Download or read book The Association Between the Executive Compensation of the Acquiring Company and the Performance of Corporate Mergers and Acquisitions Taiwan s Financial Industry as the Example written by and published by . This book was released on 2023 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Mergers and Acquisitions and Executive Compensation written by Virginia Bodolica and published by Routledge. This book was released on 2015-06-26 with total page 262 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Over the past decades, the total value of executive compensation packages has been rising dramatically, contributing to a wider pay gap between the chief executive officer and the average worker. In the midst of the financial turmoil that brought about a massive wave of corporate failures, the lavish executive compensation package has come under an intense spotlight. Public pressure has mounted to revise the levels and the structure of executive pay in a way that will tie more closely the executive wealth to that of shareholders. Merger and acquisition (M&A) activities represent an opportune setting for gauging whether shareholder value creation or managerial opportunism guides executive compensation. M&As constitute major examples of high-profile events prompted by managers who typically conceive them as a means for achieving higher levels of pay, even though they are frequently associated with disappointing returns to acquiring shareholders. Mergers and Acquisitions and Executive Compensation reviews the existing empirical evidence and provides an integrative framework for the growing body of literature that is situated at the intersection of two highly debated topics: M&A activities and executive compensation. The proposed framework structures the literature along two dimensions, such as M&A phases and firm’s role in a M&A deal, allowing readers to identify three main streams of research and five different conceptualizations of causal relationships between M&A transactions and executive compensation. The book makes a comprehensive review of empirical studies conducted to date, aiming to shed more light on the current and emerging knowledge in this field of investigation, discuss the inconsistencies encountered within each stream of research, and suggest promising directions for further exploration. This book will appeal to researchers and students alike in the fields of organizational behavior and governance as well as accounting and accountability.

Download or read book Executive Compensation and Corporate Acquisition Decisions written by Sudip Datta and published by . This book was released on 2001 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: By examining how executive compensation structure determines corporate acquisition decisions, we document a strong positive relation between acquiring managers' equity-based compensation (EBC) and stock price performance around and following acquisition announcements. This relation is highly robust when we control for acquisition mode (mergers), means of payment, managerial ownership, and previous option grants. Compared to low EBC managers, high EBC managers pay lower acquisition premiums, acquire targets with higher growth opportunities, and make acquisitions engendering larger increases in firm risk. EBC significantly explains post-acquisition stock price performance even after controlling for acquisition mode, means of payment, and quot;glamourquot; versus quot;valuequot; acquirers.

Download or read book Mergers Acquisitions and Corporate Restructurings written by Patrick A. Gaughan and published by John Wiley & Sons. This book was released on 2017-11-27 with total page 676 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The essential M&A primer, updated with the latest research and statistics Mergers, Acquisitions, and Corporate Restructurings provides a comprehensive look at the field's growth and development, and places M&As in realistic context amidst changing trends, legislation, and global perspectives. All-inclusive coverage merges expert discussion with extensive graphs, research, and case studies to show how M&As can be used successfully, how each form works, and how they are governed by the laws of major countries. Strategies and motives are carefully analyzed alongside legalities each step of the way, and specific techniques are dissected to provide deep insight into real-world operations. This new seventh edition has been revised to improve clarity and approachability, and features the latest research and data to provide the most accurate assessment of the current M&A landscape. Ancillary materials include PowerPoint slides, a sample syllabus, and a test bank to facilitate training and streamline comprehension. As the global economy slows, merger and acquisition activity is expected to increase. This book provides an M&A primer for business executives and financial managers seeking a deeper understanding of how corporate restructuring can work for their companies. Understand the many forms of M&As, and the laws that govern them Learn the offensive and defensive techniques used during hostile acquisitions Delve into the strategies and motives that inspire M&As Access the latest data, research, and case studies on private equity, ethics, corporate governance, and more From large megadeals to various forms of downsizing, a full range of restructuring practices are currently being used to revitalize and supercharge companies around the world. Mergers, Acquisitions, and Corporate Restructurings is an essential resource for executives needing to quickly get up to date to plan their own company's next moves.

