Download or read book The Strategic Use of Force in Counterinsurgency written by Miles Kitts and published by Rowman & Littlefield. This book was released on 2020-01-13 with total page 235 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The Strategic Use of Force in Counterinsurgency: Find, Fix, Fight focuses on how to understand the relationship between the use of force and the outcomes of such use. Specifically, there is debate as to how to evaluate counterinsurgency conflicts, and what prescriptions flow from that evaluation. The Neo-Classicist school emphasises prescriptions which are either directly from, or inspired by, Cold War counterinsurgency efforts undertaken by anti-communist states. The Revisionist school focuses on how best to evaluate the political dimensions of such conflicts. This book finds that a third approach, Reflective-Action, is best as it combines Neo-Classicism’s strength of issuing practical prescriptions with Revisionism’s strength for conceptually evaluating counterinsurgency conflicts. This conceptual debate is exposited in three cases. They are the British counterinsurgency during the Malayan Emergency of the 1940s and 1950s, American counterinsurgency in South Vietnam during the 1960s and 1970s, and the Coalition counterinsurgency in Iraq during the 2000s.
Download or read book Air Power in the New Counterinsurgency Era written by Alan J. Vick and published by Rand Corporation. This book was released on 2006-09-12 with total page 205 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: United States has engaged in counterinsurgency around the globe for more than a century. But insurgencies have rarely been defeated by outside powers. Rather, the afflicted nation itself must win the war politically and militarily, and the best way to help is to offer advice, training, and equipment. Air power, and the U.S. Air Force, can play an important role in such efforts, which suggests making them an institutional priority.
Download or read book The U S Army Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual written by David H. Petraeus and published by Silver Rock Publishing. This book was released on 2015-12-31 with total page 244 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This field manual establishes doctrine for military operations in a counterinsurgency (COIN) environment. It is based on lessons learned from previous counterinsurgencies and contemporary operations. It is also based on existing interim doctrine and doctrine recently developed. Counterinsurgency operations generally have been neglected in broader American military doctrine and national security policies since the end of the Vietnam War over 40 years ago. This manual is designed to reverse that trend. It is also designed to merge traditional approaches to COIN with the realities of a new international arena shaped by technological advances, globalization, and the spread of extremist ideologies--some of them claiming the authority of a religious faith. This is a comprehensive manual that details every aspect of a successful COIN operation from intelligence to leadership to diplomacy. It also includes several useful appendices that provide important supplementary material.
Download or read book Bullets Not Ballots written by Jacqueline L. Hazelton and published by Cornell University Press. This book was released on 2021-05-15 with total page 221 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In Bullets Not Ballots, Jacqueline L. Hazelton challenges the claim that winning "hearts and minds" is critical to successful counterinsurgency campaigns. Good governance, this conventional wisdom holds, gains the besieged government popular support, denies support to the insurgency, and makes military victory possible. Hazelton argues that major counterinsurgent successes since World War II have resulted not through democratic reforms but rather through the use of military force against civilians and the co-optation of rival elites. Hazelton offers new analyses of five historical cases frequently held up as examples of the effectiveness of good governance in ending rebellions—the Malayan Emergency, the Greek Civil War, the Huk Rebellion in the Philippines, the Dhofar rebellion in Oman, and the Salvadoran Civil War—to show that, although unpalatable, it was really brutal repression and bribery that brought each conflict to an end. By showing how compellence works in intrastate conflicts, Bullets Not Ballots makes clear that whether or not the international community decides these human, moral, and material costs are acceptable, responsible policymaking requires recognizing the actual components of counterinsurgent success—and the limited influence that external powers have over the tactics of counterinsurgent elites.
