Download or read book The Effects of Competition on Banks Risk Taking with and Without Deposit Insurance written by Juha-Pekka Niinimäki and published by . This book was released on 2000 with total page 23 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We consider the joint effect of competition and deposit insurance on risk taking by banks when the riskiness of banks is unobservable to depositors. It turns out that the magnitude of risk taking depends on the type of bank competition. If the bank is a monopoly or banks compete only in the loan market, deposit insurance has no effect on risk taking. In that case the banks are too risky but extreme risk taking is avoided. In contrast, introducing deposit insurance increases risk taking if banks compete for deposits. Then, deposit rates become excessively high and force the banks to take extreme risks. Regarding the effects of increasing competition when there is deposit insurance, the results imply that deposit competition encourages risk taking but loan market competition does not. Our results can be extended more generally to insurance guaranty funds.

Download or read book Bank Risk Taking and Competition Revisited written by Mr.Gianni De Nicolo and published by International Monetary Fund. This book was released on 2003-06-01 with total page 25 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This study reinvestigates the theoretical relationship between competition in banking and banks' exposure to risk of failure. There is a large existing literature that concludes that when banks are confronted with increased competition, they rationally choose more risky portfolios. We briefly review this literature and argue that it has had a significant influence on regulators and central bankers, causing them to take a less favorable view of competition and encouraging anti-competitive consolidation as a response to banking instability. We then show that existing theoretical analyses of this topic are fragile, since they do not detect two fundamental risk-incentive mechanisms that operate in exactly the opposite direction, causing banks to aquire more risk per portfolios as their markets become more concentrated. We argue that these mechanisms should be essential ingredients of models of bank competition.

Download or read book Financial Opening Deposit Insurance and Risk in a Model of Banking Competition written by Mr.Tito Cordella and published by International Monetary Fund. This book was released on 1998-06-01 with total page 46 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper studies the impact of competition on the determination of interest rates and banks’ risk-taking behavior under different assumptions about deposit insurance and the dissemination of financial information. It finds that lower entry costs foster competition in deposit rate sand reduce banks’ incentives to limit risk exposure. Although higher insurance coverage amplifies this effect, two alternative arrangements (risk-based contributions to the insurance fund and public disclosure of financial information) help to reduce it. Moreover, uninsured but fully informed depositors and risk-based full deposit insurance yield the same equilibrium risk level, which is independent of entry costs. The welfare implications of the different arrangements are also explored.

Download or read book Financial Opening Deposit Insurance and Risk in a Model of Banking Competition written by Tito Cordella and published by . This book was released on 2004 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We study the impact of competition on banks' risk-taking behavior under different assumptions about deposit insurance and the dissemination of information. While financial opening increases banks' riskiness, a risk-based deposit insurance or, alternatively, the public disclosure of financial information, are likely to mitigate this effect. Moreover, the limiting cases of uninsured but fully informed depositors, and risk-based full deposit insurance, yield the same equilibrium risk level. Although the welfare consequences of increased competition depend on its impact on risk, financial opening unambiguously improves welfare as we approach the limiting cases.

Download or read book Bank Competition Risk Taking and their Consequences Evidence from the U S Mortgage and Labor Markets written by Alan Xiaochen Feng and published by International Monetary Fund. This book was released on 2018-07-06 with total page 46 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Bank competition can induce excessive risk taking due to risk shifting. This paper tests this hypothesis using micro-level U.S. mortgage data by exploiting the exogenous variation in local house price volatility. The paper finds that, in response to high expected house price volatility, banks in U.S. counties with a competitive mortgage market lowered lending standards by twice as much as those with concentrated markets between 2000 and 2005. Such risk taking pattern was associated with real economic outcomes during the financial crisis, including higher unemployment rates in local real sectors.