Download or read book The Art of Distressed M A Buying Selling and Financing Troubled and Insolvent Companies written by H. Peter Nesvold and published by McGraw Hill Professional. This book was released on 2010-12-17 with total page 496 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Pessimists see distressed M&A . . . Optimists see distressed M&A Opportunities abound in “bankruptcy beauties”—both in good times and bad. Distressed mergers and acquisitions used to be the domain of a handful of specialists, who generated handsome profits by unlocking value in troubled companies. Now, you can learn the secrets for participating in these deals with knowledge and confidence. The Art of Distressed M&A provides the critical information needed to manage the unique complexities of buying, selling, and financing troubled companies. The Art of Distressed M&A arms you with creative solutions to seemingly impossible problems and helps you to avoid common pitfalls. This comprehensive guide enables you to: Understand the roles, rights, and responsibilities of debtors, secured creditors, unsecured creditors, advisors, trustees, and bankruptcy courts Navigate through complicated valuation, financing, legal, accounting, and tax issues Communicate effectively and make informed proposals in multiparty negotiations Create the optimal deal structure—from prepackaged plans of reorganization to 363 sales to loan-to-own transactions The Art of Distressed M&A also highlights practical examples using recent bankruptcy cases following the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 and is the first publication of its kind since The Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010.

Download or read book Corporate Restructuring and Executive Compensation written by Joel M. Stern and published by . This book was released on 1989 with total page 420 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Executive Compensation and Corporate Acquisitions in China written by Mei XUE and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page 78 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper examines 259 completed merger and acquisition (M&A) deals undertaken by Chinese firms listed on either the Shanghai or Shenzhen Stock Exchanges between 2003 and 2010. Using comprehensive financial and accounting data, augmented by unique data on executive compensation, we attempt to investigate how executive compensation relates to corporate acquisition decisions in acquiring firms in China. We find that the acquiring firms gain significantly positive abnormal returns around the announcement of M&As. We also find that the stock price of acquring firms following acquisition announcements statistically outperformace the average market in a three year period. On the other hand, we obseve that the salary in cash of top-three executives differentials greatly across the acquring firms. The overall level of managerial ownership in the acquiring firms is rather low. There are some observable patterns in the relations between the short-term CARs of the acquiring firms and the executive salary or ownership. while the level of executive ownership has no statistically significant influence on the CARs, executive salary is significantly negatively related to the CARs of the acquiring firms offering to their executives a high level of salary.

Download or read book Pay Without Performance written by Lucian A. Bebchuk and published by Harvard University Press. This book was released on 2004 with total page 308 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The company is under-performing, its share price is trailing, and the CEO gets...a multi-million-dollar raise. This story is familiar, for good reason: as this book clearly demonstrates, structural flaws in corporate governance have produced widespread distortions in executive pay. Pay without Performance presents a disconcerting portrait of managers' influence over their own pay--and of a governance system that must fundamentally change if firms are to be managed in the interest of shareholders. Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried demonstrate that corporate boards have persistently failed to negotiate at arm's length with the executives they are meant to oversee. They give a richly detailed account of how pay practices--from option plans to retirement benefits--have decoupled compensation from performance and have camouflaged both the amount and performance-insensitivity of pay. Executives' unwonted influence over their compensation has hurt shareholders by increasing pay levels and, even more importantly, by leading to practices that dilute and distort managers' incentives. This book identifies basic problems with our current reliance on boards as guardians of shareholder interests. And the solution, the authors argue, is not merely to make these boards more independent of executives as recent reforms attempt to do. Rather, boards should also be made more dependent on shareholders by eliminating the arrangements that entrench directors and insulate them from their shareholders. A powerful critique of executive compensation and corporate governance, Pay without Performance points the way to restoring corporate integrity and improving corporate performance.

Download or read book Business Sustainability in Asia written by Zabihollah Rezaee and published by John Wiley & Sons. This book was released on 2019-02-20 with total page 286 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Get familiar with business sustainability in Asia Business Sustainability in Asia offers 12 chapters that cover different aspects of business sustainability with a keen focus on its implications in Asia. Anyone who is involved with business sustainability and corporate governance, the financial reporting process, investment decisions, legal and financial advising, assurance functions, and corporate governance education will be interested in this book. It examines business sustainability performance, reporting and assurance and their integration into strategy, governance, risk assessment, performance management, and the reporting process of disclosing governance, ethics, social, environmental, and economic sustainable performance. The book also highlights how people, businesses, and resources collaborate in a business sustainability and accountability model. • Develop an awareness and understanding of the main themes, perspectives, frameworks, and issues pertaining to corporate governance and business sustainability in Asia • Covers a variety of issues relevant to business sustainability in Asia • Authored by an expert who has written extensively on the subject • Understand why organizations worldwide recognize the importance of sustainability performance If you’re a business leader, executive, auditor, or student looking to familiarize yourself with this emerging subject, Business Sustainability in Asia has you covered.

