Download or read book The FCC s Incentive Auction written by David A. Balto and published by . This book was released on 2013 with total page 12 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: As the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) considers how to allocate the broadcasters' spectrum in the upcoming "incentive auction," it should be guided by economic principles designed to maximize social benefits. To date, the spectrum policy debate largely has been driven by considerations of the private benefits of carriers such as Sprint, T-Mobile/MetroPCS, U.S. Cellular, and other small carriers (collectively, the "smaller carriers."). In April, the Department of Justice (DOJ) weighed into this debate by advocating "rules that ensure the smaller nationwide networks, which currently lack substantial low-frequency spectrum, have an opportunity to acquire such spectrum. Although it is natural instinct to root for the little guy, ensuring the livelihood of smaller carriers is not an appropriate policy objective, as that would counsel a range of subsidies and tax credits for handpicked competitors. Indeed maximizing the number of wireless competitors is not the appropriate objective either; using spectrum allocation as a tool for reducing wireless concentration would require divvying up the spectrum in such thin slices as to render the resulting allocation virtually useless. The problem with these narrow objectives is that, if pursued to their logical extreme, the resulting policies would sacrifice massive (and growing) economies of scales associated with providing the capacity needed to support mobile video, tele-medicine, distance learning, and a host of other band-width-intensive applications that consumers and small businesses are demanding from their mobile devices.
Download or read book The 2016 FCC Broadcast Incentive Auction written by Michelle Connolly and published by . This book was released on 2018 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: On March 29, 2016, the FCC initiated its first ever two-sided spectrum auction. The auction closed approximately one year later, having repurposed a total of 84 MHz of spectrum. The "incentive auction" included three primary components: (1) a reverse auction where broadcasters bid on the price at which they would voluntarily relinquish their current spectrum usage rights, (2) a forward ascending clock auction for flexible use wireless licenses which determined the winning bid for all licenses within a given geographic region, and (3) an assignment phase, where winning bidders from the forward auction participated in single-bid, second price sealed auctions to determine the exact frequencies individual licenses would be assigned within that geographic region. The reverse auction and the forward auction together completed a "stage". To guarantee that sufficient MHz were cleared, the auction included a "final stage rule" which, if not met, triggered a clearing of the previous stage and the start of a new stage. This rule led to a total of four stages taking place in the incentive auction before the final assignment phase took place. Even at first glance, the incentive auctions are unique among FCC spectrum auctions. Here we consider the estimated true valuation for these licenses based on market conditions. We further compare these results to more recent outcomes in previous FCC spectrum auctions for wireless services to determine if this novel auction mechanism (or possible strategic behavior in anticipation of the incentive auction) impacted auction outcomes.
Download or read book Telecommunications Information on Low Power Television Fccs Spectrum Incentive Auction and Unlicensed Spectrum Use written by U.s. Government Accountability Office and published by Createspace Independent Publishing Platform. This book was released on 2017-07-25 with total page 60 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: " In 2012, Congress authorized FCC to conduct an incentive auction of broadcast television spectrum whereby eligible broadcasters can voluntarily relinquish their spectrum usage rights in return for compensation. This auction will make spectrum available for new uses such as mobile broadband and will also potentially affect LPTV and translator stations. In addition to conducting the auction, FCC proposed preserving at least one vacant television channel in all areas that could be used by unlicensed devices to ensure the public continues to have access to the benefits associated with these devices. GAO was asked to review the possible effects of the auction on LPTV and translator stations and their viewers. This report examines: (1) LPTV and translator stations and how FCC's incentive auction might affect their viewers, (2) selected stakeholders' views on actions FCC has proposed to mitigate the possible effects of the auction on such stations, and (3) selected stakeholders' views on the expected outcomes of preserving a vacant television channel for unlicensed use.