Download or read book Modern Warfare written by Roger Trinquier and published by DIANE Publishing. This book was released on 1964 with total page 131 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Indian National Security and Counter Insurgency written by Namrata Goswami and published by Routledge. This book was released on 2014-11-27 with total page 235 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book, based on extensive field research, examines the Indian state’s response to the multiple insurgencies that have occurred since independence in 1947. In reacting to these various insurgencies, the Indian state has employed a combined approach of force, dialogue, accommodation of ethnic and minority aspirations and, overtime, the state has established a tradition of negotiation with armed ethnic groups in order to bolster its legitimacy based on an accommodative posture. While these efforts have succeeded in resolving the Mizo insurgency, it has only incited levels of violence with regard to others. Within this backdrop of ongoing Indian counter-insurgency, this study provides a set of conditions responsible for the groundswell of insurgencies in India, and some recommendations to better formulate India’s national security policy with regard to its counter-insurgency responses. The study focuses on the national institutions responsible for formulating India’s national security policy dealing with counter-insurgency – such as the Prime Minister’s Office, the Cabinet Committee on Security, the National Security Council, the Ministry of Home Affairs and the Indian military apparatus. Furthermore, it studies how national interests and values influence the formulation of this policy; and the overall success and/or failure of the policy to deal with armed insurgent movements. Notably, the study traces the ideational influence of Kautilya and Gandhi in India’s overall response to insurgencies. Multiple cases of armed ethnic insurgencies in Assam, Manipur, Mizoram, and Nagaland in the Northeast of India and the ideologically oriented Maoist or Naxalite insurgency affecting the heartland of India are analysed in-depth to evaluate the Indian counter-insurgency experience. This book will be of much interest to students of counter-insurgency, Asian politics, ethnic conflict, and security studies in general.
Download or read book The Art of Counter revolutionary War written by John J. McCuen and published by . This book was released on 1966 with total page 358 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Learning from Iraq written by Steven Metz and published by . This book was released on 2007 with total page 140 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: While the involvement of the United States in counterinsurgency has a long history, it had faded in importance in the years following the end of the Cold War. When American forces first confronted it in Iraq, they were not fully prepared. Since then, the U.S. military and other government agencies have expended much effort to refine their counterinsurgency capabilities. But have they done enough?
Download or read book Counterinsurgency Strategy and the Phoenix of American Capability written by Steven Metz and published by CreateSpace. This book was released on 2012-10-16 with total page 40 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Counterinsurgency is seemingly not of great concern to the U.S. Army today. This may represent a period of remission rather than the apparent abandonment of the mission. It is possible that the U.S. military may again become engaged in counterinsurgency support in the future. In this study, Steven Metz argues that the way the Department of Defense and U.S. military spend the time when counterinsurgency support is not an important part of American national security strategy determines how quickly and easily they react when policymakers commit the nation to such activity. If analysis and debate continues, at least at a low level, the military is better prepared for the reconstitution of capabilities. If it ignores global developments in insurgency and counterinsurgency, the reconstitution of capabilities would be more difficult. Today, there is no pressing strategic rationale for U.S. engagement in counterinsurgency but history suggests that if the United States remains involved in the Global South, one may emerge. American counterinsurgency strategy has unfolded in a distinct pattern over the past 50 years. At times, policymakers saw a strategic rationale for engagement in counterinsurgency. When they did, the military and Department of Defense formed or reconstituted counterinsurgency doctrine, concepts, and organizations. When the strategic rationale faded, these capabilities atrophied. This pattern may be repeated in the future. During the last decade of the Cold War, the U.S. military developed an effective approach to insurgency and implemented it in El Salvador, but this focused on one particular type of insurgency: Maoist "people's war." The El Salvador model may not apply to post-Cold War forms of insurgency. Moreover, many of the basic assumptions of American counterinsurgency strategy appear obsolete. Trends such as ungovernability, the routinization of violence, and the mutation of insurgency change the costs/benefits calculus that undergirded Cold War-era strategy and doctrine. During the current period of remission in insurgency, the Army should use its intellectual resources to analyze ongoing mutations in insurgency and to open a debate on the nature of a cogent post-Cold War counterinsurgency strategy. This strategy should expand its conceptual framework and stress three principles: selectivity, multilateralism, and concentration on secondary support functions including indirect or second-tier engagement. Such efforts will pave the way for the reconstitution of American counterinsurgency should it be required.
Download or read book Modern War and the Utility of Force written by Isabelle Duyvesteyn and published by Routledge. This book was released on 2010-04-05 with total page 318 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book investigates the use and utility of military force in modern war. After the Cold War, Western armed forces have increasingly been called upon to intervene in internal conflicts in the former Third World. These forces have been called upon to carry out missions that they traditionally have not been trained and equipped for, in environments that they often have not been prepared for. A number of these ‘new’ types of operations in allegedly ‘new’ wars stand out, such as peace enforcement, state-building, counter-insurgency, humanitarian aid, and not the least counter-terrorism. The success rate of these missions has, however, been mixed, providing fuel for an increasingly loud debate on the utility of force in modern war. This edited volume poses as its central question: what is in fact the utility of force? Is force useful for anything other than a complete conventional defeat of a regular opponent, who is confronted in the open field? This book will be of much interest to students of strategic studies, war and conflict studies, counter-insurgency, security studies and IR. Isabelle Duyvesteyn is an Associate Professor at the Department of History of International Relations, Utrecht University in the Netherlands. Jan Angstrom is a researcher at the Swedish National Defence College.
