Download or read book The Multiple Unit Auction with Variable Supply written by Yvan Lengwiler and published by . This book was released on 1998 with total page 28 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book The Multiple Unit Auction with Variable Suppy written by Yvan Lengwiler and published by . This book was released on 2001 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The theory of multiple unit auctions traditionally assumes that the offered quantity is fixed. I argue that this assumption is not appropriate for many applications because the seller may be able and willing to adjust the supply to the bidding. In this paper I address this shortcoming by analyzing a multi-unit auction game between a monopolistic seller who can produce arbitrary quantities at constant unit cost, and oligopolistic bidders. I establish the existence of a subgame-perfect equilibrium for price discriminating and for uniform price auctions. I also show that bidders have an incentive to misreport their true demand in both auction formats, but they do that in different ways and for different reasons. Furthermore, both auction formats are inefficient, but there is no unambiguous ordering among them. Finally, the more competitive the bidders are, the more likely the seller is to prefer uniform pricing over price discrimination, yet increased competition among bidders may or may not enhance efficiency.
Download or read book Strategic Bidding in a Multi unit Auction written by Catherine D. Wolfram and published by . This book was released on 1997 with total page 72 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper considers the bidding behavior of participants in the daily auction to supply electricity in England and Wales. Every day, owners of generating capacity submit bids reflecting a price for power from their plants. The price bid by the last plant used to meet electricity needs in a given time period is the price paid for capacity from all plants. Theoretical work on uniform-price multi-unit auctions suggests that bidders selling more than one unit of a good have an incentive to increase the prices they bid at high quantities. If a bid sets the equilibrium price, the bidder receives a higher price for that unit as well as for all inframarginal units. I find evidence of strategic bid increases. First, plants that are likely to be used after a number of other plants are already operating bid more. Second, the larger supplier submits higher bids, all else equal. Lastly, there is some evidence that bids for given plants are higher when the suppliers have more available capacity.
Download or read book Multi unit Auctions with Uncertain Supply and Single unit Demand written by Edward J. Anderson and published by . This book was released on 2023 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We study multi-unit auctions where bidders have single-unit demand and asymmetric information. For symmetric equilibria, we identify circumstances where uniform-pricing is better for the auctioneer than pay-as-bid pricing, and where transparency improves the revenue of the auctioneer. An issue with the uniform-price auction is that seemingly collusive equilibria can exist. We show that such outcomes are less likely if the traded volume of the auctioneer is uncertain. But if bidders are asymmetric ex-ante, then both a price áoor and a price cap are normally needed to get a unique equilibrium, which is well behaved.
Download or read book Market Power and Information Effects in a Multi unit Auction written by Andreas Hefti and published by . This book was released on 2019 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We study the effects of different information structures (full information, supply uncertainty and demand uncertainty) on equilibrium prices, allocative efficiency and bidding behavior in a (supply-side) uniform-price multi-unit auction, using supply function competition and a novel experimental design. Our setup integrates different types of market power and a varying level of competition. We empirically find that average prices tend to be higher under full information compared to the cases where bidders either have limited information about about the demand level or rivals' technologies or; the latter even leading to strictly lower average prices as the exertion of market power and bid shading is strongly reduced. We explain this finding with a behavioral equilibrium concept, where bidders behave as if competing against the average market situation. Further, we address the problem of multiplicity of equilibria by exploiting the equilibrium conditions to obtain an empirical selection of the average equilibrium supply function. The respective predictions of the average prices exceed those by standard OLS in all information treatments.