Download or read book Bank Risk Taking and Competition Revisited written by Mr.Gianni De Nicolo and published by International Monetary Fund. This book was released on 2006-12-01 with total page 51 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper studies two new models in which banks face a non-trivial asset allocation decision. The first model (CVH) predicts a negative relationship between banks' risk of failure and concentration, indicating a trade-off between competition and stability. The second model (BDN) predicts a positive relationship, suggesting no such trade-off exists. Both models can predict a negative relationship between concentration and bank loan-to-asset ratios, and a nonmonotonic relationship between bank concentration and profitability. We explore these predictions empirically using a cross-sectional sample of about 2,500 U.S. banks in 2003 and a panel data set of about 2,600 banks in 134 nonindustrialized countries for 1993-2004. In both these samples, we find that banks' probability of failure is positively and significantly related to concentration, loan-to-asset ratios are negatively and significantly related to concentration, and bank profits are positively and significantly related to concentration. Thus, the risk predictions of the CVH model are rejected, those of the BDN model are not, there is no trade-off between bank competition and stability, and bank competition fosters the willingness of banks to lend.

Download or read book Bank Leverage and Monetary Policy s Risk Taking Channel written by Mr.Giovanni Dell'Ariccia and published by International Monetary Fund. This book was released on 2013-06-06 with total page 41 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We present evidence of a risk-taking channel of monetary policy for the U.S. banking system. We use confidential data on the internal ratings of U.S. banks on loans to businesses over the period 1997 to 2011 from the Federal Reserve’s survey of terms of business lending. We find that ex-ante risk taking by banks (as measured by the risk rating of the bank’s loan portfolio) is negatively associated with increases in short-term policy interest rates. This relationship is less pronounced for banks with relatively low capital or during periods when banks’ capital erodes, such as episodes of financial and economic distress. These results contribute to the ongoing debate on the role of monetary policy in financial stability and suggest that monetary policy has a bearing on the riskiness of banks and financial stability more generally.

Download or read book International Evidence on Government Support and Risk Taking in the Banking Sector written by Mr.Luis Brandão Brandao Marques and published by International Monetary Fund. This book was released on 2013-05-02 with total page 36 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Government support to banks through the provision of explicit or implicit guarantees affects the willingness of banks to take on risk by reducing market discipline or by increasing charter value. We use an international sample of bank data and government support to banks for the periods 2003-2004 and 2009-2010. We find that more government support is associated with more risk taking by banks, especially during the financial crisis (2009-10). We also find that restricting banks' range of activities ameliorates the moral hazard problem. We conclude that strengthening market discipline in the banking sector is needed to address this moral hazard problem.

Download or read book Modernizing the Financial System written by United States. Department of the Treasury and published by . This book was released on 1991 with total page 772 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Deposit Insurance written by Wen-Dai Elizabeth Huang and published by . This book was released on 1986 with total page 346 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Industry Environment Bank Risk Taking and Deposit Insurance written by Ningyu Qian and published by . This book was released on 2016 with total page 28 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Classic theories always ignore the influence of the banking industry environment on deposit insurance's regulation mechanism. With information transparency and competition degree dimensions, we build a banking risk-taking model and find that the optimal regulation mechanism does not depend on the advantage of the scheme oneself, but it is a trade-off of bank's risk incentive which involves the banking industry environment. Under the suitable competition degree, fair-priced explicit deposit insurance is optimal when the information transparency is high. Otherwise implicit deposit insurance is optimal; moreover if the competition is fierce, then deposit insurance's regulation fails. We find that in the regulation feasible region, the improvement of industry environment will correct moral hazard; however in the regulation failure region, we perfect the exit mechanism of the bank which is in trouble by giving the disposal cost pricing strategy. And the most important is that this regulation mechanism demonstrates the endogenous cause of the exist of China's implicit guarantee system featured by strict administrative control. Based on our research we think that if we do well with the delegating power and strengthening regulation, improve the industry environment, and the collaboration with different policies then we will reform the regulation system successfully and improve the society's economic efficiency.

Download or read book Deposit Insurance Bank Risk Taking and Failures written by Felipe Aldunate and published by . This book was released on 2017 with total page 61 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: I use the introduction of deposit insurance in eight U.S. states in the early twentieth-century to study its effects on the banking system. Using a triple-difference approach exploiting regulatory differences between national and state banks and between states, I find that insured banks experienced higher deposit growth and a decrease in funding costs. I also observe a replacement of demand deposits by riskier time deposits. However, I find no effects on failure rates or risk taking. Using hand-collected micro-level data, I show that larger banks became riskier relative to smaller banks and that banks facing funding problems especially benefited.