Download or read book Counterinsurgency written by Douglas Porch and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2013-07-11 with total page 449 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Controversial new history of counterinsurgency which challenges its claims as an effective strategy of waging war.
Download or read book Counterinsurgency Law written by William Banks and published by Oxford University Press. This book was released on 2013-02-21 with total page 310 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: "The four parts of our book that follow offer a range of legal and policy perspectives on the problems of COIN in particular and irregular warfare in general as twenty-first century asymmetric warfare continues to evolve. The contributors offer analyses and prescriptions that are complimentary in some instances and widely divergent in others"--Page xxii, Introduction.
Download or read book Learning Relearning and Unlearning the Development of Counterinsurgency Doctrine in the United States Army and Marine Corps 1898 1940 written by Lauren Raouf and published by Grin Publishing. This book was released on 2016-06-28 with total page 138 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Bachelor Thesis from the year 2008 in the subject Politics - International Politics - Region: USA, Harvard University, language: English, abstract: The present thesis examines the factors that led to the development of counterinsurgency doctrine in the United States Army and Marine Corps, focusing on the period from 1898-1940, and why the two organizations had strikingly different approaches and beliefs about the importance of this doctrine. When the Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz described war as "simply a continuation of political intercourse, with the addition of other means," he was writing primarily with reference to conventional warfare between the national armies fighting for the achievement of a specific set of political objectives. However, Clausewitz's understanding of war is equally applicable to a different kind of warfare: revolutionary warfare, defined by John Shy and Thomas Collier as "the seizure of political power by the use of armed force." In this type of warfare, the insurgent force attempts to gain political power (usually the power of the state) while the counterinsurgent force-usually the state, although sometimes supported by outside actors-attempts to retain its hold on political power. Revolutionary war is at its heart a struggle for the support of the people, an explicitly political kind of warfare. The problems of waging a successful counterinsurgency have plagued military experts for centuries. In a counterinsurgency, the strengths of a conventional military power are turned into weaknesses, as applying overwhelming force is generally counterproductive to the goal of winning popular support. For most conventional military forces, fighting a counterinsurgency means changing the organization's very way of thinking about warfare. Military organizations known for their technological and conventional warfare prowess are forced to adopt new strategies and ideas when faced with the harassing tactics of insurgents who need only
Download or read book Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century written by Steven Metz and published by . This book was released on 2004-11-30 with total page 52 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Insurgency has existed throughout history but ebbed and flowed in strategic significance. Today the world has entered another period when insurgency is common and strategically significant. This is likely to continue for at least a decade, perhaps longer. As the United States confronts this threat, extrapolating old ideas, strategies, doctrine, and operational concepts is a recipe for ineffectiveness. Reconceptualization is needed. The strategic salience of insurgency for the United States is higher than it has been since the height of the Cold War. But insurgency remains challenging for the United States because two of its dominant characteristics--protractedness and ambiguity-- mitigate the effectiveness of the American military. Furthermore, the broader U.S. national security organization is not optimized for counterinsurgency support. Ultimately, a nation is only as good at counterinsurgency support as its weakest link, not its strongest. Existing American strategy and doctrine focus on national insurgencies rather than liberation ones. As a result, the strategy stresses selective engagement; formation of a support coalition if possible; keeping the American presence to a minimum level to attain strategic objectives; augmenting the regime's military, intelligence, political, informational, and economic capabilities; and, encouraging and shaping reform by the regime designed to address shortcomings and the root causes of the insurgency. The key to success is not for the U.S. military to become better at counterinsurgency, but for the U.S. military (and other elements of the government) to be skilled at helping local security and intelligence forces become effective at it. A strategy for countering a liberation insurgency must be different in some important ways. Specifically, it should include the rapid stabilization of the state or area using the appropriately sized force (but larger is usually better); a shift to minimum U.S. military presence as rapidly as possible; rapid creation of effective local security and intelligence forces; shifting the perception of the insurgency from a liberation one to a national one; encouraging sustained reform by the partner regime; and cauterization--the strengthening of states surrounding the state facing an insurgency. Sustained capability enhancement is crucial, even when the United States is not actively engaged in counterinsurgency. This includes leader development, wargaming, concept development, research and analysis, professional education, and focused training. Capability enhancement should include increasing the ability and willingness of regional states and other regional security organizations to provide counterinsurgency support, improved homeland security, and methods for early warning of insurgency, preventative actions, and the creation of early-stage support packages. The United States must make clear whether its approach to counterinsurgency is a strategy of victory or a strategy of containment, tailoring the response and method to the threat. A strategy of victory which seeks a definitive end makes sense when facing a national insurgency in which the partner government has some basis of legitimacy and popular support. In liberation insurgencies, though, a strategy of victory is a very long shot; hence a strategy of containment is the more logical one.
