CEO inside debt and firm debt jointly to further investigate compensation incentives of risky decision-making and the resulting financial policy decisions concerning the debt structure of the firm. I find larger firms with high CEO inside debt tend to diversify, as calculated by the Herfindahl-Hirschman index of debt type usage. These types of firms use a higher percentage of term loans and other debt but a lower percentage of drawn credit lines and commercial loans. Larger firms with high CEO inside debt have lower interest rates on these debt instruments and shorter maturities, suggesting a more conservative financing policy with regards to debt.

Download or read book Three Essays on the Agency Problem written by Gary Todd Moskowitz and published by . This book was released on 1999 with total page 132 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Three Essays on Executive Compensation of European Banks written by Fadi S. Shiyyab and published by . This book was released on 2013 with total page 490 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Three Essays on Say on Pay written by Karen Naaman and published by . This book was released on 2021 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This dissertation comprises three essays on issues related to Say-on-Pay, a governance measure which allows shareholders to vote on executive compensation. In the first essay adopting a window-dressing perspective, I examine whether the mandatory adoption of Say-on-Pay is associated with opportunistic non-GAAP reporting to mislead shareholders about firm's performance and avoid shareholder dissatisfaction against executive compensation. The sample comprises U.S. Fortune 250 firms, from 2003 until 2017. Results show that managers increasingly disclose non-GAAP earnings and exclude recurring items after the mandatory adoption of Say-on-Pay regulation. Also, managers' exclusion choice of recurring items and the likelihood of reporting non-GAAP metrics are more pronounced during years when the firm is subject to a vote. The findings shed some light on the unintended consequences of Say-on-Pay, especially when the ethical concerns about non-GAAP reporting are raised. The second essay integrates agency and resource dependence theories to examine the influence of compensation committee members' qualities and non-GAAP reporting on shareholders' Say-on-Pay support. Compensation committee quality is an aggregate measure of compensation committee attributes that include the directors' interdependencies, their tenure, holding a CEO position, the number of seats they hold, and committee size. Results suggest that high quality compensation committees influence shareholders to provide a support to their Say-on-Pay vote. Moreover, the quality of non-GAAP reporting is associated with shareholders' votes. Shareholders do not appear to be misled by low-quality non-GAAP metrics and managers' opportunistic motive. On the contrary, shareholders vote against executive compensation when these metrics are of low-quality. While policy makers have set the regulation to curb excessive executive pay through shareholders' votes, this study reveals that factors other than the excess pay itself may influence shareholders' perceptions. The third essay synthesizes research on Say-on-Pay and classifies it into two categories that revolve around the determinants and consequences of Say-on-Pay. Based on the first and second essays of my dissertation, I build a conceptual model that represents two closed interconnections. The first connection is between Say-on-Pay and compensation committees. Shareholders' Say-on-Pay votes are more favorable when compensation committee quality is high. However, when shareholders vote against executive compensation in Say-on-Pay, they also vote against the re-election of compensation committee members. The second connection of the model is between Say-on-Pay and non-GAAP reporting. The introduction of Say-on-Pay motivates managers to opportunistically report non-GAAP metrics. However, when managers report low-quality non-GAAP metrics, shareholders' Say-on-Pay votes become more negative. Thus, it appears that Say-on-Pay holds simultaneously a dual role as both a determinant and a consequence in its relation to compensation committee and non-GAAP reporting. Keywords: Say-on-Pay; Executive compensation; Non-GAAP earnings; Compensation committee quality; Interdependent directors; Director tenure; CEO directors; Director shareholdings; Additional directorships; Committee size.