Download or read book Three Essays in Corporate Governance and Corporate Finance written by Elvis Alexander Hernandez Perdomo and published by . This book was released on 2017 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Three Essays in Corporate Finance and Corporate Governance written by Ting He and published by . This book was released on 2011 with total page 374 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Three Essays on Corporate Finance and Governance written by Vinh Q. Nguyen and published by . This book was released on 2017 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Three Essays in Banking written by Tuyet Nhung Vu and published by . This book was released on 2020 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Essays in Corporate Finance and Corporate Governance written by David De Angelis and published by . This book was released on 2012 with total page 192 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: My dissertation contains three essays in corporate finance and corporate governance. The first essay studies the effect of information frictions across corporate hierarchies on internal capital allocation decisions, using the Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX) as a quasi-natural experiment. SOX requires firms to enhance their internal controls to improve the reliability of financial reporting across corporate hierarchies. I find that after SOX, the capital allocation decision in conglomerates is more sensitive to performance as reported by the business segments. The effects are most pronounced when conglomerates are prone to information problems within the organization and least pronounced when they still suffer from internal control weaknesses after SOX. Moreover, conglomerates' productivity and market value relative to stand-alone firms increase after SOX. These results support the argument that inefficiencies in the capital allocation process are partly due to information frictions. My findings also shed light on some unintended effects of SOX on large and complex firms. The second essay is co-authored with Yaniv Grinstein and investigates how firms tie CEO compensation to performance. We take advantage of new compensation disclosure requirements issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission in 2006. Firms vary in their choice of performance measures and horizons, and in their reliance on pre-specified goals. Consistent with optimal contracting theories, we find that firms choose performance measures that are more informative of CEO actions, and rely less on pre-specified goals when it is more costly to contract on CEO actions. The third essay investigates the design of division managers (DMs) incentive contracts again taking advantage of the disclosure requirements. I find that firms do not use relative performance evaluation across divisions and that in general most of DM compensation incentives are associated with firm performance instead of division performance. Furthermore, division performance-based incentives tend to be smaller in complex firms, when within-organization conflicts are potentially more severe. I also find that when the probability of promotion to CEO is lower, DM ownership requirements are more stringent and DM compensation incentives are greater. These results support notions that influence costs as well as promotion-based incentives are important considerations in designing DMs contracts.

Download or read book Three Essays in Corporate Governance written by Adam Yore and published by . This book was released on 2009 with total page 270 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Three Essays on Corporate Governance and Entrepreneurial Finance written by Ting Lu and published by . This book was released on 2006 with total page 278 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The central issue of my dissertation is to explore the relationship between corporate governance and entrepreneurial finance by using data from the real world. I hold the belief that the key factor for economic growth and development is the match between human capital and financial capital. Such match depends on corporate governance, which is in turn determined by a region's political, legal and cultural environments.

Download or read book Three Essays in Corporate Finance written by Ekaterina Volkova and published by . This book was released on 2017 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This dissertation explores three different aspects in corporate finance. My first essay explores governance from the side of blockholders. My second essay explores governance from the side of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). And my third essay overview and summarizes recent literature in the IPO field. In Chapter 1, "Blockholder Diversity: Effect of Polyphony on the Power of Monitoring", I investigate how the differences in skill, incentives and preferences between large shareholders in the company affect the power of their monitoring. My findings suggest that diversity between blockholder creates disagreement that have strong negative influence of the power of their governance. Such adverse influence is also reflected in the future dynamics of company value and performance. In Chapter 2 (joint with Michelle Lowry and Roni Michaely) "Information Revelation Through Regulatory Process: Interactions Between the SEC and Companies Ahead of the IPO", we explore the main determinants of extensiveness and focus of SEC review of companies before they go public. In the second part of this chapter we explore what investors could learn from the information disclosed during this review process. In Chapter 3 (joint with Michelle Lowry and Roni Michaely) "Initial Public Offerings: a Synthesis of the Literature and Direction for Future Research" we provide a literature review of recent papers in the IPO field. In addition, we also explore how the main stylized facts behave of the large sample of IPOs between 1972 and 2015.