Download or read book Executive Compensation Capital Structure Payouts and Cash Holdings written by Adilah Azhari and published by . This book was released on 2015 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The aim of this research is to examine the relationship between CEO pay and firm's financial policies. According to agency theory, manager-shareholder conflicts of interest can be alleviated (and managerial compensation can be influenced) by debt. Debt lowers the level of free cash flow which managers are able to obtain because monitoring increases. This means that when the risk of bankruptcy appears, managers must consider the best financial interests of shareholders. Under agency theory, pay-performance sensitivity is smaller for high-debt companies when alternatives are available for high alignment incentives and high debt. The research objectives focus on three empirical chapters to explore the association between CEO pay and firm's financial policies for UK firms. The first study investigates the relationship between pay-performance sensitivity and debt as the explanatory variables. In the second study, the link between CEO compensation and corporate payout policy by segregating between total payouts, dividends and share repurchases are explored. Finally, the last objective examines the interaction between CEO pay packages and cash holdings of the firm. The research sample consists of 183 publicly traded companies listed on the FTSE 350 from 1999 to 2008. The estimates in the pay-performance study show mixed support for pay-performance and leverage because the negative coefficients for market debt have weak significance overall when median regressions are employed. Thus, it can be concluded that a firm's leverage has little effect on pay-performance sensitivity as a mechanism to align the interests of the firm's CEO and debt holders. However, there is strong support for the hypothesis that CEO pay-performance sensitivity increases with a firm's growth opportunities, which suggests that firms award higher equity compensation to attract managers with more talent. The second study in this research investigates how corporate payout policy is influenced by CEO share ownership, CEO stock options and CEO long-term incentive plans (LTIPs) in UK firms from 1999 to 2008 using Tobit regressions (for total payouts, dividends and share repurchases) and logistic regressions for the propensity of firms paying out to shareholders. The results show that CEO share ownership LTIPs have positive effects on corporate payout policy. In contrast, corporate governance characteristics do not show conclusive results which affect changes in payout policy. Dividend payout is significantly influenced by CEO share ownership compared to share repurchase payout. The findings support the notion that CEOs' share equity ownership is used to align managerial interest with shareholders in terms of cash payouts to shareholders. In the final empirical chapter, the study focuses on the effect of CEO pay and corporate governance on cash holdings. The study investigates the determinants of cash holdings based on free cash flow and the agency model using cash ratios (cash to sales, cash to assets, cash to market value and log of cash) as dependent variables. The analysis documents that CEO ownership and log LTIPs both have positive and strong relationships with cash ratios. The results support the hypothesis that equity compensation can be used to align managers' interests with those of shareholders.