Download or read book Comparisons of Auction Mechanisms in a Multiple Unit Setting written by John Charles Bernard and published by . This book was released on 1999 with total page 524 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Auctions with Variable Supply written by Damian S. Damianov and published by . This book was released on 2008 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Multi unit Pay your bid Auctions with Variable Awards written by Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans and published by . This book was released on 1995 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Auction Theory written by Vijay Krishna and published by Elsevier. This book was released on 2002-04-25 with total page 318 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Auction Theory is the standard reference on auctions and the first source of authoritative information about multi-unit auctions. The book develops the main concepts of auction theory from scratch in a self-contained and theoretically rigorous manner. It explores auctions and competitive bidding as games of incomplete information through detailed examinations of themes central to auction theory. This book complements its superb presentation of auction theory with clear and concise proofs of all results on bidding strategies, efficiency, and revenue maximization. It provides discussions on auction-related subjects, including private value auctions; the Revenue Equivalence Principle; auctions with interdependent values; the Revenue Ranking (Linkage) Principle; mechanism design with interdependent values; bidding rings; multiple object auctions; equilibrium and efficiency with private values; and nonidentical objects. This book is essential reading for graduate students taking courses on auction theory, the economics of information, or the economics of incentives, as well as for any serious student of auctions. It will also appeal to professional economists or business analysts working in contract theory, experimental economics, industrial organization, and microeconomic theory. *The standard reference on auctions and the first source of authoritative information about multi-unit auctions*Explores auctions and competitive bidding as games of incomplete information*Uses accessible, detailed examinations of themes central to auction theory
Download or read book Ibss Economics 1999 written by Compiled by the British Library of Political and Economic Science and published by Psychology Press. This book was released on 2000-12-07 with total page 660 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: IBSS is the essential tool for librarians, university departments, research institutions and any public or private institution whose work requires access to up-to-date and comprehensive knowledge of the social sciences
Download or read book Multi unit Auctions with Complementarities written by Wedad Jasmine Elmaghraby and published by . This book was released on 1998 with total page 232 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Costly Offers and the Equilibration Properties of the Multiple Unit Double Auction Under Conditions of Unpredictable Shifts of Demand and Supply written by Julian C. Jamison and published by . This book was released on 1994 with total page 28 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Demand Reduction in Multi Unit Auctions with Varying Numbers of Bidders written by Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans and published by . This book was released on 2008 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Recent auction theory and experimental results document strategic demand reduction by bidders in uniform-price auctions. The present article extends this area of research to consider the effects of varying the number of bidders. Our theoretical model predicts that demand reduction should decrease with an increase in the number of bidders. Considerable demand reduction remains even in the asymptotic limit, although truthful bidding yields profits very close to those of equilibrium play. We experimentally confirm several of our predictions by examining bidding behavior of subjects in an actual marketplace, auctioning dozens of sportscards using both uniform-price and Vickrey auction formats.
Download or read book Putting Auction Theory to Work written by Paul Milgrom and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2004-01-12 with total page 378 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book provides a comprehensive introduction to modern auction theory and its important new applications. It is written by a leading economic theorist whose suggestions guided the creation of the new spectrum auction designs. Aimed at graduate students and professionals in economics, the book gives the most up-to-date treatments of both traditional theories of 'optimal auctions' and newer theories of multi-unit auctions and package auctions, and shows by example how these theories are used. The analysis explores the limitations of prominent older designs, such as the Vickrey auction design, and evaluates the practical responses to those limitations. It explores the tension between the traditional theory of auctions with a fixed set of bidders, in which the seller seeks to squeeze as much revenue as possible from the fixed set, and the theory of auctions with endogenous entry, in which bidder profits must be respected to encourage participation.
Download or read book Assets Beliefs and Equilibria in Economic Dynamics written by Charalambos D. Aliprantis and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2013-11-11 with total page 733 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A collection of papers dealing with a broad range of topics in mathematical economics, game theory and economic dynamics. The contributions present both theoretical and applied research. The volume is dedicated to Mordecai Kurz. The papers were presented in a special symposium co-hosted by the Stanford University Department of Economics and by the Stanford Institute of Economic Policy Research in August 2002.
Download or read book Multiple Unit Auctions with Strategic Price Quantity Decisions written by Rafael Tenorio and published by . This book was released on 1999 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: I study a multiple unit auction where symmetric risk-neutral bidders choose prices and quantities endogenously. In the model, bidders (a) may place non-linear valuations on the auctioned units, and (b) bid for several units at the same price ("lumpy" bids). I characterize quantity-symmetric and strictly monotone-increasing price equilibria for discriminatory and competitive auctions, and show that (i) if quantity strategy profiles are equal across auctions revenue-equivalence holds, (ii) expected revenue is higher if bidders bid for the entire supply rather than for shares of it, and (iii) equilibrium allocations may fail to be Pareto-optimal.
Download or read book Multi unit Multi period Auctions Supply Uncertainty and the Efficiency of Symmetric Equilibria written by Jeroen M. Swinkels and published by . This book was released on 1990 with total page 31 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