Download or read book Telecommunications written by U S Government Accountability Offi Gao and published by . This book was released on 2019-06-20 with total page 62 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: TELECOMMUNICATIONS: Information on Low Power Television, FCC's Spectrum Incentive Auction, and Unlicensed Spectrum Use
Download or read book Application Procedures for Broadcast Incentive Auction Scheduled to Begin on March 29 2016 Technical Formulas for Competitive Bidding Us Federal Communications Commission Regulation Fcc 2018 Edition written by The Law The Law Library and published by Createspace Independent Publishing Platform. This book was released on 2018-10-06 with total page 54 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Application Procedures for Broadcast Incentive Auction Scheduled to Begin on March 29, 2016 - Technical Formulas for Competitive Bidding (US Federal Communications Commission Regulation) (FCC) (2018 Edition) The Law Library presents the complete text of the Application Procedures for Broadcast Incentive Auction Scheduled to Begin on March 29, 2016 - Technical Formulas for Competitive Bidding (US Federal Communications Commission Regulation) (FCC) (2018 Edition). Updated as of May 29, 2018 This document announces the final application procedures for the broadcast television spectrum incentive auction (Auction 1000), including the forward and reverse auctions (Auctions 1001 and 1002 respectively). This document also summarizes detailed information, instructions, and deadlines for filing applications, as well as certain post-auction procedures established by the Commission's prior orders. This book contains: - The complete text of the Application Procedures for Broadcast Incentive Auction Scheduled to Begin on March 29, 2016 - Technical Formulas for Competitive Bidding (US Federal Communications Commission Regulation) (FCC) (2018 Edition) - A table of contents with the page number of each section
Download or read book Expanding the Economic and Innovation Opportunities of Spectrum Through Incentive Auctions Us Federal Communications Commission Regulation Fcc 2018 Edition written by The Law The Law Library and published by Createspace Independent Publishing Platform. This book was released on 2018-10-07 with total page 282 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Expanding the Economic and Innovation Opportunities of Spectrum Through Incentive Auctions (US Federal Communications Commission Regulation) (FCC) (2018 Edition) The Law Library presents the complete text of the Expanding the Economic and Innovation Opportunities of Spectrum Through Incentive Auctions (US Federal Communications Commission Regulation) (FCC) (2018 Edition). Updated as of May 29, 2018 In this document the Commission adopts rules to implement the broadcast television spectrum incentive auction. Our central objective in designing this incentive auction is to harness the economics of demand for spectrum in order to allow market forces to determine its highest and best use, which will benefit consumers of telecommunications services. This book contains: - The complete text of the Expanding the Economic and Innovation Opportunities of Spectrum Through Incentive Auctions (US Federal Communications Commission Regulation) (FCC) (2018 Edition) - A table of contents with the page number of each section
Download or read book Implementation of the FCC Spectrum Auctions written by United States. Congress. House. Committee on the Budget and published by . This book was released on 1994 with total page 108 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Telecommunications information on Low Power Television FCC s spectrum incentive auction and unlicensed spectrum use written by and published by . This book was released on 2016 with total page 54 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book FCC Record written by United States. Federal Communications Commission and published by . This book was released on 1997 with total page 1214 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Right Sizing Spectrum Auction Licenses written by William Lehr and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The wireless sector is a key contributor to economic activity and growth. Over the next several years, wireless service providers are expected to invest $25 to $53 billion upgrading and expanding their networks to deploy 4G mobile broadband across the nation. All told, wireless broadband investment and the services and innovation supported by such investment are expected to add between $259 and $355 billion to US GDP each year through 2017. The Federal Communications Commission ("Commission" or "FCC") is currently designing several spectrum auctions including the largest ever auction of terrestrial wireless spectrum, currently planned for 2015 (the "Incentive Auction"). The purpose of the Incentive Auction is to free up to 120 MHz of prime spectrum in the 600 MHz band, currently licensed to over-the-air TV broadcasting, to be repurposed for licensing for mobile broadband and other higher value wireless services. To accomplish this goal, the FCC proposes to use a two-part auction process in which broadcast television license holders submit bids for relinquishing their licenses ("Reverse Auction"); and commercial broadband providers bid to acquire licenses