Download or read book Essays on Acquisition of Newly Listed Firms and Managerial Compensation written by Luyao Pan and published by Open Dissertation Press. This book was released on 2017-01-27 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This dissertation, "Essays on Acquisition of Newly Listed Firms and Managerial Compensation" by Luyao, Pan, 潘璐瑶, was obtained from The University of Hong Kong (Pokfulam, Hong Kong) and is being sold pursuant to Creative Commons: Attribution 3.0 Hong Kong License. The content of this dissertation has not been altered in any way. We have altered the formatting in order to facilitate the ease of printing and reading of the dissertation. All rights not granted by the above license are retained by the author. Abstract: This thesis consists of two essays in corporate finance, one on newly listed firms' post-IPO activities as acquisition targets and the other on corporate executive compensation. In the first essay, I examine a large sample of U.S. newly listed firms to analyze their likelihood of becoming a takeover target. I find that 27 percent of newly listed firms are acquired within five years after the IPO, which is compared with the seasoned-firm counterpart of 17 percent. This difference is economically large, statistically significant, and robust to various firm and market characteristics controls. Several recent studies have reported newly listed firms' active activities as an acquirer. Contributing to this literature, my finding further identifies an active role of IPO firms as a takeover target. My finding is consistent with the presumed motivation of firms' going public for a "double-exit" strategy: To sell the shares through a takeover after the company goes public. Economic rationales for this strategy include advantages from auctioning off a minority stake to dispersed shareholders and more efficient bargaining in takeover negotiations due to increased share liquidity and reduced uncertainty after the IPO. Therefore, going public can be an optimal first step in the process of selling a company. In further support of this motivation, I find that IPO firms, as an acquisition target, receive higher takeover premiums than do comparable privately held targets and seasoned target firms. In conclusion, my findings are consistent with the double-exit strategy predicted by theory, suggesting that IPOs facilitate subsequent sales of the companies and that the strategy is economically justified. In the second essay, I study executive compensation under the Japanese corporate governance system. In March 2010, the Japanese regulator enacted the first legislation regarding the disclosure of director compensation to named individuals. With access to the first publicly available data for Japanese executives, I document comprehensive evidence on the level, structure, and mechanisms of CEO compensation. My findings reveal Japanese practices in CEO pay that differ from the well-known Anglo-American model in significant ways. Its distinct features include base salary dominance and unusually low levels of pay and pay variation. I also identify significant impacts on the compensation system of corporate governance and U.S. influence factors, such as keiretsu groups, financial institutions, US-style compensation committees, and cross-listing on US stock exchanges. DOI: 10.5353/th_b5295523 Subjects: Executives - Salaries, etc Consolidation and merger of corporations

Download or read book The Theory of Corporate Finance written by Jean Tirole and published by Princeton University Press. This book was released on 2010-08-26 with total page 657 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: "Magnificent."—The Economist From the Nobel Prize–winning economist, a groundbreaking and comprehensive account of corporate finance Recent decades have seen great theoretical and empirical advances in the field of corporate finance. Whereas once the subject addressed mainly the financing of corporations—equity, debt, and valuation—today it also embraces crucial issues of governance, liquidity, risk management, relationships between banks and corporations, and the macroeconomic impact of corporations. However, this progress has left in its wake a jumbled array of concepts and models that students are often hard put to make sense of. Here, one of the world's leading economists offers a lucid, unified, and comprehensive introduction to modern corporate finance theory. Jean Tirole builds his landmark book around a single model, using an incentive or contract theory approach. Filling a major gap in the field, The Theory of Corporate Finance is an indispensable resource for graduate and advanced undergraduate students as well as researchers of corporate finance, industrial organization, political economy, development, and macroeconomics. Tirole conveys the organizing principles that structure the analysis of today's key management and public policy issues, such as the reform of corporate governance and auditing; the role of private equity, financial markets, and takeovers; the efficient determination of leverage, dividends, liquidity, and risk management; and the design of managerial incentive packages. He weaves empirical studies into the book's theoretical analysis. And he places the corporation in its broader environment, both microeconomic and macroeconomic, and examines the two-way interaction between the corporate environment and institutions. Setting a new milestone in the field, The Theory of Corporate Finance will be the authoritative text for years to come.

Download or read book CEO Compensation of Listed Companies in Switzerland written by Mürüvvet Mehtap Aldogan Eklund and published by . This book was released on 2016 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Executive compensation is still a prominent topic. After the corporate scandals and strong public opposition to overpayments, scholars, policy makers, politicians, and stakeholders have turned their attention to the appropriateness of compensation contracts. This empirical dissertation is made up of three papers concerning three conceptually related factors of CEO compensation and the moderation effect of Corporate Governance variables. In detail, it is concerned with the overall research question whether CEOs' compensation in Swiss publicly traded companies are financially appropriate or optimal contracts based on the three pillars - (1) pay-for-performance, (2) risk, and (3) peer group comparison (benchmarks). Each factor is the topic of one of the three papers. Finally, it is found that Risk (beta) and peer group compensation (benchmarking) are the significant predictors of the total CEO compensation, whereas firm performance is not. In other words, CEO pay and firm performance are decoupled. Corporate Governance factors have a moderating effect on the association between CEO compensation, firm performance, and peer group comparison.