Download or read book Three Essays in Empirical Corporate Finance and Governance written by Johannes Zaia and published by . This book was released on 2020 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Three Essays on Corporate Governance and Financial Disclosure written by Qiang Wu and published by . This book was released on 2000 with total page 205 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Three Essays in Empirical Corporate Finance written by Shage Zhang and published by . This book was released on 2012 with total page 200 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Three Essays in Corporate Finance written by Jérôme Philippe Alain Taillard and published by . This book was released on 2010 with total page 210 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Abstract: In my dissertation, I first contribute to the capital structure literature by estimating the potential impact of financial distress on a firm's real business operations. Secondly, I contribute to the ownership structure literature, and more broadly to the field of corporate governance, by revisiting the relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance. In my first essay, I analyze a comprehensive sample of defendant firms that found themselves exposed to an unexpected wave of asbestos litigation in the wake of two U.S. Supreme Court decisions. Since these legal liabilities are unrelated to current operations, firms that are in financial distress due to their legal woes provide a natural experiment to study the impact of financial distress on a firm's operational performance. When analyzing firms suffering from this exogenous shock to their finances, I find little evidence of negative spillover effects ("indirect" costs) of financial distress. That is, the competitive position of the distressed firms is not adversely impacted by their weakened financial situation. Furthermore, I find empirical support for a significant disciplinary effect of financial distress as these firms actively restructure and refocus on core operations. In my second and third essays, I focus on the relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance using a large panel dataset of U.S. firms over the period 1988-2004. In the second essay, I reconcile some of the extant literature by showing that the relationship is sensitive to the firm size characteristics of the sample being used. In particular, I recover the classic hump-shaped relationship when focusing only on the largest firms (e.g. Fortune 500 firms), while the relationship turns negative when the sample is comprised of smaller firms. The negative relationship among smaller firms is consistent with entrenchment arguments given that managerial ownership is on average much higher for small firms. Second, I find that for lower levels of managerial ownership, the negative relationship is driven by older firms that have on average less liquid stocks. This finding is consistent with firms that do not perform well enough to create a liquid market for their stock, and hence have to keep high levels of insider ownership in order to avoid a negative price impact that would result from a reduction of their stake. Lastly, these results could also be suggestive of endogeneity concerns. I investigate this issue further in my third essay. Principal-agent models predict that managerial ownership and firm performance are endogenously determined by exogenous changes in a firm's contracting environment. Changes in the contracting environment are, however, only partially observed, and the standard statistical techniques used to address endogeneity may be ineffective in this corporate setting. In my third essay, together with my coauthor Phil Davies, we develop a novel econometric approach to control for the influence of time-varying unobserved variables related to a firm's contracting environment. Using the same large panel dataset of U.S. firms over the period 1988-2004, we find no evidence of a systematic relation between managerial ownership and performance.

Download or read book Three Essays on Board Gender Diversity Corporate Governance and Corporate Finance written by Aitzaz Ahsan Alias Sarang and published by . This book was released on 2019 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This thesis examines the effect of board gender diversity in corporate finance. The first chapter provides a survey of literature on board gender diversity in management science domain and conclude the chapter by highlighting the potential areas of future work in the board gender diversity and corporate finance domain. The next chapters empirically examine the effect of female directors in three important, yet not explored areas of finance in the context of the French market. The second chapter examines the effect of female directors on corporate cash holdings. Using a sample of French firms over the period 1998 to 2015, we document a significant positive relationship between women directors and two measures of corporate cash holdings. The results support the notion that female directors have a lower liquidity risk-taking propensity than their male counterparts. The third chapter examines the relationship between board gender diversity and the cost of equity. We document a significant negative effect of female directors on the cost of equity. The fourth chapter is based on the critical mass theory. The results suggest that attaining the number of at least three women increases the likelihood of dismissing poorly performing CEOs. In summary, the results validate the notion that women directors are risk averse, strict at monitoring executives, and they increase the value of firm.