to the spectrum freed up ("Forward Auction"). The FCC is currently evaluating various auction design elements to promote competition in the auction. To best ensure this important goal, the FCC is considering a number of auction design features, including spectrum aggregation limits, constraints on the types of bidding allowed, and the appropriate framework to use for the license territories to be used in the Forward Auction. This paper focuses solely on this last issue. We explain here how adopting appropriately small-sized geographic territories is necessary to promote competition and other important economic and social goals, while noting that right-sizing the license territories may not by itself be sufficient to ensure adequate competition and participation in the Forward Auction. For example, the Commission could adopt smaller license sizes and still end with an auction where the two largest wireless carriers aggregate all of the offered spectrum. Such an outcome would be inconsistent with the goal of promoting competition in wireless services. The territory size used for spectrum licenses is as important for valuing spectrum as the parcel size is to real estate value. If all plots were 50 acres, parcels in Manhattan would be too expensive and too large for most; this might compel buyers interested in a small parcel in Manhattan or a parcel in New Jersey adjacent to Manhattan to bid for land they don't want. Alternatively, otherwise qualified buyers might be prevented from buying land altogether. Analogously, wrong-sizing spectrum license territories to be used in future spectrum auctions, and in particular the Incentive Auction, is likely to result in significant and unnecessary inefficiencies in the allocation of scarce radio frequency spectrum resources. For carriers who are compelled to bid for wrong-sized spectrum license packages, the added cost may be sufficient to discourage their participation; or if they do participate, they are less likely to offer successful bids; or if they are successful, they will have fewer resources available to deploy services using the spectrum. In each case, the efficiency of the auction and the larger goals of the process suffer. This paper explains why sufficiently small geographic areas, such as Cellular Market Areas ("CMAs"), are a more appropriates license territory framework to use to ensure that licenses are right-sized in the Forward Auction. Industry participants and the FCC have successfully used smaller geographic license sizes to auction spectrum in the past, and doing so in the Forward Auction offers important advantages. Using smaller territories is better than using the larger Economic Areas ("EAs") or even intermediate-size Partial Economic Areas ("PEAs") because smaller areas efficiently match the needs of bidders to the spectrum they seek. Their use ensures that the planned auction will reallocate spectrum resources efficiently while promoting competition, economic growth, and universal broadband service. Smaller license areas are better than EAs because smaller areas will help to maximize the amount of spectrum that is repurposed for the Forward Auction. Specifically, smaller areas should increase the ability to allow for market variation in areas where limited amounts of spectrum are procured through the Reverse Auction, while reducing the amount of spectrum lost due to international border coordination with Canada and Mexico or other encumbrances. Smaller geographic license sizes should also maximize opportunities for efficient participation by both large and small wireless service providers, and promote efficient build out of spectrum acquired through the Forward Auction. Looking at past auctions, evidence suggests that auction proceeds would be optimized through the use of smaller areas as opposed to EAs. Moreover, using smaller territories is more consistent with the long-term direction of efficient spectrum management reform and future wireless markets, including access to spectrum through secondary market transactions. Finally, this paper rebuts some of the arguments made to date against the use of smaller geographic license areas. Interested parties, particularly the Competitive Carriers Association ("CCA") and their members, have pressed the FCC to license the Forward Auction licenses using smaller territory sizes. These efforts, which included sponsoring an earlier draft of this paper, resulted in a compromise, intermediate solution. The FCC has moved from recommending that the Forward Auction be licensed using Economic Area territories to a compromise territory size based on Partial Economic Areas ("PEAs"). Nonetheless, the debate over the appropriate territory size for FCC licenses continues. As the future of spectrum management is trending toward more granular management of spectrum resources (in space and time), moving toward smaller area regulatory licenses is consistent with this trend; however, the debate continues. We emphasize that while the geographic area of the license is important, there are many other features that must also be considered holistically in order to design an appropriate spectrum auction or management framework, and as such, are likely to vary by band. The focus of the analysis here, while applicable more generally, is on the design of the upcoming Broadcast Incentive Auctions.