Download or read book Strategy Strikes Back written by Max Brooks and published by U of Nebraska Press. This book was released on 2018-05 with total page 306 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The most successful film franchise of all time, Star Wars thrillingly depicts an epic multigenerational conflict fought a long time ago in a galaxy far, far away. But the Star Wars saga has as much to say about successful strategies and real-life warfare waged in our own time and place. Strategy Strikes Back brings together over thirty of today's top military and strategic experts, including generals, policy advisors, seasoned diplomats, counterinsurgency strategists, science fiction writers, war journalists, and ground‑level military officers, to explain the strategy and the art of war by way of the Star Wars films. Each chapter of Strategy Strikes Back provides a relatable, outside‑the‑box way to simplify and clarify the complexities of modern military conflict. A chapter on the case for planet building on the forest moon of Endor by World War Z author Max Brooks offers a unique way to understand our own sustained engagement in war-ravaged societies such as Afghanistan. Another chapter on the counterinsurgency waged by Darth Vader against the Rebellion sheds light on the logic behind past military incursions in Iraq. Whether using the destruction of Alderaan as a means to explore the political implications of targeting civilians, examining the pivotal decisions made by Yoda and the Jedi Council to differentiate strategic leadership in theory and in practice, or considering the ruthlessness of Imperial leaders to explain the toxicity of top-down leadership in times of war and battle, Strategy Strikes Back gives fans of Star Wars and aspiring military minds alike an inspiring and entertaining means of understanding many facets of modern warfare. It is a book as captivating and enthralling as Star Wars itself.
Download or read book Wrong Turn written by Gian Gentile and published by New Press, The. This book was released on 2015-03-03 with total page 142 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A searing indictment of US strategy in Afghanistan from a distinguished military leader and West Point military historian—“A remarkable book” (National Review). In 2008, Col. Gian Gentile exposed a growing rift among military intellectuals with an article titled “Misreading the Surge Threatens U.S. Army’s Conventional Capabilities,” that appeared in World Politics Review. While the years of US strategy in Afghanistan had been dominated by the doctrine of counterinsurgency (COIN), Gentile and a small group of dissident officers and defense analysts began to question the necessity and efficacy of COIN—essentially armed nation-building—in achieving the United States’ limited core policy objective in Afghanistan: the destruction of Al Qaeda. Drawing both on the author’s experiences as a combat battalion commander in the Iraq War and his research into the application of counterinsurgency in a variety of historical contexts, Wrong Turn is a brilliant summation of Gentile’s views of the failures of COIN, as well as a trenchant reevaluation of US operations in Afghanistan. “Gentile is convinced that Obama’s ‘surge’ in Afghanistan can’t work. . . . And, if Afghanistan doesn’t turn around soon, the Democrats . . . who have come to embrace the Petraeus-Nagl view of modern warfare . . . may find themselves wondering whether it’s time to go back to the drawing board.” —The New Republic
Download or read book Counterinsurgency in Iraq 2003 2006 written by Bruce R. Pirnie and published by Rand Corporation. This book was released on 2008-01-25 with total page 135 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Examines the deleterious effects of the U.S. failure to focus on protecting the Iraqi population for most of the military campaign in Iraq and analyzes the failure of a technologically driven counterinsurgency (COIN) approach. It outlines strategic considerations relative to COIN; presents an overview of the conflict in Iraq; describes implications for future operations; and offers recommendations to improve the U.S. capability to conduct COIN.