Download or read book A Study of the Correlation Between Executive Compensation and Company Performance written by Sergali Adilbekov and published by . This book was released on 2009 with total page 120 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Executive Compensation When a Firm is a Business Group Member written by Hyungseok Kim and published by . This book was released on 2015 with total page 39 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper examines how executive pay is set when a firm is a business group member. Using Korea as a laboratory setting, we find that member firm's cash compensation for its executives is positively linked to the stock performance of other member firms as well as its own. Further analyses reveal that this positive link to other members' performance is consistent with the hypothesis of corporate resources being tunneled from one member to another for the benefit of the controlling family. We find that this link is stronger to the performance of others that are more likely to benefit from tunneling (firms in which the controlling family has cash flow rights greater than those of the subject firm) and in firms that are more likely to suffer from tunneling (firms in which the controlling family has control-ownership disparity above the sample median).

Download or read book Executive Compensation Corporate Tax Aggressiveness and Financial Reporting Aggressiveness written by Bonnie R. Quillin and published by . This book was released on 2017 with total page 97 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Using a variety of research methods, prior empirical research finds that executive compensation influences the behavior of managers, particularly with decisions involving risk. These studies show that, when executive compensation is more sensitive to stock price volatility, firms implement riskier investment and financial policies and take more aggressive positions in financial and tax reporting. The sensitivity of executive compensation to stock price volatility is largely due to stock option compensation. Prior studies provide evidence that companies reduced the stock option grants to executives following the introduction of the Statement of Financial Accounting Standard 123R - Share-Based Payment (SFAS 123R). The reduced stock option grants lead to executive compensation being less sensitive to stock price volatility. Because SFAS 123R is unrelated to a manager's inherent risk aversion, this paper uses the introduction of SFAS 123R as a natural experiment to further explore the relationship between executive compensation and managerial risk taking, in the form of aggressive positions taken in financial and tax reporting. This paper's focus on changes in corporate tax aggressiveness and financial reporting aggressiveness complements the work of Hayes et al. (2012), Cohen et al. (2010), Chava and Purnanandam (2010), and Bakke et al. (2016), which examine changes in the riskiness of corporate financing and investment policies following SFAS 123R. I fail to find evidence that firms affected by SFAS 123R have a more pronounced decline in corporate tax or financial reporting aggressiveness following SFAS 123R than firms not affected by SFAS 123R. These findings are consistent with Cohen et al. (2009) and Hayes et al. (2012) who examines changes in vega following SFAS 123R and the riskiness of firms' investment and financing policies (research and development, capital investments, leverage, and acquisitions). Hayes et al. (2002) and Cohen et al. (2010) fail to find consistent evidence that managerial risk taking decreases following SFAS 123R. These findings are inconsistent with Chava and Purnanandam (2010) and Bakke et al. (2016) who examine changes in vega following SFAS 123R and the association with corporate financial policies (the former considers book leverage and debt; the latter, corporate hedging in the oil and gas industry). Chava and Purnanandam (2010) and Bakke et al. (2016) find evidence that managerial risk taking decreases following SFAS 123R. The lack of evidence of decreased aggressiveness in tax and financial reporting in my study add to the mixed results from other studies using SFAS 123R as a natural experiment to evaluate the relation between vega and aggressive corporate financing and risk policies. As concluded by Hayes et al. (2012), understanding the effects of vega on managerial risk taking continues to be a challenge for empirical research.

Download or read book The Impact of Bank Merger Growth on CEO Compensation written by Zhian Chen and published by . This book was released on 2017 with total page 56 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We examine the impact of bank mergers on chief executive officer (CEO) compensation during 1992-2014, a period characterised by significant banking consolidation. We show that CEO compensation is positively related to both merger growth and non-merger internal growth, with the former relation being higher in magnitude. While CEO pay-risk sensitivity is not significantly related to merger growth, CEO pay-performance sensitivity is negatively and significantly related to merger growth. Collectively, our results suggest that, through bank mergers, CEOs can earn higher compensation and decouple personal wealth from bank performance. Furthermore, we document a more severe agency problem in CEO compensation as a consequence of bank mergers relative to mergers in industrial firms. Finally, we find that the post-financial crisis regulatory reform of executive compensation in banks has limited effectiveness in curbing the merger-pay links.