Download or read book Procedures for Competitive Bidding Broadcast Incentive Auction 1000 Us Federal Communications Commission Regulation Fcc 2018 Edition written by The Law The Law Library and published by Createspace Independent Publishing Platform. This book was released on 2018-10-14 with total page 98 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Procedures for Competitive Bidding - Broadcast Incentive Auction 1000 (US Federal Communications Commission Regulation) (FCC) (2018 Edition) The Law Library presents the complete text of the Procedures for Competitive Bidding - Broadcast Incentive Auction 1000 (US Federal Communications Commission Regulation) (FCC) (2018 Edition). Updated as of May 29, 2018 In this document, the Commission establishes final bidding procedures and qualifications for participation in Auction 1000, the Incentive Auction, including the forward and reverse auctions, 1001 and 1002 respectively. This document is intended to familiarize prospective applicants with the procedures and other requirements for participation in the Incentive Auction. This book contains: - The complete text of the Procedures for Competitive Bidding - Broadcast Incentive Auction 1000 (US Federal Communications Commission Regulation) (FCC) (2018 Edition) - A table of contents with the page number of each section
Download or read book FCC Auction written by United States. Federal Communications Commission and published by . This book was released on 1998 with total page 342 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Incentive Auction Task Force and Media Bureau Adopt a Post Incentive Auction Transition Scheduling Plan Us Federal Communications Commission Regulation Fcc 2018 Edition written by The Law The Law Library and published by Createspace Independent Publishing Platform. This book was released on 2018-10-08 with total page 38 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Incentive Auction Task Force and Media Bureau Adopt a Post-Incentive Auction Transition Scheduling Plan (US Federal Communications Commission Regulation) (FCC) (2018 Edition) The Law Library presents the complete text of the Incentive Auction Task Force and Media Bureau Adopt a Post-Incentive Auction Transition Scheduling Plan (US Federal Communications Commission Regulation) (FCC) (2018 Edition). Updated as of May 29, 2018 In this document, the Media Bureau, in consultation with the Incentive Auction Task Force, the Wireless Telecommunications Bureau, and the Office of Engineering and Technology, adopts a methodology to establish construction deadlines and transitions schedule for full power and Class A television stations that are transitioning to new channels following the incentive auction. This book contains: - The complete text of the Incentive Auction Task Force and Media Bureau Adopt a Post-Incentive Auction Transition Scheduling Plan (US Federal Communications Commission Regulation) (FCC) (2018 Edition) - A table of contents with the page number of each section
Download or read book Crafting a Successful Incentive Auction written by United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page 128 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Economics at the FCC 2011 2012 written by Evan Kwerel and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The past year in economics at the Federal Communications Commission covered a broad range of topics in telecommunications policy. This paper highlights the economic issues that are addressed in the following key areas: spectrum management, universal service and intercarrier compensation reform, and merger review. In spectrum management, the FCC received congressional authority to implement an “incentive auction” to repurpose television broadcasting spectrum into flexible-use licenses that will be suitable for mobile wireless service providers. We discuss some important issues in designing the auction. We next address some aspects of the FCC's comprehensive reforms of intercarrier compensation, which mainly involves call termination rates, and of universal service. Finally, we discuss the economic analysis of two major mergers: AT&T-T-Mobile, which the FCC staff recommended should be referred to an administrative hearing, and Level 3/Global Crossing, which was cleared with no conditions.
Download or read book Complementarities and Collusion in an FCC Spectrum Auction written by Patrick L. Bajari and published by . This book was released on 2005 with total page 68 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We empirically study bidding in the C Block of the US mobile phone spectrum auctions. Spectrum auctions are conducted using a simultaneous ascending auction design that allows bidders to assemble packages of licenses with geographic complementarities. While this auction design allows the market to find complementarities, the auction might also result in an inefficient equilibrium. In addition, these auctions have equilibria where implicit collusion is sustained through threats of bidding wars. We estimate a structural model in order to test for the presence of complementarities and implicit collusion. The estimation strategy is valid under a wide variety of alternative assumptions about equilibrium in these auctions and is robust to potentially important forms of unobserved heterogeneity. We make suggestions about the design of future spectrum auctions.
Download or read book Two Cheers for the FCC s Mobility Fund Reverse Auction written by Scott Wallsten and published by . This book was released on 2013 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The United States held its first competitive bidding, or “reverse auction,” for universal service funds in September 2012. In general, in a reverse auction providers bid the subsidy they believe they need to provide a specified service in a given area, and the regulator funds the firms that ask for the smallest subsidies. While it is far too early to investigate whether this national auction generated improvements in mobile voice and broadband service in underserved areas, it is not too soon to evaluate the auction itself. This paper investigates the outcome of the Mobility Fund Phase 1 Auction (Auction 901) and considers what we could learn from it for universal service and future reverse auctions, such as the upcoming incentive auction, which aims to reallocate spectrum from broadcasters to those who place a higher value on it. The analysis, based on data from all auction participants, suggests that this one-time expenditure should be considered a qualified success. Perhaps most importantly, it demonstrated that the FCC can run an effective reverse auction and demonstrated that allocating subsidies based on cost-effectiveness measures has the potential to dramatically increase the bang for the buck we get from universal service expenditures. The analysis also yields certain lessons. Most notably, the auction highlighted the difficulty in generating participation. The FCC handled this problem well, but must continue to think hard about how to encourage participation in the future, such as the upcoming incentive auctions or the second Mobility Fund auction. Additionally, the pay-as-bid feature of the auction may be problematic, especially in the much larger upcoming Mobility Fund Phase II. The FCC should consider employing other auction mechanisms more likely to induce firms to reveal their true estimates of the subsidies necessary to provide service.
