Download or read book The Design of International Agreements written by w T. Guzman and published by . This book was released on 2010 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: States entering into international agreements have at their disposal several tools to enhance the strength and credibility of their commitments, including the ability to make the agreement a formal treaty rather than soft law, provide for mandatory dispute resolution procedures, and establish monitoring mechanisms. Each of these strategies - referred to as `design elements` - increases the costs associated with the violation of an agreement and, therefore, the probability of compliance. Yet even a passing familiarity with international agreements makes it clear that states routinely fail to include these design elements in their agreements. This article explains why rational states sometimes prefer to draft their agreements in such a way as to make them less credible and, therefore, more easily violated. In contrast to domestic law, where contractual violations are sanctioned through zero-sum payments from the breaching party to the breached-against party, sanctions for violations of international agreements are not zero-sum. To the extent that sanctions exist, they almost always represent a net loss to the parties. For example, a reputational loss felt by the violating party yields little or no offsetting benefit to its counter-party. When entering into an agreement, then, the parties take into account the possibility of a violation and recognize that if it takes place, the net loss to the parties will be larger if credibility-enhancing measures are in place. In other words, the design elements offer a benefit in the form of greater compliance, but do so by increasing the cost to the parties in the event of a violation. When deciding which design elements to include, the parties must then balance the benefits of increased compliance against the costs triggered in the event of a violation.
Download or read book The Design of International Agreements written by Andrew T. Guzmán and published by . This book was released on 2003 with total page 54 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book The Political Economy of International Agreements written by Florian Kiesow Cortez and published by Springer Nature. This book was released on 2021-09-25 with total page 127 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This volume analyzes international agreements from a political economy perspective. In four essays, it raises the question of whether domestic institutions help explain if countries join international agreements, and in case they do, what type of international organization they join. The book examines how specific democratic design elements channel and mediate domestic demands directed at politicians, and how under certain circumstances entering international agreements helps politicians navigate these demands to their benefit. The volume also distinguishes between different types of international instruments with a varying expected constraining effect upon member states, and empirically tests if this matters for incentives to join. The volume addresses scholars, students, and practitioners interested in a better understanding of how the shape of domestic institutions affects politicians’ incentives to enter into binding international agreements.
Download or read book The Continent of International Law written by Barbara Koremenos and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2016-04-07 with total page 457 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book demonstrates theoretically and empirically how international law's detailed design provisions help states cooperate despite harsh international political realities.
Download or read book The Impact of Design on the Compliance of States with International Agreements written by Jakub Walko and published by . This book was released on 2011 with total page 164 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This work tackles the question of the importance of design of international agreements on the compliance they elicit on all levels of the global trade regime. Discussing the international legal theories that underpin the different perspectives on this issue and scrutinizing case studies of both large and small treaties this thesis establishes the impact that elements of an agreement's structure have on its aggregate success. A case study of the GATT/WTO system illustrates the challenges of scale and diversity of trade issues while the study of the OILPOL and MARPOL environmental pollution regimes presents a lens on the practical implementation of an agreement and the evolution of compliance resulting from adjustments to such elements of its architecture as the monitoring components and enforcement mechanism. By analyzing different scales of the international trade system this work seeks to thread particular challenges and lessons that disappear or emerge as one moves from the large system with multiple state actors and significant monetary consequences to a smaller focus where the burden of compliance falls on individual ship captains and harbor inspectors. By investigating the relationship between the state and the individual in compliance matters this work aims to contribute to the scholarship on the optimal path of bringing on the ground realities to diplomatic negotiations. This study carries lessons for the crafting of future international agreements by pointing out areas of concentration that prove most crucial to inducing compliance and offers suggestions for a better method of effectively putting into practice the actual intent of the agreement.
Download or read book The Design of Stable International Environmental Agreements written by Ulrich J. Wagner and published by . This book was released on 2007 with total page 48 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: International environmental agreements typically strive for the solution of a common property resource dilemma. Since the sovereignty of states precludes external enforcement, international environmental agreements must be self-enforcing. Game theoretical models explain why rewards and punishments imposed through the environmental externality generally fail to enforce full cooperation. Therefore, environmental treaties incorporate provisions that enhance the incentives for participation such as transfers, sanctions and linkage to other negotiation topics in international politics. Moreover, interaction with markets and governments as well as the rules and procedures adopted in the negotiation process influence the design and the effectiveness of an international environmental agreement.