Download or read book Three Essays on Corporate Governance written by Aslihan Gizem Korkmaz and published by . This book was released on 2015 with total page 155 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This dissertation consists of three essays focusing on corporate governance. The main goal of these studies is to contribute to a better understanding of the effectiveness of different corporate governance mechanisms. The first study explores the relationship between director expertise and performance following seasoned equity offerings (SEOs). In the short run, firms with financial experts have smaller offer discounts. The cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) following the equity issues are less negative for firms with financial, legal and joint expert directors. In the long run, expert directors continue to have a positive impact on stock price performance. In the case of firm operating performance, it seems to be better for firms with legal experts and joint experts. Overall, having financial experts and legal experts on the board seems to be significantly beneficial for firms while the results for joint expertise lack significance due to the small number of firms with joint experts. The second study focuses on identifying the most effective corporate governance attributes. This study uses a cross-sectional regression analysis to investigate which attributes have a significant effect on the market's reaction to the SEO announcements.The results show that among other corporate governance characteristics, the percentage of directors on the audit committee, board size, number of board meetings, audit committee size, average board age and average director tenure seem to be significantly related to market reaction. In the case of director expertise, market reacts more positively to SEO announcements by firms with legal experts or joint experts on their boards. The third study focuses on the impact of blockholder characteristics on earnings quality. Most of the studies in literature make the intrinsic assumption that blockholders are a homogeneous group. This study is one of the very few studies to acknowledge the heterogeneity of blockholders and attempts to understand the unexplained proportion of blockholder heterogeneity. Earnings quality is calculated using the FDD model of Lee and Masulis(2009) and it is regressed on various blockholder characteristics. The results show that earnings quality is lower for firms with market-driven and multilateral blockholders.

Download or read book Three essays on corporate governance written by Cassandra D. Marshall and published by . This book was released on 2011 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Three Essays in Corporate Finance written by Hoontaek Seo and published by . This book was released on 2009 with total page 210 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Three Essays in Corporate Finance written by Hongchao Zeng and published by . This book was released on 2012 with total page 118 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This dissertation contains three essays in corporate finance. In the first essay, using the presence of business combination (BC) laws to proxy for the monitoring strength of the takeover market, we examine how an active takeover market affects the level and valuation of corporate cash holdings. After accounting for potential endogeneity of state incorporation, we find that firms incorporated in states without BC laws hold significantly more cash than those incorporated in states with BC laws. We also find that the value of cash holdings used by firms to defend themselves against unwanted takeovers in the presence of an active takeover market is not discounted by investors. Our findings suggest a substitution effect between legal antitakeover protection and firms' use of cash protection. However, there is no evidence that these cash holdings lead to value destruction. Firms may use corporate payouts to signal internal governance quality and avoid a market discount placed on cash holdings. In the second essay, using the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), the industry price-cost margin, the number of firms within an industry, and the level of import penetration to gauge the intensity of product market competition, we find that the speed of capital structure adjustment for firms in competitive industries is significantly faster than for firms in non-competitive industries. Further analysis reveals that this effect is driven solely by the capital structure movements of over-levered firms. While over-levered firms in competitive industries face higher levels of investment needs relative to those in non-competitive industries, they are significantly less likely to use debt financing and to deliberately deviate from target. In the third essay, we find that cash has a negative impact on the future market share growth of the old firms, evidence that can better explain the unwillingness of such firms to hold precautionary cash as they face increasingly more volatile cash flows in an imperfect capital market. Furthermore, we show that the relational strength between cash and product market performance evolves in a way that reflects a changing composition of manufacturing firms which progressively tilts toward young firms.