Download or read book Deposit Insurance Adoption and Bank Risk Taking written by Mathias LÉ and published by . This book was released on 2013 with total page 82 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Explicit deposit insurance is a crucial ingredient of modern financial safety nets. This paper investigates the effect of deposit insurance adoption on individual bank leverage. Using a panel of banks across 117 countries during the period 1986-2011, I show that deposit insurance adoption pushes banks to increase significantly their leverage by reducing their capital buffer. This increase in bank leverage then translates into higher probability of insolvency. Most importantly, I bring evidence that deposit insurance adoption has important competitive effects: I show that large, systemic and highly leveraged banks are unresponsive to deposit insurance adoption.

Download or read book Deposit Insurance and Bank Risk Taking written by María Fabiana Penas and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page 40 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We analyze the effect of deposit insurance on the risk-taking behavior of banks in the context of a quasi-natural experiment using detailed credit registry data. Using the case of an emerging economy, Bolivia, which introduced a deposit insurance system during the sample period, we compare the risk-taking behavior of banks before and after the introduction of this system. We find that in the post-deposit insurance period, banks are more likely to initiate riskier loans (i.e., loans with worse ratings at origination). These loans carry higher interest rates and are associated with worse ex-post performance. We also find that banks do not compensate for the extra risk by increasing collateral requirements or decreasing loan maturities. Additional results suggest that the increase in risk-taking is due to the drop in market discipline from large depositors and that differences between large (too-big-to-fail) and small banks diminished in the post-deposit insurance period.

Download or read book Bank Competition Risk and Asset Allocations written by Gianni De Nicoló and published by International Monetary Fund. This book was released on 2009-07 with total page 42 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We study a banking model in which banks invest in a riskless asset and compete in both deposit and risky loan markets. The model predicts that as competition increases, both loans and assets increase; however, the effect on the loans-to-assets ratio is ambiguous. Similarly, as competition increases, the probability of bank failure can either increase or decrease. We explore these predictions empirically using a cross-sectional sample of 2,500 U.S. banks in 2003, and a panel data set of about 2600 banks in 134 non-industrialized countries for the period 1993-2004. With both samples, we find that banks' probability of failure is negatively and significantly related to measures of competition, and that the loan-to-asset ratio is positively and significantly related to measures of competition. Furthermore, several loan loss measures commonly employed in the literature are negatively and significantly related to measures of bank competition. Thus, there is no evidence of a trade-off between bank competition and stability, and bank competition seems to foster banks' willingness to lend.

Download or read book Deposit Insurance Around the World written by Aslı Demirgüç-Kunt and published by MIT Press. This book was released on 2008 with total page 415 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Explicit deposit insurance (DI) is widely held to be a crucial element of modern financial safety nets. This book draws on an original cross-country dataset on DI systems and design features to examine the impact of DI on banking behavior and assess the policy complications that emerge in developing countries.

Download or read book Deposit Insurance and Bank Risk Taking written by Carolina Lopez-Quiles and published by . This book was released on 2018 with total page 21 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper estimates the effect of deposit insurance on the risk-taking behaviour of banks. As shown in the theoretical literature, deposit insurance may induce moral hazard and incentivise banks to take on more risk. In this paper we provide an experimental setup in which we exploit an increase in the coverage limit of deposit insurance in the U.S. in order to identify the difference in risk taking by banks that were affected and banks that were not. This difference comes from the fact that state chartered savings banks in Massachusetts had unlimited deposit insurance coverage at the time when it was increased for all other banks in the US. Given that all banks in the sample are subject to the same regulatory and supervisory requirements, and that they are similar in other characteristics, we can isolate the effect of such increase in deposit insurance. We find, contrary to the literature, that this increase in deposit insurance did not increase bank risk-taking, nor did it affect market discipline, evident through a lack of an effect on deposit rates.