Download or read book On the Design of International Environmental Agreements for Identical and Heterogeneous Developing Countries written by Amitrajeet A. Batabyal and published by . This book was released on 2001 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We study the decision question faced by an imperfectly informed supra-national governmental authority (SNGA) that intends to design an International Environmental Agreement (IEA). This SNGA can't interact directly with the externality causing firms in the developing countries (DCs), and it must interact with such firms through their national governments. We find that the monetary transfers necessary to bring about optimal behavior by firms and governments are responsive to the presence of collusion and to the timing of the underlying game. Our study suggests that IEAs are not bound to fail because of a basic monitoring and enforcement problem arising from national sovereignty. Nevertheless, the success of IEAs is dependent on the monetary resources available for the protection of the environment.
Download or read book An Agenda for the Design and Study of International Environmental Agreements written by Amitrajeet A. Batabyal and published by . This book was released on 1996 with total page 28 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Treaty Handbook written by United Nations. Treaty Section and published by . This book was released on 2012 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Revised and updated, this handbook by the Treaty Section of the United Nations Office of Legal Affairs is intended as a contribution to UN efforts to assist States in becoming parties to the international treaty framework. It is written in simple language and, with the aid of diagrams and step-by-step instructions, touches upon many aspects of treaty law and practice. This handbook is designed for use by States, international organizations and other relevant entities. In particular, it is intended to provide some degree of assistance to States that may have scarce resources and limited technical proficiency in treaty law and practice to participate fully in the multilateral treaty framework.
Download or read book Depth Versus Rigidity in the Design of International Trade Agreements written by Leslie Johns and published by . This book was released on 2015 with total page 28 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: I examine the impact of depth and rigidity in international trade agreements. Increasing the depth of required cooperation lowers the likelihood of full compliance and the stability of a trade regime. In contrast, increasing the rigidity of an agreement raises the likelihood of full compliance and lowers stability. Both depth and rigidity can lower tariffs if a state does not defect from its treaty obligations. I argue that if we control for the benefits of trade liberalization, then observable treaties will have a negative relationship between depth and rigidity. Deep agreements will be flexible, while shallow agreements will be rigid.
Download or read book Depth Flexibility and International Cooperation written by Leonardo Baccini and published by . This book was released on 2013 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: States design some international institutions more flexibly than others. What explains this variation? Focusing on preferential trade agreements, we argue that different aspects of institutional design are interdependent. In particular, we posit that deep agreements create an incentive for states to add more flexibility, which can take the form of transitional flexibility or provisions that serve as safety valves in the long term. Both types of flexibility mechanisms increase with depth and are complementary. We also argue that states are concerned about the stability of an agreement and as a consequence introduce ex-ante constraints against exploiting the future application of flexibility. An original data-set on the design of 587 trade agreements signed between 1945 and 2009 allows us to test our arguments. Descriptive evidence, multivariate statistics and instrumental variable models all support the theoretical expectations. The paper contributes to the literature on the design of international institutions and preferential trade agreements.
Download or read book The Strategic Logic of International Agreement Design written by Michael Sampson and published by . This book was released on 2016 with total page 468 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book The Political Economy of International Agreements written by Florian Kiesow Cortez and published by . This book was released on 2021 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This volume analyzes international agreements from a political economy perspective. In four essays, it raises the question of whether domestic institutions help explain if countries join international agreements, and in case they do, what type of international organization they join. The book examines how specific democratic design elements channel and mediate domestic demands directed at politicians, and how under certain circumstances entering international agreements helps politicians navigate these demands to their benefit. The volume also distinguishes between different types of international instruments with a varying expected constraining effect upon member states, and empirically tests if this matters for incentives to join. The volume addresses scholars, students, and practitioners interested in a better understanding of how the shape of domestic institutions affects politicians' incentives to enter into binding international agreements.
Download or read book Global Goals and International Agreements Lessons for the Design of the Sustainable Development Goals written by May Miller-Dawkins and published by . This book was released on 2022 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book The Continent of International Law written by Barbara Koremenos and published by . This book was released on 2009 with total page 25 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book The Design of International Trade Agreements written by Andreas Dür and published by . This book was released on 2013 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Preferential trade agreements (PTAs) have been proliferating for the last twenty years. A large literature has studied various aspects of this phenomenon. Until very recently, this literature has treated all PTAs as equal. However, PTAs differ significantly in terms of design. In this paper, we present a new dataset on the design of trade agreements (DESTA). We illustrate the usefulness of this dataset in re-visiting the literature on the PTA-trade nexus, that is, the questions if and to what extent PTAs impact trade flows.
Download or read book Interdisciplinary Perspectives on International Law and International Relations written by Jeffrey L. Dunoff and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2013 with total page 697 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Influential writers on international law and international relations explore the making, interpretation and enforcement of international law.
